

116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3233

To support the implementation of the National Defense Strategy for the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 12, 2019

Mr. GALLAGHER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To support the implementation of the National Defense Strategy for the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “National Defense
5 Strategy Implementation Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) According to the 2017 National Security
9 Strategy (NSS), “China and Russia are developing

1 advanced weapons and capabilities that could threat-
2 en our critical infrastructure and our command and
3 control architecture” and “China and Russia chal-
4 lenge American power, influence, and interests, at-
5 tempting to erode American security and pros-
6 perity”. The NSS sets the country’s primary focus
7 as sustaining favorable regional balances of power in
8 the key regions of the world, and the use of our alli-
9 ance and partnership architecture as the mechanism
10 for doing so.

11 (2) The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS)
12 rightly stresses that long-term, strategic competition
13 with China and Russia should be the top priority of
14 the United States and the Department of Defense
15 and require both increased and sustained invest-
16 ment, both because of the magnitude of the threats
17 they pose to United States security and prosperity
18 today and the potential for those threats to increase
19 in the future.

20 (3) To meet such challenges, the NDS states
21 that the strategy of the United States will be to ex-
22 pand the competitive space while pursuing three dis-
23 tinct lines of effort, including rebuilding military
24 readiness to build a more lethal Joint Force,
25 strengthening alliances and attracting new partners,

1 and reforming the Department’s business practices
2 for greater performance and affordability.

3 (4) In the January 2019 Worldwide Threat As-
4 sessment, the United States Intelligence Community
5 stated that “Russia and China seek to shape the
6 international system and regional security dynamics
7 and exert influence over the politics and economics
8 of states in all regions of the world and especially in
9 their backyards”.

10 (5) “China and Russia will present a wide vari-
11 ety of economic, political, counterintelligence, mili-
12 tary, and diplomatic challenges to the United States
13 and its allies. We anticipate that they will collabo-
14 rate to counter U.S. objectives, taking advantage of
15 rising doubts in some places about the liberal demo-
16 cratic model.”.

17 (6) The December 2018 U.S. Government Ac-
18 countability Office (GAO) report to congressional
19 committees on Long-Range Emerging Threats Fac-
20 ing the United States as Identified by Federal Agen-
21 cies stated that, “China is marshalling its diplo-
22 matic, economic, and military resources to facilitate
23 its rise as a regional and global power. This may
24 challenge U.S. access to air, space, cyberspace, and
25 maritime domains. China’s use of cyberspace and

1 electronic warfare could impact various U.S. systems
2 and operations. Russia is increasing its capability to
3 challenge the United States across multiple warfare
4 domains, including attempting to launch computer-
5 based directed energy attacks against U.S. military
6 assets. Russia is also increasing its military and po-
7 litical presence in key locations across the world.”.

8 (7) According to the 2018 Assessment and Rec-
9 ommendations by the National Defense Strategy
10 Commission (NDSC), “the U.S. military could suf-
11 fer unacceptably high casualties and loss of major
12 capital assets in its next conflict. It might struggle
13 to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Rus-
14 sia. The United States is particularly at risk of
15 being overwhelmed should its military be forced to
16 fight on two or more fronts simultaneously. Addi-
17 tionally, it would be unwise for and irresponsible not
18 to expect adversaries to attempt debilitating kinetic,
19 cyber, or other types of attacks against Americans
20 at home while they seek to defeat our military
21 abroad. U.S. military superiority is no longer as-
22 sured and the implications for American interests
23 and American security are severe.”.

24 (8) As such, the NDSC states that “DOD and
25 the Congressional committees that oversee national

1 security must focus current and future investments
2 on operational challenges such as protecting critical
3 bases of operations; rapidly reinforcing and sus-
4 taining forces engaged forward; assuring information
5 systems and conducting effective information oper-
6 ations; defeating anti-access/area-denial threats; de-
7 terring, and if necessary defeating, the use of nu-
8 clear or other strategic weapons in ways that fall
9 short of justifying a large-scale nuclear response; en-
10 hancing the capabilities and survivability of space
11 systems and supporting infrastructure; and devel-
12 oping an interoperable joint command, control, com-
13 munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
14 and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that sup-
15 ports the warfare of the future.”.

16 (9) Additionally, the NDSC states that “Mak-
17 ing informed decisions about strategic, operational,
18 and force development issues requires a foundation
19 of state-of-the-art analytic capabilities. . . . Specifi-
20 cally, the Department needs a rigorous force devel-
21 opment plan that connects its investment strategy
22 with its key priorities of winning in conflict and
23 competing effectively with China and Russia.”.

24 (10) The March 2019 GAO report on Defense
25 Strategy: Revised Analytic Approach Needed to Sup-

1 port Force Structure Decision-Making, found that
2 “The Department of Defense’s (DOD) analytic ap-
3 proach has not provided senior leaders with the sup-
4 port they need to evaluate and determine the force
5 structure necessary to implement the National De-
6 fense Strategy.”.

7 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

8 It is the sense of Congress as follows:

9 (1) The United States must be prepared to
10 meet the challenges of competitive nations that are
11 seeking to diminish the United States military ad-
12 vantage and threaten vital United States interests,
13 and China is the most significant such challenge.

14 (2) The National Defense Strategy provides the
15 correct framework to prepare for major-power com-
16 petition and conflict, but adequate resources are re-
17 quired and implementation across the entire Depart-
18 ment of Defense enterprise in line with the focus of
19 that strategy on readying the Joint Force for com-
20 petition and conflict against China and Russia.

21 (3) The United States is committed to uphold-
22 ing a free and open international order that pro-
23 motes republican government and governance in con-
24 cert with collective security, international laws, and

1 human dignity while respecting the sovereignty of
2 other countries.

3 (4) The Department of Defense should urgently
4 and at scale adapt the Joint Force’s shape, posture,
5 development vectors, and employment models to
6 maintain military advantage alongside our allies and
7 partners against China and Russia. To do this, the
8 Department of Defense should develop adapted, new
9 warfighting concepts at the operational level of war
10 that allow the United States to achieve its political
11 objectives in politically tenable ways. In concert, the
12 Joint Force should become more lethal, resilient,
13 agile, and ready to deal with Chinese and Russian
14 strategies and theories of victory.

15 (5) Investments should be focused on expanding
16 United States operational options while constraining
17 those to strategic competitors, such as China and
18 Russia.

19 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND PLANS**
20 **TO DEFEAT CHINA AND RUSSIA.**

21 Not later than February 1, 2020, and then biannually
22 thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
23 congressional defense committees a report on the Depart-
24 ment of Defense’s operational concepts and plans to defeat
25 China and Russia in competition and war, including on

1 key strategically significant scenarios identified in the Na-
2 tional Defense Strategy that also addresses each of the
3 following:

4 (1) Ways of employing the force in peace time
5 to effectively compete and deter China and Russia
6 below the threshold of war while ensuring readiness
7 for war.

8 (2) Ways of adapting innovative, operational
9 concepts needed for strategically significant and
10 plausible scenarios related to China and Russia.

11 (3) Ways of addressing operational challenges
12 related to achieving the strategic advantage against
13 China and Russia related to nuclear, space, cyber,
14 conventional, and unconventional means in
15 warfighting doctrine.

16 (4) The technologies, force developments, pos-
17 ture and capabilities, readiness, infrastructure, orga-
18 nization, personnel, and other elements of the de-
19 fense program necessary to enable these operational
20 concepts and its implementation listed in paragraphs
21 (1) through (3).

22 (5) The ability of the National Security Innova-
23 tion Base to support the operational concepts listed
24 in paragraphs (1) through (3).

1 (6) The resources and defense investments nec-
2 essary to support the operational concepts and its
3 implementation, including budget recommendations.

4 (7) The risks associated with the operational
5 concepts, including the relationship and tradeoffs be-
6 tween missions, risks, and resources.

7 (8) The likely needed boundaries of conflict
8 needed to achieve these operational concepts.

9 (9) Measures and metrics to track the effective-
10 ness of the operational concepts and plans.

11 **SEC. 5. ACTIONS TO INCREASE ANALYTIC SUPPORT.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall di-
13 rect the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Direc-
14 tor of the Joint Staff, and the Director of Cost Assess-
15 ment and Program Evaluation, in consultation with the
16 head of each military service, to jointly develop and imple-
17 ment a plan to strengthen the analytic capabilities, exper-
18 tise, and processes necessary to meet the National Defense
19 Strategy.

20 (b) ELEMENTS.—The plan under subsection (a) shall
21 include—

22 (1) an assessment of the decision support capa-
23 bility of the Department of Defense, specifically the
24 analytic expertise the Department is using to link
25 National Defense Strategy objectives to innovative

1 approaches for meeting future challenges, including
2 winning in conflict and competing effectively against
3 China and Russia;

4 (2) an approach for comparing competing anal-
5 yses and conducting joint analyses for force struc-
6 ture to support senior leaders in implementing the
7 National Defense Strategy;

8 (3) a determination of the analytic products
9 and support required to implement the National De-
10 fense Strategy, including the ability to update these
11 products to reflect current strategy, intelligence as-
12 sessments, and future threats; and

13 (4) such other matters as the Secretary of De-
14 fense determines to be appropriate.

15 (c) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than March 1,
16 2020, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the con-
17 gressional defense committees a briefing on the plan under
18 subsection (a).

19 **SEC. 6. EXTENSION AND ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE COM-**
20 **MISSION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRAT-**
21 **EGY FOR THE UNITED STATES.**

22 Section 942 of the National Defense Authorization
23 Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat.
24 2367) is amended—

1 (1) by amending subsection (f) to read as fol-
2 lows:

3 “(f) ANNUAL UPDATE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE
4 STRATEGY.—

5 “(1) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis during
6 the covered period, the chair and vice chair of the
7 Commission, or their designees, shall jointly submit
8 to the congressional defense committees a report
9 that assesses whether, and to what extent, the De-
10 partment of Defense executed the National Defense
11 Strategy in the preceding fiscal year.

12 “(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report submitted under
13 paragraph (1) shall assess the performance of the
14 Department of Defense with respect to each of the
15 elements described in sections 4 and 5(b) of the Na-
16 tional Defense Strategy Implementation Act.

17 “(3) COVERED PERIOD DEFINED.—In this sub-
18 section, the term ‘covered period’ means a period
19 that—

20 “(A) begins not later than 180 days after
21 the date of the enactment of this subsection;
22 and

23 “(B) ends on the date on which the first
24 National Defense Strategy is submitted to Con-
25 gress after such date of enactment.”.

1 (2) by striking subsection (g); and

2 (3) by redesignating subsection (h) as sub-
3 section (g).

4 **SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS AND GUIDANCE.**

5 (a) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.—In
6 this Act, the term “congressional defense committees” has
7 the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title
8 10, United States Code.

9 (b) OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES.—In this Act, the
10 term “operational challenges” means the principal oper-
11 ational challenges to meeting the defense objectives de-
12 scribed in the most recent National Defense Strategy, as
13 such challenges are defined by the Secretary of Defense
14 in guidance issued to the Department of Defense. The
15 guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense under the
16 preceding sentence shall—

17 (1) specifically identify operational challenges to
18 the Department’s principal strategic priorities of
19 winning in conflict and competing effectively with
20 China and Russia; and

21 (2) be made available in unclassified and pub-
22 licly accessible form.

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