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| | SR0093 | | LRB100 08915 MST 19058 r |
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1 | | SENATE RESOLUTION
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2 | | WHEREAS, Our national and State security should not be |
3 | | undermined
by the concerted efforts of foreign actors with the |
4 | | goal of
compromising our democratic ideals; and
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5 | | WHEREAS, In July of 2016, the Illinois Board of Elections |
6 | | was the target of a cyber-attack of unknown foreign origin |
7 | | which targeted the
Illinois Voter Registration System |
8 | | Database; and
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9 | | WHEREAS, On July 12, 2016, the IT staff at Illinois Board |
10 | | of Elections was made aware of performance issues with the |
11 | | Illinois Voter
Registration System (IVRS) database server, and |
12 | | processor usage had
spiked to 100% with no explanation; and
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13 | | WHEREAS, Analysis of server logs revealed that the spike in |
14 | | usage
was a result of rapidly repeated database queries on the |
15 | | application
status page of the Paperless Online Voter |
16 | | Application (POVA) web site; and
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17 | | WHEREAS, Additionally, Illinois State Board of Elections |
18 | | server
logs showed the database queries were a malicious form |
19 | | of cyber-attack
known as SQL Injection, which are unauthorized, |
20 | | malicious database
queries entered in a data field in a web |
21 | | application; and
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| | SR0093 | - 2 - | LRB100 08915 MST 19058 r |
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1 | | WHEREAS, Further analysis of the web server logs showed |
2 | | that
malicious SQL queries began on June 23, 2016, and that |
3 | | malicious
traffic from the IP addresses continued, though it |
4 | | was blocked at the
firewall level; and
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5 | | WHEREAS, Firewall monitoring indicated that the attackers |
6 | | were
hitting the Illinois State Board of Elections IP addresses |
7 | | five times per
second, 24 hours per day; and
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8 | | WHEREAS, Investigations of the attack concluded Illinois |
9 | | Voter
Registration System passwords were compromised, and |
10 | | passwords included those of election authorities, their |
11 | | staffs, internal Illinois State
Board of Election users, |
12 | | vendors, and web services; and
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13 | | WHEREAS, The intelligence community has described these
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14 | | individuals or actors as part of foreign entities, namely |
15 | | Russia,
intent on boosting one candidate over the other; and
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16 | | WHEREAS, Aggressive actions contrary to American interests |
17 | | that
foster political chaos and institutional mistrust in our |
18 | | democratic
values must be thoroughly repudiated; and
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19 | | WHEREAS, The American public also needs assurance that law |
20 | | enforcement is
actively investigating these matters, and if |
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1 | | further investigation
finds evidence that foreign actors |
2 | | perpetrated or directed such acts,
appropriate criminal |
3 | | charges and sanctions will be announced and
enforced; |
4 | | therefore, be it
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5 | | RESOLVED, BY THE SENATE OF THE ONE HUNDREDTH GENERAL |
6 | | ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, that we denounce any threats |
7 | | by Russia or any other
foreign actors who seek to interfere |
8 | | with the sanctity of our
democratic process; and be it further
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9 | | RESOLVED, That such an attack on the United States of |
10 | | America and
the State of Illinois must not go undisclosed, and |
11 | | that we urge that the Illinois State Board of Elections produce |
12 | | a
final comprehensive report outlining the nature of breach, an |
13 | | audit of
their IT systems, and that they enact preventative |
14 | | measures to ensure
that such cyber interference never occurs |
15 | | again; and be it further
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16 | | RESOLVED, That a suitable copy of this resolution be |
17 | | delivered to Steve Sandvoss, Executive Director of the Illinois |
18 | | State Board of Elections.
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