Bill Text: IL HB3381 | 2023-2024 | 103rd General Assembly | Introduced

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Bill Title: Amends the Criminal Code of 2012. Eliminates the felony murder provisions from the first degree murder statute. Provides that a person commits second degree murder when he or she, acting alone or with one or more participants, commits or attempts to commit a forcible felony, other than first degree murder, and in the course of or in furtherance of the crime or flight from the crime, he or she or another participant causes the death of a person, other than one of the participants. Provides that it is an affirmative defense to the charge that the defendant: (1) was not the only participant in the underlying crime; (2) did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid in the commission of the crime; (3) was not armed with a deadly weapon; and (4) did not engage himself or herself in or intend to engage in and had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury. Amends the Code of Civil Procedure. Provides for relief from judgment for defendants convicted of first degree murder committed before the effective date of the amendatory Act. Provides that nothing in these provisions prevents a movant from applying for any other relief.

Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Democrat 1-0)

Status: (Introduced) 2023-03-10 - Rule 19(a) / Re-referred to Rules Committee [HB3381 Detail]

Download: Illinois-2023-HB3381-Introduced.html

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103RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY State of Illinois 2023 and 2024 HB3381 Introduced , by Rep. Justin Slaughter SYNOPSIS AS INTRODUCED:
720 ILCS 5/9-1 from Ch. 38, par. 9-1
720 ILCS 5/9-2 from Ch. 38, par. 9-2
735 ILCS 5/2-1401 from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401
Amends the Criminal Code of 2012. Eliminates the felony murder provisions from the first degree murder statute. Provides that a person commits second degree murder when he or she, acting alone or with one or more participants, commits or attempts to commit a forcible felony, other than first degree murder, and in the course of or in furtherance of the crime or flight from the crime, he or she or another participant causes the death of a person, other than one of the participants. Provides that it is an affirmative defense to the charge that the defendant: (1) was not the only participant in the underlying crime; (2) did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid in the commission of the crime; (3) was not armed with a deadly weapon; and (4) did not engage himself or herself in or intend to engage in and had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury. Amends the Code of Civil Procedure. Provides for relief from judgment for defendants convicted of first degree murder committed before the effective date of the amendatory Act. Provides that nothing in these provisions prevents a movant from applying for any other relief.
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A BILL FOR
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AN ACT concerning criminal law.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly:
Section 5. The Criminal Code of 2012 is amended by
changing Sections 9-1 and 9-2 as follows:
(720 ILCS 5/9-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-1)
Sec. 9-1. First degree murder; death penalties;
exceptions; separate hearings; proof; findings; appellate
procedures; reversals.
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits first degree murder if, in performing
the acts which cause the death:
(1) he or she either intends to kill or do great bodily
harm to that individual or another, or knows that such
acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) he or she knows that such acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to that
individual or another; or
(3) (Blank). he or she, acting alone or with one or
more participants, commits or attempts to commit a
forcible felony other than second degree murder, and in
the course of or in furtherance of such crime or flight
therefrom, he or she or another participant causes the

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death of a person.
(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of
the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or
more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may
be sentenced to death if:
(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or
fireman killed in the course of performing his official
duties, to prevent the performance of his or her official
duties, or in retaliation for performing his or her
official duties, and the defendant knew or should have
known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or
fireman; or
(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an
institution or facility of the Department of Corrections,
or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the
course of performing his or her official duties, to
prevent the performance of his or her official duties, or
in retaliation for performing his or her official duties,
or the murdered individual was an inmate at such
institution or facility and was killed on the grounds
thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present
in such institution or facility with the knowledge and
approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or
(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two
or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section
or under any law of the United States or of any state which

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is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section
regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of
the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so
long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to
kill more than one person or of separate acts which the
defendant knew would cause death or create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another; or
(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of
the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus, or other
public conveyance; or
(5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a
contract, agreement, or understanding by which he or she
was to receive money or anything of value in return for
committing the murder or procured another to commit the
murder for money or anything of value; or
(6) (blank); or the murdered individual was killed in
the course of another felony if:
(a) the murdered individual:
(i) was actually killed by the defendant, or
(ii) received physical injuries personally
inflicted by the defendant substantially
contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by
one or more persons for whose conduct the
defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-2
of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted

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by either the defendant or the other person or
persons for whose conduct he is legally
accountable caused the death of the murdered
individual; and
(b) in performing the acts which caused the death
of the murdered individual or which resulted in
physical injuries personally inflicted by the
defendant on the murdered individual under the
circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a)
of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section,
the defendant acted with the intent to kill the
murdered individual or with the knowledge that his
acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
(c) the other felony was an inherently violent
crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent
crime. In this subparagraph (c), "inherently violent
crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery,
robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated
arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and
home invasion; or
(7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age
and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or

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(8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to
prevent the murdered individual from testifying or
participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution
or giving material assistance to the State in any
investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant
or another; or the defendant committed the murder because
the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution
or gave material assistance to the State in any
investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant
or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8),
"participating in any criminal investigation or
prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the
proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses,
or jurors; or
(9) the defendant, while committing an offense
punishable under Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2,
407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a
conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense,
intentionally killed an individual or counseled,
commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional
killing of the murdered individual; or
(10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution
or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time
of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable

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as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a
conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense,
intentionally killed an individual or counseled,
commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional
killing of the murdered individual; or
(11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated
and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means,
and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable
expectation that the death of a human being would result
therefrom; or
(12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical
technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician -
intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic,
ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid
personnel, employed by a municipality or other
governmental unit, killed in the course of performing his
official duties, to prevent the performance of his
official duties, or in retaliation for performing his
official duties, and the defendant knew or should have
known that the murdered individual was an emergency
medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical
technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician -
paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance
or first aid personnel; or
(13) the defendant was a principal administrator,

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organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug
conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of
authority superior to that of all other members of the
conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of
the murdered person; or
(14) the murder was intentional and involved the
infliction of torture. For the purpose of this Section
torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme
physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or
prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim; or
(15) the murder was committed as a result of the
intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a
motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the
motor vehicle; or
(16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or
older and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
(17) the murdered individual was a person with a
disability and the defendant knew or should have known
that the murdered individual was a person with a
disability. For purposes of this paragraph (17), "person
with a disability" means a person who suffers from a
permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from
disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital
condition that renders the person incapable of adequately

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providing for his or her own health or personal care; or
(18) the murder was committed by reason of any
person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to
prevent any person from engaging in activity as a
community policing volunteer; or
(19) the murdered individual was subject to an order
of protection and the murder was committed by a person
against whom the same order of protection was issued under
the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or
(20) the murdered individual was known by the
defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any
school and the teacher or other employee is upon the
grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is
in any part of a building used for school purposes; or
(21) the murder was committed by the defendant in
connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism
as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this Code; or
(22) the murdered individual was a member of a
congregation engaged in prayer or other religious
activities at a church, synagogue, mosque, or other
building, structure, or place used for religious worship.
(b-5) Aggravating Factor; Natural Life Imprisonment. A
defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder and
who at the time of the commission of the offense had attained
the age of 18 years or more may be sentenced to natural life
imprisonment if (i) the murdered individual was a physician,

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physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice
registered nurse, (ii) the defendant knew or should have known
that the murdered individual was a physician, physician
assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice
registered nurse, and (iii) the murdered individual was killed
in the course of acting in his or her capacity as a physician,
physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice
registered nurse, or to prevent him or her from acting in that
capacity, or in retaliation for his or her acting in that
capacity.
(c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and
Mitigation.
The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to
consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are
relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating
factors may include but need not be limited to those factors
set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating factors may include
but need not be limited to the following:
(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity;
(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense
to prosecution;
(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the
defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the

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homicidal act;
(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat
or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great
bodily harm;
(5) the defendant was not personally present during
commission of the act or acts causing death;
(6) the defendant's background includes a history of
extreme emotional or physical abuse;
(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental
capacity.
Provided, however, that an action that does not otherwise
mitigate first degree murder cannot qualify as a mitigating
factor for first degree murder because of the discovery,
knowledge, or disclosure of the victim's sexual orientation as
defined in Section 1-103 of the Illinois Human Rights Act.
(d) Separate sentencing hearing.
Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a
separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of
factors set forth in subsection (b) and to consider any
aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection
(c). The proceeding shall be conducted:
(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's
guilt; or
(2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the
proceeding if:
A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of

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guilty; or
B. the defendant was convicted after a trial
before the court sitting without a jury; or
C. the court for good cause shown discharges the
jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or
(3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a
jury for the separate proceeding.
(e) Evidence and Argument.
During the proceeding any information relevant to any of
the factors set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by
either the State or the defendant under the rules governing
the admission of evidence at criminal trials. Any information
relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any
mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be
presented by the State or defendant regardless of its
admissibility under the rules governing the admission of
evidence at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall
be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at
the hearing.
(f) Proof.
The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any
of the factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and
shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(g) Procedure - Jury.
If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds

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that none of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists,
the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that
one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exist,
the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as
instructed by the court and shall determine whether the
sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury determines
unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court
shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not
concur with the jury determination that death is the
appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in
writing including what facts or circumstances the court relied
upon, along with any relevant documents, that compelled the
court to non-concur with the sentence. This document and any
attachments shall be part of the record for appellate review.
The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing
determination.
If after weighing the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, one or more jurors determines that death is not
the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the
defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections.
(h) Procedure - No Jury.
In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds

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that none of the factors found in subsection (b) exists, the
court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment
under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set
forth in subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider any
aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in subsection
(c). If the Court determines, after weighing the factors in
aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate
sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.
If the court finds that death is not the appropriate
sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections.
(h-5) Decertification as a capital case.
In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of
first degree murder by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for
resentencing, and the State seeks the death penalty as an
appropriate sentence, on the court's own motion or the written
motion of the defendant, the court may decertify the case as a
death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence
supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated
testimony of an informant witness, as defined in Section
115-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, concerning
the confession or admission of the defendant or that the sole
evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or
single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence. If

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the court decertifies the case as a capital case under either
of the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a written
finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the
decertification pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If
the court does not decertify the case as a capital case, the
matter shall proceed to the eligibility phase of the
sentencing hearing.
(i) Appellate Procedure.
The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to
automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in
accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The
Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and
order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections if the court finds that the death
sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular
case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the death
sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular
case, independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the
Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written opinion
explaining this finding.
(j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to
be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States
or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of first
degree murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of

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Corrections.
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the
sentencing provisions of this Section is declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or
of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a
person previously sentenced to death shall cause the defendant
to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence
the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections.
(k) Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.
The Attorney General and State's Attorneys Association
shall consult on voluntary guidelines for procedures governing
whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines do not
have the force of law and are only advisory in nature.
(Source: P.A. 100-460, eff. 1-1-18; 100-513, eff. 1-1-18;
100-863, eff. 8-14-18; 101-223, eff. 1-1-20; 101-652, eff.
7-1-21.)
(720 ILCS 5/9-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-2)
Sec. 9-2. Second degree murder.
(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder
when:
(.01) he or she, acting alone or with one or more
participants, commits or attempts to commit a forcible
felony, other than first degree murder, and in the course
of or in furtherance of the crime or flight from the crime,

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he or she or another participant causes the death of a
person, other than one of the participants; or
(.02) he or she commits the offense of first degree
murder as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection
(a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and either of the following
mitigating factors are present:
(A) (1) at the time of the killing he or she is
acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting
from serious provocation by the individual killed or
another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he or
she negligently or accidentally causes the death of
the individual killed; or
(B) (2) at the time of the killing he or she
believes the circumstances to be such that, if they
existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under
the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but
his or her belief is unreasonable.
(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an
intense passion in a reasonable person provided, however, that
an action that does not otherwise constitute serious
provocation cannot qualify as serious provocation because of
the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure of the victim's sexual
orientation as defined in Section 1-103 of the Illinois Human
Rights Act.
(c) When evidence of either of the mitigating factors
defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented,

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the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove either
mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence before
the defendant can be found guilty of second degree murder. The
burden of proof, however, remains on the State to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder
and, when appropriately raised, the absence of circumstances
at the time of the killing that would justify or exonerate the
killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code.
(d) Sentence. Second degree murder is a Class 1 felony.
(e) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating
paragraph (.01) of subsection (a) that the defendant:
(1) was not the only participant in the underlying
crime;
(2) did not commit the homicidal act or in any way
solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid in the
commission of the crime;
(3) was not armed with a deadly weapon; and
(4) did not engage himself or herself in or intend to
engage in and had no reasonable ground to believe that any
other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to
result in death or serious bodily injury.
(Source: P.A. 100-460, eff. 1-1-18.)
Section 10. The Code of Civil Procedure is amended by
changing Section 2-1401 as follows:

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(735 ILCS 5/2-1401) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1401)
Sec. 2-1401. Relief from judgments.
(a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days
from the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in
this Section. Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis,
bills of review, and bills in the nature of bills of review are
abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds
for such relief heretofore available, whether by any of the
foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in every
case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of
the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the
proceedings in which it was entered. Except as provided in the
Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, there shall be no distinction
between actions and other proceedings, statutory or otherwise,
as to availability of relief, grounds for relief, or the
relief obtainable.
(b) The petition must be filed in the same proceeding in
which the order or judgment was entered but is not a
continuation thereof. The petition must be supported by an
affidavit or other appropriate showing as to matters not of
record. A petition to reopen a foreclosure proceeding must
include as parties to the petition, but is not limited to, all
parties in the original action in addition to the current
record title holders of the property, current occupants, and
any individual or entity that had a recorded interest in the
property before the filing of the petition. All parties to the

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petition shall be notified as provided by rule.
(b-5) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this
Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of
the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) the movant was convicted of a forcible felony;
(2) the movant's participation in the offense was
related to him or her previously having been a victim of
domestic violence as perpetrated by an intimate partner;
(3) no evidence of domestic violence against the
movant was presented at the movant's sentencing hearing;
(4) the movant was unaware of the mitigating nature of
the evidence of the domestic violence at the time of
sentencing and could not have learned of its significance
sooner through diligence; and
(5) the new evidence of domestic violence against the
movant is material and noncumulative to other evidence
offered at the sentencing hearing, and is of such a
conclusive character that it would likely change the
sentence imposed by the original trial court.
Nothing in this subsection (b-5) shall prevent a movant
from applying for any other relief under this Section or any
other law otherwise available to him or her.
As used in this subsection (b-5):
"Domestic violence" means abuse as defined in Section
103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.
"Forcible felony" has the meaning ascribed to the term

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in Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
"Intimate partner" means a spouse or former spouse,
persons who have or allegedly have had a child in common,
or persons who have or have had a dating or engagement
relationship.
(b-10) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this
Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of
the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(A) she was convicted of a forcible felony;
(B) her participation in the offense was a direct
result of her suffering from post-partum depression or
post-partum psychosis;
(C) no evidence of post-partum depression or
post-partum psychosis was presented by a qualified medical
person at trial or sentencing, or both;
(D) she was unaware of the mitigating nature of the
evidence or, if aware, was at the time unable to present
this defense due to suffering from post-partum depression
or post-partum psychosis, or, at the time of trial or
sentencing, neither was a recognized mental illness and as
such, she was unable to receive proper treatment; and
(E) evidence of post-partum depression or post-partum
psychosis as suffered by the person is material and
noncumulative to other evidence offered at the time of
trial or sentencing, and it is of such a conclusive
character that it would likely change the sentence imposed

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by the original court.
Nothing in this subsection (b-10) prevents a person from
applying for any other relief under this Article or any other
law otherwise available to her.
As used in this subsection (b-10):
"Post-partum depression" means a mood disorder which
strikes many women during and after pregnancy and usually
occurs during pregnancy and up to 12 months after
delivery. This depression can include anxiety disorders.
"Post-partum psychosis" means an extreme form of
post-partum depression which can occur during pregnancy
and up to 12 months after delivery. This can include
losing touch with reality, distorted thinking, delusions,
auditory and visual hallucinations, paranoia,
hyperactivity and rapid speech, or mania.
(b-15) A movant may present a meritorious claim under this
Section if the allegations in the petition establish each of
the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) the movant was convicted of a first degree felony
murder under paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of Section
9-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 committed before the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 103rd General
Assembly; and
(2) the movant was not prosecuted under paragraph (1)
or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal
Code of 2012.

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Nothing in this subsection (b-15) prevents a movant from
applying for any other relief under this Section or any other
law otherwise available to him or her.
(c) Except as provided in Section 20b of the Adoption Act
and Section 2-32 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, in a
petition based upon Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 or subsection (b-10) of this Section, or in a
motion to vacate and expunge convictions under the Cannabis
Control Act as provided by subsection (i) of Section 5.2 of the
Criminal Identification Act, the petition must be filed not
later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment.
Time during which the person seeking relief is under legal
disability or duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently
concealed shall be excluded in computing the period of 2
years.
(c-5) Any individual may at any time file a petition and
institute proceedings under this Section if his or her final
order or judgment, which was entered based on a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, has potential consequences under federal
immigration law.
(d) The filing of a petition under this Section does not
affect the order or judgment, or suspend its operation.
(e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from
the record proper, the vacation or modification of an order or
judgment pursuant to the provisions of this Section does not
affect the right, title, or interest in or to any real or

HB3381 - 23 - LRB103 25685 RLC 52034 b
personal property of any person, not a party to the original
action, acquired for value after the entry of the order or
judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor affect any
right of any person not a party to the original action under
any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the
petition, pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment.
When a petition is filed pursuant to this Section to reopen a
foreclosure proceeding, notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 15-1701 of this Code, the purchaser or successor
purchaser of real property subject to a foreclosure sale who
was not a party to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings is
entitled to remain in possession of the property until the
foreclosure action is defeated or the previously foreclosed
defendant redeems from the foreclosure sale if the purchaser
has been in possession of the property for more than 6 months.
(f) Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing
right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any
existing method to procure that relief.
(Source: P.A. 101-27, eff. 6-25-19; 101-411, eff. 8-16-19;
102-639, eff. 8-27-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)