

Union Calendar No. 486

117TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

H. R. 3524

[Report No. 117-667, Part I]

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 25, 2021

Mr. MEEKS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

DECEMBER 30, 2022

Reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]

DECEMBER 30, 2022

Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Select) discharged; committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on May 25, 2021]

A BILL

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) *SHORT TITLE.*—*This Act may be cited as the “En-*
 5 *surging American Global Leadership and Engagement Act”*
 6 *or the “EAGLE Act”.*

7 (b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—*The table of contents for*
 8 *this Act is as follows:*

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 3. Findings.

Sec. 4. Statement of policy.

Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.

Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS

Subtitle A—Science and Technology

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management.

Sec. 102. Report on national technology and industrial base.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.

Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment standards.

Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.

Sec. 115. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign energy development.

Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership

Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order.

Sec. 122. Review of trade and economic engagement globally of the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific.

Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.

Sec. 125. Strategy on deterrence of economic coercion.

Sec. 126. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.

Sec. 127. Digital trade agreements.

Sec. 128. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.

Sec. 129. Sense of Congress on ideological competition.

Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership

- Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy.*
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global leadership.
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets.
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to cross-border payment and financial messaging systems.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

- Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.*
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 206. Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 209. Taiwan diplomatic review.
Sec. 210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act.
Sec. 211. Taiwan International Solidarity Act.
Sec. 212. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
Sec. 213. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 214. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking.
Sec. 215. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018.
Sec. 216. Expanding investment by United States International Development Finance Corporation for vaccine manufacturing.
Sec. 217. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American strategic national security and economic objectives.
Sec. 218. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program.
Sec. 219. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 219A. Global Engagement Center.
Sec. 219B. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic.
Sec. 219C. Extension of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
Sec. 219D. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 219E. China Watcher Program.
Sec. 219F. Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language.
Sec. 219G. Oversight of funds made available through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021.
Sec. 219H. Requirements relating to vaccine branding.

Subtitle B—International Security Matters

- Sec. 221. Appropriate committees of Congress.*
Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea.

- Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners.*
Sec. 225. Statement of policy regarding the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Sec. 226. Identification of PLA-supported institutions.

Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power

- Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement.*
Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America’s multilateral engagement.
Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations.
Sec. 234. Junior professional officers.
Sec. 235. Report on American employment in international organizations.

Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power

- Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the world.*

PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE

- Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.*
Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding China’s arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian citizens.
Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies.
Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Sec. 250. United States-Caribbean Resilience Partnership.
Sec. 251. Countering China’s educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin America.
Sec. 252. Narcotics trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean.

PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

- Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on transatlantic relationships.*
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and between China and Russia.

PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

- Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.*
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.
Sec. 263. Indian Ocean region strategic review.

PART IV—AFRICA

- Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People's Republic of China in Africa.*
- Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa.*
- Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.*
- Sec. 274. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.*
- Sec. 275. Africa broadcasting networks.*
- Sec. 276. Africa energy security and diversification.*

PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

- Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.*
- Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.*
- Sec. 283. Sense of Congress on People's Republic of China-Iran relationship.*

PART VI—ARCTIC REGION

- Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.*
- Sec. 286. Statement of policy regarding observer status for Taiwan on the Arctic Council.*

PART VII—OCEANIA

- Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.*
- Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.*
- Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue.*
- Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships.*

PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS

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- Sec. 296. Findings.*
- Sec. 297. Statement of policy.*
- Sec. 298. Definition.*
- Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports.*
- Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands.*
- Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies and partners.*
- Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands.*
- Sec. 299D. International law enforcement academy for the Pacific Islands.*
- Sec. 299E. Security assistance for the Pacific Islands.*
- Sec. 299F. Countering transnational crime.*
- Sec. 299G. Emergency preparedness initiative for the Pacific Islands.*
- Sec. 299H. Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands.*

TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

- Sec. 301. Statement of Congress on the continued violation of rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.*
- Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong Kong.*
- Sec. 303. Hong Kong people's freedom and choice.*
- Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police force.*
- Sec. 305. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.*
- Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor.*
- Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection.*

- Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that commit human rights abuses.*
- Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet.*
- Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the succession or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.*
- Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great Firewall circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong.*
- Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights in the People's Republic of China.*
- Sec. 313. Modifications to and reauthorization of sanctions with respect to human rights violations.*
- Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination.*
- Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to international abuses of human rights.*
- Sec. 316. Policy toward the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games.*
- Sec. 317. Review and controls on export of items with critical capabilities to enable human rights abuses.*
- Sec. 318. Sense of Congress on commercial export control policy.*
- Sec. 319. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.*
- Sec. 320. Sense of Congress regarding censorship of political speech.*
- Sec. 321. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United States laws and protections.*
- Sec. 322. Sense of Congress regarding annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.*
- Sec. 323. Sense of Congress regarding press freedom in the People's Republic of China.*
- Sec. 324. United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province.*
- Sec. 325. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.*
- Sec. 326. Public disclosure on BIS licensing information.*

TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

- Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the People's Republic of China's industrial policy.*
- Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams.*
- Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy.*
- Sec. 404. Annual report on Chinese surveillance companies.*

TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

- Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.*
- Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's Republic of China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues.*
- Sec. 503. Countering the People's Republic of China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to the Middle East.*

TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE

- Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with the People's Republic of China and other countries account for environmental issues and climate change.*

- Sec. 602. *Enhancing security considerations for global climate disruptions.*
- Sec. 603. *Balancing accountability and cooperation with China.*
- Sec. 604. *Promoting responsible development alternatives to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.*
- Sec. 605. *Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and economic interests.*
- Sec. 606. *Driving a global climate change resilience strategy.*
- Sec. 607. *Addressing international climate change mitigation, adaptation, and security.*
- Sec. 608. *Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons.*
- Sec. 609. *Building United States economic growth and technological innovation through the Green Climate Fund.*
- Sec. 610. *Ensuring a whole-of-government response to climate action.*
- Sec. 611. *Working with international partners to reduce deforestation.*
- Sec. 612. *Controlling the export of electronic waste to protect United States supply chains.*

1 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

2 *In this Act:*

3 (1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
 4 *TEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term “appro-*
 5 *priate congressional committees” means—*

6 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
 7 *the Senate; and*

8 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
 9 *House of Representatives.*

10 (2) *CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese*
 11 *Communist Party.*

12 (3) *PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The*
 13 *terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean*
 14 *the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.*

15 (4) *PRC; CHINA.—The terms “PRC” and*
 16 *“China” mean the People’s Republic of China.*

1 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

2 *Congress makes the following findings:*

3 *(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is*
4 *leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili-*
5 *tary, technological, and ideological power to become a*
6 *strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United*
7 *States. The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC*
8 *in these domains are contrary to the interests and*
9 *values of the United States, its partners, and much*
10 *of the rest of the world.*

11 *(2) A number of policies being pursued by the*
12 *PRC—*

13 *(A) threaten the future character of the*
14 *international order and are shaping the rules,*
15 *norms, and institutions that govern relations*
16 *among states;*

17 *(B) will put at risk the ability of the*
18 *United States to secure its national interests;*
19 *and*

20 *(C) will put at risk the future peace, pros-*
21 *perity, and freedom of the international commu-*
22 *nity in the coming decades.*

23 *(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with*
24 *the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked*
25 *to advance the PRC’s economic and social develop-*
26 *ment to ensure that it participated in, and benefited*

1 *from, the free and open international order. The*
2 *United States pursued these goals and contributed to*
3 *the welfare of the Chinese people by—*

4 *(A) increasing the PRC's trade relations*
5 *and access to global capital markets;*

6 *(B) promoting the PRC's accession to the*
7 *World Trade Organization;*

8 *(C) providing development finance and*
9 *technical assistance;*

10 *(D) promoting research collaboration;*

11 *(E) educating the PRC's top students;*

12 *(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge*
13 *technologies and scientific knowledge; and*

14 *(G) providing intelligence and military as-*
15 *sistance.*

16 *(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to*
17 *pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an*
18 *increasingly authoritarian governance model at home*
19 *through increased restrictions on personal freedoms,*
20 *and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These*
21 *policies frequently and deliberately undermine United*
22 *States interests and are contrary to core United*
23 *States values and the values of other nations, both in*
24 *the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this stra-*
25 *tegic decision of the CCP, the United States has been*

1 *compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy to-*
2 *wards the PRC and reanimate its defense of the inter-*
3 *national order.*

4 *(5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the*
5 *Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Xi*
6 *Jinping, has elevated the “Great Rejuvenation of the*
7 *Chinese Nation” as central to the domestic and for-*
8 *oreign policy of the PRC. His program demands—*

9 *(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;*

10 *(B) concentration of military power;*

11 *(C) a dominant role for the CCP in the*
12 *state and the economy;*

13 *(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking*
14 *control over broadly asserted territorial claims;*
15 *and*

16 *(E) the denial of any universal values and*
17 *individual rights that are deemed to threaten the*
18 *CCP.*

19 *(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of govern-*
20 *ance as superior to, and at odds with, the constitu-*
21 *tional models of the United States and other democ-*
22 *racies. This approach to governance is lauded by the*
23 *CCP as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a*
24 *global leader, and to shaping the future of the world.*
25 *In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, “We*

1 *firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese charac-*
2 *teristics develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that*
3 *the superiority of our socialist system will be increas-*
4 *ingly apparent . . . [and] our country’s road of devel-*
5 *opment will have increasingly greater influence on the*
6 *world.”.*

7 (7) *The PRC’s objectives are to first establish re-*
8 *gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use*
9 *that dominant position to propel the PRC to become*
10 *the “leading world power”, shaping an international*
11 *order that is conducive to the its interests. Achieving*
12 *these objectives requires turning the PRC into a*
13 *wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a*
14 *strong military and advanced technological capability*
15 *to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of other*
16 *countries’ interests.*

17 (8) *The PRC is reshaping the current inter-*
18 *national order, which is built upon the rule of law*
19 *and free and open ideals and principles, by con-*
20 *ducting global information and influence operations,*
21 *seeking to redefine international laws and norms to*
22 *align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the le-*
23 *gitimacy of internationally recognized human rights,*
24 *and seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of*
25 *multinational organizations for the benefit of the*

1 *PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the expense*
2 *of the interests of the United States and the inter-*
3 *national community.*

4 (9) *The PRC is encouraging other countries to*
5 *follow its model of development and governance. Dur-*
6 *ing the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General Sec-*
7 *retary Xi said that the PRC could serve as a model*
8 *of development for other countries by utilizing “Chi-*
9 *nese wisdom” and a “Chinese approach to solving*
10 *problems”.*

11 (10) *The PRC is promoting its governance model*
12 *and attempting to weaken other models of governance*
13 *by—*

14 (A) *undermining democratic institutions;*

15 (B) *subverting financial institutions;*

16 (C) *coercing businesses to accommodate the*
17 *policies of the PRC; and*

18 (D) *using disinformation to disguise the na-*
19 *ture of the actions described in subparagraphs*
20 *(A) through (C).*

21 (11) *The PRC is progressing toward becoming*
22 *the global leader in science and technology. In May*
23 *2018, General Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to*
24 *reach “prosperity and rejuvenation”, it needs to “en-*
25 *deavor to be a major world center for science and in-*

1 *novation”. The PRC has invested the equivalent of*
2 *billions of dollars into education and research and de-*
3 *velopment and established joint scientific research*
4 *centers and science universities.*

5 *(12) The PRC’s drive to become a “manufac-*
6 *turing and technological superpower” and to promote*
7 *“innovation with Chinese characteristics” is coming*
8 *at the expense of human rights and longstanding*
9 *international rules and norms with respect to eco-*
10 *nomics competition, and presents a challenge to*
11 *United States national security and the security of*
12 *allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the*
13 *PRC advances its illiberal political and social poli-*
14 *cies through mass surveillance, social credit systems,*
15 *and a significant role of the state in internet govern-*
16 *ance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct*
17 *and indirect government control over its citizens’ ev-*
18 *eryday lives. Its national strategy of “civil-military*
19 *fusion” mandates that civil and commercial research,*
20 *which increasingly drives global innovation, is lever-*
21 *aged to develop new military capabilities.*

22 *(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means*
23 *to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing*
24 *and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-di-*
25 *rected industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to*

1 *ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP*
2 *engages in and encourages actions that actively un-*
3 *dermine a free and open international market, such*
4 *as intellectual property theft, forced technology trans-*
5 *fers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and manda-*
6 *tory CCP access to proprietary data as part of busi-*
7 *ness and commercial agreements between Chinese and*
8 *foreign companies.*

9 *(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13)*
10 *are designed to freeze United States and other foreign*
11 *firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competi-*
12 *tion in other important markets. The heavy subsidiza-*
13 *tion of Chinese companies includes potential violation*
14 *of its World Trade Organization commitments. In*
15 *May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC*
16 *aims to keep the “initiatives of innovation and devel-*
17 *opment security . . . in [China’s] own hands”.*

18 *(15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives*
19 *through a variety of avenues, including its signature*
20 *initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in*
21 *this section as “BRI”), which is enshrined in the Chi-*
22 *nese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road*
23 *and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as a*
24 *straightforward and wholly beneficial plan for all*
25 *countries. Eventually, it seeks to create a web of eco-*

1 *conomic relations with the PRC at its center, making*
2 *it the most concrete geographical representation of the*
3 *PRC's global ambitions. BRI increases the economic*
4 *influence of state-owned PRC firms in global markets,*
5 *enhances the PRC's political leverage with govern-*
6 *ment leaders around the world, and provides greater*
7 *access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways.*
8 *Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference*
9 *through economic dependence.*

10 *(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish re-*
11 *gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace*
12 *the United States from the region. As a Pacific*
13 *power, the United States has built and supported en-*
14 *during alliances and economic partnerships that se-*
15 *ecure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of*
16 *law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-*
17 *Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and mili-*
18 *tary coercion in the region to secure its own interests.*

19 *(17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep*
20 *the United States military from operating in the*
21 *Western Pacific and erodes United States security*
22 *guarantees.*

23 *(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive*
24 *control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air*
25 *space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually*

1 *exercising greater influence beyond the region. This*
2 *includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy*
3 *exploration, transport, and the exercise of security op-*
4 *erations in areas permitted under international law.*

5 *(19) The PRC seeks so-called “reunification”*
6 *with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately*
7 *be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called “re-*
8 *unification” is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal*
9 *inherently coercive. In January 2019, General Sec-*
10 *retary Xi stated that the PRC “make[s] no promise*
11 *to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option*
12 *of taking all necessary means”. Taiwan’s embodiment*
13 *of democratic values and economic liberalism chal-*
14 *lenges General Secretary Xi’s goal of achieving na-*
15 *tional rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Tai-*
16 *wan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island*
17 *Chain and to project power into the Second Island*
18 *Chain and beyond.*

19 *(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe-*
20 *cuted an illegal island-building campaign that threat-*
21 *ens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of com-*
22 *merce, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA*
23 *power projection capabilities, and coerces and intimi-*
24 *dates other regional claimants in an effort to advance*
25 *its unlawful claims and control the waters around*

1 *neighboring countries. Despite General Secretary Xi's*
2 *September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC*
3 *was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the*
4 *2017 19th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi an-*
5 *nounced that “construction on islands and reefs in*
6 *the South China Sea have seen steady progress”.*

7 *(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA*
8 *to attain a level of capacity and capability superior*
9 *to the United States in terms of equipment and con-*
10 *duct of modern military operations by shifting its*
11 *military doctrine from having a force “adequate [for]*
12 *China’s defensive needs” to having a force “commen-*
13 *surate with China’s international status”. Ultimately,*
14 *this transformation could enable China to impose its*
15 *will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of*
16 *military force. In 2017, General Secretary Xi estab-*
17 *lished the following developmental benchmarks for the*
18 *advancement of the PLA:*

19 *(A) A mechanized force with increased*
20 *informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.*

21 *(B) The complete modernization of China’s*
22 *national defense by 2035.*

23 *(C) The full transformation of the PLA into*
24 *a world-class force by 2050.*

1 (22) *The PRC’s strategy and supporting policies*
2 *described in this section undermine United States in-*
3 *terests, such as—*

4 (A) *upholding a free and open international*
5 *order;*

6 (B) *maintaining the integrity of inter-*
7 *national institutions with liberal norms and val-*
8 *ues;*

9 (C) *preserving a favorable balance of power*
10 *in the Indo-Pacific;*

11 (D) *ensuring the defense of its allies;*

12 (E) *preserving open sea and air lanes;*

13 (F) *fostering the free flow of commerce*
14 *through open and transparent markets; and*

15 (G) *promoting individual freedom and*
16 *human rights.*

17 (23) *The global COVID–19 pandemic has inten-*
18 *sified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s be-*
19 *havior and therefore increased the need for United*
20 *States global leadership and a competitive posture.*
21 *The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the*
22 *COVID–19 pandemic by—*

23 (A) *moving rapidly to undermine Hong*
24 *Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-called*
25 *“national security law” on Hong Kong;*

1 (B) aggressively imposing its will in the
2 East and South China Seas;

3 (C) increasing its territorial aggression in
4 South Asia, including against India; and

5 (D) engaging in a widespread and govern-
6 ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob-
7 scure the PRC Government's efforts to cover up
8 the seriousness of COVID-19, sow confusion
9 about the origination of the outbreak, and dis-
10 credit the United States, its allies, and global
11 health efforts.

12 (24) The CCP's disinformation campaign re-
13 ferred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included—

14 (A) concerted efforts, in the early days of
15 the pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope
16 of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well
17 as cases of person-to-person transmission;

18 (B) claims that the virus originated in
19 United States biological defense research at Fort
20 Detrick, Maryland;

21 (C) Chinese state media reports insinuating
22 a possible link between the virus and other
23 United States biological facilities; and

1 (D) efforts to block access to qualified inter-
2 national infectious disease experts who might
3 contradict the CCP's narrative.

4 (25) In response to the PRC's strategy and poli-
5 cies, the United States must adopt a policy of stra-
6 tegic competition with the PRC to protect and pro-
7 mote our vital interests and values.

8 (26) The United States policy of strategic com-
9 petition with respect to the People's Republic of
10 China is part of a broader strategic approach to the
11 Indo-Pacific and the world that aligns with coopera-
12 tion with United States allies and partners to ad-
13 vance shared values and interests and to preserve and
14 enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-
15 based, stable, and diverse region.

16 (27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
17 (Public Law 115–409) contributed to a comprehensive
18 framework for promoting United State security inter-
19 ests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pa-
20 cific region, investing \$7,500,000,000 over 5 years—

21 (A) to support greater security and defense
22 cooperation between the United States and allies
23 and partners in the Indo-Pacific region;

1 (B) to advance democracy and the protec-
2 tion and promotion of human rights in the Indo-
3 Pacific region;

4 (C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation be-
5 tween the United States and partners in the
6 Indo-Pacific;

7 (D) to deepen people-to-people engagement
8 through programs such as the Young Southeast
9 Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth
10 Volunteers program; and

11 (E) to enhance energy cooperation and en-
12 ergy security in the Indo-Pacific region.

13 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

14 (a) *OBJECTIVES.*—It is the policy of the United States
15 to pursue the following objectives:

16 (1) The United States global leadership role is
17 sustained and its political system and major founda-
18 tions of national power are secured for the long-term
19 in the political, economic, technological, and military
20 domains.

21 (2) The United States position as an indispen-
22 sable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sus-
23 tained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and en-
24 gagement.

1 (3) *The United States deters military confronta-*
2 *tion with the PRC and both nations work to reduce*
3 *the risk of conflict.*

4 (4) *The United States and its allies maintain a*
5 *stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with*
6 *China. The United States and its allies maintain un-*
7 *fettered access to the region, including through free-*
8 *dom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, con-*
9 *sistent with international law and practice.*

10 (5) *The allies and partners of the United*
11 *States—*

12 (A) *maintain confidence in United States*
13 *leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-*
14 *cific region;*

15 (B) *can withstand and combat subversion*
16 *by the PRC; and*

17 (C) *work closely with the United States in*
18 *setting global rules, norms, and standards that*
19 *benefit the international community.*

20 (6) *The combined economic and military*
21 *strength of the United States and its allies and part-*
22 *ners demonstrates to the PRC that the risks of at-*
23 *tempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential*
24 *benefits.*

1 (7) *The United States leads the free, open, and*
2 *rules-based international order, which comprises resil-*
3 *ient states and institutions that uphold and defend*
4 *principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, indi-*
5 *vidual freedom, and human rights. The international*
6 *order is strong enough to withstand attempts at desta-*
7 *bilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.*

8 (8) *The key rules, norms, and standards of inter-*
9 *national engagement in the 21st century are main-*
10 *tained, including—*

11 (A) *the protection of human rights, commer-*
12 *cial engagement and investment, and technology;*
13 *and*

14 (B) *that such rules, norms, and standards*
15 *are in alignment with the values and interests of*
16 *the United States, its allies and partners, and*
17 *other stakeholders in the liberal international*
18 *order.*

19 (9) *The United States counters attempts by the*
20 *PRC to—*

21 (A) *undermine open and democratic soci-*
22 *eties;*

23 (B) *distort global markets;*

24 (C) *manipulate the international trade sys-*
25 *tem;*

1 (D) coerce other nations via economic,
2 cyber, and military means; or

3 (E) use its technological advantages to un-
4 dermine individual freedoms or other states' na-
5 tional security interests.

6 (10) The United States deters military con-
7 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to re-
8 duce the risk of conflict.

9 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in
10 pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

11 (1) to strengthen the United States domestic
12 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic
13 growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
14 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that
15 improve the ability of the United States to pursue its
16 vital economic, foreign policy, and national security
17 interests;

18 (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition
19 with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic,
20 development, security, informational, and techno-
21 logical realms to maximize the United States'
22 strengths and increase the costs for the PRC of harm-
23 ing the interests and values of the United States and
24 its partners and allies;

1 (3) to lead a free, open, and secure international
2 system characterized by the rule of law, open markets
3 and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commit-
4 ment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes,
5 human rights, good and transparent governance, and
6 freedom from coercion;

7 (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
8 ances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral
9 and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance
10 shared interests and values and bolster partner coun-
11 tries' confidence that the United States is and will re-
12 main a strong, committed, and reliable partner that
13 respects the views and interests of its allies and
14 friends;

15 (5) to encourage and collaborate with United
16 States allies and partners in boosting their own capa-
17 bilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect
18 shared interests and values, free from coercion and ex-
19 ternal pressure;

20 (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and
21 healthy, constructive competition in United States-
22 China economic relations by—

23 (A) advancing policies that harden the
24 United States economy against unfair and ille-

1 *gal commercial or trading practices and the co-*
2 *ercion of United States businesses; and*

3 *(B) improving United States laws and reg-*
4 *ulations as necessary to prevent any PRC at-*
5 *tempts to harm United States economic competi-*
6 *tiveness;*

7 *(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led*
8 *growth in emerging markets around the world, in-*
9 *cluding through the use of United States Government*
10 *tools that—*

11 *(A) support greater private sector invest-*
12 *ment and advance capacity-building initiatives*
13 *that are grounded in the rule of law;*

14 *(B) promote open markets;*

15 *(C) establish clear policy and regulatory*
16 *frameworks;*

17 *(D) improve the management of key eco-*
18 *nomical sectors;*

19 *(E) combat corruption;*

20 *(F) foster and support greater collaboration*
21 *with and among partner countries and the*
22 *United States private sector to develop secure*
23 *and sustainable infrastructure; and*

24 *(G) support American workers and create*
25 *American jobs;*

1 (8) to play a leading role in advancing inter-
2 national rules and norms that foster free and recip-
3 rocal trade and open and integrated markets;

4 (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in
5 support of United States companies and businesses in
6 partner countries that seek fair competition;

7 (10) to ensure that the United States is second
8 to none in the innovation of critical and emerging
9 technologies, such as next-generation telecommuni-
10 cations, artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
11 semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—

12 (A) providing necessary investment and
13 concrete incentives for the private sector to accel-
14 erate development of such technologies;

15 (B) modernizing export controls and invest-
16 ment screening regimes and associated policies
17 and regulations;

18 (C) enhancing the role of the United States
19 in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues
20 for developing norms regarding the use of emerg-
21 ing critical technologies;

22 (D) reducing United States barriers and in-
23 creasing incentives for collaboration with allies
24 and partners on the research and co-development
25 of critical technologies;

1 *(E) collaborating with allies and partners*
2 *to protect critical technologies by—*

3 *(i) coordinating and aligning export*
4 *control measures;*

5 *(ii) building capacity for defense tech-*
6 *nology security;*

7 *(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in stra-*
8 *tegitically critical supply chains; and*

9 *(iv) ensuring diversification; and*

10 *(F) designing major defense capabilities for*
11 *export to vetted allies and partners;*

12 *(11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies*
13 *and other willing partners to promote ideals and*
14 *principles that—*

15 *(A) advance a free and open international*
16 *order;*

17 *(B) strengthen democratic institutions;*

18 *(C) protect and promote human rights; and*

19 *(D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-*
20 *porting;*

21 *(12) to develop comprehensive strategies and*
22 *policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;*

23 *(13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the*
24 *United Nations, its associated agencies, and other*
25 *multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity*

1 *and effectiveness of these organizations in facilitating*
2 *solutions to global challenges;*

3 *(14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental*
4 *freedoms and human rights in the United States rela-*
5 *tionship with the PRC;*

6 *(15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-*
7 *tilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a*
8 *free and open order and address regional and global*
9 *challenges posed by the Government of the PRC re-*
10 *garding—*

11 *(A) violations and abuses of human rights;*

12 *(B) restrictions on religious practices; and*

13 *(C) the undermining and abrogation of*
14 *treaties, other international agreements, and*
15 *other international norms related to human*
16 *rights;*

17 *(16) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, re-*
18 *pression, and coercion to attain unfair economic ad-*
19 *vantages or compel other nations to defer to its polit-*
20 *ical and strategic objectives in ways that threaten the*
21 *United States or its allies and partners;*

22 *(17) to maintain United States access to the*
23 *Western Pacific, including through necessary invest-*
24 *ments in United States military capabilities, policies,*
25 *and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust co-*

1 *operation, exercises, and interoperability with allies*
2 *and partners;*

3 *(18) to deter the PRC from—*

4 *(A) initiating armed conflict;*

5 *(B) coercing nations; or*

6 *(C) using grey-zone tactics below the level of*
7 *armed conflict;*

8 *(19) to strengthen United States-PRC military-*
9 *to-military communication and improve both mili-*
10 *tary and civilian crisis avoidance and management*
11 *procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the*
12 *risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level*
13 *visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and*
14 *military officials and other measures, in alignment*
15 *with United States interests; and*

16 *(20) to strengthen stability and reduce sus-*
17 *picious, cooperate with the PRC when interests align,*
18 *including through bilateral or multilateral means and*
19 *at the United Nations, as appropriate, and especially*
20 *in the following areas—*

21 *(A) global fight against climate change;*

22 *(B) nuclear security; and*

23 *(C) global financial stability.*

1 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 *It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the pol-*
3 *icy described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:*

4 *(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally*
5 *and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United*
6 *States—*

7 *(A) to marshal sustained political will to*
8 *protect its vital interests, promote its values, and*
9 *advance its economic and national security ob-*
10 *jectives; and*

11 *(B) to achieve this sustained political will,*
12 *persuade the American people and United States*
13 *allies and partners of—*

14 *(i) the current challenges facing the*
15 *international rules based order; and*

16 *(ii) the need for long-term investments*
17 *and engagement to defend shared interests*
18 *and values.*

19 *(2) The United States must coordinate closely*
20 *with allies and partners to compete effectively with*
21 *the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners*
22 *to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing*
23 *and checking aggressive PRC behavior.*

24 *(3) Effective United States strategy toward*
25 *China requires—*

1 (A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress;
2 and

3 (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful col-
4 laboration and consultation between the executive
5 branch and Congress.

6 (4) The United States must ensure close integra-
7 tion among economic and foreign policymakers and
8 provide support to the private sector, civil society,
9 universities and academic institutions, and other rel-
10 evant actors in free and open societies to enable such
11 actors—

12 (A) to collaborate to advance common inter-
13 ests; and

14 (B) to identify appropriate policies—

15 (i) to strengthen the United States and
16 its allies; and

17 (ii) to promote a compelling vision of
18 a free and open order.

19 (5) The United States must ensure that all Fed-
20 eral departments, agencies, and overseas missions are
21 organized and resourced to effectively defend and ad-
22 vance United States interests, by—

23 (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-
24 Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in
25 Washington, DC;

1 (B) placing greater numbers of foreign serv-
2 ice officers, international development profes-
3 sionals, members of the foreign commercial serv-
4 ice, intelligence professionals, and other United
5 States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific
6 region; and

7 (C) ensuring that this workforce has the
8 training, demonstrated proficiency in language
9 and culture, technical skills, and other com-
10 petencies required to advance a successful strat-
11 egy in relation to the PRC.

12 (6) The United States must place renewed pri-
13 ority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary
14 instruments of national power, including diplomacy,
15 information, technology, economics, foreign assistance
16 and development finance, commerce, intelligence, and
17 law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing the
18 challenges posed by the PRC.

19 (7) The United States must sustain military ca-
20 pabilities necessary to achieve United States political
21 objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including—

22 (A) promoting regional security in the
23 Indo-Pacific;

24 (B) reassuring allies and partners while
25 protecting them from coercion; and

1 (C) deterring PRC aggression and pre-
2 venting unwanted conflict.

3 (8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful
4 adaptation to the information environment of the 21st
5 century. United States public diplomacy and mes-
6 saging efforts must effectively—

7 (A) promote the value of partnership with
8 the United States; and

9 (B) counter CCP propaganda and
10 disinformation that threatens United States in-
11 terests.

12 **SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

13 (a) *APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON*
14 *ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.*—Nothing in
15 *this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede,*
16 *or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United*
17 *States Government under section 620M of the Foreign As-*
18 *sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of*
19 *title 10, United States Code.*

20 (b) *NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY*
21 *FORCE.*—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author-
22 *izing the use of military force.*

1 **TITLE I—INVESTING IN**
2 **AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS**
3 **Subtitle A—Science and Technology**

4 **SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-**
5 **PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-**
6 **SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.**

7 (a) *AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.*—The
8 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
9 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate
10 the contracting by the Department of State for the profes-
11 sional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee
12 for service basis, to assist interested United States persons
13 and business entities with supply chain management issues
14 related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), includ-
15 ing—

16 (1) *exiting from the PRC market or relocating*
17 *certain production facilities to locations outside the*
18 *PRC;*

19 (2) *diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-*
20 *forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of*
21 *the PRC;*

22 (3) *navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-*
23 *lenges in the course of the activities described in para-*
24 *graphs (1) and (2); and*

1 (4) *identifying alternative markets for produc-*
2 *tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including*
3 *through providing market intelligence, facilitating*
4 *contact with reliable local partners as appropriate,*
5 *and other services.*

6 (b) *CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons con-*
7 *tracted to perform the services described in subsection (a)*
8 *shall—*

9 (1) *be under the authority of the United States*
10 *Chief of Mission in the country in which they are*
11 *hired, in accordance with existing United States laws;*

12 (2) *coordinate with Department of State and De-*
13 *partment of Commerce officers; and*

14 (3) *coordinate with United States missions and*
15 *relevant local partners in other countries as needed to*
16 *carry out the services described in subsection (a).*

17 (c) *PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-*
18 *DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in sub-*
19 *section (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, small-*
20 *, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the matters*
21 *described in subsection (a).*

22 (d) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
23 *authorized to be appropriated \$15,000,000 for each of fiscal*
24 *years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying out*
25 *this section.*

1 (e) *PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY FOR-*
2 *EIGN ADVERSARIES.*—None of the funds appropriated pur-
3 suant to this section may be provided to an entity—

4 (1) *under the foreign ownership, control, or in-*
5 *fluence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP, or*
6 *other foreign adversary;*

7 (2) *determined to have beneficial ownership from*
8 *foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direc-*
9 *tion, or influence of foreign adversaries; and*

10 (3) *that has any contract in effect at the time of*
11 *the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract with-*
12 *in the previous one year that is no longer in effect,*
13 *with—*

14 (A) *the Government of the PRC;*

15 (B) *the CCP;*

16 (C) *the PLA;*

17 (D) *an entity majority-owned, majority-*
18 *controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern-*
19 *ment of the PRC, the CCP, or the PLA; or*

20 (E) *a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an*
21 *entity described in subparagraph (D).*

22 (f) *DEFINITIONS.*—The terms “foreign ownership, con-
23 trol, or influence” and “FOCI” have the meanings given
24 to those terms in the National Industrial Security Program

1 *Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor docu-*
2 *ment.*

3 **SEC. 102. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUS-**
4 **TRIAL BASE.**

5 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
6 *that—*

7 (1) *a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated*
8 *approach, which leverages economies of scale with*
9 *major allies, is necessary for the United States to re-*
10 *tain its lead in defense technology;*

11 (2) *allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer*
12 *of defense-related technologies and services to members*
13 *of the national technology and industrial base (as de-*
14 *finied in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code)*
15 *would advance United States security interests by*
16 *helping to leverage the defense-related technologies and*
17 *skilled workforces of trusted allies to reduce the de-*
18 *pendence on other countries, including countries that*
19 *pose challenges to United States interests around the*
20 *world, for defense-related innovation and investment;*
21 *and*

22 (3) *it is in the interest of the United States to*
23 *continue to increase cooperation with Australia, Can-*
24 *ada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and*
25 *Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-related*

1 *technology and services and leverage the investments*
2 *of like-minded, major ally nations in order to maxi-*
3 *mize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology*
4 *innovation.*

5 **(b) REPORT.—**

6 **(1) IN GENERAL.—***Not later than 90 days after*
7 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
8 *State shall submit a report to the appropriate con-*
9 *gressional committees that—*

10 **(A)** *describes the Department of State's ef-*
11 *forts to facilitate access among the national tech-*
12 *nology and industrial base to defense articles*
13 *and services subject to the United States Muni-*
14 *tions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms*
15 *Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and*

16 **(B)** *identifies foreign legal, regulatory, for-*
17 *ign policy, or other challenges or considerations*
18 *that prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include*
19 *any gaps in the respective export control regimes*
20 *implemented by United Kingdom of Great Brit-*
21 *ain and Northern Ireland, Australia, or Canada.*

22 **(2) FORM.—***This report required under para-*
23 *graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a*
24 *classified annex.*

1 ***Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure***
2 ***and Energy Development***

3 ***SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-***
4 ***FINED.***

5 *In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of*
6 *Congress” means—*

7 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations and the*
8 *Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and*

9 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the*
10 *Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-*
11 *resentatives.*

12 ***SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL-***
13 ***ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND-***
14 ***ARDS.***

15 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COLLABORATIVE STAND-*
16 *ARDS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States*
17 *should initiate collaboration among governments, the pri-*
18 *vate sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of*
19 *the standards for quality global infrastructure development*
20 *advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with re-*
21 *spect to the following issues:*

22 (1) *Respect for the sovereignty of countries in*
23 *which infrastructure investments are made.*

24 (2) *Anti-corruption.*

25 (3) *Rule of law.*

1 (4) *Human rights and labor rights.*

2 (5) *Fiscal and debt sustainability.*

3 (6) *Social and governance safeguards.*

4 (7) *Transparency.*

5 (8) *Environmental and energy standards.*

6 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMITMENT TO CO-*
7 *OPERATION.—It is the sense of Congress that the United*
8 *States should launch a series of fora around the world show-*
9 *ing the commitment of the United States and partners*
10 *of the United States to high-quality development coopera-*
11 *tion, including with respect to the issues described in sub-*
12 *section (a).*

13 **SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM**
14 **THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

15 (a) *FINDING.—It is in the national interest of the*
16 *United States to establish a coordinated interagency strat-*
17 *egy to marshal the resources of the United States Govern-*
18 *ment to provide foreign countries with financing that*
19 *strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore*
20 *reduces a foreign government’s need to enter into agree-*
21 *ments with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), includ-*
22 *ing to obtain support from its Belt and Road Initiative.*

23 (b) *STRATEGY.—*

24 (1) *AUTHORITY.—Not later than 180 days after*
25 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the President*

1 *shall develop and submit a strategy to the relevant*
2 *congressional committees to use the resources of Fed-*
3 *eral agencies to counteract offers of assistance and fi-*
4 *nancing from the PRC to foreign governments that*
5 *are of strategic importance to the United States.*

6 (2) *COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy*
7 *shall—*

8 (A) *identify primary sectors where the*
9 *United States could provide a competitive ad-*
10 *vantage to increase a country’s economic inde-*
11 *pendence;*

12 (B) *select countries with corresponding eco-*
13 *nomics needs, with priority given to those who*
14 *are vulnerable to Chinese economic influence;*

15 (C) *identify any corresponding existing fi-*
16 *nancing available from United States Govern-*
17 *ment entities to prioritize and devise specific fi-*
18 *nancing tailored to the needs of such foreign gov-*
19 *ernments if none are currently available;*

20 (D) *identify any cooperative and com-*
21 *plementary assistance and financing from*
22 *friendly foreign governments, including coordi-*
23 *nated assistance and co-financing;*

24 (E) *create a streamlined decision-making*
25 *process, directed by the National Security Coun-*

1 *cil, to devise financing and make agency deci-*
2 *sions and commitments on a timely basis to sup-*
3 *port United States competitive offers;*

4 *(F) establish a formal G7+European Com-*
5 *mission Working Group to develop a comprehen-*
6 *sive strategy to develop alternatives to the PRC's*
7 *Belt and Road Initiative for development fi-*
8 *nance; and*

9 *(G) integrate existing efforts into the strat-*
10 *egy, including efforts to address the Government*
11 *of the PRC's use of the United Nations to ad-*
12 *vance the Belt and Road Initiative, including*
13 *the proliferation of memoranda of understanding*
14 *between the PRC and United Nations funds and*
15 *programs regarding the implementation of the*
16 *Belt and Road Initiative.*

17 (3) *PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating*
18 *Federal agencies should include the Department of*
19 *State, Department of the Treasury, United States*
20 *Agency for International Development (USAID),*
21 *United States International Development Finance*
22 *Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation,*
23 *United States Trade and Development Agency, De-*
24 *partment of Commerce, and other Federal depart-*
25 *ments and agencies as appropriate.*

1 (4) *EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.*—*The President*
2 *should issue an Executive Order to implement the*
3 *strategy and make such changes in agency regulations*
4 *and procedures as are necessary to put the strategy*
5 *into effect.*

6 (5) *RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.*—
7 *In this section, the term “relevant congressional com-*
8 *mittees” means—*

9 (A) *the Committee on Appropriations, the*
10 *Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Com-*
11 *mittee on Financial Services of the House of*
12 *Representatives; and*

13 (B) *the Committee on Appropriations, the*
14 *Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Com-*
15 *mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs*
16 *of the Senate.*

17 (c) *AUTHORITY.*—*The Secretary of State, in coordina-*
18 *tion with the Administrator of the USAID, is authorized*
19 *to establish or continue an initiative, to be known as the*
20 *“Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network”,*
21 *under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with*
22 *other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented*
23 *on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may*
24 *carry out various programs to advance the development of*

1 *sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure*
2 *worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by—*

3 *(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to*
4 *improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and*
5 *procurement environments, and project preparation*
6 *capacity of countries that are partners of the United*
7 *States in such development;*

8 *(2) providing transaction advisory services and*
9 *project preparation assistance to support sustainable*
10 *infrastructure; and*

11 *(3) coordinating the provision of United States*
12 *assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-*
13 *cluding infrastructure that uses United States manu-*
14 *factured goods and services, and catalyzing invest-*
15 *ment led by the private sector.*

16 *(d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the*
17 *“Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” de-*
18 *scribed under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-*
19 *thorized to provide support, including through the Trans-*
20 *action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost*
21 *the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and*
22 *assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential*
23 *infrastructure projects, including through providing serv-*
24 *ices such as—*

25 *(1) legal services;*

- 1 (2) *project preparation and feasibility studies;*
- 2 (3) *debt sustainability analyses;*
- 3 (4) *bid or proposal evaluation; and*
- 4 (5) *other services relevant to advancing the devel-*
5 *opment of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality*
6 *infrastructure.*

7 (e) *STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.*——

8 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—As part of the “Infrastructure
9 *Transaction and Assistance Network*” described under
10 *subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to*
11 *provide support, including through the Strategic In-*
12 *frastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project*
13 *preparation, pipeline development, and other infra-*
14 *structure project support.*

15 (2) *JOINT STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE*
16 *PROJECTS.*—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infra-
17 *structure Fund should be used in coordination with*
18 *the Department of Defense, the International Develop-*
19 *ment Finance Corporation, like-minded donor part-*
20 *ners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to sup-*
21 *port joint infrastructure projects that are in the na-*
22 *tional security interest of the United States and vul-*
23 *nerable to strategic competitors.*

24 (f) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—There is
25 *authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022*

1 to 2026, \$75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and
2 Assistance Network, of which \$20,000,000 should be made
3 available for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

4 **SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN-**
5 **ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.**

6 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—The President shall direct a com-
7 prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con-
8 sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory lend-
9 ing and financing, including in the form of providing sup-
10 port to companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of
11 China (PRC) that engage in such activities, by the Govern-
12 ment of the PRC in the energy sectors of developing coun-
13 tries.

14 (b) *POLICY.*—It is the policy of the United States to—

15 (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted en-
16 ergy needs and capacities of developing countries, and
17 analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state-
18 owned industries and other companies incorporated
19 in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and
20 financing of energy projects, including direct financ-
21 ing by the PRC government, PRC financial institu-
22 tions, or direct state support to state-owned enter-
23 prises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;

24 (2) pursue strategic support and investment op-
25 portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sec-

1 *tor reforms, to expand the development and deploy-*
2 *ment of advanced energy technologies in developing*
3 *countries;*

4 *(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and*
5 *other financial products on terms that advance do-*
6 *mestic economic and local employment opportunities,*
7 *utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage pri-*
8 *vate sector growth, and, when appropriate United*
9 *States equity and sovereign lending products as alter-*
10 *natives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chi-*
11 *nese financial institutions;*

12 *(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-*
13 *national financial and multilateral institutions to le-*
14 *verage investment in advanced energy technologies in*
15 *developing countries; and*

16 *(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the*
17 *cooperative development of advanced energy tech-*
18 *nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-*
19 *ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the ef-*
20 *fects of energy engagement by the PRC through preda-*
21 *tory lending or other actions that negatively impact*
22 *other countries.*

23 *(c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.—*
24 *Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of*
25 *this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary*

1 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall
2 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a United
3 States Government strategy to increase United States ex-
4 ports of advanced energy technologies to—

5 (1) improve energy security in allied and devel-
6 oping countries;

7 (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and trans-
8 parent energy markets;

9 (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy
10 trading relationships; and

11 (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

12 **SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S**

13 **INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVEL-**
14 **OPMENT.**

15 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—No later than 180 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
17 for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
18 priate committees of Congress a report that—

19 (1) identifies priority countries for deepening
20 United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
21 cordance with the economic and national security in-
22 terests of the United States and where deeper energy
23 partnerships are most achievable;

24 (2) describes the involvement of the Government
25 of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and compa-

1 *the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic*
2 *economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability.*

3 *(2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from*
4 *the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic*
5 *pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that covered*
6 *40 percent of the world economy, leading the 11 re-*
7 *maining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the Com-*
8 *prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa-*
9 *cific Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting*
10 *high-standard rules for regional economic engage-*
11 *ment.*

12 *(3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association*
13 *of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea,*
14 *China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed*
15 *the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership*
16 *(RCEP), the world's biggest trade deal in terms of*
17 *GDP.*

18 *(4) Reduced United States economic engagement*
19 *has led United States allies and partners to question*
20 *the United States' commitment to the Indo-Pacific re-*
21 *gion. Despite its distortive and unfair trade practices,*
22 *the People's Republic of China is taking advantage of*
23 *this vacuum by deepening its partnerships in the re-*
24 *gion and promoting its own state-led economic model.*

1 (5) *The United States is increasingly on the out-*
2 *side looking in with regards to economic pacts in the*
3 *Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these agree-*
4 *ments puts it at both a strategic and competitive dis-*
5 *advantage in the region and allows competitors to ex-*
6 *pend their economic influence at the United States'*
7 *expense.*

8 (6) *Given that these partnerships and agree-*
9 *ments will define the rules and norms that will gov-*
10 *ern regional commerce over the coming decades, the*
11 *United States is currently not well positioned to*
12 *shape the coming economic landscape.*

13 (7) *It is in the United States' vital interest to*
14 *upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in*
15 *the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to*
16 *strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully par-*
17 *ticipate in the region's economic dynamism.*

18 **SEC. 122. REVIEW OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT**

19 **GLOBALLY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF**
20 **CHINA.**

21 (a) *REPORT.*—*Not later than 180 days after the date*
22 *of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co-*
23 *ordination with the United States Trade Representative*
24 *and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to*
25 *the appropriate congressional committees that describes the*

1 *global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement of*
2 *the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past decade,*
3 *including any bilateral or plurilateral trade and invest-*
4 *ment agreements it has signed, and their impact on the*
5 *United States economy, American companies and workers,*
6 *as well as on the countries that have entered into agree-*
7 *ments with the PRC and the global economy as a whole.*

8 (b) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall in-*
9 *clude the following:*

10 (1) *A survey and comparison of the PRC’s inter-*
11 *national economic practices, which will—*

12 (A) *provide an overview of the PRC’s dis-*
13 *tortive trade policies;*

14 (B) *list the PRC’s trade and investment*
15 *agreements globally, both agreements it has*
16 *signed or entered into and any ongoing negotia-*
17 *tions it has with individual countries or groups*
18 *of countries;*

19 (C) *detail the other mechanisms the PRC*
20 *uses to advance its international economic objec-*
21 *tives, including economic and commercial dia-*
22 *logues and BRI related activities;*

23 (D) *compare the United States and Chinese*
24 *approaches and priorities on trade and invest-*

1 *ment with major global economies, United States*
2 *allies, and for each region of the world; and*

3 *(E) outline what further steps the PRC may*
4 *take in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its eco-*
5 *nomics position and influence.*

6 *(2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC's*
7 *trade and investment policies, including—*

8 *(A) the impact of these trade and invest-*
9 *ment agreements on the PRC's economy, with a*
10 *focus on its trade and investment profile, the im-*
11 *act on the PRC's economic growth and per-cap-*
12 *ita income, and the impact on the profitability*
13 *and market share of Chinese companies and*
14 *SOEs;*

15 *(B) the impact of these agreements on the*
16 *PRC's political and diplomatic relations with*
17 *the countries it entered into agreements with and*
18 *by region; and*

19 *(C) the impact of the PRC's trade and in-*
20 *vestment relationships with other countries on*
21 *the market share of United States companies.*

22 **SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC**
23 **DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

24 *(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
25 *that United States national interests and the primacy of*

1 *United States power in the Indo-Pacific are intimately tied*
2 *to the following economic objectives:*

3 (1) *Deepening United States trade and invest-*
4 *ment relationships in the region, especially with key*
5 *allies and partners.*

6 (2) *Confirming American leadership and par-*
7 *ticipation in global regional economic organizations*
8 *and fora, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-*
9 *operation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization*
10 *(WTO).*

11 (3) *Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral*
12 *agreements on trade and investment, as well as nego-*
13 *tiations at the WTO to reassert United States eco-*
14 *nomics leadership by writing the rules of the road on*
15 *critical economic questions.*

16 (4) *Building secure and resilient supply chains*
17 *for industries critical for United States national in-*
18 *terest, including semiconductors, vaccines, and per-*
19 *sonal protective equipment.*

20 (5) *Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a*
21 *market-based economic model.*

22 (b) *REPORTING.*—*Not later than 180 days after the*
23 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,*
24 *in coordination with the United States Trade Representa-*
25 *tive and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report*

1 to the appropriate committees of Congress that presents the
2 steps the United States is taking and plans to take to
3 achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) and in-
4 cludes specific action plans for the following:

5 (1) *Enhancing United States trade and invest-*
6 *ment relationships in the region bilaterally and*
7 *plurilaterally, especially with United States allies*
8 *and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.*

9 (2) *Reenergizing APEC as a critical component*
10 *of the region's economic architecture.*

11 (3) *Work to ensure that the United States ab-*
12 *sence from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agree-*
13 *ment for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional*
14 *Comprehensive Economic Partnership do not under-*
15 *mine the United States' ability to shape regional*
16 *trade and investment rules.*

17 (4) *Working with allies and partners to build re-*
18 *silient and trusted supply chains especially for crit-*
19 *ical and emerging technologies, including semiconduc-*
20 *tors, and products and components critical for na-*
21 *tional health, including vaccines and related mate-*
22 *rials and personal protective equipment.*

23 (5) *Driving the formation and adoption of high-*
24 *standards and rules for the region in the following*
25 *areas:*

1 (A) *Advanced technologies and the digital*
2 *sphere.*

3 (B) *Labor practices and environmental*
4 *standards.*

5 (C) *Intellectual property rights.*

6 (6) *Developing roadmaps for how to counter the*
7 *PRC's unfair trade and economic practices, with a*
8 *specific focus on—*

9 (A) *subsidies and unfair competition by*
10 *state-owned enterprises; and*

11 (B) *corruption and politicized infrastruc-*
12 *ture.*

13 (c) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
14 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
15 *of Congress” means—*

16 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations and the*
17 *Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs;*
18 *and*

19 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the*
20 *Committee on Energy and Commerce.*

21 **SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER**
22 **AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE ASIA PACIFIC**
23 **ECONOMIC COOPERATION.**

24 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

1 (1) *the United States has benefitted from the re-*
2 *gional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pa-*
3 *cific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum since its*
4 *inception in 1989;*

5 (2) *APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for*
6 *21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted for*
7 *60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of global*
8 *trade;*

9 (3) *APEC has contributed to the reduction in*
10 *trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and en-*
11 *hanced access to global value chains, while raising the*
12 *profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sustain-*
13 *ability, gender parity, and inclusive growth;*

14 (4) *it is in the United States interest to engage*
15 *and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive*
16 *regional economy that benefits United States workers,*
17 *consumers, and businesses and better integrates the*
18 *United States economy with others in the region;*

19 (5) *when the United States last hosted APEC in*
20 *2011, it was able to promote United States interests,*
21 *while reassuring allies and partners about its strong*
22 *commitment to the region in the economic arena;*

23 (6) *today, APEC can again be used as a forum*
24 *to make progress on several United States priorities,*

1 *that are shared by United States allies and partners,*
2 *including—*

3 *(A) making regional commerce more inclu-*
4 *sive;*

5 *(B) fostering innovation and digitization;*
6 *and*

7 *(C) addressing climate change and environ-*
8 *mental protection;*

9 *(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous*
10 *opportunity to leverage American leadership to shape*
11 *the regional economic agenda;*

12 *(8) hosting APEC would allow the United States*
13 *to advance several of its own priorities in the region,*
14 *including to—*

15 *(A) expand the participation of APEC*
16 *stakeholders to include labor groups, environ-*
17 *mental advocates, and other part of civil society;*

18 *(B) upgrade APEC's work to empower and*
19 *promote small and medium enterprises;*

20 *(C) spotlight best practices and plans to up-*
21 *grade skills for the next-generation of technology*
22 *jobs;*

23 *(D) advance a climate and sustainable*
24 *trade and development agenda with a focus on*

1 *green technologies, infrastructure and finance;*
2 *and*

3 *(E) advance work on digital trade, includ-*
4 *ing by expanding rules on data privacy, pro-*
5 *moting digital inclusiveness and promoting the*
6 *free flow of data; and*

7 *(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United*
8 *States should immediately announce its interest to*
9 *host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secre-*
10 *tariat and like-minded APEC members to build sup-*
11 *port.*

12 **SEC. 125. STRATEGY ON DETERRENCE OF ECONOMIC COER-**
13 **SION.**

14 *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date*
15 *of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to*
16 *the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-govern-*
17 *ment strategy to deter Chinese economic coercion against*
18 *third countries that includes the following:*

19 *(1) An explanation of the means available to the*
20 *United States, with the cooperation of allies, to enable*
21 *a country with a smaller economy to withstand such*
22 *coercion.*

23 *(2) A description of the role that the Secretary*
24 *of State, acting through the Under Secretary of State*
25 *for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, will play in*

1 *the imposition of reputational costs on the PRC for*
2 *conducting economic coercion.*

3 (3) *Role clarity for the Secretary of State, the*
4 *Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-*
5 *national Development, the Secretary of Defense, the*
6 *head of each element of the intelligence community*
7 *(as such term is defined by section 3 of the National*
8 *Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the Secretary*
9 *of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the*
10 *United States Trade Representative, and the United*
11 *States International Development Finance Corpora-*
12 *tion in implementing such strategy.*

13 (b) *UPDATE.*—*Not later than 2 years after the date*
14 *of the submission of the strategy under subsection (a), and*
15 *every 2 years thereafter for 8 years, the President shall sub-*
16 *mit to the appropriate congressional committees an assess-*
17 *ment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy,*
18 *lessons learned from the past year, and planned changes*
19 *to the strategy.*

20 (c) *FORM.*—*The strategy and update required by sub-*
21 *sections (a) and (b), respectively, shall be submitted in clas-*
22 *sified form with an unclassified summary.*

23 (d) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-*
24 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate congres-*
25 *sional committees” means—*

1 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
2 *mittee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee*
3 *on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives;*
4 *and*

5 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
6 *Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-*
7 *tion, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and*
8 *Urban Affairs of the Senate.*

9 **SEC. 126. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY**
10 **ISSUES.**

11 (a) *LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SET-*
12 *TING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States*
13 *must lead in international bodies that set the governance*
14 *norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies*
15 *in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a*
16 *free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.*

17 (b) *COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It is*
18 *the sense of Congress that the United States, along with al-*
19 *lies and partners, should lead an international effort that*
20 *uses all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal*
21 *to combat the expanding use of information and commu-*
22 *nications technology products and services to surveil, re-*
23 *press, and manipulate populations (also known as “digital*
24 *authoritarianism”).*

1 (c) *FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL*
2 *AGE.*—*It is the sense of Congress that the United States*
3 *should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-*
4 *mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish*
5 *information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained*
6 *as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral*
7 *mechanism for communication.*

8 (d) *EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOP-*
9 *MENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OR*
10 *HUMAN RIGHTS.*—*It is the sense of Congress that the*
11 *United States should lead a global effort to develop and*
12 *adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical*
13 *technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies can-*
14 *not be abused by malign actors, whether they are govern-*
15 *ments or other entities, and that they do not threaten demo-*
16 *cratic governance or human rights.*

17 **SEC. 127. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.**

18 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

19 (1) *as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated*
20 *United States dependence on digital tools, inter-*
21 *national rules around digital governance and trade*
22 *have remained largely piecemeal;*

23 (2) *the People’s Republic of China is operating*
24 *under and advancing a set of digital rules that are*

1 *contrary to United States values and interests, and*
2 *those of United States allies and partners;*

3 *(3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and*
4 *bilateral digital trade agreements, including the Com-*
5 *prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa-*
6 *cific Partnership, the Singapore-Australia Digital*
7 *Trade Agreement, and the Singapore-New Zealand-*
8 *Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have*
9 *emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States*
10 *should be driving;*

11 *(4) the United States has already underscored*
12 *the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.-*
13 *Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 and*
14 *including a robust digital trade or e-commerce chap-*
15 *ter in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement;*

16 *(5) a regional deal on digital governance and*
17 *trade would allow the United States to unite a group*
18 *of like-minded economies around common standards*
19 *and norms, including the principles of openness, in-*
20 *clusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow*
21 *of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the*
22 *global economy;*

23 *(6) such an agreement would facilitate the cre-*
24 *ation of common rules and standards that govern*
25 *cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy, and*

1 *cybersecurity at a time of growing digital*
2 *vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and insti-*
3 *tutions around the world;*

4 *(7) such an agreement would facilitate the par-*
5 *ticipation of small and medium-sized enterprises in*
6 *the global economy through trade facilitation meas-*
7 *ures, including e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-pay-*
8 *ment; and*

9 *(8) the United States Trade Representative, in*
10 *consultation with the Secretary of State should nego-*
11 *tiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or ar-*
12 *rangements relating to digital trade with the like-*
13 *minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the Eu-*
14 *ropean Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes*
15 *intelligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and*
16 *allies, as appropriate.*

17 **SEC. 128. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY**
18 **PARTNERSHIP.**

19 *(a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY*
20 *PARTNERSHIP.—The President is authorized to establish a*
21 *program, to be known as the “Digital Connectivity and Cy-*
22 *bersecurity Partnership” to help foreign countries—*

23 *(1) expand and increase secure Internet access*
24 *and digital infrastructure;*

1 (2) *adopt policies and regulatory positions that*
2 *foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and*
3 *secure internet, equitable access, the free flow of data,*
4 *multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and*
5 *pro-competitive and secure information and commu-*
6 *nications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;*

7 (3) *promote and protect human rights and*
8 *counter corruption and predatory behavior through-*
9 *out communications and cybersecurity policy and im-*
10 *plementation;*

11 (4) *guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime,*
12 *disinformation and misinformation, and the use of*
13 *digital technology and services to carry out criminal*
14 *activity or human rights violations;*

15 (5) *bolster the role of civil society in informing*
16 *ICT policy and regulations;*

17 (6) *promote exports of United States ICT goods*
18 *and services and increase United States company*
19 *market share in target markets;*

20 (7) *promote the innovation and diversification of*
21 *ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant*
22 *on imports from the People's Republic of China;*

23 (8) *build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-*
24 *operability, and promote best practices for a national*
25 *approach to cybersecurity; and*

1 (9) *enhance the security of their digital infra-*
2 *structure to facilitate better information sharing with*
3 *the United States and United States allies and part-*
4 *ners, as appropriate.*

5 (b) *IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.*—*Not later than 180 days*
6 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary*
7 *of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency*
8 *for International Development shall jointly submit to the*
9 *appropriate congressional committees an implementation*
10 *plan for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the sub-*
11 *mission of the plan to advance the goals identified in sub-*
12 *section (a). The implementation plan shall also include a*
13 *description of interagency responsibilities to carry out im-*
14 *plementation, a description of any barriers to successful im-*
15 *plementation, and a description of any additional resources*
16 *or authorities needed for successful implementation.*

17 (c) *CONSULTATION.*—*In developing the implementa-*
18 *tion plan required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State*
19 *and the Administrator of the United States Agency for*
20 *International Development shall consult with—*

21 (1) *the appropriate congressional committees;*
22 (2) *leaders of the United States industry;*
23 (3) *civil society leaders with expertise in tech-*
24 *nology, telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic*

1 ***Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy***
2 ***and Leadership***

3 ***SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL***
4 ***POLICY.***

5 *Congress makes the following findings:*

6 (1) *The People’s Republic of China operates a*
7 *system of state-owned financial institutions including*
8 *retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and*
9 *insurers which are given favorable treatment under*
10 *Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have*
11 *strict restrictions on their ability to operate in the*
12 *PRC.*

13 (2) *In order to join the World Trade Organiza-*
14 *tion (WTO) in 2001, the PRC Government committed*
15 *to opening the credit card payment business to for-*
16 *ign firms by 2006.*

17 (3) *After years of the PRC refusing to open its*
18 *payment market, the United States brought a case*
19 *against the PRC before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO*
20 *mandated that the PRC open its card payment mar-*
21 *ket to global competitors.*

22 (4) *Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Gov-*
23 *ernment refused to comply with the ruling and main-*
24 *tained a rule that required all yuan-denominated*
25 *payment cards to use the PRC’s Union Pay network.*

1 *Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had*
2 *grown to \$27 trillion, did the PRC Government ap-*
3 *prove the application of foreign firms to enter the*
4 *market.*

5 *(5) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive*
6 *capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese market*
7 *to foreign investors while hamstringing its own citi-*
8 *zens ability to control their money.*

9 *(6) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi*
10 *Jinping announced that the PRC would launch a*
11 *technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai*
12 *Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22,*
13 *2019.*

14 *(7) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire*
15 *Jack Ma referred to “pawnshop mentality” of state-*
16 *owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public of-*
17 *fering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by Chi-*
18 *nese regulators.*

19 *(8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use*
20 *of a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the*
21 *world’s first central bank backed digital currency,*
22 *and the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong*
23 *Monetary Authority have already begun testing the*
24 *cross-border functionality of the digital currency.*

1 **SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINAN-**
2 **CIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.**

3 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
4 *that—*

5 (1) *the dominance of the dollar as the global re-*
6 *serve currency has yielded significant benefits to the*
7 *United States and the American people by allowing*
8 *the United States to maintain economic independ-*
9 *ence, better control its monetary policy, and finance*
10 *government outlays;*

11 (2) *American global leadership has benefited*
12 *from the United States monetary stability, credit-*
13 *worthiness, deep capital markets, and financial tech-*
14 *nology innovations;*

15 (3) *effective diplomacy and safeguarding of*
16 *American national security rely on the United States*
17 *role as the global financial leader, hub of global trade,*
18 *and source of economic opportunity;*

19 (4) *by cracking down on dissent in the key fi-*
20 *nancial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of*
21 *a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing for-*
22 *ward a Central Bank digital currency, the People's*
23 *Republic of China is attempting to become the leading*
24 *hub of finance in the world; and*

1 (5) *the United States must maintain its position*
2 *as a global financial leader to continue its broader*
3 *global leadership role around the world.*

4 (b) *REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date*
5 *of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co-*
6 *ordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit*
7 *to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—*

8 (1) *lists and examines the benefits to American*
9 *foreign policy that derive from the United States fi-*
10 *nancial leadership and the dollar's status as the*
11 *world's global reserve currency;*

12 (2) *describes the actions taken by the People's*
13 *Republic of China that could cement China's role as*
14 *the world's leading financial center;*

15 (3) *analyzes the possible impact on American*
16 *national security and foreign policy were the yuan to*
17 *supplant the dollar as the world's leading reserve cur-*
18 *rency;*

19 (4) *outlines how the United States can work dip-*
20 *lomatically with allies, partners, and other nations to*
21 *preserve a financial system that is free, open, and*
22 *fair; and*

23 (5) *identifies steps the United States can take to*
24 *preserve its status as the world's leading financial*

1 center and maintain the dollar's position as the glob-
2 al reserve currency.

3 (c) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
4 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
5 *of Congress” means—*

6 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
7 *House of Representatives;*

8 (2) *the Committee on Financial Services of the*
9 *House of Representatives;*

10 (3) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
11 *Senate; and*

12 (4) *the Committee on Banking, Housing, and*
13 *Urban Affairs of the Senate.*

14 **SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED**
15 **STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.**

16 (a) *FINDINGS.*—

17 (1) *Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese*
18 *companies sought to raise capital and list shares on*
19 *American stock markets.*

20 (2) *In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese*
21 *firms were delisted from the New York Stock Ex-*
22 *change as a result of fraud, accounting scandals, and*
23 *other corporate governance failures.*

24 (3) *Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the*
25 *United States Government, the Public Company Ac-*

1 *counting Oversight Board (PCAOB) signed a memo-*
2 *randum of understanding with the China Securities*
3 *Regulatory Commission and the China Ministry of*
4 *Finance for the production and exchange of audit*
5 *documents.*

6 *(4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regu-*
7 *lators continue to hinder the PCAOB's access to rel-*
8 *evant documents that are necessary for the PCAOB to*
9 *carry out its enforcement duties.*

10 *(5) In August 2020, the Department of State*
11 *sent a letter to American universities warning about*
12 *national security implications related to Chinese*
13 *stock holdings.*

14 *(6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the*
15 *President signed the Holding Foreign Companies Ac-*
16 *countable Act (Public Law 116–222), which requires*
17 *foreign companies listed on American stock markets*
18 *to comply with PCAOB auditing rules within three*
19 *years. Under the legislation, issuers not in compliance*
20 *within three years will be delisted.*

21 *(b) REPORT.—*

22 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
23 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
24 *State, in coordination with the Secretary of the*
25 *Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congres-*

1 sional committees a report that describes the costs and
2 benefits to the United States posed by the presence of
3 companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of
4 China (PRC) that are listed on American stock ex-
5 changes or traded over the counter, in the form of
6 American depository receipts.

7 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—The report
8 shall—

9 (A) identify companies incorporated in the
10 PRC that—

11 (i) are listed or traded on one or sev-
12 eral stock exchanges within the United
13 States, including over-the-counter market
14 and “A Shares” added to indexes and ex-
15 change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
16 changes in the PRC; and

17 (ii) based on the factors for consider-
18 ation described in paragraph (3), have
19 knowingly and materially contributed to—

20 (I) activities that undermine
21 United States national security;

22 (II) serious abuses of internation-
23 ally recognized human rights; or

1 (III) a substantially increased fi-
2 nancial risk exposure for United
3 States-based investors;

4 (B) describe the activities of the companies
5 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and
6 their implications for the United States; and

7 (C) develop policy recommendations for the
8 United States Government, State governments,
9 United States financial institutions, United
10 States equity and debt exchanges, and other rel-
11 evant stakeholders to address the risks posed by
12 the presence in United States capital markets of
13 the companies identified pursuant to subpara-
14 graph (A).

15 (3) *FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.*—
16 In completing the report under paragraph (1), the
17 President shall consider whether a company should be
18 identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) because the
19 company has—

20 (A) materially contributed to the develop-
21 ment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated pro-
22 curement by the PLA, of lethal military equip-
23 ment or component parts of such equipment;

1 (B) contributed to the construction and
2 militarization of features in the South China
3 Sea;

4 (C) been sanctioned by the United States or
5 has been determined to have conducted business
6 with sanctioned entities;

7 (D) engaged in an act or a series of acts of
8 intellectual property theft;

9 (E) engaged in corporate or economic espio-
10 nage;

11 (F) contributed to the proliferation of nu-
12 clear or missile technology in violation of United
13 Nations Security Council resolutions or United
14 States sanctions;

15 (G) contributed to the repression of religious
16 and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including
17 in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or
18 Tibet Autonomous Region;

19 (H) contributed to the development of tech-
20 nologies that enable censorship directed or di-
21 rectly supported by the Government of the PRC;
22 or

23 (I) contributed to other activities or behav-
24 ior determined to be relevant by the President.

1 (4) *FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY RECOMMENDA-*
2 *TIONS.—In completing the report under paragraph*
3 *(1), the President shall weigh the national security*
4 *implications and consider the following factors identi-*
5 *fied pursuant to paragraph (3) (except that such re-*
6 *port should exclude from its analysis the delisting or*
7 *potential delisting of companies from United States*
8 *markets as a result of failing to retain a Public Com-*
9 *pany Accounting Oversight Board-registered public*
10 *accounting firm as required by section 104 of the*
11 *Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7214)):*

12 (A) *The possibility that banning or*
13 *delisting companies from United States markets*
14 *could lead to an outflow of companies to list in*
15 *the PRC.*

16 (B) *The possibility that banning or*
17 *delisting companies from United States markets*
18 *could impact the status of the United States as*
19 *the world's leading capital markets center, par-*
20 *ticularly vis-à-vis the PRC.*

21 (C) *The impact on American foreign policy*
22 *and national security if United States leadership*
23 *in capital markets was weakened vis-à-vis the*
24 *PRC.*

1 (c) *REPORT FORM.*—The report required under sub-
2 section (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

3 (d) *PUBLICATION.*—The report required under sub-
4 section (b) shall be made accessible to the public online
5 through relevant United States Government websites.

6 **SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLI-**
7 **CATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-BORDER**
8 **PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYS-**
9 **TEMS.**

10 (a) *REPORT.*—

11 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
13 State, in coordination with the Secretary of the
14 Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congress-
15 sional committees a report on the diplomatic and eco-
16 nomic implications of cross-border payment systems.

17 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—The report re-
18 quired under paragraph (1) shall—

19 (A) assess the extent to which American di-
20 plomacy and global leadership hinge upon the
21 current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of
22 cross-border payment and financial messaging
23 systems;

1 (B) examine the durability of the Society
2 for Worldwide Interbank Financial Tele-
3 communication cooperative;

4 (C) review and analyze ways in which the
5 Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems,
6 cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital cur-
7 rencies could erode this system; and

8 (D) analyze how changes to global cross-bor-
9 der payment systems could undermine United
10 States national security interests including im-
11 pacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the countering
12 of terrorist finance, and the enforcement of anti-
13 money laundering provisions.

14 (b) *REPORT FORM.*—The report required under sub-
15 section (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

16 (c) *PUBLICATION.*—The report under subsection (a)(1)
17 shall be made accessible to the public online through rel-
18 evant United States Government websites.

1 **TITLE II—INVESTING IN**
2 **ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS**
3 **Subtitle A—Strategic and**
4 **Diplomatic Matters**

5 **SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
6 **FINED.**

7 *In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of*
8 *Congress” means—*

9 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
10 *Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on*
11 *Appropriations of the Senate; and*

12 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
13 *mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap-*
14 *propriations of the House of Representatives.*

15 **SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR**
16 **ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

17 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
18 *that—*

19 (1) *the United States treaty alliances in the*
20 *Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to*
21 *the United States and are among the Nation’s most*
22 *precious assets, enabling the United States to advance*
23 *its vital national interests, defend its territory, ex-*
24 *pend its economy through international trade and*
25 *commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies*

1 *while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent*
2 *the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its sur-*
3 *rounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power*
4 *or powers, and deter potential aggressors;*

5 *(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan,*
6 *South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thai-*
7 *land are critical allies in advancing a free and open*
8 *order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling chal-*
9 *lenges with unity of purpose, and have collaborated to*
10 *advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas*
11 *such as defense and security, economic prosperity, in-*
12 *frastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;*

13 *(3) the United States greatly values other part-*
14 *nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with*
15 *India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand,*
16 *and Vietnam, as well as its trilateral and quadrilat-*
17 *eral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the*
18 *Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),*
19 *and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which*
20 *are essential to further shared interests;*

21 *(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific*
22 *demands consistent United States and allied commit-*
23 *ment to strengthening and advancing alliances so*
24 *that they are postured to meet these challenges, and*
25 *will require sustained political will, concrete partner-*

1 *ships, economic, commercial, technological, and secu-*
2 *urity cooperation, consistent and tangible commit-*
3 *ments, high-level and extensive consultations on mat-*
4 *ters of mutual interest, mutual and shared coopera-*
5 *tion in the acquisition of key capabilities important*
6 *to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the*
7 *face of political, economic, or military coercion;*

8 *(5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-*
9 *tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-*
10 *versaries and weaken the collective ability to advance*
11 *shared interests;*

12 *(6) the United States must work with allies to*
13 *prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific*
14 *region;*

15 *(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the*
16 *Expert Group of the International Military Council*
17 *on Climate and Security (IMCCS), entitled “Climate*
18 *and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific” noted, the*
19 *Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions most vulner-*
20 *able to climate impacts, and as former Deputy Under*
21 *Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environ-*
22 *ment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS,*
23 *noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the*
24 *Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian re-*
25 *sponse costs and impacting security throughout the*

1 *region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food*
2 *insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more*
3 *frequent;*

4 *(8) the United State should continue to engage*
5 *on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners*
6 *of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as*
7 *laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Pub-*
8 *lic Law 115–409), in the areas of—*

9 *(A) forecasting environmental challenges;*

10 *(B) assisting with transnational coopera-*
11 *tion on sustainable uses of forest and water re-*
12 *sources with the goal of preserving biodiversity*
13 *and access to safe drinking water;*

14 *(C) fisheries and marine resource conserva-*
15 *tion; and*

16 *(D) meeting environmental challenges and*
17 *developing resilience;*

18 *(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with*
19 *the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the*
20 *United States Agency for International Development,*
21 *should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific cli-*
22 *mate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on*
23 *internal and external actions needed—*

24 *(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk*
25 *reduction, and resilience to weather-related im-*

1 *pacts on strategic interests of the United States*
2 *and partners and allies of the United States in*
3 *the region; and*

4 *(B) to address humanitarian and food secu-*
5 *rity impacts of weather-related changes in the re-*
6 *gion; and*

7 *(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mecha-*
8 *nisms remain essential to the evolving institutional*
9 *architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.*

10 *(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of*
11 *the United States—*

12 *(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security*
13 *cooperation with and among United States allies in*
14 *the Indo-Pacific, as appropriate, including through*
15 *diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy*
16 *security and development, scientific and health part-*
17 *nerships, educational and cultural exchanges, intel-*
18 *ligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-re-*
19 *lated initiatives;*

20 *(2) to uphold the United States multilateral and*
21 *bilateral treaty obligations, including—*

22 *(A) defending Japan consistent with the*
23 *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Be-*
24 *tween the United States of America and Japan,*
25 *done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all*

1 *related and subsequent bilateral security agree-*
2 *ments and arrangements concluded on or before*
3 *the date of enactment of this Act;*

4 (B) *defending the Republic of Korea con-*
5 *sistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between*
6 *the United States and the Republic of Korea,*
7 *done at Washington, October 1, 1953, and all re-*
8 *lated and subsequent bilateral security agree-*
9 *ments and arrangements concluded on or before*
10 *the date of enactment of this Act;*

11 (C) *defending the Philippines consistent*
12 *with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-*
13 *tween the United States and the Republic of the*
14 *Philippines, done at Washington, August 30,*
15 *1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral se-*
16 *curity agreements and arrangements concluded*
17 *on or before the date of enactment of this Act;*

18 (D) *defending Thailand consistent with the*
19 *Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (“Ma-*
20 *nila Pact”), done at Manila, September 8, 1954,*
21 *understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk commu-*
22 *nicque of 1962, and all related and subsequent bi-*
23 *lateral security agreements and arrangements*
24 *concluded on or before the date of enactment of*
25 *this Act; and*

1 (E) *defending Australia consistent with the*
2 *Security Treaty Between Australia and the*
3 *United States of America, done at San Fran-*
4 *cisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and*
5 *subsequent bilateral security agreements and ar-*
6 *rangements concluded on or before the date of en-*
7 *actment of this Act;*

8 (3) *to strengthen and deepen the United States'*
9 *bilateral and regional partnerships, including with*
10 *India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;*

11 (4) *to cooperate with allies and partners to pro-*
12 *mote human rights across the Indo-Pacific region bi-*
13 *laterally and through regional and multilateral fora*
14 *and pacts;*

15 (5) *to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-*
16 *nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-*
17 *ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,*
18 *Indonesia, and India; and*

19 (6) *to collaborate and cooperate on the sustain-*
20 *able development of the Mekong River Basin, includ-*
21 *ing by providing support for environmental conserva-*
22 *tion and protection initiatives in the Mekong sub-re-*
23 *gion and through assistance to Cambodia, Laos, Thai-*
24 *land, and Vietnam, whose governments comprise the*
25 *Mekong River Commission (MRC). United States ef-*

1 *forts should focus on increasing MRC member coun-*
2 *tries' capacity in the sustainable conservation and*
3 *management of natural resources.*

4 **SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.**

5 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
6 *that—*

7 (1) *as a Pacific power, the United States should*
8 *continue to strengthen its cooperation with Australia,*
9 *India, and Japan, (commonly referred to as the*
10 *Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or “Quad”) to en-*
11 *hance and implement a shared vision to meet regional*
12 *challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, re-*
13 *silient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by re-*
14 *spect for democratic norms, rule of law, and market-*
15 *driven economic growth, and that is free from undue*
16 *influence and coercion;*

17 (2) *the United States should expand dialogue*
18 *and cooperation through the Quad with a range of*
19 *partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navi-*
20 *gation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes,*
21 *democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to*
22 *uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen demo-*
23 *cratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;*

24 (3) *the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad*
25 *leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the*

1 *economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including*
2 *expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine pro-*
3 *duction and equitable access, and to address shared*
4 *challenges, including in cyberspace, critical tech-*
5 *nologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure in-*
6 *vestment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster*
7 *relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances*
8 *the important cooperation among Quad nations that*
9 *is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;*

10 *(4) building upon their announced commitment*
11 *to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines*
12 *by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region,*
13 *the United States International Development Finance*
14 *Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation*
15 *Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Co-*
16 *operation, including through partnerships other mul-*
17 *tilateral development banks, should also venture to fi-*
18 *nance development and infrastructure projects in the*
19 *Indo-Pacific region that are competitive, transparent,*
20 *and sustainable;*

21 *(5) the United States should participate in the*
22 *Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Aus-*
23 *tralia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar*
24 *initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health,*
25 *economic, and national security sectors to the United*

1 *States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded*
2 *countries; and*

3 *(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary*
4 *Working Group could—*

5 *(A) sustain and deepen engagement between*
6 *senior officials of the Quad countries on a full*
7 *spectrum of issues; and*

8 *(B) be modeled on the successful and long-*
9 *standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups*
10 *between the United States and Mexico, Canada,*
11 *and the United Kingdom, as well as other formal*
12 *and informal parliamentary exchanges.*

13 *(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—*

14 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
15 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
16 *State shall submit to the appropriate congressional*
17 *committees a strategy for bolstering engagement and*
18 *cooperation with the Quad.*

19 *(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy*
20 *required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:*

21 *(A) A description of how the United States*
22 *intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in*
23 *the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engage-*
24 *ment with India, Japan, and Australia on*
25 *shared interests and common challenges.*

1 (B) A summary of—

2 (i) current and past Quad initiatives
3 across the whole of the United States Gov-
4 ernment, including to promote broad based
5 and inclusive economic growth, trade, and
6 investment, and to advance technology co-
7 operation, energy innovation, climate miti-
8 gation and adaptation, physical and digital
9 infrastructure development, education, dis-
10 aster management, and global health secu-
11 rity;

12 (ii) proposals shared among Quad
13 countries to deepen existing security co-
14 operation, intelligence sharing, economic
15 partnerships, and multilateral coordination;
16 and

17 (iii) initiatives and agreements under-
18 taken jointly with Quad countries, in addi-
19 tion to other like-minded partners in the
20 Indo-Pacific, on areas of shared interest.

21 (C) A description of efforts to jointly—

22 (i) expand ongoing COVID-19 co-
23 operation to prepare for the next pandemic
24 by focusing on medium-term vaccine and

1 *medical supply production and building a*
2 *broader dialogue on global public health;*

3 *(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen*
4 *regional economic engagement and integra-*
5 *tion, and strengthen regional rules and*
6 *standards around trade and investment;*

7 *(iii) strengthen climate actions on*
8 *mitigation, adaptation, resilience, tech-*
9 *nology, capacity-building, and climate fi-*
10 *nance;*

11 *(iv) facilitate the development of qual-*
12 *ity infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific*
13 *through joint financing, investment, tech-*
14 *nical assistance, and standards setting;*

15 *(v) enhance joint maritime security*
16 *and maritime domain awareness initiatives*
17 *to protect the maritime commons and sup-*
18 *port international law and freedom of navi-*
19 *gation in the Indo-Pacific; and*

20 *(vi) develop international technology*
21 *standards and share or co-develop new in-*
22 *novative technologies of the future.*

1 **SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMEN-**
2 **TARY WORKING GROUP.**

3 (a) *ESTABLISHMENT.*—Not later than 30 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
5 shall seek to enter into negotiations with the governments
6 of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the
7 United States, known as the “Quad”) with the goal of
8 reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-
9 Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer coopera-
10 tion on shared interests and values.

11 (b) *UNITED STATES GROUP.*—

12 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—At such time as the govern-
13 ments of the Quad countries enter into a written
14 agreement described in subsection (a) to establish a
15 Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group, there
16 shall be established a United States Group, which
17 shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-
18 Parliamentary Working Group.

19 (2) *MEMBERSHIP.*—

20 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—The United States
21 Group shall be comprised of not more than 24
22 Members of Congress.

23 (B) *APPOINTMENT.*—Of the Members of
24 Congress appointed to the United States Group
25 under subparagraph (A)—

1 (i) *half shall be appointed by the*
2 *Speaker of the House of Representatives*
3 *from among Members of the House, not*
4 *fewer than four of whom shall be members*
5 *of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and*

6 (ii) *half shall be appointed by the*
7 *President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based*
8 *on recommendations of the majority leader*
9 *and minority leader of the Senate, from*
10 *among Members of the Senate, not fewer*
11 *than four of whom shall be members of the*
12 *Committee on Foreign Relations (unless the*
13 *majority leader and minority leader deter-*
14 *mine otherwise).*

15 (3) *MEETINGS.—*

16 (A) *IN GENERAL.—The United States*
17 *Group shall seek to meet not less frequently than*
18 *annually with representatives and appropriate*
19 *staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, and*
20 *India, and any other country invited by mutual*
21 *agreement of the Quad countries.*

22 (B) *LIMITATION.—A meeting described in*
23 *subparagraph (A) may be held—*

24 (i) *in the United States;*

- 1 (ii) in another Quad country during
2 periods when Congress is not in session; or
3 (iii) virtually.

4 (4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—

5 (A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of
6 the House of Representatives shall designate the
7 chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation
8 of the United States Group from the House from
9 among members of the Committee on Foreign Af-
10 fairs.

11 (B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President
12 Pro Tempore of the Senate shall designate the
13 chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation
14 of the United States Group from the Senate from
15 among members of the Committee on Foreign
16 Relations.

17 (5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
19 appropriated \$1,000,000 for each fiscal years
20 2022 through 2025 for the United States Group.

21 (B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

22 (i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year
23 for which an appropriation is made for the
24 United States Group, half of the amount
25 appropriated shall be available to the dele-

1 *gation from the House of Representatives*
2 *and half of the amount appropriated shall*
3 *be available to the delegation from the Sen-*
4 *ate.*

5 *(ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The*
6 *amounts available to the delegations of the*
7 *House of Representatives and the Senate*
8 *under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouch-*
9 *ers to be approved by the chairperson of the*
10 *delegation from the House of Representa-*
11 *tives and the chairperson of the delegation*
12 *from the Senate, respectively.*

13 *(6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States*
14 *Group may accept gifts or donations of services or*
15 *property, subject to the review and approval, as ap-*
16 *propriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of*
17 *Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the*
18 *Senate.*

19 *(7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The*
20 *certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from*
21 *the House of Representatives or the delegation of the*
22 *Senate of the United States Group shall be final and*
23 *conclusive upon the accounting officers in the audit-*
24 *ing of the accounts of the United States Group.*

1 (8) *ANNUAL REPORT.*—*The United States Group*
2 *shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of*
3 *the House of Representatives and the Committee on*
4 *Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fis-*
5 *cal year for which an appropriation is made for the*
6 *United States Group, including a description of its*
7 *expenditures under such appropriation.*

8 **SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
9 **ASEAN.**

10 *It is the policy of the United States to—*

11 (1) *stand with the nations of the Association of*
12 *Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to*
13 *COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in build-*
14 *ing capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics*
15 *and other public health challenges;*

16 (2) *support high-level United States participa-*
17 *tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year;*

18 (3) *reaffirm the importance of United States-*
19 *ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi-*
20 *nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and sup-*
21 *port the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC)*
22 *goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable*
23 *long-term economic growth and cooperation with the*
24 *United States that focuses on innovation and capac-*
25 *ity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster*

1 *management, food security, human rights, and trade*
2 *facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's poorest coun-*
3 *tries;*

4 *(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster*
5 *greater integration and unity within the ASEAN*
6 *community, as well as to foster greater integration*
7 *and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and*
8 *security partners, including Japan, the Republic of*
9 *Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;*

10 *(5) recognize the value of strategic economic ini-*
11 *tiatives such as United States-ASEAN Connect, which*
12 *demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC*
13 *and builds upon economic relationships in the region;*

14 *(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mari-*
15 *time and territorial disputes in a constructive man-*
16 *ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-*
17 *matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and*
18 *international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with*
19 *international law, including through the adoption of*
20 *a code of conduct in the South China Sea that rep-*
21 *resents the interests of all parties and promotes peace*
22 *and stability in the region;*

23 *(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and*
24 *territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-*

1 *ing the Government of the People's Republic of*
2 *China—*

3 *(A) to cease any current activities, and*
4 *avoid undertaking any actions in the future,*
5 *that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-*
6 *late disputes through the use of coercion, intimi-*
7 *dation, or military force;*

8 *(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals,*
9 *and other features, and refrain from new efforts*
10 *to militarize, including the construction of new*
11 *garrisons and facilities and the relocation of ad-*
12 *ditional military personnel, material, or equip-*
13 *ment;*

14 *(C) to oppose actions by any country that*
15 *prevent other countries from exercising their sov-*
16 *ereign rights to the resources in their exclusive*
17 *economic zones and continental shelves by enforc-*
18 *ing claims to those areas in the South China Sea*
19 *that lack support in international law; and*

20 *(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-*
21 *ministrative and military districts in contested*
22 *areas in the South China Sea;*

23 *(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-*
24 *tions that cause permanent physical damage to the*
25 *marine environment and support the efforts of the*

1 *National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration*
2 *and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the*
3 *illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the re-*
4 *gion;*

5 *(9) urge ASEAN nations to develop a common*
6 *approach to encourage China and the Philippines to*
7 *comply with the decision of the Permanent Court of*
8 *Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of*
9 *the Philippines in the case against the People's Re-*
10 *public of China's excessive maritime claims;*

11 *(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United*
12 *States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt*
13 *human smuggling and trafficking in persons and*
14 *urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mech-*
15 *anisms to provide assistance and support to refugees*
16 *and migrants;*

17 *(11) support the Mekong-United States Partner-*
18 *ship;*

19 *(12) support newly created initiatives with*
20 *ASEAN nations, including the United States-ASEAN*
21 *Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Imple-*
22 *mentation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innova-*
23 *tion Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health*
24 *Futures;*

1 (13) encourage the President to communicate to
2 *ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule*
3 *of law and open and transparent government,*
4 *strengthening civil society, and protecting human*
5 *rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing*
6 *politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary*
7 *killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-*
8 *dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of*
9 *speech and expression;*

10 (14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN
11 *that address corruption in the public and private sec-*
12 *tors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery*
13 *criminalization in the private sector, and build bene-*
14 *ficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN–*
15 *USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the South*
16 *East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA–PAC);*

17 (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders
18 *Initiative as an example of a people-to-people part-*
19 *nership that provides skills, networks, and leadership*
20 *training to a new generation that will create and fill*
21 *jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships,*
22 *and rise to address the regional and global challenges*
23 *of the future;*

24 (16) support the creation of initiatives similar to
25 *the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for*

1 *other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-peo-*
2 *ple partnerships with an emphasis on civil society*
3 *leaders;*

4 *(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that*
5 *have fully upheld and implemented all United Na-*
6 *tions Security Council resolutions and international*
7 *agreements with respect to the Democratic People’s*
8 *Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile pro-*
9 *grams and encourage all other ASEAN governments*
10 *to do the same; and*

11 *(18) allocate appropriate resources across the*
12 *United States Government to articulate and imple-*
13 *ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-*
14 *ports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports*
15 *ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-*
16 *solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific com-*
17 *munity.*

18 **SEC. 206. YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.**

19 *(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the*
20 *“Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Act” or the*
21 *“YSEALI Act”.*

22 *(b) YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—*

23 *(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in*
24 *the Department of State the Young Southeast Asian*
25 *Leaders Initiative (“YSEALI”) program.*

1 (2) *GOALS.—The YSEALI program shall seek to*
2 *build to capacity of young leaders in Southeast Asia*
3 *to—*

4 (A) *support young leaders from Southeast*
5 *Asia by offering professional development and a*
6 *global network to share expertise, including in*
7 *the areas of civic engagement, economic em-*
8 *powerment and social entrepreneurship, edu-*
9 *cation and environmental issues; and*

10 (B) *further strengthen the enduring part-*
11 *nership between the United States and Southeast*
12 *Asia and connect United States experts with*
13 *YSEALI participants.*

14 (3) *YSEALI PROGRAMS.—*

15 (A) *YSEALI ACADEMIC FELLOWS PRO-*
16 *GRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Aca-*
17 *ademic Fellows Program to bring students from*
18 *YSEALI partner countries to the United States*
19 *for the purposes of building practical expertise,*
20 *leadership skills, and professional networks relat-*
21 *ing to one or more of the YSEALI themes. The*
22 *Secretary of State may award fellowships under*
23 *the Academic Fellows Program to eligible indi-*
24 *viduals based on the following:*

1 (i) *Citizenship and residency in a*
2 *YSEALI partner country.*

3 (ii) *Status as a full-time under-*
4 *graduate student, or recent graduate of col-*
5 *lege, university, or other institutions of*
6 *higher learning.*

7 (iii) *Other criteria determined appro-*
8 *priate by the Secretary.*

9 (B) *YSEALI PROFESSIONAL FELLOWS PRO-*
10 *GRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Profes-*
11 *sional Fellows Program to bring professionals*
12 *from YSEALI partner countries to the United*
13 *States for the purposes of building practical ex-*
14 *pertise, leadership skills, and professional net-*
15 *works relating to one or more of the YSEALI*
16 *themes. The Secretary of State may award fel-*
17 *lowships under the Professional Fellows Program*
18 *to eligible individuals based on the following:*

19 (i) *Citizenship and residency in a*
20 *YSEALI partner country.*

21 (ii) *Status as an emerging leader in*
22 *government, civil society, or the private sec-*
23 *tor, and demonstrated expertise relating to*
24 *one or more of the YSEALI themes.*

1 (iii) *Current employment, and two or*
2 *more years of professional work experience*
3 *relevant to one or more YSEALI themes.*

4 (iv) *Other criteria determined appro-*
5 *priate by the Secretary.*

6 (C) *OTHER INITIATIVES.—The Secretary of*
7 *State may designate other initiatives as YSEALI*
8 *initiatives under this section if they advance the*
9 *goals of the YSEALI program as described in*
10 *paragraph (2).*

11 (4) *ACTIVITIES.—*

12 (A) *UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.—*
13 *The Secretary of State shall oversee all United*
14 *States-based activities carried out under the*
15 *YSEALI program, including the participation of*
16 *YSEALI Academic Fellows in a program at a*
17 *United States university or college, and the par-*
18 *ticipation of YSEALI Professional Fellows at*
19 *United States private and public sector organi-*
20 *zations for individually-tailored work place-*
21 *ments. Both fellowships may include site visits,*
22 *professional networking opportunities, leadership*
23 *training, community service, and organized cul-*
24 *tural activities, as appropriate.*

1 (B) *SOUTHEAST ASIA-BASED ACTIVITIES.*—
2 *The Secretary of State should continue to sup-*
3 *port overseas initiatives of the program, includ-*
4 *ing the following:*

5 (i) *Quality leadership training, profes-*
6 *sional development, and networking oppor-*
7 *tunities for YSEALI alumni.*

8 (ii) *Reciprocal exchanges for YSEALI*
9 *Professional Fellows Program’s United*
10 *States professional hosts and interlocutors*
11 *to support post-United States exchange ac-*
12 *tion plans and other related public diplo-*
13 *macy goals, as appropriate.*

14 (iii) *Opportunities for networking with*
15 *YSEALI alumni and professionals and ex-*
16 *perts who are American and Southeast*
17 *Asian.*

18 (iv) *The YSEALI Regional Workshop*
19 *program, offering networking, mentoring,*
20 *hands-on training, and the tools necessary*
21 *to lead communities in addressing eco-*
22 *nomi c, environmental, educational, and*
23 *civic engagement issues.*

24 (v) *The YSEALI Seeds for the Future*
25 *program, providing small, competitive*

1 *grants to young leaders in Southeast Asia*
2 *to improve their communities, countries,*
3 *and the region towards one or more of the*
4 *themes of civic engagement, economic em-*
5 *powerment and social entrepreneurship,*
6 *education, or environmental issues.*

7 *(vi) The YSEALI Academy at Ful-*
8 *bright University Vietnam, offering execu-*
9 *tive-level seminars for entry to mid-level*
10 *professionals around the themes of tech-*
11 *nology and innovation, public policy, and*
12 *entrepreneurship.*

13 *(vii) The YSEALI Women’s Leader-*
14 *ship Academy Program, enhancing people-*
15 *to-people ties and engagement with young*
16 *and emerging leaders by promoting gender*
17 *equality and advancing the status of women*
18 *and girls, such as in the public health sector*

19 *(C) ALUMNI PLATFORM.—The Secretary of*
20 *State is authorized to convene current YSEALI*
21 *participants and YSEALI alumni through a*
22 *platform to promote networking opportunities*
23 *within the YSEALI community.*

24 *(D) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this*
25 *paragraph, United States diplomatic and con-*

1 *sular posts, the Secretary of State, and agency*
2 *external partners managing and implementing*
3 *the YSEALI program—*

4 *(i) shall promote United States policy*
5 *goals in Southeast Asia by providing tools*
6 *and resources to help young Southeast*
7 *Asian leaders develop important skills and*
8 *connections, including through online cam-*
9 *paings and public diplomacy initiatives;*

10 *(ii) shall establish a system for moni-*
11 *toring, evaluating, and improving the*
12 *YSEALI program; and*

13 *(iii) may accept financial contribu-*
14 *tions from foundations, corporations, pri-*
15 *ivate donors, program partners, and imple-*
16 *menting agency external partners intended*
17 *to foster the goals of the YSEALI program.*

18 (5) *REPORTS.—*

19 (A) *STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State*
20 *shall submit to the appropriate congressional*
21 *committees a strategy for implementing the*
22 *YSEALI program, including the following:*

23 *(i) YSEALI program goals, targets,*
24 *and planned outcomes for each year and,*
25 *separately, for the YSEALI program gen-*

1 *erally during the duration of its implemen-*
2 *tation.*

3 *(ii) The continuation of YSEALI pro-*
4 *gram monitoring and evaluation plan, in-*
5 *cluding metrics for measuring YSEALI pro-*
6 *gram progress identification of annual*
7 *YSEALI program goals, and targets.*

8 *(B) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than 1*
9 *year after the date of the enactment of this sec-*
10 *tion, and annually thereafter for 4 years, the*
11 *Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-*
12 *priate congressional committees and publish on a*
13 *publicly available website of the Department a*
14 *report on—*

15 *(i) YSEALI program progress and an*
16 *assessment of the metrics, goals, targets, and*
17 *outcomes described in subparagraph (A)(i),*
18 *including information relating to YSEALI*
19 *program implementation and outcome ac-*
20 *tivities during the year covered by each re-*
21 *port; and*

22 *(ii) recommendations for improvements*
23 *or amendments to the YSEALI program*
24 *and strategy, if any, that would improve*

1 *their effectiveness during subsequent years*
2 *of YSEALI program implementation.*

3 (C) *FINAL REPORT.*—*Not later than the*
4 *date of the submission of the last report required*
5 *under subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State*
6 *shall submit to the appropriate congressional*
7 *committees a final assessment report that evalu-*
8 *ates YSEALI program implementation and out-*
9 *comes during the entire duration of YSEALI*
10 *program operation, including recommendations*
11 *regarding whether the YSEALI program should*
12 *be reauthorized and any changes that would im-*
13 *prove its effectiveness.*

14 (6) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

15 (A) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
16 *TEES.*—*The term “appropriate congressional*
17 *committees” means—*

18 (i) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of*
19 *the House of Representatives;*

20 (ii) *the Committee on Appropriations*
21 *of the House of Representatives;*

22 (iii) *the Committee on Foreign Rela-*
23 *tions of the Senate; and*

24 (iv) *the Committee on Appropriations*
25 *of the Senate.*

1 (B) *IMPLEMENTING AGENCY EXTERNAL*
2 *PARTNERS.*—*The term “implementing agency ex-*
3 *ternal partners” means any external partner*
4 *that is not a United States Government agency,*
5 *and may include one or more of the following en-*
6 *tities:*

7 (i) *Local or multinational corpora-*
8 *tions.*

9 (ii) *Nongovernmental organizations.*

10 (iii) *Universities.*

11 (iv) *Regional institutions.*

12 (C) *YSEALI THEME.*—*The term “YSEALI*
13 *theme” means—*

14 (i) *civic engagement;*

15 (ii) *economic empowerment and social*
16 *entrepreneurship;*

17 (iii) *education;*

18 (iv) *environmental issues; or*

19 (v) *any other theme included by the*
20 *Secretary of State.*

21 (D) *YSEALI PARTNER COUNTRIES.*—*The*
22 *term “YSEALI partner countries” includes each*
23 *member country of the Association of Southeast*
24 *Asian Nations and each other country or polit-*
25 *ical entity the Secretary of State determines ap-*

1 *propriate to include in the programs established*
2 *under this section.*

3 **SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7**
4 **AND G20 COUNTRIES.**

5 *It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting*
6 *through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda*
7 *with G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to economic*
8 *and democratic freedoms, including relating to the fol-*
9 *lowing:*

10 (1) *Trade and investment issues and enforce-*
11 *ment.*

12 (2) *Building support for international infra-*
13 *structure standards, including standards agreed to at*
14 *the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.*

15 (3) *The erosion of democracy and human rights.*

16 (4) *The security of 5G telecommunications.*

17 (5) *Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-*
18 *tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-*
19 *nies, and other policies and practices.*

20 (6) *Predatory international sovereign lending*
21 *that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic*
22 *Cooperation and Development and Paris Club prin-*
23 *ciples.*

24 (7) *International influence campaigns.*

25 (8) *Environmental standards.*

1 (9) *Coordination with like-minded regional part-*
2 *ners that are not in the G7 and G20.*

3 **SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART-**
4 **nersHIP.**

5 (a) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
6 *United States—*

7 (1) *to support the close economic, political, and*
8 *security relationship between Taiwan and the United*
9 *States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the*
10 *approach to the United States Indo-Pacific;*

11 (2) *to advance the security of Taiwan and its de-*
12 *mocracy a vital national security interest of the*
13 *United States;*

14 (3) *to reinforce all existing United States Gov-*
15 *ernment commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the*
16 *Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the three*
17 *joint communiques, and the “Six Assurances”;*

18 (4) *to support Taiwan’s implementation of its*
19 *asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities*
20 *identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;*

21 (5) *to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spend-*
22 *ing in order to fully resource its defense strategy;*

23 (6) *to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-*
24 *cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-*
25 *fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop*

1 *and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti-*
2 *ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, ad-*
3 *vanced command, control, communications, com-*
4 *puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,*
5 *and resilient command and control capabilities, into*
6 *its military forces;*

7 *(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's*
8 *meaningful participation in international organiza-*
9 *tions, including the World Health Assembly, the*
10 *International Civil Aviation Organization, the Inter-*
11 *national Criminal Police Organization, and other*
12 *international bodies as appropriate;*

13 *(8) to advocate for information sharing with*
14 *Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on*
15 *Cancer;*

16 *(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among*
17 *the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded*
18 *partners;*

19 *(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-*
20 *tially through new agreements or resumption of talks*
21 *under the Trade and Investment Framework Agree-*
22 *ment;*

23 *(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-*
24 *ance of a bilateral free trade agreement;*

1 (12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
2 logical cooperation, including improving supply
3 chain security;

4 (13) to support United States educational and
5 exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
6 moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-
7 tory, and politics in Taiwan; and

8 (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-
9 tween the United States and Taiwan.

10 (b) *SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND*
11 *EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.*—

12 (1) *ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-*
13 *TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.*—*The*
14 *Secretary of State should consider establishing an*
15 *independent nonprofit entity that—*

16 (A) *is dedicated to deepening ties between*
17 *the future leaders of Taiwan and the United*
18 *States; and*

19 (B) *works with State and local school dis-*
20 *tricts and educational institutions in the United*
21 *States to send high school and university stu-*
22 *dents to Taiwan to study the Chinese language,*
23 *culture, history, politics, and other relevant sub-*
24 *jects.*

1 (2) *PARTNER.*—*State and local school districts*
2 *and educational institutions, including public univer-*
3 *sities, in the United States are encouraged to partner*
4 *with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representa-*
5 *tive Office in the United States to establish programs*
6 *to promote an increase in educational and cultural*
7 *exchanges.*

8 **SEC. 209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.**

9 (a) *FINDINGS.*—*Congress finds the following:*

10 (1) *Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22*
11 *U.S.C. 3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United*
12 *States to “promote extensive, close, and friendly com-*
13 *mercial, cultural, and other relations between the peo-*
14 *ple of the United States and the people of Taiwan”.*

15 (2) *In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to*
16 *the American Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination*
17 *Council for North American Affairs, was renamed the*
18 *“Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs”.*

19 (3) *It is the policy of the United States to refer*
20 *to Taiwan as “Taiwan”, not “Taipei” or “Chinese*
21 *Taipei”.*

22 (4) *The Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep-*
23 *resentative Office is inaptly named as it works to cul-*
24 *tivate the extensive, close, and friendly commercial,*
25 *cultural, and other relations between the people of the*

1 *United States and the people, organizations, and en-*
2 *terprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Taipei.*

3 *(b) NEGOTIATIONS TO RENAME TECRO.—Reflective of*
4 *the substantively deepening ties between Taiwan and the*
5 *United States, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into*
6 *negotiations with appropriate officials of the Taipei Eco-*
7 *nomic and Cultural Representative Office in the United*
8 *States with the objective of renaming its office in Wash-*
9 *ington, D.C., the Taiwan Representative Office in the*
10 *United States, and its subsidiary offices in the United*
11 *States, accordingly.*

12 **SEC. 210. TAIWAN PEACE AND STABILITY ACT.**

13 *(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the*
14 *“Taiwan Peace and Stability Act”.*

15 *(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

16 *(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
17 *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
18 *tees” means—*

19 *(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
20 *House of Representatives; and*

21 *(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
22 *the Senate.*

23 *(2) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term*
24 *“international organization” includes United Nations*
25 *funds, programs, specialized agencies, entities, and*

1 *bodies, as well as other organizations outside of the*
2 *United Nations system that the Secretary of State de-*
3 *termines appropriate, in consultation with other rel-*
4 *evant Federal departments and agencies.*

5 (3) *ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.*—*The term “One-*
6 *China Principle” means only the PRC’s policy to-*
7 *ward Taiwan.*

8 (4) *CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.*—*The term*
9 *“civil society organizations” means international*
10 *civil society organizations that are critical to main-*
11 *taining Taiwan’s international space and enabling*
12 *Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in the*
13 *global community.*

14 (5) *POTENTIAL PLA CAMPAIGNS.*—*The term “po-*
15 *tential PLA campaigns” means—*

16 (A) *a naval blockade of Taiwan;*

17 (B) *an amphibious assault and ground in-*
18 *vasion of Taiwan, especially such invasion de-*
19 *signed to accomplish a fiat accompli before inter-*
20 *vention is possible; or*

21 (C) *a seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s*
22 *outlying islands.*

23 (c) *FINDINGS.*—*Congress makes the following findings:*

24 (1) *The United States has consistently sought to*
25 *advance peace and stability in East Asia as a central*

1 *element of United States foreign policy toward the re-*
2 *gion.*

3 *(2) The Government of the People’s Republic of*
4 *China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai*
5 *Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam-*
6 *paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi-*
7 *cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to*
8 *erode United States policy and create a fait accompli*
9 *on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future.*

10 *(3) In order to ensure the longevity of United*
11 *States policy and preserve the ability of the people of*
12 *Taiwan to determine their future independently, it is*
13 *necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic,*
14 *and physical space.*

15 *(4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humani-*
16 *tarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases*
17 *such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever*
18 *in countries around the world. During the COVID–*
19 *19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of*
20 *personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests to*
21 *countries in need.*

22 *(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, São Tomé and*
23 *Príncipe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina*
24 *Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati*

1 *have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in*
2 *favor of diplomatic relations with China.*

3 (6) *Taiwan was invited to participate in the*
4 *World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making*
5 *body of the World Health Organization, as an ob-*
6 *server annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the*
7 *2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increas-*
8 *ingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the WHA.*
9 *Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017,*
10 *2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.*

11 (7) *The Taipei Flight Information Region re-*
12 *portedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 pas-*
13 *sengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan*
14 *International Airport, the 11th busiest airport in the*
15 *world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating*
16 *at the International Civil Aviation Organization*
17 *since 2013.*

18 (8) *United Nations General Assembly Resolution*
19 *2758 (1971) does not address the issue of representa-*
20 *tion of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations,*
21 *nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the*
22 *people on Taiwan.*

23 (d) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
24 *United States to—*

1 (1) *maintain the position that peace and sta-*
2 *bility in the Western Pacific are in the political, secu-*
3 *rity, and economic interests of the United States, and*
4 *are matters of international concern; and*

5 (2) *work with allies and partners to promote*
6 *peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter*
7 *military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that*
8 *would undermine regional stability.*

9 (e) *SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL*
10 *PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.—It is*
11 *the sense of Congress that—*

12 (1) *Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous,*
13 *is home to 23,500,000 people, and is an important*
14 *contributor to the global community;*

15 (2) *multiple United States Government Adminis-*
16 *trations have taken important steps to advance Tai-*
17 *wan’s meaningful participation in international or-*
18 *ganizations and to enhance cooperation with Taiwan*
19 *to provide global public goods, including through de-*
20 *velopment assistance, humanitarian assistance, and*
21 *disaster relief in trilateral and multilateral fora;*

22 (3) *nonetheless, significant structural, policy,*
23 *and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan’s*
24 *meaningful participation in the international com-*
25 *munity; and*

1 (4) *efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with other*
2 *parts of the global community could be further en-*
3 *hanced through a systematic approach, along with*
4 *greater attention from Congress and the American*
5 *public to such efforts.*

6 (f) *STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL*
7 *PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.—*

8 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
9 *the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary*
10 *of State, in consultation with other Federal depart-*
11 *ments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to*
12 *the appropriate congressional committees a strategy—*

13 (A) *to advance Taiwan’s meaningful par-*
14 *ticipation in a prioritized set of international*
15 *organizations; and*

16 (B) *that responds to growing pressure from*
17 *the PRC on foreign governments, international*
18 *organizations, commercial actors, and civil soci-*
19 *ety organizations to comply with its “One-China*
20 *Principle” with respect to Taiwan.*

21 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy*
22 *required under paragraph (1) shall include—*

23 (A) *an assessment of the methods the PRC*
24 *uses to coerce actors to into adhering to its “One-*
25 *China Principle”, including those employed*

1 *against governments, international organiza-*
2 *tions, and civil society organizations and pres-*
3 *sure on commercial actors, to the extent relevant*
4 *in the context of Taiwan’s meaningful participa-*
5 *tion international organizations;*

6 *(B) an assessment of the policies of foreign*
7 *governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to*
8 *identify likeminded allies and partners who*
9 *might become public or private partners in the*
10 *strategy;*

11 *(C) a systematic analysis of all inter-*
12 *national organizations, as practicable, to iden-*
13 *tify those that best lend themselves to advancing*
14 *Taiwan’s participation, including—*

15 *(i) the organization’s policy on the re-*
16 *quirements to obtain membership and ob-*
17 *server status, as well as the foundational*
18 *documents defining membership require-*
19 *ments and observer status within the orga-*
20 *nization;*

21 *(ii) the organization’s participation*
22 *rules;*

23 *(iii) the processes for developing mem-*
24 *bership requirements and participation*
25 *rules;*

1 (iv) the policies of current members re-
2 garding Taiwan's political status; and

3 (v) the organization's relative reliance
4 on contributions from the PRC and how it
5 may affect internal decision-making;

6 (D) an evaluation of the feasibility and ad-
7 visability of expanding economic, security, and
8 diplomatic engagement with countries that have
9 demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up-
10 graded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns
11 with United States interests;

12 (E) a survey of international organizations
13 that have allowed Taiwan's meaningful partici-
14 pation, including an assessment of whether any
15 erosion in Taiwan's engagement has occurred
16 within those organizations and how Taiwan's
17 participation has positively strengthened the ca-
18 pacity and activity of these organizations, pro-
19 viding positive models for Taiwan's inclusion in
20 other similar forums;

21 (F) a list of not more than 20 international
22 organizations at which the United States Gov-
23 ernment will prioritize using its voice, vote, and
24 influence to advance Taiwan's meaningful par-
25 ticipation over the three-year period following

1 *the date of enactment of this Act, to be derived*
2 *from the organizations identified pursuant to*
3 *subparagraph (C); and*

4 (G) *a description of the diplomatic strate-*
5 *gies and the coalitions the United States Govern-*
6 *ment plans to develop to implement subpara-*
7 *graph (F).*

8 (3) *FORM.—The strategy required under para-*
9 *graph (1) shall be submitted in classified form but*
10 *may include an unclassified summary.*

11 (4) *CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State*
12 *shall consult with the appropriate congressional com-*
13 *mittees—*

14 (A) *not later than 90 days after the date of*
15 *enactment of this Act, with respect to the inter-*
16 *national organizations identified pursuant to*
17 *paragraph (2)(C); and*

18 (B) *not later than 180 days after the date*
19 *of the submission of the strategy required under*
20 *paragraph (1), and every 180 days thereafter for*
21 *2 years, regarding the development and imple-*
22 *mentation of the strategy required.*

23 (g) *EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOP-*
24 *MENT COOPERATION.—*

1 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—No later than 120 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Adminis-
3 trator of the United States Agency for International
4 Development (USAID), in consultation with the
5 United States International Development Finance
6 Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate
7 congressional committees a report on cooperation with
8 Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral development
9 initiatives, through the American Institute in Taiwan
10 as appropriate.

11 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—The report re-
12 quired in paragraph (1) shall include the following:

13 (A) A comprehensive review of existing co-
14 operation mechanisms and initiatives between
15 USAID or DFC and relevant departments and
16 agencies in Taiwan, including, but not limited
17 to Taiwan’s International Cooperation and De-
18 velopment Fund (ICDF).

19 (B) An assessment of how USAID and DFC
20 development cooperation with relevant depart-
21 ments and agencies in Taiwan compares to com-
22 parable cooperation with partners of similar eco-
23 nomic size and foreign assistance capacity.

1 (C) *An analysis of the opportunities and*
2 *challenges the cooperation described in subpara-*
3 *graph (A) has offered to date, including—*

4 (i) *opportunities collaboration has of-*
5 *fered to expand USAID's and DFC's ability*
6 *to deliver assistance into a wider range*
7 *communities;*

8 (ii) *sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF,*
9 *other relevant agencies and departments in*
10 *Taiwan, or the organizations' implementing*
11 *partners, have a comparative advantage in*
12 *providing assistance; and*

13 (iii) *opportunities to transition virtual*
14 *capacity building events relevant depart-*
15 *ments and agencies in Taiwan, through the*
16 *Global Cooperation and Training Frame-*
17 *work and other forums, into in-person, en-*
18 *during forms of development cooperation.*

19 (D) *An assessment of any legal, policy,*
20 *logistical, financial, or administrative barriers*
21 *to expanding cooperation in trilateral or multi-*
22 *lateral development, including—*

23 (i) *availability of personnel at the*
24 *American Institute in Taiwan responsible*

1 *for coordinating development assistance co-*
2 *operation;*

3 *(ii) volume of current cooperation ini-*
4 *tiatives and barriers to expanding it;*

5 *(iii) diplomatic, policy, or legal bar-*
6 *riers facing the United States or other part-*
7 *ners to including Taiwan in formal and in-*
8 *formal multilateral development cooperation*
9 *mechanisms;*

10 *(iv) resource or capacity barriers to ex-*
11 *panding cooperation facing the United*
12 *States or Taiwan; and*

13 *(v) geopolitical barriers that com-*
14 *plicate United States-Taiwan cooperation*
15 *in third countries.*

16 *(E) Recommendations to address the chal-*
17 *lenges identified in subparagraph (D).*

18 *(F) A description of any additional re-*
19 *sources or authorities that expanding cooperation*
20 *might require.*

21 *(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph*
22 *(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may*
23 *include a classified annex.*

1 *(h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING UNITED*
2 *STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.—It is the*
3 *sense of the Congress that—*

4 *(1) expanding United States economic relations*
5 *with Taiwan has benefited the people of both the*
6 *United States and Taiwan; and*

7 *(2) the United States should explore opportuni-*
8 *ties to deepen, and where possible expand, economic*
9 *ties between Taiwan and the United States, through*
10 *dialogue, and by developing the legal templates re-*
11 *quired to support potential future agreements.*

12 *(i) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY*
13 *IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.—It is the sense of Congress that—*

14 *(1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, includ-*
15 *ing through high rates of PRC sorties into air space*
16 *near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises*
17 *near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United*
18 *States position that differences in cross-Strait rela-*
19 *tions must be resolved peacefully;*

20 *(2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict*
21 *to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any in-*
22 *crease in the risk of conflict demands attention and*
23 *obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most*
24 *viable means to prevent war;*

1 (3) *Taiwan should continue to implement its*
2 *asymmetric defense strategy, including investing in*
3 *cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also*
4 *strengthening recruitment and training of its reserve*
5 *and civil defense forces, and those capabilities in-*
6 *clude, but are not limited to, coastal defense cruise*
7 *missiles; and*

8 (4) *while enhancing deterrence, it is also essen-*
9 *tial to maintain open and effective crisis communica-*
10 *tion and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to*
11 *reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately,*
12 *conflict.*

13 (j) *STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A*
14 *CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.—*

15 (1) *IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after*
16 *the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall*
17 *submit to the appropriate congressional committees a*
18 *whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence*
19 *over a cross-Strait military conflict between the PRC*
20 *and Taiwan.*

21 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy*
22 *shall include the following:*

23 (A) *A comprehensive review of existing dip-*
24 *lomatic, economic, and military tools to establish*

1 *deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict and an as-*
2 *essment of their efficacy.*

3 *(B) An examination of the present and fu-*
4 *ture capabilities of the United States and Tai-*
5 *wan to respond to the potential PLA campaigns*
6 *against Taiwan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The*
7 *analysis shall include an assessment of the*
8 *progress Taiwan has made in developing the*
9 *cost-effective and resilient capabilities needed to*
10 *respond to its strategic environment, as well as*
11 *any additional personnel, procurement, or train-*
12 *ing reforms required.*

13 *(C) An evaluation of the feasibility of ex-*
14 *panding coordination with United States allies*
15 *and partners to enhance deterrence over a cross-*
16 *Strait conflict. The review shall include a review*
17 *of the following matters:*

18 *(i) Expanding coordination of public*
19 *or private messaging on deterrence vis-à-vis*
20 *Taiwan.*

21 *(ii) Coordinating use of economic tools*
22 *to raise the costs of PRC military action*
23 *that could precipitate a cross-Strait con-*
24 *flict.*

1 (iii) *Enhancing codevelopment and co-*
2 *deployment of military capabilities related*
3 *to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or*
4 *enhancing coordination on training of Tai-*
5 *wan's military forces.*

6 (D) *Recommendations on significant addi-*
7 *tional diplomatic, economic, and military steps*
8 *available to the United States Government, uni-*
9 *laterally and in concert with United States allies*
10 *and partners, to enhance the clarity and credi-*
11 *bility of deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict.*

12 (E) *A description of any additional re-*
13 *sources or authorities needed to implement the*
14 *recommendations identified in subparagraph*
15 *(D).*

16 (3) *FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph*
17 *(1) shall be submitted classified form but may include*
18 *an unclassified annex.*

19 (4) *CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days*
20 *after the date of enactment of this Act, and not less*
21 *frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 7 years,*
22 *the President (or a designee), as well as representa-*
23 *tives from the agencies and departments involved in*
24 *developing the strategy required in paragraph (1),*
25 *shall consult with the appropriate congressional com-*

1 *mittees regarding the development and implementa-*
2 *tion of the strategy required in this subsection. The*
3 *representatives from the relevant agencies and depart-*
4 *ments shall be at the Under Secretary level or above.*

5 *(k) STRENGTHENING TAIWAN'S CIVILIAN DEFENSE*
6 *PROFESSIONALS.—*

7 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
8 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
9 *State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,*
10 *shall present to the appropriate congressional com-*
11 *mittees a plan for strengthening the community of ci-*
12 *vilian defense professionals in Taiwan, facilitated*
13 *through the American Institute in Taiwan as appro-*
14 *priate.*

15 *(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan re-*
16 *quired by paragraph (1) shall include the following:*

17 *(A) A comprehensive review of existing*
18 *United States Government and non-United*
19 *States Government programmatic and funding*
20 *modalities to support Taiwan's civilian defense*
21 *professionals in pursuing professional develop-*
22 *ment, educational, and cultural exchanges in the*
23 *United States, including—*

1 (i) opportunities through Department
2 of State-supported programs, such as the
3 International Visitor Leaders Program; and

4 (ii) opportunities offered through non-
5 governmental institutions, such as think
6 tanks, to the extent the review can prac-
7 tically make such an assessment.

8 (B) A description of the frequency that ci-
9 vilian defense professionals from Taiwan pursue
10 or are selected for the programs reviewed pursu-
11 ant to subparagraph (A).

12 (C) An analysis of any funding, policy, ad-
13 ministrative, or other barriers preventing greater
14 participation from Taiwan's civilian defense
15 professionals in the opportunities identified pur-
16 suant to subparagraph (A).

17 (D) An evaluation of the value expanding
18 the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subpara-
19 graph (A) would offer for strengthening Taiwan's
20 existing civilian defense community, and for in-
21 creasing the perceived value of the field for young
22 professionals in Taiwan.

23 (E) An assessment of options the United
24 States Government could take individually, with
25 partners in Taiwan, or with foreign govern-

1 ments, or nongovernmental partners, to expand
2 the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subpara-
3 graph (A).

4 (F) A description of additional resources
5 and authorities required by the options assessed
6 pursuant to subparagraph (E).

7 (3) *FORM.*—The plan required by paragraph (1)
8 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may in-
9 clude a classified annex.

10 **SEC. 211. TAIWAN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACT.**

11 (a) *SHORT TITLE.*—This section may be cited as the
12 “Taiwan International Solidarity Act”.

13 (b) *CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS*
14 *GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2758.*—Subsection (a) of
15 section 2 of the *Taiwan Allies International Protection and*
16 *Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law*
17 *116–135) (relating to diplomatic relations with Taiwan)*
18 *is amended by adding at the end the following new para-*
19 *graphs:*

20 “(10) *United Nations General Assembly Resolu-*
21 *tion 2758 (1971) established the representatives of the*
22 *Government of the People’s Republic of China as the*
23 *only lawful representatives of China to the United*
24 *Nations. The resolution did not address the issue of*
25 *representation of Taiwan and its people in the United*

1 *Nations or any related organizations, nor did the res-*
2 *olution take a position on the relationship between the*
3 *People’s Republic of China and Taiwan or include*
4 *any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty.*

5 *“(11) The United States opposes any initiative*
6 *that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the con-*
7 *sent of the people.”.*

8 *(c) UNITED STATES ADVOCACY FOR INTERNATIONAL*
9 *ORGANIZATIONS TO RESIST THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF*
10 *CHINA’S EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE “ONE CHINA” POSI-*
11 *TION.—Section 4 of the Taiwan Allies International Protec-*
12 *tion and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019*
13 *(relating to the policy of the United States regarding Tai-*
14 *wan’s participation in international organizations) is*
15 *amended—*

16 *(1) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” after the*
17 *semicolon at the end;*

18 *(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at*
19 *the end and inserting “; and”; and*

20 *(3) by adding at the end the following new para-*
21 *graph:*

22 *“(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives*
23 *of the United States Government in all organizations*
24 *described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and*
25 *influence of the United States to advocate such orga-*

1 *nizations to resist the People’s Republic of China’s ef-*
2 *forts to distort the decisions, language, policies, or*
3 *procedures of such organizations regarding Taiwan.”.*

4 *(d) OPPOSING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S*
5 *EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE TAIWAN’S TIES AND PARTNER-*
6 *SHIPS INTERNATIONALLY.—Subsection (a) of section 5 of*
7 *the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhance-*
8 *ment Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strength-*
9 *ening ties with Taiwan) is amended—*

10 *(1) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” after the*
11 *semicolon at the end;*

12 *(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at*
13 *the end and inserting “; and”; and*

14 *(3) by adding at the end the following new para-*
15 *graph:*

16 *“(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States al-*
17 *lies and partners to oppose the People’s Republic of*
18 *China’s efforts to undermine Taiwan’s official diplo-*
19 *matic relationships and its partnerships with coun-*
20 *tries with which it does not maintain diplomatic re-*
21 *lations.”.*

22 *(e) REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S*
23 *ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE ITS “ONE CHINA” POSITION.—*

24 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 5 of*
25 *the Taiwan Allies International Protection and En-*

1 *hancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating*
2 *to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended by in-*
3 *serting before the period at the end the following: “,*
4 *as well as information relating to any prior or ongo-*
5 *ing attempts by the People’s Republic of China to un-*
6 *dermine Taiwan’s membership or observer status in*
7 *all organizations described in section (4)(1) and Tai-*
8 *wan’s ties and relationships with other countries in*
9 *accordance with subsection (a) of this section”.*

10 (2) *EFFECTIVE DATE.*—*The amendment made by*
11 *paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the en-*
12 *actment of this Act and apply beginning with the*
13 *first report required under subsection (b) of section 5*
14 *of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and*
15 *Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as*
16 *amended by paragraph (1), that is required after such*
17 *date.*

18 **SEC. 212. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.**

19 (a) *SHORT TITLE.*—*This section may be cited as the*
20 *“Taiwan Fellowship Act”.*

21 (b) *FINDINGS; PURPOSES.*—

22 (1) *FINDINGS.*—*Congress finds the following:*

23 (A) *The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law*
24 *96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United*
25 *States policy “to preserve and promote extensive,*

1 *close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and*
2 *other relations between the people of the United*
3 *States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the*
4 *people on the China mainland and all other peo-*
5 *ples of the Western Pacific area”.*

6 *(B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance*
7 *Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the*
8 *United States has grown its strategic partner-*
9 *ship with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of*
10 *23,000,000 people.*

11 *(C) Despite a concerted campaign by the*
12 *People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan*
13 *from its diplomatic partners and from inter-*
14 *national organizations, including the World*
15 *Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a*
16 *global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic*
17 *response, including by donating more than*
18 *2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical*
19 *equipment to the United States.*

20 *(D) The creation of a United States fellow-*
21 *ship program with Taiwan would support—*

22 *(i) a key priority of expanding people-*
23 *to-people exchanges, which was outlined in*
24 *President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 Na-*
25 *tional Security Strategy;*

1 (ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s com-
2 mitment to Taiwan, “a leading democracy
3 and a critical economic and security part-
4 ner”, as expressed in his March 2021 In-
5 terim National Security Strategic Guid-
6 ance; and

7 (iii) April 2021 guidance from the De-
8 partment of State based on a review re-
9 quired under the Taiwan Assurance Act of
10 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF
11 of Public Law 116–260) to “encourage U.S.
12 government engagement with Taiwan that
13 reflects our deepening unofficial relation-
14 ship”.

15 (2) *PURPOSES.*—The purposes of this section
16 are—

17 (A) to further strengthen the United States-
18 Taiwan strategic relationship and broaden un-
19 derstanding of the Indo-Pacific region by tempo-
20 rarily assigning officials of agencies of the
21 United States Government to Taiwan for inten-
22 sive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement
23 as Fellows with the governing authorities on
24 Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;

1 (B) to expand United States Government
2 expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills
3 and understanding of the politics, history, and
4 culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region
5 by providing eligible United States personnel the
6 opportunity to acquire such skills and under-
7 standing through the Taiwan Fellowship Pro-
8 gram established under subsection (c); and

9 (C) to better position the United States to
10 advance its economic, security, and human
11 rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific re-
12 gion.

13 (c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—

14 (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

15 (A) AGENCY HEAD.—The term “agency
16 head” means, in the case of the executive branch
17 of United States Government, or in the case of
18 a legislative branch agency specified in subpara-
19 graph (B), the head of the respective agency.

20 (B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-
21 ERNMENT.—The term “agency of the United
22 States Government” includes the Government Ac-
23 countability Office, the Congressional Budget Of-
24 fice, the Congressional Research Service, and the
25 United States-China Economic and Security Re-

1 *view Commission of the legislative branch, as*
2 *well as any agency of the executive branch.*

3 (C) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
4 *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional*
5 *committees” means—*

6 (i) *the Committee on Appropriations,*
7 *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the*
8 *Committee on Armed Services of the House*
9 *of Representatives; and*

10 (ii) *the Committee on Appropriations*
11 *and the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
12 *the Senate.*

13 (D) *DETAILEE.—The term “detailee” means*
14 *an employee of an agency of the United States*
15 *Government on loan to the American Institute in*
16 *Taiwan, without a change of position from the*
17 *agency at which such employee is employed.*

18 (E) *IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term*
19 *“implementing partner” means any United*
20 *States organization described in section*
21 *501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986*
22 *and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of*
23 *such Code that—*

24 (i) *is selected through a competitive*
25 *process;*

1 (ii) performs logistical, administrative,
2 and other functions, as determined by the
3 Department of State and the American In-
4 stitute of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan
5 Fellowship Program; and

6 (iii) enters into a cooperative agree-
7 ment with the American Institute in Tai-
8 wan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship
9 Program.

10 (2) *ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP*
11 *PROGRAM.*—

12 (A) *ESTABLISHMENT.*—*The Secretary of*
13 *State shall establish the “Taiwan Fellowship*
14 *Program” (referred to in this section as the*
15 *“Program”) to provide a fellowship opportunity*
16 *in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible United*
17 *States citizens through the cooperative agreement*
18 *established in subparagraph (B). The Secretary*
19 *of State, in consultation with appropriate coun-*
20 *terparts at the American Institute in Taiwan*
21 *and the implementing partner, may modify the*
22 *name of the Program.*

23 (B) *COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.*—

24 (i) *IN GENERAL.*—*The American Insti-*
25 *tute in Taiwan shall use amounts appro-*

1 *priated pursuant to the authorization under*
2 *paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an annual*
3 *or multi-year cooperative agreement with*
4 *an appropriate implementing partner.*

5 *(ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary of*
6 *State, in consultation with the American*
7 *Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate,*
8 *the implementing partner, shall award to*
9 *eligible United States citizens, subject to*
10 *available funding—*

11 *(I) not fewer than five fellowships*
12 *during the first two years of the Pro-*
13 *gram; and*

14 *(II) not fewer than ten fellowships*
15 *during each of the remaining years of*
16 *the Program.*

17 *(C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLE-*
18 *MENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days*
19 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, the*
20 *American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation*
21 *with the Secretary of State, shall—*

22 *(i) begin negotiations with the Taipei*
23 *Economic and Cultural Representative Of-*
24 *fice, or with another appropriate entity, for*
25 *the purpose of entering into an agreement*

1 to facilitate the placement of fellows in an
2 agency of the governing authorities on Tai-
3 wan; and

4 (ii) begin the process of selecting an
5 implementing partner, which—

6 (I) shall agree to meet all of the
7 legal requirements required to operate
8 in Taiwan; and

9 (II) shall be composed of staff who
10 demonstrate significant experience
11 managing exchange programs in the
12 Indo-Pacific region.

13 (D) CURRICULUM.—

14 (i) *FIRST YEAR.*—During the first year
15 of each fellowship under this subsection,
16 each fellow should study—

17 (I) the Mandarin Chinese lan-
18 guage;

19 (II) the people, history, and polit-
20 ical climate on Taiwan; and

21 (III) the issues affecting the rela-
22 tionship between the United States and
23 the Indo-Pacific region.

24 (ii) *SECOND YEAR.*—During the second
25 year of each fellowship under this section,

1 each fellow, subject to the approval of the
2 Secretary of State, the American Institute
3 in Taiwan, and the implementing partner,
4 and in accordance with the purposes of this
5 section, shall work in—

6 (I) a parliamentary office, min-
7 istry, or other agency of the governing
8 authorities on Taiwan; or

9 (II) an organization outside of the
10 governing authorities on Taiwan,
11 whose interests are associated with the
12 interests of the fellow and the agency of
13 the United States Government from
14 which the fellow had been employed.

15 (E) *FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.*—

16 Notwithstanding any requirement under this sec-
17 tion, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
18 the American Institute in Taiwan and, as ap-
19 propriate, the implementing partner, may award
20 fellowships that have a duration of between nine
21 months and two years, and may alter the cur-
22 riculum requirements under subparagraph (D)
23 for such purposes.

1 (F) *SUNSET*.—*The Program shall terminate*
2 *ten years after the date of the enactment of this*
3 *section.*

4 (3) *PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS*.—

5 (A) *ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS*.—*A*
6 *United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship*
7 *under this section if he or she—*

8 (i) *is an employee of the United States*
9 *Government;*

10 (ii) *has at least two years of experience*
11 *in any branch of the United States Govern-*
12 *ment;*

13 (iii) *has received at least one exem-*
14 *plary performance review in his or her cur-*
15 *rent United States Government role within*
16 *at least the last three years prior to begin-*
17 *ning the fellowship;*

18 (iv) *has a demonstrated professional or*
19 *educational background in the relationship*
20 *between the United States and countries in*
21 *the Indo-Pacific region; and*

22 (v) *has demonstrated his or her com-*
23 *mitment to further service in the United*
24 *States Government.*

1 (B) *RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.*—Each
2 recipient of a fellowship under this section shall
3 agree, as a condition of such fellowship—

4 (i) to maintain satisfactory progress in
5 language training and appropriate behavior
6 in Taiwan, as determined by the Depart-
7 ment of State, the American Institute in
8 Taiwan and, as appropriate, its imple-
9 menting partner;

10 (ii) to refrain from engaging in any
11 intelligence or intelligence-related activity
12 on behalf of the United States Government;
13 and

14 (iii) to continue Federal Government
15 employment for a period of not less than
16 four years after the conclusion of the fellow-
17 ship, or for not less than two years for a fel-
18 lowship that is one year or shorter.

19 (C) *RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING*
20 *PARTNER.*—

21 (i) *SELECTION OF FELLOWS.*—The im-
22 plementing partner, in close coordination
23 with the Secretary of State and the Amer-
24 ican Institute in Taiwan, shall—

1 (I) make efforts to recruit fellow-
2 ship candidates who reflect the diver-
3 sity of the United States;

4 (II) select fellows for the Program
5 based solely on merit, with appropriate
6 supervision from the Department of
7 State and the American Institute in
8 Taiwan; and

9 (III) prioritize the selection of
10 candidates willing to serve a fellowship
11 lasting one year or longer.

12 (ii) *FIRST YEAR.*—The implementing
13 partner should provide each fellow in the
14 first year (or shorter duration, as jointly
15 determined by the Secretary of State and
16 the American Institute in Taiwan, for those
17 who are not serving a two-year fellowship)
18 with—

19 (I) intensive Mandarin Chinese
20 language training; and

21 (II) courses in the politic, culture,
22 and history of Taiwan, China, and the
23 broader Indo-Pacific.

24 (iii) *WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAIN-*
25 *ING.*—The Secretary of State, in coordina-

1 *tion with the American Institute in Taiwan*
2 *and, as appropriate, the implementing*
3 *partner, may waive any of the training re-*
4 *quired under clause (ii) to the extent that a*
5 *fellow has Mandarin Chinese language*
6 *skills, knowledge of the topics described in*
7 *clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons*
8 *approved by the Secretary of State and the*
9 *American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the*
10 *training requirements are waived for a fel-*
11 *low serving a two-year fellowship, the train-*
12 *ing portion of his or her fellowship may be*
13 *shortened to the extent appropriate.*

14 *(iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The imple-*
15 *menting partner, in consultation with the*
16 *Secretary of State and the American Insti-*
17 *tute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office*
18 *and at least one full-time staff member in*
19 *Taiwan to—*

20 *(I) liaise with the American Insti-*
21 *tute in Taiwan and the governing au-*
22 *thorities on Taiwan; and*

23 *(II) serve as the primary in-coun-*
24 *try point of contact for the recipients*

1 of fellowships under this section and
2 their dependents.

3 (v) *OTHER FUNCTIONS.*—The imple-
4 menting partner should perform other func-
5 tions in association in support of the Pro-
6 gram, including logistical and administra-
7 tive functions, as included in the coopera-
8 tive agreement entered into pursuant to
9 paragraph (2)(B) by the Secretary of State
10 and the American Institute in Taiwan.

11 (D) *NONCOMPLIANCE.*—

12 (i) *IN GENERAL.*—Any fellow who fails
13 to comply with the requirements under this
14 section shall reimburse the American Insti-
15 tute in Taiwan for—

16 (I) the Federal funds expended for
17 the fellow's participation in the fellow-
18 ship, as set forth in clauses (ii) and
19 (iii); and

20 (II) interest accrued on such
21 funds (calculated at the prevailing
22 rate).

23 (ii) *FULL REIMBURSEMENT.*—Any fel-
24 low who violates clause (i) or (ii) of sub-
25 paragraph (B) shall reimburse the Amer-

1 *ican Institute in Taiwan in an amount*
2 *equal to the sum of—*

3 *(I) all of the Federal funds ex-*
4 *pended for the fellow's participation in*
5 *the fellowship; and*

6 *(II) interest on the amount speci-*
7 *fied in subclause (I), which shall be*
8 *calculated at the prevailing rate.*

9 *(iii) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.—*
10 *Any fellow who violates subparagraph*
11 *(B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Insti-*
12 *tute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the*
13 *difference between—*

14 *(I) the amount specified in clause*
15 *(ii); and*

16 *(II) the product of—*

17 *(aa) the amount the fellow*
18 *received in compensation during*
19 *the final year of the fellowship,*
20 *including the value of any allow-*
21 *ances and benefits received by the*
22 *fellow; multiplied by*

23 *(bb) the percentage of the pe-*
24 *riod specified in subparagraph*
25 *(B)(iii) during which the fellow*

1 *did not remain employed by the*
2 *United States Government.*

3 *(E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90*
4 *days after the selection of the first class of fellows*
5 *under this section and annually thereafter for 10*
6 *years, the Secretary of State shall offer to brief*
7 *the appropriate congressional committees regard-*
8 *ing the following:*

9 *(i) An assessment of the performance of*
10 *the implementing partner in fulfilling the*
11 *purposes of this section.*

12 *(ii) The number of applicants each*
13 *year, the number of applicants willing to*
14 *serve a fellowship lasting one year or*
15 *longer, and the number of such applicants*
16 *selected for a fellowship.*

17 *(iii) The names and sponsoring agen-*
18 *cies of the fellows selected by the imple-*
19 *menting partner and the extent to which*
20 *such fellows represent the diversity of the*
21 *United States.*

22 *(iv) The names of the parliamentary*
23 *offices, ministries, other agencies of the gov-*
24 *erning authorities on Taiwan, and non-*

1 *governmental institutions to which each fel-*
2 *low was assigned.*

3 *(v) Any recommendations, as appro-*
4 *priate, to improve the implementation of*
5 *the Program, including added flexibilities*
6 *in the administration of the program.*

7 *(vi) An assessment of the Program's*
8 *value upon the relationship between the*
9 *United States and Taiwan or the United*
10 *States and Asian countries.*

11 *(F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—*

12 *(i) IN GENERAL.—The financial*
13 *records of any implementing partner shall*
14 *be audited annually in accordance with*
15 *generally accepted auditing standards by*
16 *independent certified public accountants or*
17 *independent licensed public accountants*
18 *who are certified or licensed by a regulatory*
19 *authority of a State or another political*
20 *subdivision of the United States.*

21 *(ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under*
22 *clause (i) shall be conducted at the place or*
23 *places where the financial records of the im-*
24 *plementing partner are normally kept.*

1 (iii) *ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.*—*The*
2 *implementing partner shall make available*
3 *to the accountants conducting an audit*
4 *under clause (i)—*

5 (I) *all books, financial records,*
6 *files, other papers, things, and prop-*
7 *erty belonging to, or in use by, the im-*
8 *plementing partner that are necessary*
9 *to facilitate the audit; and*

10 (II) *full facilities for verifying*
11 *transactions with the balances or secu-*
12 *rities held by depositories, fiscal*
13 *agents, and custodians.*

14 (iv) *REPORT.*—

15 (I) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than*
16 *180 days after the end of each fiscal*
17 *year, the implementing partner shall*
18 *provide a report of the audit conducted*
19 *for such fiscal year under clause (i) to*
20 *the Secretary of State and the Amer-*
21 *ican Institute in Taiwan.*

22 (II) *CONTENTS.*—*Each audit re-*
23 *port under subclause (I) shall—*

24 (aa) *set forth the scope of the*
25 *audit at issue;*

1 *(bb) include such statements,*
2 *along with the auditor's opinion*
3 *of those statements, as may be*
4 *necessary to present fairly the im-*
5 *plementing partner's assets and*
6 *liabilities, surplus or deficit, with*
7 *reasonable detail;*

8 *(cc) include a statement of*
9 *the implementing partner's in-*
10 *come and expenses during the*
11 *year; and*

12 *(dd) include a schedule of—*

13 *(AA) all contracts and*
14 *cooperative agreements re-*
15 *quiring payments greater*
16 *than \$5,000; and*

17 *(BB) any payments of*
18 *compensation, salaries, or*
19 *fees at a rate greater than*
20 *\$5,000 per year.*

21 *(III) COPIES.—Each audit report*
22 *shall be produced in sufficient copies*
23 *for distribution to the public.*

24 *(4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERN-*
25 *MENT SERVICE.—*

1 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—

2 (i) *DETAIL AUTHORIZED.*—*With the*
3 *approval of the Secretary of State, an agen-*
4 *cy head may detail, for a period of not*
5 *more than two years, an employee of the*
6 *agency of the United States Government*
7 *who has been awarded a fellowship under*
8 *this Act, to the American Institute in Tai-*
9 *wan for the purpose of assignment to the*
10 *governing authorities on Taiwan or an or-*
11 *ganization described in paragraph*
12 *(2)(D)(ii)(II).*

13 (ii) *AGREEMENT.*—*Each detailee shall*
14 *enter into a written agreement with the*
15 *Federal Government before receiving a fel-*
16 *lowship, in which the fellow shall agree—*

17 (I) *to continue in the service of*
18 *the sponsoring agency at the end of fel-*
19 *lowship for a period of at least four*
20 *years (or at least two years if the fel-*
21 *lowship duration is one year or short-*
22 *er) unless such detailee is involuntarily*
23 *separated from the service of such*
24 *agency; and*

1 (ii) to pay to the American Insti-
2 tute in Taiwan any additional ex-
3 penses incurred by the United States
4 Government in connection with the fel-
5 lowship if the detailee voluntarily sep-
6 arates from service with the sponsoring
7 agency before the end of the period for
8 which the detailee has agreed to con-
9 tinue in the service of such agency.

10 (iii) *EXCEPTION.*—The payment
11 agreed to under clause (i)(II) may not be
12 required of a detailee who leaves the service
13 of the sponsoring agency to enter into the
14 service of another agency of the United
15 States Government unless the head of the
16 sponsoring agency notifies the detailee be-
17 fore the effective date of entry into the serv-
18 ice of the other agency that payment will be
19 required under this subsection.

20 (B) *STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.*—
21 A detailee under this paragraph—

22 (i) is deemed, for the purpose of pre-
23 serving allowances, privileges, rights, senior-
24 ity, and other benefits, to be an employee of
25 the sponsoring agency;

1 (ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and
2 benefits from funds available to such agen-
3 cy, which is deemed to comply with section
4 5536 of title 5, United States Code; and

5 (iii) may be assigned to a position
6 with an entity described in paragraph
7 (2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position
8 does not involve—

9 (I) the taking of an oath of alle-
10 giance to another government; or

11 (II) the acceptance of compensa-
12 tion or other benefits from any foreign
13 government by such detailee.

14 (C) *RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING*
15 *AGENCY.*—

16 (i) *IN GENERAL.*—The agency of the
17 United States Government from which a
18 detailee is detailed should provide the fellow
19 allowances and benefits that are consistent
20 with Department of State Standardized
21 Regulations or other applicable rules and
22 regulations, including—

23 (I) a living quarters allowance to
24 cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;

1 (II) a cost of living allowance to
2 cover any possible higher costs of living
3 in Taiwan;

4 (III) a temporary quarters sub-
5 sistence allowance for up to seven days
6 if the fellow is unable to find housing
7 immediately upon arriving in Taiwan;

8 (IV) an education allowance to
9 assist parents in providing the fellow's
10 minor children with educational serv-
11 ices ordinarily provided without charge
12 by public schools in the United States;

13 (V) moving expenses to transport
14 personal belongings of the fellow and
15 his or her family in their move to Tai-
16 wan, which is comparable to the allow-
17 ance given for American Institute in
18 Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan;
19 and

20 (VI) an economy-class airline
21 ticket to and from Taiwan for each fel-
22 low and the fellow's immediate family.

23 (ii) *MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.*—The
24 American Institute in Taiwan and its im-
25 plementing partner, with the approval of

1 *the Department of State, may modify the*
2 *benefits set forth in clause (i) if such modi-*
3 *fication is warranted by fiscal cir-*
4 *cumstances.*

5 *(D) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The Amer-*
6 *ican Institute in Taiwan, the implementing*
7 *partner, and any governing authorities on Tai-*
8 *wan or nongovernmental entities in Taiwan at*
9 *which a fellow is detailed during the second year*
10 *of the fellowship may not be held responsible for*
11 *the pay, allowances, or any other benefit nor-*
12 *mally provided to the detailee.*

13 *(E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be de-*
14 *tailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimburse-*
15 *ment to the United States by the American Insti-*
16 *tute in Taiwan.*

17 *(F) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—*
18 *Detailees may be paid by the American Institute*
19 *in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits listed*
20 *in subparagraph (C).*

21 *(5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year be-*
22 *fore the sunset of the Program pursuant to paragraph*
23 *(2)(F), the Comptroller General of the United States*
24 *shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations*
25 *of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs*

1 of the House of Representatives a report that includes
2 the following:

3 (A) An analysis of United States Govern-
4 ment participants in the Program, including the
5 number of applicants and the number of fellow-
6 ships undertaken, and the places of employment.

7 (B) An assessment of the costs and benefits
8 for participants in the Program and for the
9 United States Government of such fellowships.

10 (C) An analysis of the financial impact of
11 the fellowship on United States Government of-
12 fices that have detailed fellows to participate in
13 the Program.

14 (D) Recommendations, if any, on how to
15 improve the Program.

16 (6) FUNDING.—

17 (A) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
18 TIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated
19 to the American Institute in Taiwan—

20 (i) for fiscal year 2022, \$2,900,000, of
21 which \$500,000 should be made available to
22 an appropriate implementing partner to
23 launch the Program; and

24 (ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc-
25 ceeding fiscal year, \$2,400,000.

1 (B) *PRIVATE SOURCES.*—*The implementing*
2 *partner selected to implement the Program may*
3 *accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of*
4 *services or property in carrying out such pro-*
5 *gram, subject to the review and approval of the*
6 *American Institute in Taiwan.*

7 **SEC. 213. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL**
8 **AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PA-**
9 **CIFIC.**

10 (a) *FINDINGS.*—*Congress makes the following findings:*

11 (1) *In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State*
12 *allocated \$1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in*
13 *bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources, in-*
14 *cluding as authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia*
15 *Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–*
16 *409; 132 Stat. 5391), and \$798,000,000 in the fiscal*
17 *year 2020 diplomatic engagement budget. These*
18 *amounts represent only 5 percent of the diplomatic*
19 *engagement budget and only 4 percent of the total De-*
20 *partment of State-USAID budget.*

21 (2) *Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engage-*
22 *ment budget and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific*
23 *averaged only 5 percent of the total, while foreign as-*
24 *stance resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.*

1 (3) *In 2020, the Department of State began a*
2 *process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure*
3 *that its personnel footprint matches the demands of*
4 *great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pa-*
5 *cific.*

6 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
7 *that—*

8 (1) *the size of the United States diplomatic corps*
9 *must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging*
10 *challenges of the 21st century, including those in the*
11 *Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere;*

12 (2) *robust Chinese-language skills are necessary*
13 *for the success of the United States diplomatic corps*
14 *and integral to its ability to meet national security*
15 *objectives;*

16 (3) *the increase must be designed to meet the ob-*
17 *jectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on*
18 *strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of*
19 *countries that adhere to and uphold the rules-based*
20 *international order; and*

21 (4) *the increase must be implemented with a*
22 *focus on increased numbers of economic, political, and*
23 *public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative*
24 *increase of at least 200 Foreign Service officer gener-*
25 *alists, to—*

1 (A) *advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade*
2 *and open investment environments for United*
3 *States entities, and engaged in increased com-*
4 *mercial diplomacy in key markets;*

5 (B) *better articulate and explain United*
6 *States policies, strengthen civil society and*
7 *democratic principles, enhance reporting on glob-*
8 *al activities, promote people-to-people exchanges,*
9 *and advance United States influence; and*

10 (C) *increase capacity at small- and me-*
11 *dium-sized embassies and consulates in the Indo-*
12 *Pacific and other regions around the world, as*
13 *necessary.*

14 (c) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of*
15 *the United States to—*

16 (1) *ensure Department of State funding levels*
17 *and personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the*
18 *region’s high degree of importance and significance to*
19 *United States political, economic, and security inter-*
20 *ests; and*

21 (2) *increase diplomatic engagement and foreign*
22 *assistance funding and the quantity of personnel*
23 *dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the*
24 *Department of State’s total budget.*

1 (d) *ACTION PLAN.*—Not later than 180 days after the
2 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
3 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees
4 of Congress an action plan that includes the following ele-
5 ments:

6 (1) *Identification of requirements to advance*
7 *United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific*
8 *and the personnel and budgetary resources for the De-*
9 *partment of State needed to satisfy such objectives, as-*
10 *suming an unconstrained resource environment.*

11 (2) *A plan to increase the portion of the Depart-*
12 *ment’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms*
13 *of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and*
14 *security assistance.*

15 (3) *A plan to increase the number of positions*
16 *at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with*
17 *responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a*
18 *description of increases at each post or bureau, a*
19 *breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of*
20 *how such increases in personnel will advance United*
21 *States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.*

22 (4) *A plan to increase the number of Chinese-*
23 *language speakers and translation specialists at posts*
24 *in the Indo-Pacific region and within bureau offices*

1 *with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, in-*
2 *cluding in INR.*

3 (5) *A description of any staffing or other train-*
4 *ing or personnel reforms that may be required to*
5 *quickly increase departmental capacity to address the*
6 *inter-disciplinary, interconnected opportunities and*
7 *challenges presented in the Indo-Pacific, including*
8 *but not limited to issues related to climate change,*
9 *public health, supply chains, cybersecurity, and dig-*
10 *ital technology issues.*

11 (6) *Defined concrete and annual benchmarks*
12 *that the Department will meet in implementing the*
13 *action plan.*

14 (7) *A description of any barriers to imple-*
15 *menting the action plan and recommendations to ad-*
16 *dress these barriers, noting whether additional au-*
17 *thorities or resources from Congress is needed to ad-*
18 *dress these barriers.*

19 (e) *UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 180*
20 *days after the submission of the action plan described in*
21 *subsection (d) for not more than 3 years, the Secretary of*
22 *State shall submit an update and brief the appropriate con-*
23 *gressional committees on the implementation of such action*
24 *plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assess-*
25 *ment of benchmarks reached.*

1 (f) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There is*
2 *authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022,*
3 *\$2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assistance*
4 *resources to carry out the purposes of part I and chapter*
5 *4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.*
6 *2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and*
7 *\$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the*
8 *Indo-Pacific region.*

9 (g) *INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU-*
10 *ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.*—
11 *Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (f)*
12 *include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to*
13 *section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of*
14 *2018 (Public Law 115–409).*

15 (h) *BENCHMARKS UPDATE.*—*Not later than 2 years*
16 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary*
17 *of State shall report to the appropriate congressional com-*
18 *mittees on the extent to which the strategic objectives de-*
19 *scribed in the action plan in subsection (d) have been satis-*
20 *fied or progress toward such satisfaction has been made.*

21 **SEC. 214. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS**
22 **CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING.**

23 (a) *CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND*
24 *SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.*—*Not later than 180*
25 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-*

1 *retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the*
2 *appropriate congressional committees a written report de-*
3 *tailing—*

4 (1) *a description of United States Government*
5 *efforts to gain a commitment from the Government of*
6 *the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to submit un-*
7 *regulated fentanyl precursors such as 4-AP to con-*
8 *trols;*

9 (2) *a plan for future steps the United States*
10 *Government will take to urge the PRC to combat il-*
11 *licit fentanyl production and trafficking originating*
12 *in the PRC;*

13 (3) *an assessment of the intersection between il-*
14 *licit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and il-*
15 *licit environmental trade and possible relationships of*
16 *trade-based money laundering; and*

17 (4) *an assessment of the intersection between il-*
18 *licit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and*
19 *counterfeit medicines and medical supplies in the*
20 *United States.*

21 (b) *FORM OF REPORT.*—*The report required under*
22 *subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with*
23 *a classified annex.*

1 **SEC. 215. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVEST-**
2 **MENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF**
3 **INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT**
4 **ACT OF 2018.**

5 (a) *APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT*
6 *OF 1990.*—Section 1421(c) of the *Better Utilization of In-*
7 *vestments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C.*
8 *9621(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:*

9 “(7) *APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT RE-*
10 *FORM ACT OF 1990.*—

11 “(A) *IN GENERAL.*—Subject to subpara-
12 *graphs (B) and (C), support provided under*
13 *paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be*
14 *considered to be a Federal credit program that is*
15 *subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990*
16 *(2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of applying*
17 *the requirements of such Act to such support.*

18 “(B) *DETERMINATION OF COST.*—

19 “(i) *IN GENERAL.*—For purposes of
20 *section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform*
21 *Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5) et seq.) the*
22 *cost of support provided under paragraph*
23 *(1) with respect to a project shall be the net*
24 *present value, at the time when funds are*
25 *disbursed to provide the support, of the fol-*
26 *lowing estimated cash flows:*

1 “(I) *The purchase price of the*
2 *support.*

3 “(II) *Dividends, redemptions, and*
4 *other shareholder distributions during*
5 *the term of the support.*

6 “(III) *Proceeds received upon a*
7 *sale, redemption, or other liquidation*
8 *of the support.*

9 “(IV) *Adjustments for risk of esti-*
10 *mated losses, if any.*

11 “(i) *CHANGES IN TERMS INCLUDED.—*
12 *The estimated cash flows described in sub-*
13 *clauses (I) through (IV) of clause (i) shall*
14 *include the effects of changes in terms re-*
15 *sulting from the exercise of options included*
16 *in the agreement to provide the support.*

17 “(C) *REESTIMATE OF COST.—When the esti-*
18 *mated cost of support provided under paragraph*
19 *(1) with respect to a project made in a single fis-*
20 *cal year is reestimated in a subsequent year, the*
21 *difference between the reestimated cost and the*
22 *previous cost estimate shall be paid from the bal-*
23 *ances available in the Corporate Capital Account*
24 *established under section 1434.”.*

1 (b) *MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.*—Section 1433
2 *of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Develop-*
3 *ment Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking*
4 *“\$60,000,000,000” and inserting “\$100,000,000,000”.*

5 (c) *FUNDING FOR CORPORATE CAPITAL ACCOUNT.*—
6 *Section 1434(b) of the Better Utilization of Investments*
7 *Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9634(b))*
8 *is amended—*

9 (1) *in paragraph (5), by striking “and” at the*
10 *end;*

11 (2) *by redesignating paragraph (6) as para-*
12 *graph (7); and*

13 (3) *by inserting after paragraph (5) the fol-*
14 *lowing:*

15 *“(6) receipts of reestimated costs received pursu-*
16 *ant to section 1421(c); and”.*

17 (d) *REPORT.*—*Not later than 180 days after the date*
18 *of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of*
19 *the United States International Development Finance Cor-*
20 *poration shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-*
21 *mittees and the Committee on Appropriations of the House*
22 *of Representatives and the Senate a report on—*

23 (1) *a plan to expand the Corporation’s financing*
24 *to support United States national security and devel-*
25 *opment priorities in critical regions; and*

1 (2) *the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic*
2 *resources that would be required in order to carry out*
3 *the plan required by this subsection.*

4 **SEC. 216. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES**
5 **INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE**
6 **CORPORATION FOR VACCINE MANUFAC-**
7 **TURING.**

8 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Development Finance Corpora-*
9 *tion is authorized to provide financing to entities in India*
10 *and in other less developed countries to increase vaccine*
11 *manufacturing capacity for the following purposes:*

12 (1) *Manufacturing Stringent Regulatory Author-*
13 *ization (SRA) or World Health Organization (WHO)*
14 *Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vaccines.*

15 (2) *Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency*
16 *Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms re-*
17 *lated to COVID–19.*

18 (3) *Manufacturing critical medical supplies*
19 *needed for preventing, detecting and treating COVID–*
20 *19, including ventilators, personal protective equip-*
21 *ment, oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.*

22 (b) *REPORTING REQUIREMENT.*—*Not later than 180*
23 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief*
24 *Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation,*

1 *in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide*
2 *a report to the appropriate congressional committees—*

3 *(1) outlining the countries where DFC financing*
4 *could be most impactful for vaccine manufacturing*
5 *and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 billion*
6 *COVID–19 vaccines by 2022;*

7 *(2) including a detailed explanation of the*
8 *United States and partner country interests served by*
9 *the United States providing support to such projects;*

10 *(3) including a detailed description of any sup-*
11 *port provided by other United States allies and part-*
12 *ners to expand the initiatives outlined in subsection*
13 *(a); and*

14 *(4) including a detailed description of any sup-*
15 *port provided by the People’s Republic of China in*
16 *support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a).*

17 *(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-*
18 *section (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a*
19 *classified annex if necessary.*

20 **SEC. 217. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS**
21 **ALIGN WITH AMERICAN STRATEGIC NA-**
22 **TIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJEC-**
23 **TIVES.**

24 *(a) FINDING.—With 276 embassies and other rep-*
25 *resentative offices globally, China now has more diplomatic*

1 posts around the world than any other country, including
2 the United States. Many of Beijing's new missions can be
3 found in countries that recently broke ties with Taiwan
4 (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the
5 Gambia, and São Tomé and Príncipe) or do not have any
6 United States diplomatic physical presence despite these
7 countries asking for increased United States engagement
8 and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica).

9 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress,
10 that the Department of State should conduct an assessment
11 of all United States diplomatic missions and posts to verify
12 such missions and posts align with United States national
13 security and economic interests, as well as ensuring that
14 these locations position the United States appropriately
15 with its strategic competitors to advance the national inter-
16 est in every country worldwide, including those countries
17 currently lacking any physical United States diplomatic
18 presence, whether an embassy, consulate general, or prin-
19 cipal officer post.

20 (c) *REPORTING.*—Not later than 180 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter
22 for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
23 priate congressional committees a report assessing the num-
24 ber, location, and objectives of each of its diplomatic mis-
25 sions and posts worldwide, including an assessment of any

1 *gaps that exist compared to other country strategic competi-*
2 *tors. The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the heads*
3 *of other Federal departments and agencies having an over-*
4 *seas presence at any United States diplomatic mission or*
5 *post to ensure such assessment reflects all Federal Govern-*
6 *ment equities and viewpoints.*

7 **SEC. 218. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE**
8 **FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.**

9 *There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year*
10 *period beginning on October 1, 2021, \$105,500,000, to pro-*
11 *mote education, training, research, and foreign language*
12 *skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance*
13 *with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural*
14 *Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).*

15 **SEC. 219. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN-**
16 **TERING DISINFORMATION.**

17 *(a) AUTHORIZATION OF USAGM APPROPRIATIONS.—*
18 *There is authorized to be appropriated for the United States*
19 *Agency for Global Media \$100,000,000 for each of fiscal*
20 *years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and new programs*
21 *to support local media, build independent media, combat*
22 *CCP disinformation inside and outside of the People’s Re-*
23 *public of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship,*
24 *and monitor and evaluate such programs, of which—*

1 (1) *not less than \$50,000,000 shall be directed to*
2 *a grant to Radio Free Asia language services;*

3 (2) *not less than \$20,000,000 shall be made*
4 *available to serve populations in China through Man-*
5 *darin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language*
6 *services; and*

7 (3) *not less than \$5,500,000 shall be made avail-*
8 *able for digital media services—*

9 (A) *to counter propaganda of non-Chinese*
10 *populations in foreign countries; and*

11 (B) *to counter propaganda of Chinese popu-*
12 *lations in China through “Global Mandarin”*
13 *programming.*

14 (b) *SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of*
15 *State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for*
16 *Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Adminis-*
17 *trator of the United States Agency for International Devel-*
18 *opment, acting through the Assistant Administrator for De-*
19 *velopment, Democracy, and Innovation, shall jointly sup-*
20 *port and train foreign journalists on investigative tech-*
21 *niques necessary to ensure public accountability, promote*
22 *transparency, fight corruption, and support the ability of*
23 *the public to develop informed opinions about pressing*
24 *issues facing their countries.*

1 (c) *INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.*—*The Bureau of*
2 *Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to*
3 *support internet freedom programs.*

4 (d) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There is*
5 *authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State*
6 *and United States Agency for International Development*
7 *\$170,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026,*
8 *for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom,*
9 *training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appro-*
10 *priated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to re-*
11 *main available until expended and shall be in addition to*
12 *amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to support*
13 *press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.*

14 **SEC. 219A. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.**

15 (a) *FINDING.*—*Congress established the Global Engage-*
16 *ment Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts” of the*
17 *Federal Government to “recognize, understand, expose, and*
18 *counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and*
19 *disinformation globally”.*

20 (b) *EXTENSION.*—*Section 1287(j) of the National De-*
21 *fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C.*
22 *2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that is 8 years*
23 *after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting*
24 *“December 31, 2027”.*

1 (c) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
2 *that the Global Engagement Center should expand its co-*
3 *ordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through the*
4 *exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and*
5 *agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering*
6 *foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director*
7 *of National Intelligence and Special Operations Com-*
8 *mand’s Joint MISO Web Operations Center.*

9 (d) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
10 *authorized to be appropriated \$150,000,000 for fiscal year*
11 *2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign*
12 *state and non-state sponsored propaganda and*
13 *disinformation.*

14 **SEC. 219B. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PAN-**
15 **DEMIC.**

16 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
17 *that—*

18 (1) *it is critical to understand the origins of the*
19 *COVID-19 pandemic so the United States can better*
20 *prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health*
21 *threats in the future;*

22 (2) *given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic*
23 *on all Americans, the American people deserve to*
24 *know what information the United States Govern-*

1 *ment possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as ap-*
2 *propriate;*

3 *(3) it is critical for independent experts to have*
4 *full access to all pertinent human, animal, and envi-*
5 *ronmental data, biological sample, research, and per-*
6 *sonnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak rel-*
7 *evant to determining how this pandemic emerged;*

8 *(4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the*
9 *United States Government and 13 other foreign gov-*
10 *ernments that the international team of experts dis-*
11 *patched to the People’s Republic of China by the*
12 *World Health Organization (WHO) to study the ori-*
13 *gins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was “significantly de-*
14 *layed and lacked access to complete, original data*
15 *and samples”;*

16 *(5) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Direc-*
17 *tor-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom*
18 *Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative*
19 *team had encountered “difficulties” in accessing nec-*
20 *essary raw data, that “we have not yet found the*
21 *source of the virus”, and that “all hypotheses remain*
22 *on the table”;*

23 *(6) the G7 communique expressing support for*
24 *full implementation of the International Health Reg-*
25 *ulations, including “a timely, transparent, expert-led,*

1 *and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID–19*
2 *Origins study including, as recommended by the ex-*
3 *erts’ report, in China” is a valuable commitment by*
4 *the United States and its allies to investigating the*
5 *origins of COVID–19 in order to better prepare for*
6 *future pandemics; and*

7 *(7) Congress supports the effort announced by*
8 *President Biden, directing the intelligence community*
9 *to conduct a 90 day review to further analyze infor-*
10 *mation pointing to the origins of COVID–19.*

11 *(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days*
12 *after enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to*
13 *the appropriate committees of Congress a report consisting*
14 *of—*

15 *(1) an assessment of the most likely source or or-*
16 *igin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a detailed*
17 *review of all information the United States possesses*
18 *that it has identified as potentially relevant to the*
19 *source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including*
20 *zoonotic transmission and spillover, or other sources*
21 *of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on the in-*
22 *formation the United States Government has to date;*

23 *(2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and*

24 *(3) challenges identified to its ability to make*
25 *such an assessment.*

1 (c) *FORM.*—*The report required by subsection (b) shall*
2 *be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classi-*
3 *fied annex.*

4 (d) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
5 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
6 *of Congress” means—*

7 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
8 *Senate;*

9 (2) *the Select Committee on Intelligence of the*
10 *Senate;*

11 (3) *the Committee on Health, Education, Labor,*
12 *and Pensions of the Senate;*

13 (4) *the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-*
14 *sources of the Senate;*

15 (5) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
16 *House of Representatives;*

17 (6) *the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-*
18 *ligence of the House of Representatives; and*

19 (7) *the Committee on Energy and Commerce of*
20 *the House of Representatives.*

21 **SEC. 219C. EXTENSION OF ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE**

22 **ACT OF 2018.**

23 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
24 *that—*

1 (1) *the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of*
2 *the world’s most dynamic democracies, economic op-*
3 *portunities, as well as many challenges to United*
4 *States interests and values as a result of the growth*
5 *in authoritarian governance in the region and by*
6 *broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the*
7 *changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to*
8 *human rights principles and obligations;*

9 (2) *the People’s Republic of China poses a par-*
10 *ticular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally*
11 *recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic*
12 *and trade practices, disregards international laws*
13 *and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign*
14 *influence operations, and enables global digital*
15 *authoritarianism;*

16 (3) *the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018*
17 *(“ARIA”) enhances the United States’ commitment in*
18 *the Indo-Pacific region by—*

19 (A) *expanding its defense cooperation with*
20 *its allies and partners;*

21 (B) *investing in democracy and the protec-*
22 *tion of human rights;*

23 (C) *engaging in cybersecurity initiatives;*
24 *and*

1 (D) supporting people-to-people engagement
2 and other shared priorities; and

3 (4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific
4 Strategy Report concludes that ARIA “enshrines a
5 generational whole-of-government policy framework
6 that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and
7 open Indo-Pacific region”.

8 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—*The Asia*
9 *Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409)*
10 *is amended—*

11 (1) in section 201(b), by striking
12 “\$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019
13 through 2023” and inserting “\$2,000,000,000 for each
14 of fiscal years 2022 through 2026”;

15 (2) in section 215(b), by striking “2023” and in-
16 serting “2026”;

17 (3) in section 306(a)—

18 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “5 years”
19 and inserting “8 years”; and

20 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking “2023”
21 and inserting “2026”;

22 (4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking “2023” and
23 inserting “2026”;

24 (5) in section 410—

1 (A) in subsection (c), by striking “2023”
2 and inserting “2026”; and

3 (B) in subsection (d), in the matter pre-
4 ceding paragraph (1), by striking “2023” and
5 inserting “2026”; and

6 (6) in section 411, by striking “2023” and in-
7 serting “2026”.

8 **SEC. 219D. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AF-**
9 **RICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB-**
10 **BEAN.**

11 (a) *STRATEGY REQUIRED.*—

12 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*The President shall establish*
13 *United States strategies to promote, facilitate, and in-*
14 *crease trade and investment and development in Afri-*
15 *ca and Latin America and the Caribbean.*

16 (2) *FOCUS OF STRATEGY.*—*The strategy required*
17 *by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing two-way*
18 *trade and investment with Africa and Latin America*
19 *and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real dollar value*
20 *by the date that is 5 years after the date of the enact-*
21 *ment of this Act.*

22 (3) *SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.*—

23 (A) *UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO PRO-*
24 *MOTE TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AF-*
25 *RICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN.*—

1 *Not later than 180 days after the date of the en-*
2 *actment of this Act, the President, in consulta-*
3 *tion with the heads of the relevant Federal de-*
4 *partments and agencies, shall submit to the ap-*
5 *propriate congressional committees and make*
6 *publicly available a government-wide strategy*
7 *for Africa, to be known as the Prosper Africa*
8 *Strategy, and for Latin America and the Carib-*
9 *bean, that provides detailed descriptions of how*
10 *the United States intends to fulfill the policy ob-*
11 *jectives described in paragraph (2). The strate-*
12 *gies shall—*

13 *(i) support and be aligned with other*
14 *existing United States Government strate-*
15 *gies; and*

16 *(ii) include specific and measurable*
17 *goals, benchmarks, performance metrics,*
18 *timetables, and monitoring and evaluation*
19 *plans to ensure the accountability and effec-*
20 *tiveness of all policies and initiatives car-*
21 *ried out under the strategy.*

22 *(B) SPECIFIC PLANS FOR DEPARTMENTS*
23 *AND AGENCIES.—The strategies submitted pursu-*
24 *ant to subparagraph (A) shall also include spe-*
25 *cific implementation plans, in coordination with*

1 *the recommendations and activities of the Eco-*
2 *nomie Diplomacy Action Group under section*
3 *708 of the Championing American Business*
4 *Through Diplomacy Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C.*
5 *9904), from each of the relevant Federal depart-*
6 *ments and agencies that describes—*

7 *(i) the anticipated contributions of the*
8 *department or agency, including technical,*
9 *financial, and in-kind contributions, to im-*
10 *plement the strategies;*

11 *(ii) the efforts of the department or*
12 *agency to ensure that the policies and ini-*
13 *tiatives carried out pursuant to the strate-*
14 *gies are designed to achieve maximum im-*
15 *pact and effectiveness; and*

16 *(iii) recommendations on necessary re-*
17 *sources, including staffing, to expand efforts*
18 *to promote trade and investment between*
19 *the United States and Africa, and the*
20 *United States and Latin America and the*
21 *Caribbean.*

22 *(C) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The*
23 *strategies submitted pursuant to subparagraph*
24 *(A) shall include plans for coordinating with rel-*
25 *evant departments and agencies the implementa-*

1 *tion of agency-specific plans described in sub-*
2 *paragraph (B), particularly as it relates to ad-*
3 *vancing two-way trade and investment trans-*
4 *actions and business enabling environment re-*
5 *forms.*

6 *(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the sub-*
7 *mission of the strategies required by subsection (a)(3), and*
8 *annually thereafter until 2026, the President shall submit*
9 *to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in co-*
10 *ordination with the report required by section 707 of the*
11 *Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act*
12 *of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9903) that—*

13 *(1) summarizes and evaluates the implementa-*
14 *tion of United States diplomatic efforts and foreign*
15 *assistance programs, projects, and activities to ad-*
16 *vance the policy objectives set forth in subsection*
17 *(a)(2);*

18 *(2) describes the nature and extent of the coordi-*
19 *nation among the relevant Federal departments and*
20 *agencies, including summary of activities and engage-*
21 *ments of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group; and*

22 *(3) describes the monitoring and evaluation*
23 *tools, mechanisms, and indicators to assess progress*
24 *made on the policy objectives of this section.*

1 (c) *EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR AFRICA AND LATIN*
2 *AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT.*—
3 *The President shall designate an individual to serve as the*
4 *Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in*
5 *Africa, also known as the Prosper Africa Executive Direc-*
6 *tor, and an individual to serve as Executive Director for*
7 *Trade and Investment Strategy in Latin America and the*
8 *Caribbean to—*

9 (1) *oversee the development and implementation*
10 *of the strategies required by subsection (a); and*

11 (2) *coordinate developing and implementing the*
12 *strategy with the Office of the United States Trade*
13 *Representative, the Office of Management and Budget,*
14 *and the relevant departments and agencies.*

15 (d) *BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGES WITH AF-*
16 *RICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.*—*It is the*
17 *sense of Congress that, not later than one year after the*
18 *date of the enactment of this Act, high-level officials of rel-*
19 *evant departments and agencies of the United States Gov-*
20 *ernment with responsibility for promoting trade, invest-*
21 *ment, financing, and development should conduct joint ac-*
22 *tivities to advance the strategies described in subsection(a),*
23 *including business development exchanges with public and*
24 *private sector representatives from Africa and Latin Amer-*

1 *ica, and the Caribbean who are focused on promoting two-*
2 *way trade and investment.*

3 *(e) TRAINING, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND IN-*
4 *FORMATION SHARING.—The President shall develop a*
5 *plan—*

6 *(1) to standardize the training received by*
7 *United States and Foreign Commercial Service offi-*
8 *cers, economic officers of the Department of State,*
9 *and economic officers of the United States Agency for*
10 *International Development with respect to the pro-*
11 *grams and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of*
12 *the United States, the United States International*
13 *Development Finance Corporation, the Small Busi-*
14 *ness Administration, and the United States Trade*
15 *and Development Agency; and*

16 *(2) to ensure that—*

17 *(A) not later than one year after the date*
18 *of the enactment of this Act—*

19 *(i) all personnel referred to in para-*
20 *graph (1) receive the training described in*
21 *that paragraph; and*

22 *(ii) relevant departments and agencies*
23 *share information on trade and investment*
24 *transactions facilitated by the United States*

1 *Government and funded by the public or*
2 *private sector;*

3 *(B) not later than 60 days after the date of*
4 *the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of*
5 *USAID and the Chief Executive Officer of DFC*
6 *shall develop a plan to enhance coordination and*
7 *expedite information sharing that includes—*

8 *(i) a process for sharing of information*
9 *in a timely fashion, and at least monthly,*
10 *on—*

11 *(I) active and early stage leads on*
12 *transactions initiated, promoted, or fa-*
13 *cilitated by DFC;*

14 *(II) transactions deemed ineligible*
15 *for DFC support or not being pursued*
16 *by DFC for other reasons; and*

17 *(III) transaction opportunities*
18 *identified by USAID or other relevant*
19 *United States departments and agen-*
20 *cies submitted for DFC consideration;*
21 *and*

22 *(ii) any training required for DFC,*
23 *USAID, or other interagency staff to imple-*
24 *ment the plan;*

1 (C) *the Executive Directors and their ap-*
2 *pointed staff shall be responsible for coordinating*
3 *implementation of this plan; and*

4 (D) *DFC and USAID shall, in consultation*
5 *with the Executive Directors and Congress, iden-*
6 *tify targets for DFC's financial commitments*
7 *and any private capital mobilized to finalize a*
8 *transaction.*

9 (f) *DATA SHARING PLATFORM.—*

10 (1) *ESTABLISHMENT.—The Administrator of*
11 *USAID shall, in consultation with the Executive Di-*
12 *rectors and relevant department and agencies, estab-*
13 *lish an interoperable digital platform maintained by*
14 *the staff of the Executive Directors to—*

15 (A) *facilitate interagency information shar-*
16 *ing and collaboration on trade and investment*
17 *transactions; and*

18 (B) *ensure relevant department and agen-*
19 *cies use such platform to review, track, and de-*
20 *velop consensus on transactions and their rel-*
21 *ative priorities.*

22 (2) *COORDINATION.—The Executive Directors*
23 *shall coordinate regularly with the leadership of rel-*
24 *evant Federal department and agencies to—*

25 (A) *advance and finalize transactions; or*

1 (B) provide a written justification for any
2 transaction deemed ineligible for United States
3 Government financing under existing authori-
4 ties.

5 (g) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

6 (1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
7 *TEES.*—*The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
8 *tees” means—*

9 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
10 *the Senate;*

11 (B) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
12 *Senate;*

13 (C) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
14 *House of Representatives; and*

15 (D) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
16 *House of Representatives.*

17 (2) *RELEVANT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND*
18 *AGENCIES.*—*The term “relevant Federal departments*
19 *and agencies” includes—*

20 (A) *the Department of State;*

21 (B) *the Department of the Treasury;*

22 (C) *the Department of Commerce;*

23 (D) *the United States Agency for Inter-*
24 *national Development (USAID);*

25 (E) *the Millennium Challenge Corporation;*

1 (F) the United States International Devel-
2 opment Finance Corporation (DFC);

3 (G) the United States Trade and Develop-
4 ment Agency;

5 (H) the United States African Development
6 Foundation;

7 (I) the Export Import Bank;

8 (J) the Small Business Administration;

9 (K) the Department of Agriculture; and

10 (L) any other entity deemed appropriate by
11 the President.

12 (3) *EARLY-STAGE LEAD.*—The term “early-stage
13 lead” means a prospective transaction which is being
14 evaluated by DFC staff, prior to DFC holding an in-
15 ternal screening meeting or accepting an application.

16 (4) *TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT.*—The
17 term “two-way trade and investment” means United
18 States exports to Africa and Latin America and the
19 Caribbean, United States public and private invest-
20 ment in Africa and Latin America and the Carib-
21 bean, exports from Africa and Latin America and the
22 Caribbean to the United States, and Africa and Latin
23 America and the Caribbean investment in the United
24 States.

1 **SEC. 219E. CHINA WATCHER PROGRAM.**

2 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, acting*
3 *through the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and*
4 *Pacific Affairs, and in coordination with relevant offices*
5 *and bureaus of the Department of State, shall implement*
6 *a “China Watcher Program” within the Department of*
7 *State to—*

8 (1) *monitor and combat Chinese malign influ-*
9 *ence across economic and political sectors in foreign*
10 *countries; and*

11 (2) *augment the capacity of United States Gov-*
12 *ernment engagement with foreign countries and re-*
13 *gional and international economic and political orga-*
14 *nizations and institutions relating to policy coordina-*
15 *tion regarding China and such Chinese malign influ-*
16 *ence.*

17 (b) *PLACEMENT.*—*In carrying out the China Watcher*
18 *Program under this section, the Secretary of State shall*
19 *place Foreign Service officers in positions in select United*
20 *States diplomatic and consular posts, at the discretion of*
21 *the Secretary of State, to engage both Chinese and third-*
22 *country nationals, including host governments, on the mat-*
23 *ters described in subsection (a).*

24 (c) *ANNUAL REPORT.*—*Each diplomatic or consular*
25 *post with a China Watcher Program shall produce an an-*
26 *nual report outlining the steps each such post has taken*

1 *to advance the mission, trends observed, and the nature and*
2 *extent of Chinese foreign direct investment and influence*
3 *in key economic and political sectors, including technology,*
4 *manufacturing, transportation, energy, metals, agriculture,*
5 *and real estate.*

6 (d) *AUTHORIZATION OF ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS.—*
7 *There is authorized to be appropriated \$5,000,000 for fiscal*
8 *year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter to carry out this*
9 *section.*

10 **SEC. 219F. LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHINESE**
11 **LANGUAGE.**

12 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
13 *that—*

14 (1) *as a substitute to Confucius Institutes, the*
15 *United States Government should invest heavily into*
16 *alternative programs and institutions that ensure*
17 *there remains a robust pipeline of Americans learning*
18 *China’s many languages; and*

19 (2) *in a 21st century that will be dominated by*
20 *a strategic competition between the United States and*
21 *China, it is in the national security interests of the*
22 *United States to ensure that Americans continue to*
23 *invest in Chinese language skills, as well as Tibetan,*
24 *Uyghur, and Mongolian languages, while ensuring*

1 *they can do so in a context free of malign political*
2 *influence from foreign state actors.*

3 **(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR**
4 **STUDY OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.**—*The Secretary of*
5 *State shall establish in the Department of State the “Liu*
6 *Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language” to fund*
7 *study by United States persons of Mandarin and Cantonese*
8 *Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contem-*
9 *porary spoken languages of China, abroad or in the United*
10 *States.*

11 **(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—*There are*
12 *authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State*
13 *for fiscal year 2021 and every fiscal year thereafter,*
14 *\$10,000,000 to carry out the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study*
15 *of the Chinese Language.*

16 **(d) REQUIRED ACTIVITIES.**—*Amounts authorized to be*
17 *appropriated pursuant to subsection (c) shall—*

18 **(1)** *be designed to advance the national security*
19 *and foreign policy interests of the United States, as*
20 *determined by the Secretary of State;*

21 **(2)** *favor funding mechanisms that can maxi-*
22 *mize the total number of United States persons given*
23 *the opportunity to acquire full conversational lin-*
24 *guistic proficiency in Mandarin and Cantonese Chi-*

1 *nese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contem-*
2 *porary spoken languages of China;*

3 *(3) favor funding mechanisms that provide op-*
4 *portunities for such language study to areas tradi-*
5 *tionally under-served by such opportunities;*

6 *(4) be shaped by an ongoing consultative process*
7 *taking into account design inputs of—*

8 *(A) civil society institutions, including Chi-*
9 *nese diaspora community organizations;*

10 *(B) language experts in Mandarin and*
11 *Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian,*
12 *and other contemporary spoken languages of*
13 *China;*

14 *(C) organizations representing historically*
15 *disadvantaged socioeconomic groups in the*
16 *United States; and*

17 *(D) human rights organizations; and*

18 *(5) favor opportunities to fund the study of Man-*
19 *darin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mon-*
20 *golian, and other contemporary spoken languages of*
21 *China at Alaska Native-serving institutions, Asian*
22 *American and Native American Pacific Islander-serv-*
23 *ing institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions, his-*
24 *torically Black college or universities, Native Amer-*
25 *ican-serving nontribal institutions, Native Hawaiian-*

1 *serving institutions, Predominantly Black institu-*
2 *tions, Tribal Colleges or Universities.*

3 *(e) REPORT.—*

4 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after*
5 *the date of the enactment of this Act and annually*
6 *thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in*
7 *consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal*
8 *departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall sub-*
9 *mit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House*
10 *of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Re-*
11 *lations of the Senate a report detailing activities and*
12 *disbursements made to carry out this Act over the im-*
13 *mediately preceding academic year.*

14 *(2) REPORT CONTENTS.—Each report required*
15 *under paragraph (1) shall include details on—*

16 *(A) which institutions, programs, or entities*
17 *received funds through the Liu Xiaobo Fund for*
18 *Study of the Chinese Language;*

19 *(B) funds distribution disaggregated by in-*
20 *stitution, program, or entity, including identi-*
21 *fication of the State or country in which such*
22 *institution, program, or entity is located;*

23 *(C) the number of United States persons*
24 *who received language study under the Liu*
25 *Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language,*

1 *and the average amount disbursed per person for*
2 *such study;*

3 *(D) a comparative analysis of per dollar*
4 *program effectiveness and efficiency in allowing*
5 *United States persons to reach conversational*
6 *proficiency Mandarin or Cantonese Chinese, Ti-*
7 *betan, Uyghur, Mongolian, or other contem-*
8 *porary spoken languages of China;*

9 *(E) an analysis of which of the languages*
10 *referred to in subparagraph (D) were studied*
11 *through the funding from the Liu Xiaobo Fund*
12 *for Study of the Chinese Language; and*

13 *(F) any recommendations of the Secretary*
14 *of State for improvements to the authorities, pri-*
15 *orities, or management of the Liu Xiaobo Fund*
16 *for Study of the Chinese Language.*

17 *(f) INTERAGENCY FUNDS TRANSFERS AUTHORIZA-*
18 *TION.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Sec-*
19 *retary of State to carry out this Act are authorized to be*
20 *transferred to the heads of other appropriate Federal de-*
21 *partments and agencies for similar purposes, subject to*
22 *prior notification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of*
23 *the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign*
24 *Relations of the Senate. Such heads shall consult with the*

1 *Secretary in the preparation of the report required under*
2 *subsection (e).*

3 (g) *LIMITATIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appro-*
4 *priated to carry out this Act may only be made available*
5 *for the costs of language study funded and administration*
6 *incurred by the Department of State or programs carried*
7 *out by the Department of State (or by another Federal de-*
8 *partment or agency pursuant to subsection (f)) to carry out*
9 *this section.*

10 (h) *DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

11 (1) *ALASKA NATIVE-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The*
12 *term “Alaska Native-serving institution” has the*
13 *meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the*
14 *Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).*

15 (2) *ASIAN AMERICAN AND NATIVE AMERICAN PA-*
16 *CIFIC ISLANDER-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term*
17 *“Asian American and Native American Pacific Is-*
18 *lander-serving institution” has the meaning given*
19 *such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education*
20 *Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(e)).*

21 (3) *HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term*
22 *“Hispanic-serving institution” has the meaning given*
23 *such term in section 502 of the Higher Education Act*
24 *of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a).*

1 (4) *HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNIVER-*
2 *SITY.—The term “historically Black college or univer-*
3 *sity” means a part B institution described in section*
4 *322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (22*
5 *U.S.C. 1061(2)).*

6 (5) *NATIVE AMERICAN-SERVING NONTRIBAL IN-*
7 *STITUTION.—The term “Native American-serving*
8 *nontribal institution” has the meaning given such*
9 *term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act*
10 *of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).*

11 (6) *NATIVE HAWAIIAN-SERVING INSTITUTION.—*
12 *The term “Native Hawaiian-serving institution” has*
13 *the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the*
14 *Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).*

15 (7) *PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTION.—The*
16 *term “Predominantly Black institution” has the*
17 *meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the*
18 *Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).*

19 (8) *TRIBAL COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The term*
20 *“Tribal College or University” has the meaning given*
21 *such term in section 316(b) of the Higher Education*
22 *Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)).*

1 **SEC. 219G. OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE**
2 **THROUGH THE AMERICAN RESCUE PLAN ACT**
3 **OF 2021.**

4 (a) *AUTHORITIES AND CONDITIONS.*—Amounts au-
5 thorized and appropriated under title X of the American
6 Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117–2) to carry out
7 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.)
8 shall be subject to the applicable authorities and conditions
9 for funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assist-
10 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and division K
11 of Public Law 116–260.

12 (b) *OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.*—Amounts au-
13 thorized and appropriated under sections 10001 and 10002
14 of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 may be transferred
15 to the Inspector General of the Department of State and
16 the Inspector General of the United States Agency for Inter-
17 national Development to expand the capacity of such In-
18 spectors General to conduct effective oversight of the foreign
19 assistance programs and activities under such Act.

20 (c) *UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL*
21 *FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA*
22 *COVID–19 RESPONSE MECHANISM.*—United States con-
23 tributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
24 and Malaria COVID–19 Response Mechanism under section
25 10003(a)(2) of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021—

1 (1) *shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner*
2 *that incentivizes other public and private donor con-*
3 *tributions; and*

4 (2) *shall be subject to the reporting and with-*
5 *holding requirements under subsections (c),*
6 *(d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C), (d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of*
7 *section 202 of the United States Leadership Against*
8 *HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003*
9 *(22 U.S.C. 7622).*

10 **SEC. 219H. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO VACCINE BRAND-**
11 **ING.**

12 *The President shall ensure that every vaccine donated*
13 *or otherwise procured and financed by the United States*
14 *Government shall be clearly branded with the United States*
15 *flag.*

16 ***Subtitle B—International Security***
17 ***Matters***

18 **SEC. 221. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**

19 *In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of*
20 *Congress” means—*

21 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
22 *Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on*
23 *Appropriations of the Senate; and*

1 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
2 *mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap-*
3 *propriations of the House of Representatives.*

4 **SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILI-**
5 **TARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE**
6 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

7 *There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fis-*
8 *cal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department*
9 *of State, out of amounts authorized to be appropriated or*
10 *otherwise made available for assistance under chapter 5 of*
11 *part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.*
12 *2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education*
13 *and training assistance), \$45,000,000 for activities in the*
14 *Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this subtitle. Funds*
15 *may be disbursed only after vetting of individuals proposed*
16 *to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and 620M of*
17 *the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and*
18 *2378d).*

19 **SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM**
20 **OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-**
21 **WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC**
22 **AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE**
23 **SOUTH CHINA SEA.**

24 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—*

1 (1) *condemns coercive and threatening actions or*
2 *the use of force to impede freedom of navigation oper-*
3 *ations in international airspace by military or civil-*
4 *ian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize*
5 *the Indo-Pacific region;*

6 (2) *urges the Government of the People’s Repub-*
7 *lic of China to refrain from implementing the de-*
8 *clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification*
9 *Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea,*
10 *where contrary to freedom of overflight in inter-*
11 *national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar*
12 *provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re-*
13 *gion;*

14 (3) *reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of*
15 *Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on*
16 *both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s*
17 *claims to offshore resources across most of the South*
18 *China Sea are unlawful; and*

19 (4) *condemns the People’s Republic of China for*
20 *failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Ar-*
21 *bitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as a*
22 *state party to the United Nations Convention on the*
23 *Law of the Sea.*

24 (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of*
25 *the United States to—*

1 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
2 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
3 ing with respect to the mutual defense treaties with
4 Indo-Pacific allies;

5 (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights,
6 freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace
7 above it, that are available to all countries, and op-
8 pose the militarization of new and reclaimed land
9 features in the South China Sea;

10 (3) continue certain policies with respect to the
11 PRC claims in the South China Sea, specifically—

12 (A) that PRC claims in the South China
13 Sea, including to offshore resources across most
14 of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

15 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a
16 maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in
17 areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration
18 found to be in the Philippines' Exclusive Eco-
19 nomic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

20 (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
21 yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived
22 from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands;
23 and

24 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial
25 or maritime claim to James Shoal;

1 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
2 destabilizing activities, including environmentally
3 harmful and provocative land reclamation;

4 (5) ensure that disputes are managed without in-
5 timidation, coercion, or force;

6 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust
7 claims in accordance with international law;

8 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and
9 maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-
10 torial seas, must derive from land features and other-
11 wise comport with international law;

12 (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-
13 tions covering disputed areas in the South China Sea,
14 regulations which have raised tensions in the region;

15 (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that
16 Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast
17 Asian claimant countries and does not serve as a ve-
18 hicle for the People's Republic of China to advance its
19 unlawful maritime claims;

20 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
21 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
22 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
23 done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is suf-
24 ficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the

1 *United States Armed Forces and the forces of other*
2 *countries, including the People’s Republic of China;*

3 *(11) support the development of regional institu-*
4 *tions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional*
5 *Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus,*
6 *the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN*
7 *Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in*
8 *the region and reinforce the role of international law;*

9 *(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships*
10 *with other countries in the region for maritime do-*
11 *main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-*
12 *forts by the United States Government to explore the*
13 *development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms*
14 *for a “common operating picture” in the South China*
15 *Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would*
16 *serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior*
17 *and deter risky and dangerous activities;*

18 *(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent*
19 *any other country from exercising its sovereign rights*
20 *to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)*
21 *and continental shelf by making claims to those areas*
22 *in the South China Sea that have no support in*
23 *international law; and*

24 *(14) assure the continuity of operations by the*
25 *United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including,*

1 *when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and*
2 *allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and over-*
3 *flight and other lawful uses of the sea.*

4 **SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-**
5 **PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS.**

6 *(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
7 *that—*

8 *(1) the Secretary of State should expand and*
9 *strengthen existing measures under the United States*
10 *Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capa-*
11 *bilities to allies and partners consistent with agreed-*
12 *on division of responsibility for alliance roles, mis-*
13 *sions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-*
14 *ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with*
15 *United States strategic imperatives;*

16 *(2) the United States should design for export to*
17 *Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical*
18 *to maintaining a favorable military balance in the*
19 *region, including long-range precision fires, air and*
20 *missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land*
21 *attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic sys-*
22 *tems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance*
23 *capabilities, and command and control systems con-*
24 *sistent with law, regulation, policy, and international*
25 *commitments;*

1 (3) *the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2);*

2
3
4
5 (4) *the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, should—*

6
7 (A) *urge allies and partners to invest in sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency requirements and avoid the need for accessing United States stocks in wartime; and*

8
9
10 (B) *cooperate with allies to deliver such munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies' capacity to produce such munitions; and*

11
12
13
14 (5) *it is in the United States interest to not authorize arms transfers or security cooperation to governments that demonstrate patterns of gross violations of human rights if such arms or security cooperation could be used to commit or support such violations.*

15
16
17
18
19 (b) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—*

20
21
22 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and*

1 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
2 *mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap-*
3 *propriations of the House of Representatives.*

4 (c) *REPORT.—*

5 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after*
6 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
7 *State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,*
8 *shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-*
9 *gress a report that describes United States priorities*
10 *for building more capable security partners in the*
11 *Indo-Pacific region.*

12 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-*
13 *quired under paragraph (1) shall—*

14 (A) *provide a priority list of defense and*
15 *military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and*
16 *partners must possess for the United States to be*
17 *able to achieve its military objectives in the*
18 *Indo-Pacific region;*

19 (B) *identify, from the list referred to in sub-*
20 *paragraph (A), the capabilities that are best pro-*
21 *vided, or can only be provided, by the United*
22 *States;*

23 (C) *identify—*

1 (i) actions required to expedite fielding
2 the capabilities identified in subparagraph
3 (B); and

4 (ii) steps needed to fully account for
5 and a plan to integrate all means of United
6 States foreign military sales, direct com-
7 mercial sales, security assistance, and all
8 applicable authorities of the Department of
9 State and the Department of Defense;

10 (D) assess the requirements for United
11 States security assistance, including Inter-
12 national Military Education and Training, in
13 the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means
14 to deliver critical partner capability require-
15 ments identified in subparagraph (B);

16 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet
17 the requirements for United States security as-
18 sistance, and identify resource gaps;

19 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
20 requirements for United States security assist-
21 ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re-
22 sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative
23 and policy barriers, and factors related to spe-
24 cific partner countries;

1 (G) identify limitations on the ability of the
2 United States to provide such capabilities, in-
3 cluding capabilities identified under subpara-
4 graph (B), because of existing United States
5 treaty obligations, United States policies, includ-
6 ing sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign As-
7 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and
8 2378d), or other regulations;

9 (H) recommend improvements to the process
10 for developing requirements for United States
11 partner capabilities; and

12 (I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
13 ommendations for infrastructure and posture,
14 based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

15 (3) *FORM.*—The report required under this sub-
16 section shall be unclassified, but may include a classi-
17 fied annex.

18 **SEC. 225. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE THREAT**
19 **POSED BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY**
20 **TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZA-**
21 **TION.**

22 *It is the policy of the United States to—*

23 (1) urge NATO allies to work closely with like-
24 minded partners, in particular with the European
25 Union, to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen

1 *resilience, maintain a technological edge, and address*
2 *the challenges to the rules-based international order*
3 *posed by the Chinese Communist Party;*

4 *(2) encourage NATO allies to explore how to*
5 *monitor and defend against any activity of the Chi-*
6 *nese Communist Party that could impact collective*
7 *defense, military readiness, or resilience in the Su-*
8 *preme Allied Commander Europe's Area of Responsi-*
9 *bility, including by identifying vulnerabilities of key*
10 *sectors and supply chains, in coordination with the*
11 *European Union;*

12 *(3) push for NATO allies to establish a consult-*
13 *ative body to bring together such allies, and other in-*
14 *stitutions and partners as relevant, to exchange infor-*
15 *mation, share experiences, and discuss all aspects of*
16 *such allies' security interests with respect to the Chi-*
17 *nese Communist Party; and*

18 *(4) prioritize urging all NATO allies to share the*
19 *burden that comes with collective security in an in-*
20 *creasingly complex security environment by reaching*
21 *by 2024 the pledge set at the 2014 Wales Summit to*
22 *spend two percent of GDP on defense spending and*
23 *20 percent of annual defense spending on major new*
24 *equipment.*

1 **SEC. 226. IDENTIFICATION OF PLA-SUPPORTED INSTITU-**
2 **TIONS.**

3 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 60 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
5 the Secretary of State shall publish and disseminate to
6 United States institutions and places of study a list identi-
7 fying the research, engineering, and scientific institutions
8 that the Secretary determines are affiliated with, or funded
9 by, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

10 (b) *FORM.*—The list published and disseminated under
11 subsection (a) shall be unclassified and publicly accessible,
12 but may include a classified annex.

13 ***Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies***
14 ***to Bolster American Power***

15 **SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.**

16 *Congress finds the following:*

17 (1) *Every UN member state is legally required to*
18 *finance the UN’s core budget in order to ensure that*
19 *these missions are properly resourced, and assessment*
20 *rates are renegotiated every three years by the UN*
21 *General Assembly.*

22 (2) *While the United States is the largest single*
23 *financial contributor to the UN system, the current*
24 *model is beneficial because it requires all UN member*
25 *states, no matter how big or small, to help shoulder*

1 *the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets at speci-*
2 *fied levels.*

3 (3) *Failing to meet our financial commitments*
4 *to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised*
5 *our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable*
6 *partner and is seeking to leverage its own contribu-*
7 *tions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in ways*
8 *that run counter to United States interests and val-*
9 *ues.*

10 (4) *The People's Republic of China is now the*
11 *second largest financial contributor to UN peace-*
12 *keeping, having gone from an assessment rate of just*
13 *3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent today, and*
14 *is the ninth largest troop-contributor to UN missions,*
15 *providing more personnel than the other four perma-*
16 *nent members of the Security Council combined.*

17 (5) *With greater engagement comes greater influ-*
18 *ence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their ex-*
19 *panded clout to push back against the human rights,*
20 *civilian protection, and gender-based violence aspects*
21 *of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United States*
22 *funding shortfalls as a pretext.*

23 (6) *The PRC has also used its growing clout to*
24 *fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals cur-*
25 *rently occupy the top posts of four of the UN's 15 spe-*

1 *lating to detail and transfer of Federal employees to*
2 *international organizations), to detail or transfer em-*
3 *ployees to relevant international organizations;*

4 *(4) the Secretary of State should assist the De-*
5 *partment of State and other Federal agencies in car-*
6 *rying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent;*

7 *(5) the Secretary of State should support quali-*
8 *fied American candidates in their bid to win election*
9 *to United Nations-related leadership positions; and*

10 *(6) the Secretary of State should support the*
11 *placement of Junior Professional Officers sponsored*
12 *by the United States in United Nations-affiliated*
13 *agencies.*

14 **SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NA-**
15 **TIONS.**

16 *(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is au-*
17 *thorized to establish within the Department of State’s Bu-*
18 *reau of International Organization Affairs an Office of*
19 *Multilateral Strategy and Personnel.*

20 *(b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection*
21 *(a) of this section shall be responsible for—*

22 *(1) promoting United States leadership and par-*
23 *ticipation in the United Nations system, with a focus*
24 *on issue areas where authoritarian nations are exer-*

1 *cising increased influence in and determining the*
2 *agenda of the United Nations system;*

3 *(2) establishing and implementing a standard*
4 *operating procedure for the promotion and efficient*
5 *tracking of United States citizen employment at the*
6 *United Nations and other international organizations*
7 *that includes Mission Geneva;*

8 *(3) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations*
9 *jobs and identifying qualified United States citizens*
10 *and other qualified nationals to promote for such po-*
11 *sitions;*

12 *(4) tracking leadership changes in United Na-*
13 *tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and*
14 *developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-*
15 *minded countries are assembled to ensure leadership*
16 *racers are not won by countries that do not share*
17 *United States interests;*

18 *(5) eliminating current barriers to the employ-*
19 *ment of United States citizens in the United Nations*
20 *Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and*

21 *(6) increasing the number of qualified United*
22 *States candidates for leadership and oversight posi-*
23 *tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-*
24 *grams, agencies, and at other international organiza-*
25 *tions.*

1 **SEC. 234. JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS.**

2 (a) *INCREASE IN JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER PO-*
3 *SITIONS.—The Secretary of State should increase the num-*
4 *ber of Junior Professional Officer positions sponsored by*
5 *the United States within the United Nations system.*

6 (b) *REPORT.—Not later than December 31 of each*
7 *year, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate*
8 *congressional committees information regarding the*
9 *amount of funding each bureau has designated during the*
10 *immediately preceding fiscal year for Junior Professional*
11 *Officer positions in the United Nations system and the*
12 *number of such positions that exist as of the end of the prior*
13 *fiscal year.*

14 **SEC. 235. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTER-**
15 **NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.**

16 (a) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
17 *date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter,*
18 *the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of*
19 *other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate,*
20 *shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional*
21 *committees a report on how many Federal employees are*
22 *currently detailed or transferred to an international orga-*
23 *nization during the immediately preceding 1-year period*
24 *and a strategy for increasing the number of Federal em-*
25 *ployees so detailed or transferred.*

1 (b) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—Each report re-
2 *quired by subsection (a) shall include the following:*

3 (1) *The number of Federal employees detailed or*
4 *transferred to an international organization under*
5 *section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and sub-*
6 *part C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relat-*
7 *ing to the detail and transfer of Federal employees to*
8 *international organizations), including—*

9 (A) *an identification of the Federal agency*
10 *from which such employees were detailed or*
11 *transferred; and*

12 (B) *an identification of the international*
13 *organizations to and from which such employees*
14 *have been so detailed or transferred.*

15 (2) *A list of international organizations to and*
16 *from which the United States previously detailed or*
17 *transferred Federal employees.*

18 ***Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to***
19 ***Bolster American Power***

20 ***SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH***
21 ***ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD.***

22 *It is the policy of the United States—*

23 (1) *to strengthen alliances and partnerships with*
24 *like-minded countries around the globe; and*

1 (2) *to work in collaboration with such allies and*
2 *partners—*

3 (A) *to address significant diplomatic, eco-*
4 *nomical, and military challenges posed by the Peo-*
5 *ple’s Republic of China (PRC);*

6 (B) *to deter the PRC from pursuing mili-*
7 *tary aggression;*

8 (C) *to promote the peaceful resolution of ter-*
9 *ritorial disputes in accordance with inter-*
10 *national law;*

11 (D) *to promote private sector-led long-term*
12 *economic development while countering efforts by*
13 *the Government of the PRC to leverage predatory*
14 *economic practices as a means of political and*
15 *economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and*
16 *beyond;*

17 (E) *to promote the values of democracy and*
18 *human rights, including through efforts to end*
19 *the repression by the PRC of political dissidents,*
20 *Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, Tibetan*
21 *Buddhists, Christians, and other ethnic minori-*
22 *ties;*

23 (F) *to respond to the crackdown by the*
24 *PRC, in contravention of the commitments made*
25 *under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984*

1 *and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legiti-*
2 *mate aspirations of the people of Hong Kong;*
3 *and*

4 *(G) to counter the PRC Government’s efforts*
5 *to spread disinformation in the PRC and beyond*
6 *with respect to its response to COVID–19.*

7 ***PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE***

8 ***SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED***
9 ***STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.***

10 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

11 *(1) the United States and Canada have a unique*
12 *relationship based on shared geography, extensive per-*
13 *sonal connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense*
14 *commitments, and a shared vision to uphold democ-*
15 *racy, human rights, and the rules based international*
16 *order established after World War II;*

17 *(2) the United States and Canada can better ad-*
18 *dress the People’s Republic of China’s economic, polit-*
19 *ical, and security influence through closer cooperation*
20 *on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship,*
21 *transparent practices in public procurement and in-*
22 *frastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and*
23 *connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations,*
24 *bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy,*
25 *good governance, and human rights;*

1 (3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United
2 States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives
3 to address border management, commercial and trade
4 relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with
5 respect to the People’s Republic of China, and
6 transnational challenges, including pandemics, energy
7 security, and environmental stewardship;

8 (4) the United States and Canada should en-
9 hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation,
10 influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-
11 ganda efforts;

12 (5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-
13 ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-
14 cations technology, extraction of natural resources,
15 and port infrastructure, pose national security risks
16 for the United States and Canada;

17 (6) the United States should share, as appro-
18 priate, intelligence gathered regarding—

19 (A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and

20 (B) the PRC government’s intentions with
21 respect to 5G expansion;

22 (7) the United States and Canada should con-
23 tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple-
24 ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada

1 *Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development*
2 *Collaboration; and*

3 (8) *the United States and Canada should*
4 *prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in*
5 *the Arctic, including by modernizing the North Amer-*
6 *ican Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) sensor*
7 *architecture to provide effective warning and tracking*
8 *of threats by peer competitors, including long-range*
9 *missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern*
10 *Hemisphere.*

11 **SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA'S ARBI-**
12 **TRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITI-**
13 **ZENS.**

14 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

15 (1) *the Government of the People's Republic of*
16 *China's apparent arbitrary detention and abusive*
17 *treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and*
18 *Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-*
19 *ernment of Canada's arrest of Meng Wanzhou is deep-*
20 *ly concerning;*

21 (2) *the Government of Canada has shown inter-*
22 *national leadership by—*

23 (A) *upholding the rule of law and com-*
24 *plying with its international legal obligations,*
25 *including obligations pursuant to the Extra-*

1 *dition Treaty Between the United States of*
2 *America and Canada, signed at Washington De-*
3 *cember 3, 1971; and*

4 *(B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-*
5 *bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,*
6 *which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the*
7 *European Union, and reaffirms well-established*
8 *prohibitions under international human rights*
9 *conventions against the arbitrary detention of*
10 *foreign nationals to be used as leverage in coun-*
11 *try-to-country relations; and*

12 *(3) the United States continues to join the Gov-*
13 *ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-*
14 *lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for*
15 *due process for Canadian national Robert*
16 *Schellenberg.*

17 **SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
18 **CANADA.**

19 *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
20 *date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit*
21 *to the appropriate congressional committees, and the Com-*
22 *mittees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of*
23 *Representatives, a strategy that describes how the United*
24 *States will enhance cooperation with the Government of*

1 *Canada in managing relations with the Government of the*
2 *People's Republic of China.*

3 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The strategy required under sub-*
4 *section (a) shall—*

5 (1) *identify key policy points of convergence and*
6 *divergence between the United States and Canada in*
7 *managing relations with the People's Republic of*
8 *China in the areas of technology, trade, economic*
9 *practices, cyber security, secure supply chains and*
10 *critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;*

11 (2) *include a description of United States devel-*
12 *opment and coordination efforts with Canadian coun-*
13 *terparts to enhance the cooperation between the*
14 *United States and Canada with respect to—*

15 (A) *managing economic relations with the*
16 *People's Republic of China;*

17 (B) *democracy and human rights in the*
18 *People's Republic of China;*

19 (C) *technology issues involving the People's*
20 *Republic of China;*

21 (D) *defense issues involving the People's Re-*
22 *public of China; and*

23 (E) *international law enforcement and*
24 *transnational organized crime issues;*

1 (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to
2 work with Canada to counter the People’s Republic of
3 China’s projection of an authoritarian governing
4 model around the world;

5 (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
6 cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-
7 nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to
8 Huawei’s 5G technology;

9 (5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—

10 (A) to advance joint United States-Cana-
11 dian priorities for responsible stewardship in the
12 Arctic Region; and

13 (B) to counter the People’s Republic of Chi-
14 na’s efforts to project political, economic, and
15 military influence into the Arctic Region; and

16 (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can-
17 ada to track and counter the People’s Republic of Chi-
18 na’s attempts to exert influence across the multilat-
19 eral system.

20 (c) *FORM.*—The strategy required under this section
21 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made
22 available to the public, but may include a classified annex,
23 if necessary.

24 (d) *CONSULTATION.*—Not later than 90 days after the
25 date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently

1 *than every 180 days thereafter for five years, the Secretary*
2 *of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional*
3 *committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the*
4 *Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the de-*
5 *velopment and implementation of the strategy required*
6 *under this section.*

7 **SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETI-**
8 **TIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS,**
9 **AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA**
10 **AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

11 *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
12 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,*
13 *in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of the*
14 *Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of*
15 *the United States Agency for International Development*
16 *(USAID), the Attorney General, the United States Trade*
17 *Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the*
18 *United States International Development Finance Corpora-*
19 *tion, shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-*
20 *tees, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee*
21 *on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the*
22 *Committee on Finance and the Committee on Appropria-*
23 *tions of the Senate a multi-year strategy for increasing*
24 *United States economic competitiveness and promoting*
25 *good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in*

1 *Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in*
2 *the areas of—*

3 (1) *investment;*

4 (2) *equitable, inclusive, and sustainable develop-*
5 *ment;*

6 (3) *commercial relations;*

7 (4) *anti-corruption activities; and*

8 (5) *infrastructure projects.*

9 (b) *ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required*
10 *under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-*
11 *ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—*

12 (1) *enhance the technical capacity of Latin*
13 *American and Caribbean countries to advance the*
14 *sustainable and inclusive development of equitable*
15 *economies;*

16 (2) *reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between*
17 *such countries;*

18 (3) *facilitate a more open, transparent, and com-*
19 *petitive environment for United States businesses in*
20 *the region;*

21 (4) *establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-*
22 *view long term financial sustainability and security*
23 *implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-*
24 *tors or services, including transportation, commu-*
25 *nications, natural resources, and energy;*

1 (5) *establish competitive, transparent, and inclu-*
2 *sive infrastructure project selection and procurement*
3 *processes that promote transparency, supplier diver-*
4 *sity, open competition, financial sustainability, ad-*
5 *herence to robust global standards, and the employ-*
6 *ment of a diverse local workforce and management;*

7 (6) *strengthen legal structures critical to robust*
8 *democratic governance, fair competition, combatting*
9 *corruption, and ending impunity; and*

10 (7) *enhance transparent, affordable, and equi-*
11 *table access to the internet and digital infrastructure*
12 *in the Western Hemisphere.*

13 (c) *BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.*—*Not later than one*
14 *year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annu-*
15 *ally thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, after*
16 *consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Sec-*
17 *retary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United*
18 *States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the*
19 *United States International Development Finance Corpora-*
20 *tion, shall brief the congressional committees specified in*
21 *subsection (a) regarding the implementation of this section,*
22 *including examples of successes and challenges.*

1 **SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-**
2 **TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN**
3 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

4 (a) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
5 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
6 *of Congress” means—*

7 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
8 *Senate;*

9 (2) *the Select Committee on Intelligence of the*
10 *Senate;*

11 (3) *the Committee on Armed Services of the Sen-*
12 *ate;*

13 (4) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
14 *House of Representatives;*

15 (5) *the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-*
16 *ligence of the House of Representatives; and*

17 (6) *the Committee on Armed Services of the*
18 *House of Representatives.*

19 (b) *REPORTING REQUIREMENT.*—

20 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 90 days after*
21 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
22 *State, in coordination with the Director of National*
23 *Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence*
24 *Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall*
25 *submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a*
26 *report that assesses the nature, intent, and impact on*

1 *United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic*
2 *activity aimed at influencing the decisions, proce-*
3 *dures, and programs of multilateral organizations in*
4 *Latin America and the Caribbean, including the*
5 *World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organi-*
6 *zation of American States, and the Inter-American*
7 *Development Bank.*

8 (2) *DEFENSE SECTOR.*—*The report required*
9 *under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of*
10 *the nature, intent, and impact on United States stra-*
11 *tegic interests of Chinese military activity in Latin*
12 *America and the Caribbean, including military edu-*
13 *cation and training programs, weapons sales, and*
14 *space-related activities in the military or civilian*
15 *spheres, such as—*

16 (A) *the satellite and space control station*
17 *the People’s Republic of China constructed in*
18 *Argentina; and*

19 (B) *defense and security cooperation carried*
20 *out by the People’s Republic of China in Latin*
21 *America and the Caribbean, including sales of*
22 *surveillance and monitoring technology to gov-*
23 *ernments in the region such as Venezuela, Cuba,*
24 *Ecuador, and Colombia, and the potential use of*

1 *such technologies as tools of Chinese intelligence*
2 *services.*

3 (3) *FORM.*—*The report required under para-*
4 *graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and*
5 *include classified annexes.*

6 **SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND**
7 **THE CARIBBEAN.**

8 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*There is authorized to be appro-*
9 *priated to the Department of State \$13,500,000 for the*
10 *International Military Education and Training Program*
11 *for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal*
12 *years 2022 through 2026.*

13 (b) *MODERNIZATION.*—*The Secretary of State shall*
14 *modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding*
15 *in accordance with subsection (a) to ensure that such pro-*
16 *grams are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice*
17 *for international military education and training for Latin*
18 *American and Caribbean partners.*

19 (c) *REQUIRED ELEMENTS.*—*The programs referred to*
20 *in subsection (a) shall—*

21 (1) *provide training and capacity-building op-*
22 *portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-*
23 *rity services;*

24 (2) *provide practical skills and frameworks for—*

1 (A) *improving the functioning and organi-*
2 *zation of security services in Latin America and*
3 *the Caribbean;*

4 (B) *creating a better understanding of the*
5 *United States and its values; and*

6 (C) *using technology for maximum effi-*
7 *ciency and organization;*

8 (3) *promote and ensure that security services in*
9 *Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian au-*
10 *thority and operate in compliance with international*
11 *norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including*
12 *a respect for human rights, and full compliance with*
13 *requirements under section 620M of the Foreign As-*
14 *istance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; commonly re-*
15 *ferred to as the “Leahy law”); and*

16 (4) *receive funds only after vetting of individuals*
17 *proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B*
18 *and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22*
19 *U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).*

1 **SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN**
2 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING**
3 **ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE**
4 **RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-**
5 **NOLOGIES.**

6 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
7 *that—*

8 (1) *the Government of the People’s Republic of*
9 *China is exporting its model for internal security and*
10 *state control of society through advanced technology*
11 *and artificial intelligence; and*

12 (2) *the inclusion of communication networks and*
13 *communications supply chains with equipment and*
14 *services from companies with close ties to or that are*
15 *susceptible to pressure from governments or security*
16 *services without reliable legal checks on governmental*
17 *powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ private infor-*
18 *mation, increased censorship, violations of human*
19 *rights, and harassment of political opponents.*

20 (b) *DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.*—*The Secretary of*
21 *State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-*
22 *ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and*
23 *the Caribbean to—*

24 (1) *help identify and mitigate the risks to civil*
25 *liberties posed by technologies and services described*
26 *in subsection (a); and*

1 (2) *offer recommendations on ways to mitigate*
2 *such risks.*

3 (c) *INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Exec-*
4 *utive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media,*
5 *who may work through the Open Technology Fund of the*
6 *Agency, and the Secretary of State, working through the*
7 *Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet*
8 *Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall*
9 *expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship*
10 *technology and services to journalists in Latin America and*
11 *the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely*
12 *access or share digital news and information.*

13 (d) *SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of*
14 *State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United*
15 *States Agency for International Development, shall work*
16 *through nongovernmental organizations to—*

17 (1) *support and promote programs that support*
18 *internet freedom and the free flow of information on-*
19 *line in Latin America and the Caribbean;*

20 (2) *protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-*
21 *able access to internet in Latin America and the Car-*
22 *ibbean;*

23 (3) *provide integrated support to civil society for*
24 *technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and*

1 *applied research programs in Latin America and the*
2 *Caribbean;*

3 *(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in*
4 *Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative*
5 *techniques necessary to ensure public accountability*
6 *and prevent government overreach in the digital*
7 *sphere;*

8 *(5) assist independent media outlets and journal-*
9 *ists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build*
10 *their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth*
11 *news reports covering governance and human rights*
12 *topics;*

13 *(6) provide training for journalists and civil so-*
14 *ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to*
15 *improve transparency and accountability in govern-*
16 *ment and the private sector;*

17 *(7) provide training on investigative reporting of*
18 *incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business,*
19 *and commercial practices;*

20 *(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to*
21 *strengthen their capacity to monitor the incidents and*
22 *practices described in paragraph (7); and*

23 *(9) identify local resources to support the pre-*
24 *ponderance of activities that would be carried out*
25 *under this subsection.*

1 **SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE**
2 **TO CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.**

3 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress makes the following findings:

4 (1) *The countries of the Caribbean are heavily*
5 *reliant upon imported oil to provide for approxi-*
6 *mately 90 percent of their energy production.*

7 (2) *The level of dependence is even higher includ-*
8 *ing—*

9 (A) *Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9*
10 *percent of its electricity;*

11 (B) *Barbados, which relies on oil for 96*
12 *percent of its electricity;*

13 (C) *The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil*
14 *for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and*

15 (D) *St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100*
16 *percent of its electricity.*

17 (3) *Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had*
18 *a detrimental effect on economic development, growth,*
19 *and competitiveness in the Caribbean.*

20 (4) *Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Carib-*
21 *bean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal develop-*
22 *ment and pollution. Soot particulates and climate*
23 *change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously*
24 *damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source of*
25 *tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural*
26 *beauty.*

1 (5) *Air pollution caused by burning oil for elec-*
2 *tricity—*

3 (A) *has serious health impacts in the form*
4 *of higher rates of asthma and other lung ail-*
5 *ments; and*

6 (B) *can also exacerbate climate change.*

7 (6) *The Caribbean region is particularly vulner-*
8 *able to sea level rise and stronger storms.*

9 (7) *Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of*
10 *the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated*
11 *by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance,*
12 *which—*

13 (A) *offered preferential terms for oil sales;*
14 *and*

15 (B) *supplies some countries with up to 40*
16 *percent of their energy production needs.*

17 (8) *The ongoing domestic economic crisis and*
18 *political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Govern-*
19 *ment of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the*
20 *Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional*
21 *power. Only Cuba still receives preferential*
22 *Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela,*
23 *while other Petrocaribe member countries are experi-*
24 *encing a destabilized flow of oil.*

1 (9) *China has spent more than \$244,000,000,000*
2 *on energy projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent*
3 *of which was spent in Latin America and the Carib-*
4 *bean. Although the majority of this spending was for*
5 *oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the largest in-*
6 *vestor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.*

7 (10) *The World Bank estimates that the Carib-*
8 *bean will need \$12,000,000,000 in power investments*
9 *through 2035.*

10 (11) *Renewable energy technology costs have de-*
11 *creased dramatically in recent years, offering a more*
12 *viable economic alternative for energy production.*
13 *Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent since*
14 *2008, causing significant market growth, and accord-*
15 *ing to data released by the International Renewable*
16 *Energy Agency, $\frac{1}{3}$ of global power capacity is based*
17 *in renewable energy.*

18 (12) *In 2016, the International Monetary Fund*
19 *estimated that transportation accounted for 36 per-*
20 *cent of the total primary energy consumed in the Car-*
21 *ibbean subregion.*

22 (13) *According to the United Nations Environ-*
23 *ment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean*
24 *could achieve annual savings of \$621,000,000,000 and*
25 *a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO₂ by 2050 if*

1 *the region’s energy and transport sectors reach net*
2 *zero emissions.*

3 *(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore*
4 *and offshore resources needed for renewable energy,*
5 *including sun, wind, geothermal, and some hydro-*
6 *power production capacity.*

7 *(15) The United States Government is deeply en-*
8 *gaged in providing technical and policy assistance to*
9 *countries of the Caribbean on energy issues through—*

10 *(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of*
11 *the Americas;*

12 *(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and*

13 *(C) bilateral assistance programs.*

14 *(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North Amer-*
15 *ican Leaders’ Summit, President Barack Obama,*
16 *Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, and*
17 *President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico reaffirmed*
18 *their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and*
19 *increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while*
20 *opening wider markets for clean energy and green*
21 *technology.*

22 *(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack*
23 *Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security*
24 *Initiative, which would partner with individual*
25 *countries—*

1 (A) to transform its energy sector;

2 (B) to work to increase access to finance,
3 good governance, and diversification; and

4 (C) to maximize the impact of existing
5 donor effects.

6 (18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Car-
7 ibbean-Central American Energy Summit, the energy
8 security task force formally launched the Caribbean
9 Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C-
10 SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordi-
11 nation and action on energy security and agreed to
12 expand the regional market and transmission system.

13 (19) The United States has an important oppor-
14 tunity—

15 (A) to deepen this engagement;

16 (B) to work as a partner with Caribbean
17 countries on a more regional and coordinated
18 basis;

19 (C) to help ease the region's dependence on
20 imported oil; and

21 (D) to promote affordable alternative
22 sources of energy.

23 (b) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this section:

1 (1) *CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.*—*The term “Carib-*
2 *bean countries” means countries in the Caribbean re-*
3 *gion, but does not include Cuba or Venezuela.*

4 (2) *CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.*—*The term “Car-*
5 *ibbean governments” means the national governments*
6 *of the Caribbean countries.*

7 (c) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—*It is the policy of the*
8 *United States to help Caribbean countries—*

9 (1) *achieve greater energy security and improve*
10 *domestic energy resource mobilization;*

11 (2) *lower their dependence on imported fuels;*

12 (3) *eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil,*
13 *other petroleum products, and coal for the generation*
14 *of electricity;*

15 (4) *increase production of renewable energy; and*

16 (5) *meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of*
17 *their national determined contributions to the Paris*
18 *Agreement.*

19 (d) *STRATEGY.*—

20 (1) *SUBMISSION.*—*Not later than 120 days after*
21 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
22 *State, in coordination with the Administrator of the*
23 *United States Agency for International Development*
24 *(USAID), shall submit to the appropriate congres-*
25 *sional committees a multi-year strategy that describes*

1 *how the Department of State will promote regional*
2 *cooperation with Caribbean countries—*

3 *(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels,*
4 *grow domestic clean energy production in the re-*
5 *gion, strengthen regional energy security, and*
6 *lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions;*

7 *(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the*
8 *transportation sector;*

9 *(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy*
10 *conservation, and investment in alternatives to*
11 *imported fuels;*

12 *(D) to improve grid reliability and mod-*
13 *ernize electricity transmission networks;*

14 *(E) to advance deployment of innovative so-*
15 *lutions to expand community and individuals'*
16 *access to electricity;*

17 *(F) to help reform energy markets to en-*
18 *courage good regulatory governance and to pro-*
19 *mote a climate of private sector investment; and*

20 *(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions*
21 *from the energy and transportation sector.*

22 *(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under*
23 *subsection (a) shall include—*

24 *(A) a thorough review and inventory of*
25 *United States Government activities that are*

1 *being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in*
2 *coordination with multilateral institutions—*

3 *(i) to promote energy and climate secu-*
4 *rity in the Caribbean region; and*

5 *(ii) to reduce the region’s reliance on*
6 *oil for electricity generation;*

7 *(B) opportunities for marshaling regional*
8 *cooperation—*

9 *(i) to overcome market barriers result-*
10 *ing from the small size of Caribbean energy*
11 *markets;*

12 *(ii) to address the high transportation*
13 *and infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean*
14 *countries;*

15 *(iii) to ensure greater donor coordina-*
16 *tion between governments, multilateral in-*
17 *stitutions, multilateral banks, and private*
18 *investors; and*

19 *(iv) to expand regional financing op-*
20 *portunities to allow for lower cost energy*
21 *entrepreneurship;*

22 *(C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean*
23 *government has—*

24 *(i) an independent utility regulator or*
25 *equivalent;*

1 (ii) affordable access by third party in-
2 vestors to its electrical grid with minimal
3 regulatory interference;

4 (iii) effective energy efficiency and en-
5 ergy conservation;

6 (iv) programs to address technical and
7 nontechnical issues;

8 (v) a plan to eliminate major market
9 distortions;

10 (vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and

11 (vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean
12 energy solutions; and

13 (D) recommendations for how United States
14 policy, technical, and economic assistance can be
15 used in the Caribbean region—

16 (i) to advance renewable energy devel-
17 opment and the incorporation of renewable
18 technologies into existing energy grids and
19 the development and deployment of micro-
20 grids where appropriate and feasible to
21 boost energy security and reliability, par-
22 ticularly to underserved communities;

23 (ii) to increase the generation of clean
24 energy sufficiently to replace and allow for

1 *the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy*
2 *generation units in Caribbean countries;*

3 *(iii) to create regional financing op-*
4 *portunities to allow for lower cost energy*
5 *entrepreneurship;*

6 *(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in*
7 *the region to help attract private investment*
8 *and break down any market or regulatory*
9 *barriers; and*

10 *(v) to establish a mechanism for each*
11 *host government to have access to inde-*
12 *pendent legal advice—*

13 *(I) to speed the development of en-*
14 *ergy-related contracts; and*

15 *(II) to better protect the interests*
16 *of Caribbean governments and citizens.*

17 (3) *CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy*
18 *under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall*
19 *work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult*
20 *with—*

21 *(A) the Secretary of the Interior;*

22 *(B) the Secretary of Commerce;*

23 *(C) the Secretary of the Treasury;*

24 *(D) the Board of Directors of the Export-*
25 *Import Bank of the United States;*

1 to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds
2 (324) have been in the Caribbean.

3 (3) This region is seven times more likely to ex-
4 perience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And, when
5 one occurs, it will incur as much as six times more
6 damage.

7 (4) Extreme weather events and other environ-
8 mental impacts will only worsen over the coming
9 years, and if not addressed, we will see only increas-
10 ing economic shocks on these countries, driving irreg-
11 ular migration.

12 (5) While the United States has considerable ex-
13 pertise and capacity in assisting countries with dis-
14 aster response, there remains a need for stronger part-
15 nerships that build regional resilience through effi-
16 cient and interoperable platforms, protecting people
17 and speeding recovery.

18 (6) The People's Republic of China has dramati-
19 cally increased its engagement in the Caribbean in
20 the past five years, including offering loans and
21 grants related to disaster response and resilience and
22 sought to acquire property rights in the Caribbean
23 that would be detrimental to United States national
24 security interests.

1 (7) *In 2019, the United States launched a new*
2 *U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen co-*
3 *operation and investment to strengthen our disaster*
4 *resilience throughout the Caribbean region, includ-*
5 *ing—*

6 (A) *to streamline early warning response*
7 *networks and formalize communication channels;*

8 (B) *to enhance, encourage, and work col-*
9 *laboratively on further developing aviation dis-*
10 *aster resilience plans and partnerships;*

11 (C) *to prioritize regional technical exchange*
12 *in energy planning, risk reduction, and resil-*
13 *ience;*

14 (D) *to increase communications network*
15 *interoperability between Caribbean partners and*
16 *the United States;*

17 (E) *to utilize storm surge mapping data*
18 *and share real-time information in preparation*
19 *for potential damage resulting from tropical cy-*
20 *clones and tsunamis;*

21 (F) *to use meteorological services to*
22 *strengthen and deepen physical and communica-*
23 *tions infrastructure, data collection networks,*
24 *and human and technical capacity throughout*

1 *the region, as well as interactions with the pub-*
2 *lic;*

3 *(G) to understand that while the use of*
4 *international and military and civil defense as-*
5 *sets in disaster response may only be considered*
6 *as a last resort, when local, national, and inter-*
7 *national civilian capabilities are overwhelmed,*
8 *civil-military coordination should occur, in sup-*
9 *port of the affected nation;*

10 *(H) to develop a framework that would gov-*
11 *ern the deployment of international military and*
12 *civil defense assets in disaster response when*
13 *local, national, and international civilian capa-*
14 *bilities are overwhelmed, in support of the af-*
15 *ected nation;*

16 *(I) to seek common mechanisms for ensur-*
17 *ing rapid disaster response and recovery, includ-*
18 *ing waiving or expediting diplomatic clearances,*
19 *waiving of or reducing customs fees, stream-*
20 *lining overflight and airspace clearance, and en-*
21 *sureing that the first responders have the ability*
22 *to rapidly respond to disasters in other coun-*
23 *tries;*

24 *(J) to promote the integration and coordi-*
25 *nation of regional response mechanisms in the*

1 *Caribbean, including through the Caribbean Dis-*
2 *aster Emergency Management Agency, the Re-*
3 *gional Security System, United States Govern-*
4 *ment Agencies, and allies in ways that facilitate*
5 *more effective and efficient planning, mitigation,*
6 *response, and resilience to natural disasters;*

7 *(K) to share best practices in improved*
8 *building codes with national disaster organiza-*
9 *tions, including building better programs, at re-*
10 *gional, national and community levels; and*

11 *(L) to promote community-based disaster*
12 *preparedness and mitigation activities, particu-*
13 *larly in underserved communities, with the aim*
14 *of increasing broad public participation and re-*
15 *silience.*

16 ***(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to***
17 ***help Caribbean countries—***

18 ***(1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural***
19 ***disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and***
20 ***a changing environment;***

21 ***(2) partner with United States Federal, State,***
22 ***and local agencies and engage in technical coopera-***
23 ***tion, dialogue, and assistance activities;***

1 (3) *harmonize standards and practices related to*
2 *paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased invest-*
3 *ment and integration;*

4 (4) *increase investment from United States com-*
5 *panies in the Caribbean on resilience-building, adap-*
6 *tation, and climate-related mitigation efforts;*

7 (5) *promote regional cooperation and ensure ef-*
8 *forts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and*
9 *international partners complement each other; and*

10 (6) *further assist with the efforts described in*
11 *subsection (a)(7).*

12 (c) *STRATEGY.*—*Not later than 180 days after the date*
13 *of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co-*
14 *ordination with the heads of other Federal departments and*
15 *agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-*
16 *mittees a multi-year strategy that describes how the Depart-*
17 *ment of State will achieve the policies described in sub-*
18 *section (b).*

19 (d) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There are*
20 *authorized to be appropriated for activities, programs, tech-*
21 *nical assistance, and engagement under this section the fol-*
22 *lowing:*

23 (1) *\$20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.*

24 (2) *\$25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.*

1 (3) \$30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and each
2 fiscal year thereafter.

3 (e) *REPORTING AND MONITORING.*—

4 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Of the amounts authorized to
5 be appropriated each fiscal year pursuant to sub-
6 section (d), at least five percent of all programming
7 funding allocation shall support and be directed to-
8 ward reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effec-
9 tiveness.

10 (2) *ENGAGEMENT AND COLLABORATION.*—The
11 Department of State shall ensure that at least 20 per-
12 cent of amounts authorized to be appropriated pursu-
13 ant to subsection (d) directly support the training of,
14 engagement with, collaboration with, and exchange of
15 expertise on resilience between United States Federal,
16 State, and local officials and their Caribbean govern-
17 ment counterparts. Such amounts should also sup-
18 port, as appropriate, increased academic, civil soci-
19 ety, media, and private sector engagement in the
20 fields of resilience-building, adaptation, and mitiga-
21 tion.

22 **SEC. 251. COUNTERING CHINA'S EDUCATIONAL AND CUL-**
23 **TURAL DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA.**

24 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) *According to a report by the National En-*
2 *dowment for Democracy, China has spent the equiva-*
3 *lent of billions of dollars to shape public opinion and*
4 *perceptions around the world through thousands of*
5 *people-to-people exchanges, cultural activities, edu-*
6 *cational programs, and the development of media en-*
7 *terprises and information initiatives with global*
8 *reach.*

9 (2) *Educational and exchange programs are a*
10 *core element of United States public diplomacy, ele-*
11 *vating our culture, policies, and interests worldwide.*

12 (3) *These programs provide students with access*
13 *to international knowledge, an opportunity to learn*
14 *foreign languages, and a unique environment for de-*
15 *veloping cultural understanding, all of which are val-*
16 *uable skills in today's global economy.*

17 (4) *90 percent of ECA's appropriation is spent*
18 *in the United States or invested directly in American*
19 *citizens or American organizations.*

20 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
21 *that—*

22 (1) *China's efforts to mold public opinion and*
23 *influence educational institutions undermine United*
24 *States' influence in Latin America and the Caribbean*

1 *and threaten democratic institutions and practices in*
2 *the region;*

3 (2) *the United States Government should expand*
4 *current educational and cultural exchange programs*
5 *in Latin America and the Caribbean, which are cost-*
6 *effective and strengthen people-to-people diplomacy, to*
7 *promote national security and foreign policy interests*
8 *of the United States; and*

9 (3) *educational exchanges foster linguistic, cul-*
10 *tural, and educational skills that advance United*
11 *States economic competitiveness, strengthen alliances,*
12 *and support democracies worldwide.*

13 (c) *STRATEGY.*—*Not later than 180 days after the date*
14 *of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting*
15 *through the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational*
16 *and Cultural Affairs, and in coordination with the Assist-*
17 *ant Administrator for the Bureau of Economic Growth,*
18 *Education, and Environment at the United States Agency*
19 *for International Development, shall devise a strategy—*

20 (1) *to evaluate and expand existing programs*
21 *and, as necessary, design and implement new edu-*
22 *cational, professional, and cultural exchanges and*
23 *other programs to—*

24 (A) *create and sustain mutual under-*
25 *standing with other countries necessary to ad-*

1 *vance United States foreign policy goals by culti-*
2 *vating people-to-people ties among current and*
3 *future global leaders that build enduring net-*
4 *works and personal relationships; and*

5 *(B) promote United States national secu-*
6 *rity interests and values, including through the*
7 *expansion of exchange visitor programs such as*
8 *international visitor leadership programs and*
9 *the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative, as*
10 *well as professional capacity building programs*
11 *that prioritize building skills in entrepreneur-*
12 *ship, promoting transparency, and technology;*

13 *(2) to ensure that exchange programs for Ameri-*
14 *cans abroad and international visitors attract a di-*
15 *verse pool of participants, including from underrep-*
16 *resented, marginalized, and low-income communities;*
17 *and*

18 *(3) to evaluate, expand, and strengthen existing*
19 *programs, and, as necessary, design and implement*
20 *new basic and higher education programs in Latin*
21 *America and the Caribbean, in accordance with the*
22 *United States Strategy on International Basic Edu-*
23 *cation and the United States Agency for Inter-*
24 *national Development Education Policy, to enable all*
25 *young adults, youth, and children to acquire the qual-*

1 *ity education and skills needed to be productive mem-*
2 *bers in society, which will lead to better individual*
3 *and societal outcomes.*

4 *(d) REPORT WITH INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not*
5 *later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this*
6 *Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the*
7 *Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate*
8 *congressional committees a report that assesses the nature*
9 *and impact of the People’s Republic of China’s educational*
10 *and cultural sector activity in Latin America and the Car-*
11 *ibbean, its impact on United States’ strategic interests, and*
12 *recommendations for the United States Government to ex-*
13 *pand people-to-people ties.*

14 **SEC. 252. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN LATIN AMERICA AND**
15 **THE CARIBBEAN.**

16 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

17 *(1) narcotics trafficking continues to pose a secu-*
18 *rity threat to the countries and peoples of Latin*
19 *America and the Caribbean;*

20 *(2) other forms of transnational organized crime,*
21 *including arms trafficking, human smuggling, money*
22 *laundering, and illicit financing, are drivers of irreg-*
23 *ular migration;*

24 *(3) narcotics trafficking is fueled by governments*
25 *that fail to curb the illicit drug trade by adequately*

1 *regulating the legal trade of non-fentanyl opioids and*
2 *precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl,*
3 *fentanyl analogs, and other synthetic drugs;*

4 *(4) further, governments that do not cooperate*
5 *sufficiently on financial investigations and prosecu-*
6 *tions, withhold information with respect to money*
7 *laundering crimes, or are determined to facilitate il-*
8 *licit activities, particularly by transnational orga-*
9 *nized criminal organizations, should be held account-*
10 *able;*

11 *(5) as noted in the International Narcotics Con-*
12 *trol Strategy Report 2020, China “has not cooperated*
13 *sufficiently on financial investigations and does not*
14 *provide adequate responses to requests for financial*
15 *investigation information”;*

16 *(6) the United States should apply economic and*
17 *other targeted financial sanctions with respect to in-*
18 *dividuals engaged in financial crimes and money*
19 *laundering that fosters narcotics trafficking in the*
20 *countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and*

21 *(7) the United States should look to policies to*
22 *hold accountable countries that fail to sufficiently in-*
23 *vestigate financial crimes and money laundering that*
24 *foster narcotics trafficking in the countries of Latin*
25 *America and the Caribbean.*

1 *our collective national security, and defend shared*
2 *values;*

3 *(5) the United States, European Union, the*
4 *United Kingdom, and other European countries*
5 *should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reli-*
6 *ance on supply chains away from the People’s Repub-*
7 *lic of China, especially in the medical and pharma-*
8 *ceutical sectors;*

9 *(6) the United States, European Union, the*
10 *United Kingdom, and other European countries*
11 *should leverage their respective economic innovation*
12 *capabilities to support the global economic recovery*
13 *from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast*
14 *with the centralized economy of the People’s Republic*
15 *of China;*

16 *(7) the United States, United Kingdom, and Eu-*
17 *ropean Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate*
18 *their trade disputes, including negotiating a United*
19 *States-European Union trade agreement that benefits*
20 *workers and the broader economy in both the United*
21 *States and European Union;*

22 *(8) the United States, European Union, and*
23 *Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address the*
24 *security, economic, democracy, and human rights*
25 *challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China;*

1 (9) *the United States, European Union, the*
2 *United Kingdom, and other European countries*
3 *should enhance cooperation to counter People’s Re-*
4 *public of China disinformation, influence operations,*
5 *and propaganda efforts;*

6 (10) *the United States and Europe share serious*
7 *concerns with the repressions being supported and ex-*
8 *ecuted by the Government of the People’s Republic of*
9 *China, and should continue implementing measures*
10 *to address the Government of the People’s Republic of*
11 *China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and*
12 *Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and*
13 *programs to prevent the export of China’s authori-*
14 *tarian governance model to countries around the*
15 *world;*

16 (11) *the United States and Europe should re-*
17 *main united in their shared values against attempts*
18 *by the Government of the People’s Republic of China*
19 *at the United Nations and other multilateral organi-*
20 *zations to promote efforts that erode the Universal*
21 *Declaration of Human Rights, like the “community of*
22 *a shared future for mankind” and “democratization*
23 *of international relations”;*

24 (12) *the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-*
25 *ture investments around the world, particularly in*

1 *5G telecommunications technology and port infra-*
2 *structure, could threaten democracy across Europe*
3 *and the national security of key countries;*

4 *(13) as appropriate, the United States should*
5 *share intelligence with European allies and partners*
6 *on Huawei's 5G capabilities and the intentions of the*
7 *Government of the People's Republic of China with*
8 *respect to 5G expansion in Europe;*

9 *(14) the European Union's Investment Screening*
10 *Regulation, which came into force in October 2020, is*
11 *a welcome development, and member states should*
12 *closely scrutinize PRC investments in their countries*
13 *through their own national investment screening*
14 *measures;*

15 *(15) the President should actively engage the Eu-*
16 *ropean Union on the implementation of the Export*
17 *Control Reform Act regulations and to better har-*
18 *monize United States and European Union policies*
19 *with respect to export controls;*

20 *(16) the President should strongly advocate for*
21 *the listing of more items and technologies to restrict*
22 *dual use exports controlled at the National Security*
23 *and above level to the People's Republic of China*
24 *under the Wassenaar Arrangement;*

1 (17) *the United States should explore the value*
2 *of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Com-*
3 *mittee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that*
4 *would specifically coordinate United States and Eu-*
5 *ropean Union export control policies with respect to*
6 *limiting exports of sensitive technologies to the Peo-*
7 *ple’s Republic of China; and*

8 (18) *the United States should work with counter-*
9 *parts in Europe to—*

10 (A) *evaluate United States and European*
11 *overreliance on goods originating in the People’s*
12 *Republic of China, including in the medical and*
13 *pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strate-*
14 *gies to diversify supply chains;*

15 (B) *develop a common strategy for pro-*
16 *moting energy security and economic growth in*
17 *eastern Europe and the Balkans that addresses*
18 *shared concerns related to China’s Belt and*
19 *Road Initiative in these regions, including com-*
20 *plementary investments in the Three Seas Initia-*
21 *tive Fund for clean energy and digital*
22 *connectivity projects;*

23 (C) *counter PRC efforts to use COVID–19-*
24 *related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure*
25 *developing countries by offering relevant United*

1 *States and European expertise and assistance;*
2 *and*

3 *(D) leverage the United States and Euro-*
4 *pean private sectors to advance the post-COVID-*
5 *19 economic recovery.*

6 **SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-**
7 **OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S**
8 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

9 *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
10 *date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief*
11 *the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on*
12 *Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed*
13 *Services of the House of Representatives on a strategy for*
14 *how the United States will enhance cooperation with the*
15 *European Union, NATO, and European partner countries*
16 *with respect to the People's Republic of China.*

17 *(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under sub-*
18 *section (a) shall include the following elements with respect*
19 *to the strategy referred to in such subsection:*

20 *(1) An identification of the senior Senate-con-*
21 *firmed Department of State official who leads United*
22 *States efforts to cooperate with the European Union,*
23 *NATO, and European partner countries to advance a*
24 *shared approach with respect to the People's Republic*
25 *of China.*

1 (2) *An identification of key policy points of con-*
2 *vergence and divergence between the United States*
3 *and European allies and partners with respect to the*
4 *People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology,*
5 *trade, and economic practices.*

6 (3) *A description of efforts to advance shared in-*
7 *terests with European counterparts on—*

8 (A) *security and economic challenges with*
9 *respect to the People’s Republic of China;*

10 (B) *democracy and human rights challenges*
11 *with respect to the People’s Republic of China;*

12 (C) *technology issues with respect to the*
13 *People’s Republic of China;*

14 (D) *defense issues with respect to the Peo-*
15 *ple’s Republic of China; and*

16 (E) *developing a comprehensive strategy to*
17 *respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)*
18 *established by the Government of the People’s Re-*
19 *public of China.*

20 (4) *A description of the coordination mechanisms*
21 *among key regional and functional bureaus within*
22 *the Department of State and Department of Defense*
23 *tasked with engaging with European allies and part-*
24 *ners on the People’s Republic of China.*

1 (5) *A detailing of diplomatic efforts up to the*
2 *date of the briefing and future plans to work with*
3 *European allies and partners to counter the Govern-*
4 *ment of the People’s Republic of China’s advancement*
5 *of an authoritarian governance model around the*
6 *world.*

7 (6) *A detailing of the diplomatic efforts made up*
8 *to the date of the briefing and future plans to support*
9 *European efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives*
10 *to Huawei’s 5G technology.*

11 (7) *A detailing of how United States public di-*
12 *plomacy tools, including the Global Engagement Cen-*
13 *ter of the Department of State, will coordinate efforts*
14 *with counterpart entities within the European Union*
15 *to counter Chinese propaganda.*

16 (8) *A description of the staffing and budget re-*
17 *sources the Department of State dedicates to engage-*
18 *ment between the United States and the European*
19 *Union on the People’s Republic of China and provide*
20 *an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute*
21 *such strategy.*

22 (9) *A detailing of diplomatic efforts to work with*
23 *European allies and partners to track and counter*
24 *Chinese attempts to exert influence across multilateral*
25 *fora, including at the World Health Organization.*

1 (c) *FORM.*—*The briefing required under section (a)*
2 *shall be classified.*

3 (d) *CONSULTATION.*—*Not later than 180 days after the*
4 *date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter*
5 *for three years, the Secretary of State shall consult with*
6 *the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on*
7 *Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed*
8 *Services of the House of Representatives regarding the devel-*
9 *opment and implementation of the elements described in*
10 *subsection (b).*

11 **SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON**
12 **PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.**

13 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The President should work with*
14 *transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among the*
15 *Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, and*
16 *the European Development Finance Institutions (referred*
17 *to as the “DFI Alliance”)* *to enhance coordination on*
18 *shared objectives to foster private sector-led development*
19 *and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed fi-*
20 *nancing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the*
21 *People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative*
22 *(BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—*

23 (1) *the European Union Strategy on Connecting*
24 *Europe and Asia;*

1 (2) *the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Ini-*
2 *tiative Fund;*

3 (3) *the Blue Dot Network among the United*
4 *States, Japan, and Australia; and*

5 (4) *a European Union-Japan initiative that has*
6 *leveraged \$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects*
7 *and emphasizes transparency standards.*

8 (b) *STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro-*
9 *pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to en-*
10 *hance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the*
11 *Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for*
12 *Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel-*
13 *oping countries.*

14 **SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE-**
15 **TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN**
16 **CHINA AND RUSSIA.**

17 (a) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
18 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
19 *of Congress” means—*

20 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Se-*
21 *lect Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on*
22 *Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce,*
23 *Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En-*
24 *ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Bank-*
25 *ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on*

1 *Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the*
2 *Senate; and*

3 *(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-*
4 *manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-*
5 *mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy*
6 *and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services,*
7 *the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Com-*
8 *mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-*
9 *tives.*

10 *(b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—*

11 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
12 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of*
13 *National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the*
14 *Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec-*
15 *retary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Sec-*
16 *retary of the Treasury, and such other heads of Fed-*
17 *eral agencies as the Director considers appropriate,*
18 *submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a*
19 *report and brief such committees on cooperation be-*
20 *tween—*

21 *(A) the People’s Republic of China and the*
22 *Islamic Republic of Iran; and*

23 *(B) the People’s Republic of China and the*
24 *Russian Federation.*

1 (2) *CONTENTS.*—*The report and briefing under*
2 *paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:*

3 (A) *An identification of major areas of dip-*
4 *lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan-*
5 *cial, economic, military, and space coopera-*
6 *tion—*

7 (i) *between the People’s Republic of*
8 *China and the Islamic Republic of Iran;*
9 *and*

10 (ii) *between the People’s Republic of*
11 *China and the Russian Federation.*

12 (B) *An assessment of the effect of the*
13 *COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation.*

14 (C) *An assessment of the effect that United*
15 *States compliance with the Joint Comprehensive*
16 *Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in January*
17 *14, 2016, and United States withdrawal from*
18 *the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the coopera-*
19 *tion described in subparagraph (A)(i).*

20 (D) *An assessment of the effect on the co-*
21 *operation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that*
22 *would be had by the United States reentering*
23 *compliance with the JCPOA or a successor*
24 *agreement and the effect of the United States not*

1 *reentering compliance with the JCPOA or reach-*
2 *ing a successor agreement.*

3 (3) *FORM.—The report submitted under para-*
4 *graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but*
5 *may include a classified annex.*

6 (c) *SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES*
7 *AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Direc-*
8 *tor of National Intelligence and the heads of other appro-*
9 *priate Federal departments and agencies should share with*
10 *important allies and partners of the United States, as ap-*
11 *propriate, the findings of the report required under sub-*
12 *section (b).*

13 **PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

14 **SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL**
15 **ASIA.**

16 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

17 (1) *the United States should continue to stand*
18 *with friends and partners, while also working to es-*
19 *tablish new partners in South and Central Asia as*
20 *they contend with efforts by the Government of the*
21 *People’s Republic of China to interfere in their re-*
22 *spective political systems and encroach upon their*
23 *sovereign territory; and*

24 (2) *the United States should reaffirm its commit-*
25 *ment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partner-*

1 *ship with India and further deepen bilateral defense*
2 *consultations and collaboration with India commensurate*
3 *with its status as a major defense partner.*

4 **SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
5 **SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.**

6 *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
7 *date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit*
8 *to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee*
9 *on Armed Services of the Senate and, the Committee on*
10 *Armed Services of the House of Representatives a strategy*
11 *for how the United States will engage with the countries*
12 *of South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1*
13 *mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of China.*

14 *(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-*
15 *section (a) shall include the following elements:*

16 *(1) A detailed description of the security and*
17 *economic challenges that the People’s Republic of*
18 *China (PRC) poses to the countries of South and Cen-*
19 *tral Asia, including border disputes with South and*
20 *Central Asian countries that border the People’s Re-*
21 *public of China, and PRC investments in land and*
22 *sea ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy*
23 *projects across the region.*

24 *(2) A detailed description of United States ef-*
25 *forts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in in-*

1 *frastructure and other sectors in South and Central*
2 *Asia.*

3 *(3) A detailed description of bilateral and re-*
4 *gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia on*
5 *strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts to*
6 *interfere in their political systems and economies.*

7 *(4) A detailed description of United States diplo-*
8 *matic efforts to work with the Government of Afghani-*
9 *stan on addressing the challenges posed by PRC in-*
10 *vestment in the Afghan mineral sector.*

11 *(5) A detailed description of United States diplo-*
12 *matic efforts with the Government of Pakistan with*
13 *respect to matters relevant to the People's Republic of*
14 *China, including investments by the People's Republic*
15 *of China in Pakistan through the Belt and Road Ini-*
16 *tiative.*

17 *(6) In close consultation with the Government of*
18 *India, identification of areas with respect to which*
19 *the United States Government can provide diplomatic*
20 *and other support as appropriate for India's efforts*
21 *to address economic and security challenges posed by*
22 *the People's Republic of China in the region.*

23 *(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms*
24 *among key regional and functional bureaus within*
25 *the Department of State and Department of Defense*

1 *tasked with engaging with the countries of South and*
2 *Central Asia on issues relating to the People’s Repub-*
3 *lic of China.*

4 (8) *A description of the efforts being made by*
5 *Federal departments and agencies, including the De-*
6 *partment of State, the United States Agency for*
7 *International Development, the Department of Com-*
8 *merce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of*
9 *the United States Trade Representative, to help the*
10 *countries of South and Central Asia develop trade*
11 *and commerce links that will help those countries di-*
12 *versify their trade away from the People’s Republic of*
13 *China.*

14 (9) *A detailed description of United States diplo-*
15 *matic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey,*
16 *and any other countries with significant populations*
17 *of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing perse-*
18 *cution in the People’s Republic of China to press*
19 *those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic mi-*
20 *norities to the People’s Republic of China, protect eth-*
21 *nic minorities from intimidation by Chinese Govern-*
22 *ment authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms*
23 *of assembly and expression.*

24 (c) *FORM.—The strategy required under section (a)*
25 *shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made*

1 *available to the public, but may include a classified annex*
2 *as necessary.*

3 *(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after the*
4 *date of the enactment of this Act and not less often than*
5 *annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State*
6 *shall consult with the appropriate congressional commit-*
7 *tees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and*
8 *the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Represent-*
9 *atives regarding the development and implementation of the*
10 *strategy required under subsection (a).*

11 **SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW.**

12 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

13 *(1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally impor-*
14 *tant part of the Indo-Pacific where the United States*
15 *has political, economic, and security interests.*

16 *(2) The United States has an interest in working*
17 *with partners in the Indo-Pacific, including India,*
18 *Japan, and Australia, to address regional governance,*
19 *economic connectivity, and security challenges includ-*
20 *ing threats to freedom of navigation.*

21 *(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—As a part of the United*
22 *States engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be the policy*
23 *of the United States to strengthen engagement with the*
24 *countries in the Indian Ocean region, including with gov-*

1 *ernments, civil society, and private sectors in such countries*
2 *to—*

3 *(1) promote United States political engagement*
4 *with such region, including through active participa-*
5 *tion in regional organizations, and strengthened dip-*
6 *lomatic relations with United States partners in such*
7 *region;*

8 *(2) enhance United States economic connectivity*
9 *and commercial exchange with such region;*

10 *(3) defend freedom of navigation in such region*
11 *from security challenges, including related to piracy;*

12 *(4) support the ability of governments and orga-*
13 *nizations in such region to respond to natural disas-*
14 *ters;*

15 *(5) support and facilitate the role of regional al-*
16 *lies and partners as net providers of security to such*
17 *region and as partners to the United States in ad-*
18 *dressing security challenges in such region, including*
19 *through assistance to such allies and partners to build*
20 *capacity in maritime security and maritime domain*
21 *awareness;*

22 *(6) continue to build the United States-India re-*
23 *lationship in order to regularize security cooperation*
24 *through the negotiation of agreements concerning ac-*

1 *cess, communication, and navigation, including*
2 *through foundational agreements; and*

3 *(7) promote cooperation with United States al-*
4 *lies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Aus-*
5 *tralia, and major defense partners, including India,*
6 *and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and*
7 *France, to support a rules-based order in such region.*

8 *(c) STRATEGY.—*

9 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
10 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
11 *State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense*
12 *and the Administrator of the United States Agency*
13 *for International Development (USAID), shall submit*
14 *to the appropriate committees of Congress a multi-*
15 *year strategy for United States engagement to sup-*
16 *port United States interests in the Indian Ocean re-*
17 *gion. Such strategy shall—*

18 *(A) define United States political, economic,*
19 *and security interests in the Indian Ocean re-*
20 *gion;*

21 *(B) outline challenges to the interests of the*
22 *United States in such region;*

23 *(C) outline efforts to improve cooperation*
24 *between the United States and members of the*
25 *Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia,*

1 *through coordination in diplomacy and develop-*
2 *ment priorities, joint military exercises and op-*
3 *erations, and other activities that promote*
4 *United States political, economic, and security*
5 *interests;*

6 *(D) outline efforts to support economic*
7 *connectivity in such region, including through*
8 *the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infra-*
9 *structure Working Group, the Asia-Africa*
10 *Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand*
11 *and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pacific,*
12 *including with the countries of Southeast Asia,*
13 *that maintain high standards of investment and*
14 *support for civil society and people-to-people*
15 *connectivity;*

16 *(E) describe how the United States can en-*
17 *gage with regional intergovernmental organiza-*
18 *tions and entities, including the Indian Ocean*
19 *Rim Association, to promote United States polit-*
20 *ical, economic, and security interests in such re-*
21 *gion;*

22 *(F) review the United States diplomatic*
23 *posture in such region, including an assessment*
24 *of United States diplomatic engagement in coun-*
25 *tries without a permanent United States em-*

1 *bassy or diplomatic mission, and an assessment*
2 *of ways to improve the cooperation with the*
3 *Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;*

4 (G) *review United States diplomatic agree-*
5 *ments with countries in such region that facili-*
6 *tate United States military operations in such*
7 *region, including bilateral and multilateral*
8 *agreements, and describe efforts to expand*
9 *United States cooperation with such countries*
10 *through the negotiation of additional agreements;*
11 *and*

12 (H) *include a security assistance strategy*
13 *for such region that outlines priorities, objectives,*
14 *and actions for United States security assistance*
15 *efforts to governments of countries in such region*
16 *to promote United States political, economic,*
17 *and security interests in such region.*

18 (2) *INCLUSION.—The strategy required under*
19 *paragraph (1) may be submitted as a part of any*
20 *other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific.*

21 (3) *REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later*
22 *than one year after the submission of the strategy re-*
23 *quired under paragraph (1) and one year thereafter,*
24 *the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate*

1 *congressional committees a report on progress made*
2 *toward implementing such strategy.*

3 *(d) UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY*
4 *REVIEW COMMISSION.—*

5 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section*
6 *1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense*
7 *Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C.*
8 *7002(c)(2)) is amended—*

9 *(A) by inserting “, including in the Indian*
10 *Ocean region” after “deployments of the People’s*
11 *Republic of China military”; and*

12 *(B) by adding at the end the following new*
13 *sentence: “In this subparagraph, the term ‘In-*
14 *Indian Ocean region’ means the Indian Ocean, in-*
15 *cluding the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal,*
16 *and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian*
17 *Ocean.”.*

18 *(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made*
19 *by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the*
20 *enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the*
21 *first report required under section 1238 of the Floyd*
22 *D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for*
23 *Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph)*
24 *that is submitted after such date.*

25 *(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

1 (b) *INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.*—Not later than 180
2 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
3 retary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of
4 National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees
5 of Congress a report that assesses the nature and impact
6 of the People’s Republic of China’s political, economic,
7 socio-cultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and
8 its impact on United States strategic interests, including
9 information relating to—

10 (1) *the amount and impact of direct investment,*
11 *loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and*
12 *other preferential trading arrangements;*

13 (2) *the involvement of People’s Republic of China*
14 *(PRC) state-owned enterprises in Africa;*

15 (3) *the amount of African debt held by the PRC;*

16 (4) *the involvement of PRC private security,*
17 *technology and media companies in Africa;*

18 (5) *the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to*
19 *African countries;*

20 (6) *the scope of PRC investment in and control*
21 *of African energy resources and minerals critical for*
22 *emerging and foundational technologies;*

23 (7) *an analysis on the linkages between PRC’s*
24 *aid and assistance to African countries and African*

1 *countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals in inter-*
2 *national fora;*

3 *(8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facili-*
4 *tate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in*
5 *counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex-*
6 *tractive resources and wildlife products, between Afri-*
7 *ca and the PRC;*

8 *(9) the methods and techniques that the PRC*
9 *uses to exert undue influence on African governments*
10 *and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, including*
11 *through the CCP's party-to-party training program,*
12 *and to influence African multilateral organizations;*
13 *and*

14 *(10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and*
15 *educational activities undertaken by the PRC and*
16 *CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa.*

17 **SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE**
18 **UNITED STATES IN AFRICA.**

19 *(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
20 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
21 *of Congress” means—*

22 *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
23 *Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on*
24 *Finance of the Senate; and*

1 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
2 *mittee on Appropriations, and the Committee on*
3 *Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.*

4 (b) *STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.*—*Not later than 180*
5 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-*
6 *retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary of*
7 *the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney Gen-*
8 *eral, the United States Trade Representative, the Adminis-*
9 *trator of the United States Agency for International Devel-*
10 *opment, and the leadership of the United States Inter-*
11 *national Development Finance Corporation, submit to the*
12 *appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth*
13 *a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic*
14 *competitiveness and promoting improvements in the invest-*
15 *ment climate in Africa, including through support for—*

16 (1) *democratic institutions and the rule of law,*
17 *including property rights; and*

18 (2) *improved transparency, anti-corruption ef-*
19 *forts, and good governance.*

20 (c) *ELEMENTS.*—*The strategy submitted pursuant to*
21 *subsection (a) shall include—*

22 (1) *a description and assessment of barriers to*
23 *United States investment in Africa for United States*
24 *businesses, including a clear identification of the dif-*
25 *ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized*

1 *businesses, and an assessment of whether existing pro-*
2 *grams effectively address such barriers;*

3 *(2) a description and assessment of barriers to*
4 *African diaspora investment in Africa, and rec-*
5 *ommendations to overcome such barriers;*

6 *(3) an identification of the economic sectors in*
7 *the United States that have a comparative advantage*
8 *in African markets;*

9 *(4) a determination of priority African countries*
10 *for promoting two-way trade and investment and an*
11 *assessment of additional foreign assistance needs, in-*
12 *cluding democracy and governance and rule of law*
13 *support, to promote a conducive operating environ-*
14 *ment in priority countries;*

15 *(5) an identification of opportunities for stra-*
16 *tegic cooperation with European allies on trade and*
17 *investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue*
18 *on trade, security, development, and environmental*
19 *issues of mutual interest; and*

20 *(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Af-*
21 *rica Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and*
22 *investment, strategic engagement, and security in Af-*
23 *rica.*

1 (d) *ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT*
2 *HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.*—*The Comptroller General*
3 *of the United States shall—*

4 (1) *conduct a review of the number of Foreign*
5 *Commercial Service Officers and Department of State*
6 *Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub-*
7 *Saharan Africa; and*

8 (2) *develop and submit to the appropriate con-*
9 *gressional committees an assessment of whether*
10 *human resource capacity in such embassies is ade-*
11 *quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco-*
12 *nomical programs and initiatives in Africa, including*
13 *the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Pros-*
14 *per Africa.*

15 **SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT**
16 **TO AFRICA.**

17 (a) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
18 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
19 *of Congress” means—*

20 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
21 *Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-*
22 *mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and*

23 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
24 *mittee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select*

1 *Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-*
2 *tives.*

3 *(b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER PRC*
4 *CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.—*

5 *(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish*
6 *an interagency Working Group, which shall include*
7 *representatives of the Department of State, the De-*
8 *partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of Na-*
9 *tional Intelligence, and such other agencies of the*
10 *United States Government as the President considers*
11 *appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggres-*
12 *sion with respect to Africa.*

13 *(2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established*
14 *pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit*
15 *to the appropriate congressional committees a set of*
16 *recommendations, such as for—*

17 *(A) bolstering the capacity of governments*
18 *in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data*
19 *networks and critical infrastructure, where ap-*
20 *plicable;*

21 *(B) providing alternatives to Huawei;*

22 *(C) an action plan for United States embas-*
23 *sies in Africa to provide assistance to host-coun-*
24 *try governments with respect to protecting their*
25 *vital digital networks and infrastructure from*

1 *cluding through efforts to enhance leadership skills,*
2 *encourage entrepreneurship, strengthen public admin-*
3 *istration and the role of civil society, and connect*
4 *young African leaders continentally and globally*
5 *across the private, civic, and public sectors.*

6 (b) *YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE PRO-*
7 *GRAM.—*

8 (1) *IN GENERAL.—There is established in the De-*
9 *partment of State the Young African Leaders Initia-*
10 *tive (“YALI”) program.*

11 (2) *PURPOSE.—The YALI program shall seek to*
12 *build the capacity of young African leaders in sub-*
13 *Saharan Africa in the areas of business, civic engage-*
14 *ment, or public administration, including through ef-*
15 *forts to—*

16 (A) *support young African leaders by offer-*
17 *ing professional development, training, and net-*
18 *working opportunities, particularly in the areas*
19 *of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elec-*
20 *tions, human rights, entrepreneurship, good gov-*
21 *ernance, and public administration; and*

22 (B) *provide increased economic and tech-*
23 *nical assistance to young African leaders to pro-*
24 *mote economic growth and strengthen ties be-*
25 *tween United States and African businesses.*

1 (3) *FELLOWSHIPS.*—*The YALI program shall*
2 *award fellowships under the Mandela Washington*
3 *Fellowship for Young African Leaders program to*
4 *young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have dem-*
5 *onstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, in-*
6 *novation, public service, and leadership, and who*
7 *have had a positive impact in their communities, or-*
8 *ganizations, or institutions.*

9 (4) *REGIONAL LEADERSHIP CENTERS.*—*The*
10 *YALI program shall seek to establish regional leader-*
11 *ship centers in sub-Saharan Africa to offer training*
12 *to young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have dem-*
13 *onstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, in-*
14 *novation, public service and leadership, and who have*
15 *had a positive impact in their communities, organi-*
16 *zations, or institutions.*

17 (5) *ACTIVITIES.*—

18 (A) *UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.*—
19 *The Secretary of State, in coordination with the*
20 *Administrator for the United States Agency for*
21 *International Development and the heads of*
22 *other relevant Federal departments and agencies,*
23 *shall oversee all United States-based activities*
24 *carried out under the YALI program, including*
25 *the following:*

1 (i) *The participation of Mandela*
2 *Washington fellows in a six-week Leader-*
3 *ship Institute at a United States university*
4 *or college in business, civic engagement, or*
5 *public management, including academic*
6 *sessions, site visits, professional networking*
7 *opportunities, leadership training, commu-*
8 *nity service, and organized cultural activi-*
9 *ties.*

10 (ii) *The participation by Mandela*
11 *Washington fellows in an annual Mandela*
12 *Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide*
13 *such Fellows the opportunity to meet with*
14 *United States leaders from the private, pub-*
15 *lic, and non-profit sectors.*

16 (B) *AFRICA-BASED ACTIVITIES.*—*The Sec-*
17 *retary of State, in coordination with the Admin-*
18 *istrator for the United States Agency for Inter-*
19 *national Development and the heads of other rel-*
20 *evant Federal departments and agencies, should*
21 *continue to support YALI programs in sub-Sa-*
22 *haran Africa, including the following:*

23 (i) *Access to continued leadership*
24 *training and other professional development*
25 *opportunities for Mandela Washington Fel-*

1 *lowship for Young African Leaders alumni*
2 *upon their return to their home countries,*
3 *including online courses, technical assist-*
4 *ance, and access to funding.*

5 *(ii) Training for young African leaders*
6 *at regional leadership centers established in*
7 *accordance with paragraph (4), and*
8 *through online and in-person courses offered*
9 *by such centers.*

10 *(iii) Opportunities for networking and*
11 *engagement with—*

12 *(I) other alumni of the Mandela*
13 *Washington Fellowship for Young Afri-*
14 *can Leaders;*

15 *(II) alumni of programs at re-*
16 *gional leadership centers established in*
17 *accordance with paragraph (4); and*

18 *(III) United States and like-*
19 *minded diplomatic missions, business*
20 *leaders, and others as appropriate.*

21 *(C) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this*
22 *paragraph, the Secretary of State, in coordina-*
23 *tion with the Administrator of the United States*
24 *Agency for International Development and the*
25 *heads of other relevant Federal departments and*

1 *agencies shall seek to partner with the private*
2 *sector to pursue public-private partnerships, le-*
3 *verage private sector expertise, expand net-*
4 *working opportunities, and identify funding op-*
5 *portunities as well as fellowship and employment*
6 *opportunities for participants in the YALI pro-*
7 *gram.*

8 *(6) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180*
9 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the*
10 *Secretary of State, in coordination with the Adminis-*
11 *trator of the United States Agency for International*
12 *Development and the heads of other relevant Federal*
13 *departments and agencies, shall submit to the appro-*
14 *priate congressional committees a plan for imple-*
15 *menting the YALI program, including the following:*

16 *(A) A description of clearly defined pro-*
17 *gram goals, targets, and planned outcomes for*
18 *each year and for the duration of implementa-*
19 *tion of the program.*

20 *(B) A strategy to monitor and evaluate the*
21 *program and progress made toward achieving*
22 *such goals, targets, and planned outcomes.*

23 *(C) A strategy to ensure the program is pro-*
24 *moting United States foreign policy goals in Af-*
25 *rica, including ensuring that the program is*

1 *clearly branded and paired with robust public*
2 *diplomacy efforts.*

3 (7) *REPORT.*—*Not later than 1 year after the*
4 *date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-*
5 *after for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordina-*
6 *tion with the Administrator of the United States*
7 *Agency for International Development, shall submit*
8 *to the appropriate congressional committees and pub-*
9 *lish in a publicly accessible, internet-based form, a*
10 *report on the following:*

11 (A) *The progress made toward achieving the*
12 *goals, targets, and planned outcomes described in*
13 *paragraph (6)(A), including an overview of the*
14 *program implemented in the previous year and*
15 *an estimated number of beneficiaries.*

16 (B) *An assessment of how the YALI pro-*
17 *gram is contributing to and promoting United*
18 *States-Africa relations, particularly in areas of*
19 *increased private sector investment, trade pro-*
20 *motion, support to civil society, improved public*
21 *administration, and fostering entrepreneurship*
22 *and youth empowerment.*

23 (C) *Recommendations for improvements or*
24 *changes to the program and implementation*
25 *plan, if any, that would improve their effective-*

1 *ness during subsequent years of implementation*
2 *of the program.*

3 (8) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES*
4 *DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate*
5 *congressional committees” means—*

6 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and*
7 *the Committee on Appropriations of the House of*
8 *Representatives; and*

9 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Relations*
10 *and the Committee on Appropriations of the*
11 *Senate.*

12 (9) *SUNSET.—The requirements of this section*
13 *shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the*
14 *date of the enactment of this Act.*

15 **SEC. 275. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.**

16 *Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment*
17 *of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States*
18 *Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate*
19 *congressional committees a report on the resources and*
20 *timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organiza-*
21 *tion the mission of which shall be to promote democratic*
22 *values and institutions in Africa by providing objective, ac-*
23 *curate, and relevant news and information to the people*
24 *of Africa and counter disinformation from malign actors,*
25 *especially in countries in which a free press is banned by*

1 *the government or not fully established, about the region,*
2 *the world, and the United States through uncensored news,*
3 *responsible discussion, and open debate.*

4 **SEC. 276. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICA-**
5 **TION.**

6 (a) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
7 *United States to support increased access to energy in Afri-*
8 *ca and reduce Africa’s energy dependence on countries that*
9 *use energy reliance for undue political influence such as the*
10 *Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China.*

11 (b) *FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:*

12 (1) *Lack of access to energy remains a signifi-*
13 *cant barrier to economic advancement and oppor-*
14 *tunity in Africa. As of 2018, an estimated*
15 *789,000,000 people, the vast majority of them in sub-*
16 *Saharan Africa, lacked access to any modern elec-*
17 *tricity. Even in the region’s most advanced econo-*
18 *mies, average annual per capita electricity consump-*
19 *tion is often under 200 kilowatt-hours, less than what*
20 *is needed to power a typical refrigerator. Only a*
21 *small fraction of the 12,000,000 young Africans who*
22 *enter the job market each year find employment; and*
23 *the cost and reliability of electricity remain top con-*
24 *straints to job creation and economic competitiveness.*

1 (2) *The United States’ global strategic competi-*
2 *tors have stepped in to address this disparity and fi-*
3 *nance energy sector development across Africa. China*
4 *is the single largest trading partner for African coun-*
5 *tries in aggregate, and the largest bilateral lender for*
6 *public sector loans across Africa. Approximately 65*
7 *percent of Chinese lending to Africa goes to infra-*
8 *structure, and between 2013–2020, the energy sector*
9 *consistently accounted for the largest share of all in-*
10 *vestment under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.*

11 (3) *Reliable, affordable, and sustainable power is*
12 *the foundation for all modern economies and nec-*
13 *essary for increasing growth and employment.*

14 (4) *Increasing energy supply in low- and lower*
15 *middle-income countries is necessary in the next dec-*
16 *ades in order to meet human, social, security, and*
17 *economic needs.*

18 (5) *Addressing energy poverty, powering inclu-*
19 *sive economies, and making energy systems resilient*
20 *in low- and lower middle-income countries will re-*
21 *quire diversified power systems and a mix of tech-*
22 *nologies that align with local conditions, resources,*
23 *and needs.*

24 (c) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
25 *that countries in Africa continue to be important partners*

1 *to the United States and the DFC should continue to make*
2 *investments in sub-Saharan Africa to facilitate technologies*
3 *that contribute to energy security and reliable, affordable,*
4 *and sustainable power in low and lower middle-income*
5 *countries.*

6 (d) *AMENDMENT.—Section 3 of the Electrify Africa*
7 *Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note)*
8 *is amended—*

9 (1) *in paragraph (8), by striking “and” at the*
10 *end;*

11 (2) *in paragraph (9), by striking the period and*
12 *inserting a semicolon; and*

13 (3) *by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol-*
14 *lowing:*

15 “(10) *advance United States foreign policy and*
16 *development goals by assisting African countries to*
17 *reduce their dependence on energy resources from*
18 *countries that use energy dependence for undue polit-*
19 *ical influence, such as the Russian Federation or the*
20 *People’s Republic of China, which have used energy*
21 *and financial resources to influence other countries;*

22 “(11) *promote the energy security of allies and*
23 *partners of the United States by encouraging the de-*
24 *velopment of accessible, transparent, and competitive*

1 *energy markets that provide diversified sources and*
2 *reliable, affordable, and sustainable power;*

3 *“(12) encourage United States public and pri-*
4 *ivate sector investment in African energy infrastruc-*
5 *ture projects to bridge the gap between energy security*
6 *requirements and commercial demand in a way that*
7 *is consistent with the region’s capacity; and*

8 *“(13) help facilitate the export of United States*
9 *energy resources, technology, and expertise to global*
10 *markets in a way that benefits the energy security of*
11 *allies and partners of the United States, including in*
12 *Africa.”.*

13 **PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

14 **SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN,**
15 **AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND**
16 **NORTH AFRICA.**

17 *(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
18 *that—*

19 *(1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading*
20 *its influence in the Middle East and North Africa*
21 *through its energy and infrastructure investments,*
22 *technology transfer, and arms sales;*

23 *(2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to estab-*
24 *lish military or dual use facilities in geographically*
25 *strategic locations in the Middle East and North Afri-*

1 *ca to further its Belt and Road Initiative at the ex-*
2 *pense of United States national security interests;*
3 *and*

4 *(3) the export of certain communications infra-*
5 *structure from the People’s Republic of China de-*
6 *grades the security of partner networks, exposes intel-*
7 *lectual property to theft, threatens the ability of the*
8 *United States to conduct security cooperation with*
9 *compromised regional partners, and furthers China’s*
10 *authoritarian surveillance model.*

11 *(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—*

12 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
13 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
14 *State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,*
15 *the Administrator of the United States Agency for*
16 *International Development, and the heads of other ap-*
17 *propriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and*
18 *submit to the appropriate congressional committees*
19 *and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate*
20 *and the House of Representatives a strategy for coun-*
21 *tering and limiting the People’s Republic of China’s*
22 *influence in, and access to, the Middle East and*
23 *North Africa.*

24 *(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under*
25 *paragraph (1) shall include—*

1 (A) an assessment of the People’s Republic
2 of China’s intent with regards to increased co-
3 operation with Middle East and North African
4 countries and how such cooperation fits into its
5 broader global strategic objectives;

6 (B) an assessment of how governments
7 across the region are responding to the People’s
8 Republic of China’s efforts to increase its mili-
9 tary presence in their countries;

10 (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation
11 through foreign military sales, financing, and ef-
12 forts to build partner capacity and increase
13 interoperability with the United States;

14 (D) an assessment of the People’s Republic
15 of China’s joint research and development with
16 the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
17 the United States’ national security interests,
18 and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s
19 Republic of China’s influence in such area;

20 (E) an assessment of arms sales and weap-
21 ons technology transfers from the People’s Repub-
22 lic of China to the Middle East and North Afri-
23 ca, impacts on United States’ national security
24 interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the

1 *People’s Republic of China’s influence in such*
2 *area;*

3 *(F) an assessment of the People’s Republic*
4 *of China’s military sales to the region, including*
5 *lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;*

6 *(G) an assessment of People’s Republic of*
7 *China military basing and dual-use facility ini-*
8 *tiatives across the Middle East and North Africa,*
9 *impacts on United States’ national security in-*
10 *terests, and recommended steps to mitigate the*
11 *People’s Republic of China’s influence in such*
12 *area;*

13 *(H) efforts to improve regional security co-*
14 *operation with United States allies and partners*
15 *with a focus on—*

16 *(i) maritime security in the Arabian*
17 *Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi-*
18 *terranean;*

19 *(ii) integrated air and missile defense;*

20 *(iii) cyber security;*

21 *(iv) border security; and*

22 *(v) critical infrastructure security, to*
23 *include energy security;*

24 *(I) increased support for government-to-gov-*
25 *ernment engagement on critical infrastructure*

1 *development projects, including ports and water*
2 *infrastructure;*

3 *(J) efforts to encourage United States pri-*
4 *ivate sector and public-private partnerships in*
5 *healthcare technology and foreign direct invest-*
6 *ment in non-energy sectors;*

7 *(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and*
8 *professional education exchanges with key part-*
9 *ner countries;*

10 *(L) specific steps to counter increased in-*
11 *vestment from the People’s Republic of China in*
12 *telecommunications infrastructure and diplo-*
13 *matic efforts to stress the political, economic, and*
14 *social benefits of a free and open internet;*

15 *(M) efforts to promote United States private*
16 *sector engagement in and public-private partner-*
17 *ships on renewable energy development;*

18 *(N) the expansion of public-private partner-*
19 *ship efforts on water, desalination, and irriga-*
20 *tion projects; and*

21 *(O) efforts to warn United States partners*
22 *in the Middle East and North Africa of the risks*
23 *associated with the People’s Republic of China’s*
24 *telecommunications infrastructure and provide*

1 *alternative “clean paths” to the People’s Repub-*
2 *lic of China’s technology.*

3 *(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (b)*
4 *shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made*
5 *available to the public, but may include a classified annex*
6 *as necessary.*

7 **SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND**
8 **NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.**

9 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

10 *(1) The United States and the international*
11 *community have long-term interests in the stability,*
12 *security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle*
13 *East and North Africa.*

14 *(2) In addition to and apart from military and*
15 *security efforts, the United States should harness a*
16 *whole of government approach, including bilateral*
17 *and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort,*
18 *and public diplomacy to compete with and counter*
19 *PRC influence.*

20 *(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of*
21 *United States engagement, transparent governance*
22 *structures, and active civil society engagement help*
23 *counter predatory foreign investment and influence*
24 *efforts.*

1 (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—*It is the policy of the*
2 *United States that the United States and the international*
3 *community should continue diplomatic and economic ef-*
4 *forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that sup-*
5 *port reform efforts to—*

6 (1) *promote greater economic opportunity;*

7 (2) *foster private sector development;*

8 (3) *strengthen civil society;*

9 (4) *promote transparent and democratic govern-*
10 *ance and the rule of law; and*

11 (5) *promote greater regional integration and*
12 *intraregional cooperation, including with Israel.*

13 **SEC. 283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF**
14 **CHINA-IRAN RELATIONSHIP.**

15 *It is the sense of Congress that the People’s Republic*
16 *of China’s economic relationship with Iran, including oil*
17 *purchases in violation of United States sanctions, under-*
18 *mines United States efforts to compel Iran to abandon its*
19 *malign activities.*

20 **PART VI—ARCTIC REGION**

21 **SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.**

22 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.*—*It*
23 *is the sense of Congress that—*

24 (1) *the rapidly changing Arctic environment—*

1 (A) creates new national and regional secu-
2 rity challenges due to increased military activity
3 in the Arctic;

4 (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging
5 as a major theater of conflict in ongoing stra-
6 tegic competition;

7 (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit-
8 toral countries have inadequate capacity to pa-
9 trol the increased vessel traffic in this remote re-
10 gion, which is a result of diminished annual lev-
11 els of sea ice;

12 (D) impacts public safety due to increased
13 human activity in the Arctic region where search
14 and rescue capacity remains very limited; and

15 (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's frag-
16 ile and pristine environment and the unique and
17 highly sensitive species found in the Arctic's ma-
18 rine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

19 (2) the United States should reduce the con-
20 sequences described in paragraph (1) by—

21 (A) evaluating the wide variety and dy-
22 namic set of security and safety risks developing
23 in the Arctic;

24 (B) developing policies and making prep-
25 arations to mitigate and respond to threats and

1 *risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to*
2 *work with allies and partners in the Arctic re-*
3 *gion to deter potential aggressive activities and*
4 *build Arctic competencies;*

5 *(C) adequately funding the National Earth*
6 *System Prediction Capability to substantively*
7 *improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on*
8 *the time scales necessary to ensure regional secu-*
9 *rity and trans-Arctic shipping;*

10 *(D) investing in resources, including a sig-*
11 *nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure*
12 *that the United States has adequate capacity to*
13 *prevent and respond to security threats in the*
14 *Arctic region; and*

15 *(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with*
16 *all states in the Arctic region to reach an agree-*
17 *ment for—*

18 *(i) maintaining peace and stability in*
19 *the Arctic region;*

20 *(ii) fostering cooperation on steward-*
21 *ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-*
22 *gion;*

23 *(iii) ensuring safe and efficient man-*
24 *agement of commercial maritime traffic in*
25 *the Arctic;*

1 (iv) promoting responsible natural re-
2 source management and economic develop-
3 ment; and

4 (v) countering China's Polar Silk
5 Road initiative;

6 (vi) examining the possibility of recon-
7 vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum;
8 and

9 (vii) reducing black carbon and meth-
10 ane emissions in the Arctic Region, includ-
11 ing by working with observers of the Arctic
12 Council, including India and the People's
13 Republic of China, to adopt mitigation
14 plans consistent with the findings and rec-
15 ommendations of the Arctic Council's
16 Framework for Action on Black Carbon and
17 Methane.

18 (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—It is the policy of the
19 *United States*—

20 (1) to recognize only the states specified in sub-
21 section (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other
22 claims to such status; and

23 (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a
24 serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the
25 interests of United States allies and partners.

1 (c) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

2 (1) *ARCTIC STATES.*—*The term “Arctic states”*
3 *means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,*
4 *Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden,*
5 *and Iceland.*

6 (2) *ARCTIC REGION.*—*The term “Arctic Region”*
7 *means the geographic region north of the 66.56083*
8 *parallel latitude north of the equator.*

9 (d) *DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR*
10 *ARCTIC AFFAIRS.*—*There is established within the Depart-*
11 *ment of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs*
12 *(referred to in this section as the “Ambassador”), appointed*
13 *in accordance with paragraph (1).*

14 (1) *APPOINTMENT.*—*The Ambassador shall be*
15 *appointed by the President, by and with the advice*
16 *and consent of the Senate.*

17 (2) *DUTIES.*—

18 (A) *DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.*—*Sub-*
19 *ject to the direction of the President and the Sec-*
20 *retary of State, the Ambassador is authorized to*
21 *represent the United States in matters and cases*
22 *relevant to the Arctic Region in—*

23 (i) *contacts with foreign governments,*
24 *intergovernmental organizations, and spe-*
25 *cialized agencies of the United Nations, the*

1 *Arctic Council, and other international or-*
2 *ganizations of which the United States is a*
3 *member; and*

4 *(ii) multilateral conferences and meet-*
5 *ings relating to Arctic affairs.*

6 *(B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The*
7 *Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic*
8 *Council when the United States holds the Chair-*
9 *manship of the Arctic Council.*

10 *(3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Amba-*
11 *sador shall coordinate United States policies related*
12 *to the Arctic Region, including—*

13 *(A) meeting national security, economic,*
14 *and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic af-*
15 *airs;*

16 *(B) protecting the Arctic environment and*
17 *conserving its biological resources;*

18 *(C) promoting environmentally sustainable*
19 *natural resource management and economic de-*
20 *velopment;*

21 *(D) strengthening institutions for coopera-*
22 *tion among the Arctic states;*

23 *(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in*
24 *decisions that affect them;*

1 (F) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-
2 search on local, regional, and global environ-
3 mental issues;

4 (G) integrating scientific data on the cur-
5 rent and projected effects of climate change in
6 the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is
7 applied to the development of security strategies
8 for the Arctic Region;

9 (H) making available the methods and ap-
10 proaches on the integration of climate science to
11 other regional security planning programs in the
12 Department of State to better ensure that broad-
13 er decision-making processes may more ade-
14 quately account for the effects of climate change;
15 and

16 (I) reducing black carbon and methane
17 emissions in the Arctic Region.

18 (e) *ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY*.—The Amba-
19 sador shall develop a policy, to be known as the “Arctic
20 Region Security Policy”, to assess, develop, budget for, and
21 implement plans, policies, and actions—

22 (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the
23 United States in Arctic states, including through en-
24 hancements to diplomatic missions and facilities,
25 participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-

1 *lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United*
2 *States initiatives and assistance programs across*
3 *agencies to protect the national security of the United*
4 *States and its allies and partners;*

5 *(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic*
6 *states to the effects of environmental change and in-*
7 *creased civilian and military activity by Arctic states*
8 *and other states that may result from increased acces-*
9 *sibility of the Arctic Region;*

10 *(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Re-*
11 *gion and Arctic states that—*

12 *(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic*
13 *environment; and*

14 *(B) are strategically significant to the*
15 *United States;*

16 *(4) to coordinate the integration of environ-*
17 *mental change and national security risk and vulner-*
18 *ability assessments into the decision making process*
19 *on foreign assistance awards with Greenland;*

20 *(5) to advance principles of good governance by*
21 *encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on*
22 *collaborative approaches—*

23 *(A) to responsibly manage natural resources*
24 *in the Arctic Region;*

1 (B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
2 time safety in the Arctic Region;

3 (C) to prevent the escalation of security ten-
4 sions by mitigating against the militarization of
5 the Arctic Region;

6 (D) to develop mutually agreed upon multi-
7 lateral policies among Arctic states on the man-
8 agement of maritime transit routes through the
9 Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the
10 transit policies for access to and transit in the
11 Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and

12 (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic
13 Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability
14 and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
15 mane and responsible fashion;

16 (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
17 vivability, and resiliency of United States interests
18 and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and

19 (7) to reduce black carbon and methane emis-
20 sions in the Arctic.

21 **SEC. 286. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING OBSERVER**
22 **STATUS FOR TAIWAN ON THE ARCTIC COUN-**
23 **CIL.**

24 It is the policy of the United States to urge that Tai-
25 wan be given observer status on the Arctic Council.

PART VII—OCEANIA**SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-
GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.**

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic national security and economic priority of the United States Government;

(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open Indo-Pacific region;

(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development exchanges that promote the goals of individual countries and the entire region;

(4) to work with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic development;

(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in existing regional organizations and international structures to promote the national security

1 *and economic goals of the United States and countries*
2 *of Oceania;*

3 *(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United*
4 *States strategy that will enhance youth engagement*
5 *and advance long-term growth and development*
6 *throughout the region, especially as such relates to*
7 *protecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-*
8 *hoods and strengthening the resilience of the countries*
9 *of Oceania against current and future threats result-*
10 *ing from extreme weather and severe changes in the*
11 *environment;*

12 *(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign*
13 *influence and corruption aimed at undermining the*
14 *political, environmental, social, and economic sta-*
15 *bility of the people and governments of the countries*
16 *of Oceania;*

17 *(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries*
18 *of Oceania to address public health challenges and*
19 *improve global health security;*

20 *(9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar-*
21 *ket-based private sector investments that adhere to*
22 *best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain-*
23 *ability, and environmental and social safeguards as*
24 *an alternative to state-directed investments by author-*
25 *itarian governments;*

1 (10) to ensure the people and communities of
2 Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and degrad-
3 ing munitions hazards and other debris that threaten
4 health and livelihoods;

5 (11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering
6 United States support for maintaining Taiwan's dip-
7 lomatic partners in Oceania; and

8 (12) to work cooperatively with all governments
9 in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re-
10 mains of members of the United States Armed Forces
11 who are missing in action from previous conflicts in
12 the Indo-Pacific region.

13 **SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.**

14 (a) *OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.*—Not later than
15 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
16 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
17 sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening
18 United States engagement with the countries of Oceania,
19 including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with
20 Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared con-
21 cerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security and
22 resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

23 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—The strategic roadmap required by
24 subsection (a) shall include the following:

1 (1) *A description of United States regional goals*
2 *and concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing*
3 *engagement with the countries of Oceania.*

4 (2) *An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of*
5 *United States regional goals and concerns that are*
6 *shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in-*
7 *cluding a review of issues related to anti-corruption*
8 *efforts, maritime and other security issues, environ-*
9 *mental protection, fisheries management, economic*
10 *growth and development, and disaster resilience and*
11 *preparedness.*

12 (3) *A review of ongoing programs and initiatives*
13 *by the Governments of the United States, Australia,*
14 *New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of shared re-*
15 *gional goals and concerns.*

16 (4) *A review of ongoing programs and initiatives*
17 *by regional organizations and other related intergov-*
18 *ernmental structures aimed at addressing shared re-*
19 *gional goals and concerns.*

20 (5) *A plan for aligning United States programs*
21 *and resources in pursuit of shared regional goals and*
22 *concerns, as appropriate.*

23 (6) *Recommendations for additional United*
24 *States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources*
25 *necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.*

1 (7) *Any other elements the Secretary of State*
2 *considers appropriate.*

3 **SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

4 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than one year after the*
5 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State*
6 *shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the*
7 *feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States-*
8 *based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be*
9 *known as the “Oceania Security Dialogue”) among the*
10 *countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring*
11 *and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic,*
12 *and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce-*
13 *ania.*

14 (b) *REPORT REQUIRED.*—*The briefing required by*
15 *subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following:*

16 (1) *A review of the ability of the Department of*
17 *State to participate in a public-private sponsored se-*
18 *curity dialogue.*

19 (2) *An assessment of the potential locations for*
20 *conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the ju-*
21 *risdiction of the United States.*

22 (3) *Consideration of dates for conducting an*
23 *Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize par-*
24 *ticipation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific*
25 *countries of Oceania.*

1 (4) *A review of the funding modalities available*
2 *to the Department of State to help finance an Oce-*
3 *ania Security Dialogue, including grant-making au-*
4 *thorities available to the Department of State.*

5 (5) *An assessment of any administrative, statu-*
6 *tory, or other legal limitations that would prevent the*
7 *establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue with*
8 *participation and support of the Department of State.*

9 (6) *An analysis of how an Oceania Security*
10 *Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration*
11 *on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the*
12 *changing environment as the greatest existential*
13 *threat to countries of Oceania.*

14 (7) *An evaluation of how an Oceania Security*
15 *Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of*
16 *existing regional structures and organizations dedi-*
17 *cated to the security of the Oceania region, such as*
18 *the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental*
19 *Security Forum.*

20 (8) *An analysis of how an Oceania Security*
21 *Dialogue would help with implementation of the stra-*
22 *tegic roadmap required by section 292 and advance*
23 *the National Security Strategy of the United States.*

24 (c) *INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent*
25 *practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the*

1 *Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the*
2 *lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Studies*
3 *of the Department of Defense to determine the feasibility*
4 *and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security Dia-*
5 *logue.*

6 **SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.**

7 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than one year after the*
8 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace*
9 *Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-*
10 *mittees a report on strategies to reasonably and safely ex-*
11 *pand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania,*
12 *with the goals of—*

13 (1) *expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to*
14 *all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and*

15 (2) *working with regional and international*
16 *partners of the United States to expand the presence*
17 *of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania*
18 *communities in support of climate resilience initia-*
19 *tives.*

20 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The report required by subsection (a)*
21 *shall—*

22 (1) *assess the factors contributing to the current*
23 *absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oce-*
24 *ania;*

1 (2) *examine potential remedies that include*
2 *working with United States Government agencies and*
3 *regional governments, including governments of*
4 *United States allies—*

5 (A) *to increase the health infrastructure and*
6 *medical evacuation capabilities of the countries*
7 *of Oceania to better support the safety of Peace*
8 *Corps volunteers while in such countries;*

9 (B) *to address physical safety concerns that*
10 *have decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to*
11 *operate in Oceania; and*

12 (C) *to increase transportation infrastruc-*
13 *ture in the countries of Oceania to better support*
14 *the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and their ac-*
15 *cess to necessary facilities;*

16 (3) *evaluate the potential to expand the deploy-*
17 *ment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the*
18 *countries of Oceania address social, economic, and de-*
19 *velopment needs of their communities that require*
20 *specific professional expertise; and*

21 (4) *explore potential new operational models to*
22 *address safety and security needs of Peace Corps vol-*
23 *unteers in the countries of Oceania, including—*

24 (A) *changes to volunteer deployment dura-*
25 *tions; and*

1 (B) *scheduled redeployment of volunteers to*
2 *regional or United States-based healthcare facili-*
3 *ties for routine physical and behavioral health*
4 *evaluation.*

5 (c) *VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMU-*
6 *NITIES.—*

7 (1) *IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential to*
8 *expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-*
9 *income Oceania communities under subsection (a)(2),*
10 *the Director of the Peace Corps shall consider the de-*
11 *velopment of initiatives described in paragraph (2).*

12 (2) *INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives de-*
13 *scribed in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives*
14 *that help the countries of Oceania address social, eco-*
15 *nomie, and development needs of their communities,*
16 *including by—*

17 (A) *addressing, through appropriate resil-*
18 *ience-based interventions, the vulnerability that*
19 *communities in Oceania face as result of extreme*
20 *weather, severe environmental change, and other*
21 *climate related trends; and*

22 (B) *improving, through smart infrastruc-*
23 *ture principles, access to transportation and*
24 *connectivity infrastructure that will help address*
25 *the economic and social challenges that commu-*

1 *nities in Oceania confront as a result of poor or*
2 *nonexistent infrastructure.*

3 (d) *OCEANIA DEFINED.*—*In this section, the term*
4 *“Oceania” includes the following:*

5 (1) *Easter Island of Chile.*

6 (2) *Fiji.*

7 (3) *French Polynesia of France.*

8 (4) *Kiribati.*

9 (5) *New Caledonia of France.*

10 (6) *Nieu of New Zealand.*

11 (7) *Papua New Guinea.*

12 (8) *Samoa.*

13 (9) *Vanuatu.*

14 (10) *The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Aus-*
15 *tralia.*

16 (11) *The Cook Islands of New Zealand.*

17 (12) *The Coral Islands of Australia.*

18 (13) *The Federated States of Micronesia.*

19 (14) *The Norfolk Island of Australia.*

20 (15) *The Pitcairn Islands of the United King-*
21 *dom.*

22 (16) *The Republic of the Marshal Islands.*

23 (17) *The Republic of Palau.*

24 (18) *The Solomon Islands.*

25 (19) *Tokelau of New Zealand.*

1 (20) *Tonga.*

2 (21) *Tuvalu.*

3 (22) *Wallis and Futuna of France.*

4 **PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS**

5 **SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE.**

6 *This part may be cited as the “Boosting Long-term*
7 *U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Act” or the “BLUE Pacific*
8 *Act”.*

9 **SEC. 296. FINDINGS.**

10 *Congress finds the following:*

11 (1) *The Pacific Islands—*

12 (A) *are home to roughly 10 million resi-*
13 *dents, including over 8.6 million in Papua New*
14 *Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cul-*
15 *tures and peoples;*

16 (B) *are spread across an expanse of the Pa-*
17 *cific Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the*
18 *Earth’s surface, including the three sub-regions*
19 *of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia; and*

20 (C) *face shared challenges in development*
21 *that have distinct local contexts, including cli-*
22 *mate change and rising sea levels, geographic*
23 *distances from major markets, and vulnerability*
24 *to external shocks such as natural disasters.*

1 (2) *The United States is a Pacific country with*
2 *longstanding ties and shared values and interests*
3 *with the Pacific Islands, including through the Com-*
4 *pacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated*
5 *States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Fed-*
6 *erated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of*
7 *Palau.*

8 (3) *The United States has vital national security*
9 *interests in the Pacific Islands, including—*

10 (A) *protecting regional peace and security*
11 *that fully respects the sovereignty of all nations;*

12 (B) *advancing economic prosperity free*
13 *from coercion through trade and sustainable de-*
14 *velopment; and*

15 (C) *supporting democracy, good governance,*
16 *the rule of law, and human rights and funda-*
17 *mental freedoms.*

18 (4) *Successive United States administrations*
19 *have recognized the importance of the Pacific region,*
20 *including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic*
21 *documents, including the following:*

22 (A) *The 2015 National Security Strategy,*
23 *which first declared the rebalance to Asia and*
24 *the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pa-*
25 *cific nation, and paved the way for subsequent*

1 *United States engagement with the Pacific Is-*
2 *lands, including several new policies focused on*
3 *conservation and resilience to climate change an-*
4 *nounced in September 2016.*

5 *(B) The 2017 National Security Strategy,*
6 *which includes a commitment to “shore up frag-*
7 *ile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to*
8 *reduce their vulnerability to economic fluctua-*
9 *tions and natural disasters”.*

10 *(C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,*
11 *which identified the Pacific Islands as “critical*
12 *to U.S. strategy because of our shared values, in-*
13 *terests, and commitments” and committed the*
14 *United States to “building capacity and resil-*
15 *ience to address maritime security; Illegal, Unre-*
16 *ported, and Unregulated fishing; drug traf-*
17 *ficking; and resilience to address climate change*
18 *and disaster response”.*

19 *(5) The United States has deepened its diplo-*
20 *matic engagement with the Pacific Islands through*
21 *several recent initiatives, including—*

22 *(A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an*
23 *additional \$100,000,000 in 2019 and*
24 *\$200,000,000 in 2020, on top of the approxi-*
25 *mately \$350,000,000 that the United States pro-*

1 *vides annually to the region to support shared*
2 *priorities in economic and human development,*
3 *climate change, and more; and*

4 *(B) the Small and Less Populous Island*
5 *Economies (SALPIE) Initiative launched in*
6 *March 2021 to strengthen United States collabo-*
7 *ration with island countries and territories, in-*
8 *cluding in the Pacific Islands, on COVID–19*
9 *economic challenges, long-term economic develop-*
10 *ment, climate change, and other shared interests.*

11 *(6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security,*
12 *signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in*
13 *2018, affirmed that climate change “remains the sin-*
14 *gle greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and*
15 *wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific” and asserted*
16 *“the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its*
17 *national affairs free of external interference and coer-*
18 *cion”.*

19 *(7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated*
20 *that the Pacific Islands region needs upwards of \$2.8*
21 *billion a year in investment needs through 2030, in*
22 *addition to \$300 million a year for climate mitiga-*
23 *tion and adaptation over the same period.*

24 *(8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective*
25 *policies to prevent and contain the spread of the*

1 *Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as*
2 *“COVID–19”) pandemic to their populations. The*
3 *United States has provided over \$130,000,000 in as-*
4 *stance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID–19 re-*
5 *sponse. However, priorities must be met to ensure*
6 *continued success in preventing the spread of the*
7 *COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and widespread*
8 *vaccinations, and pursuing long-term economic recov-*
9 *ery in the Pacific Islands, including through—*

10 *(A) expanding testing capacity and acquisi-*
11 *tion of needed medical supplies, including avail-*
12 *able COVID–19 vaccines and supporting vac-*
13 *cination efforts, through a reliable supply chain;*

14 *(B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and*
15 *reopening of economic and social activities; and*

16 *(C) mitigating and recovering from the im-*
17 *pacts of the COVID–19 pandemic on the health*
18 *system and the reliance on food and energy im-*
19 *ports as well as lost tourism revenue and other*
20 *economic and food security damages caused by*
21 *the pandemic.*

22 *(9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volun-*
23 *teers have proudly served in the Pacific Islands,*
24 *building strong people-to-people relationships and*
25 *demonstrating the United States commitment to peace*

1 *and development in the region. Prior to the COVID–*
2 *19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence in*
3 *four countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps vol-*
4 *unteers continue to be in high demand in the Pacific*
5 *Islands and have been requested across the region.*

6 **SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

7 *It is the policy of the United States—*

8 *(1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive,*
9 *multifaceted, and principled United States policy in*
10 *the Pacific Islands that—*

11 *(A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity*
12 *for all countries through a rules-based regional*
13 *order that respects the sovereignty and political*
14 *independence of all nations;*

15 *(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open*
16 *and vibrant corridor for international maritime*
17 *trade and promotes trade and sustainable devel-*
18 *opment that supports inclusive economic growth*
19 *and autonomy for all nations and addresses so-*
20 *cioeconomic challenges related to public health,*
21 *education, renewable energy, digital connectivity,*
22 *and more;*

23 *(C) supports regional efforts to address the*
24 *challenges posed by climate change, including by*
25 *strengthening resilience to natural disasters and*

1 *through responsible stewardship of natural re-*
2 *sources;*

3 *(D) improves civil society, strengthens*
4 *democratic governance and the rule of law, and*
5 *promotes human rights and the preservation of*
6 *the region’s unique cultural heritages;*

7 *(E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing*
8 *and containing the spread of the COVID–19*
9 *pandemic and in pursuing long-term economic*
10 *recovery; and*

11 *(F) supports existing regional architecture*
12 *and international norms;*

13 *(2) to support the vision, values, and objectives*
14 *of existing regional multilateral institutions and*
15 *frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and*
16 *the Pacific Community, including—*

17 *(A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Region-*
18 *alism;*

19 *(B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional*
20 *Security; and*

21 *(C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;*

22 *(3) to extend and renew the provisions of the*
23 *Compacts of Free Association and related United*
24 *States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic*
25 *of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of*

1 *Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of Palau un-*
2 *less they are extended and renewed; and*

3 *(4) to work closely with United States allies and*
4 *partners with existing relationships and interests in*
5 *the Pacific Islands, such as Australia, Japan, New*
6 *Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing common goals.*

7 **SEC. 298. DEFINITION.**

8 *In this part, the terms “Pacific Islands” means the*
9 *Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati,*
10 *the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States*
11 *of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic*
12 *of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the*
13 *Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the*
14 *Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.*

15 **SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM OF**
16 **REPORTS.**

17 *(a) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—Any re-*
18 *ports required to be submitted to the appropriate congres-*
19 *sional committees under this part that are subject to dead-*
20 *lines for submission consisting of the same units of time*
21 *may be consolidated into a single report that is submitted*
22 *to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to*
23 *such deadlines and that contains all information required*
24 *under such reports.*

1 (b) *FORM OF REPORTS.*—Each report required by this
2 part shall be submitted in unclassified form but may con-
3 tain a classified annex.

4 **SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC IS-**
5 **LANDS.**

6 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress
7 that—

8 (1) *the strategic importance of the Pacific Is-*
9 *lands necessitates an examination of whether United*
10 *States diplomatic, economic, and development engage-*
11 *ment and presence in the Pacific Islands region is*
12 *sufficient to effectively support United States objec-*
13 *tives and meaningful participation in regional fora;*

14 (2) *improving shared understanding of and*
15 *jointly combatting the transnational challenges perti-*
16 *nent to the Pacific Islands region with countries of*
17 *the Pacific Islands and regional partners such as*
18 *Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is vi-*
19 *tally important to our shared long-term interests of*
20 *stability, security, and prosperity;*

21 (3) *the United States should seek to participate*
22 *in and support efforts to coordinate a regional re-*
23 *sponse toward maritime security, including through*
24 *continued United States and Pacific Islands partici-*
25 *pation in the Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu and*

1 *Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and robust*
2 *cooperation with regional allies and partners; and*

3 *(4) the United States Government should commit*
4 *to sending appropriate levels of representation to re-*
5 *gional events.*

6 *(b) REPORT.—*

7 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
8 *the date of the enactment of this Act and annually*
9 *thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in*
10 *consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the*
11 *Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-*
12 *national Development, shall submit to the appro-*
13 *priate congressional committees a report on the diplo-*
14 *matic and development presence of the United States*
15 *in the Pacific Islands.*

16 *(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-*
17 *graph (1) shall include the following:*

18 *(A) A description of the Department of*
19 *State, United States Agency for International*
20 *Development, United States International Devel-*
21 *opment Finance Corporation, Millennium Chal-*
22 *lenge Corporation, and United States Commer-*
23 *cial Service presence, staffing, programming,*
24 *and resourcing of operations in the Pacific Is-*

1 *lands, including programming and resourcing*
2 *not specifically allocated to the Pacific Islands.*

3 *(B) A description of gaps in such presence,*
4 *including unfilled full-time equivalent positions.*

5 *(C) A description of limitations and chal-*
6 *lenges such gaps pose to United States strategic*
7 *objectives, including—*

8 *(i) gaps in support of the Pacific Is-*
9 *lands due to operations being conducted*
10 *from the United States Agency for Inter-*
11 *national Development offices in Manila and*
12 *Suva; and*

13 *(ii) gaps in programming and*
14 *resourcing.*

15 *(D) A strategy to expand and elevate such*
16 *presence to fill such gaps, including by estab-*
17 *lishing new missions, expanding participation*
18 *in regional forums, and elevating United States*
19 *representation in regional forums.*

20 *(e) AUTHORITY TO ENHANCE DIPLOMATIC AND ECO-*
21 *NOMIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State and the Sec-*
22 *retary of Commerce are authorized to hire locally employed*
23 *staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of promoting*
24 *increased diplomatic engagement and economic and com-*

1 *mercial engagement between the United States and the Pa-*
2 *cific Islands.*

3 (d) *REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRAT-*
4 *EGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-*
5 *ment of this Act, and every five years thereafter, the Admin-*
6 *istrator of the United States Agency for International De-*
7 *velopment shall submit to the appropriate congressional*
8 *committees a regional development cooperation strategy for*
9 *the Pacific Islands.*

10 **SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES AND**
11 **PARTNERS.**

12 (a) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall consult*
13 *and coordinate with regional allies and partners, such as*
14 *Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional in-*
15 *stitutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific*
16 *Community, with respect to programs to provide assistance*
17 *to the Pacific Islands, including programs established by*
18 *this Act, including for purposes of—*

19 (1) *deconflicting programming;*

20 (2) *ensuring that any programming does not ad-*
21 *versely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Is-*
22 *lands; and*

23 (3) *ensuring complementary programs benefit*
24 *the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent prac-*
25 *ticable.*

1 (b) *FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.*—*The Secretary*
2 *of State shall establish a formal consultative process with*
3 *such regional allies and partners to coordinate with respect*
4 *to such programs and future-years programming.*

5 (c) *REPORT.*—*Not later than 180 days after the date*
6 *of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the*
7 *Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-*
8 *sional committees and the Armed Services Committees of*
9 *the Senate and the House of Representatives a report that*
10 *includes—*

11 (1) *a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and*
12 *programs undertaken by regional allies and partners,*
13 *including multilateral organizations, to advance pri-*
14 *orities identified in this Act;*

15 (2) *a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and*
16 *programs undertaken by non-allied foreign actors that*
17 *are viewed as being potentially harmful or in any*
18 *way detrimental to one or more countries of the Pa-*
19 *cific Islands;*

20 (3) *an assessment of United States programs in*
21 *the Pacific Islands and their alignment and*
22 *complementarity with the efforts of regional allies and*
23 *partners identified in paragraph (1); and*

24 (4) *a review of the formal consultative process*
25 *required in subsection (b) to summarize engagements*

1 *held and identify opportunities to improve coordina-*
2 *tion with regional allies and partners.*

3 **SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PA-**
4 **CIFIC ISLANDS.**

5 *(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
6 *that—*

7 *(1) the United States Government should lever-*
8 *age the full range of authorities and programs avail-*
9 *able to assist the Pacific Islands in achieving their*
10 *development goals;*

11 *(2) United States development assistance should*
12 *seek to build on existing public and private sector in-*
13 *vestments while creating new opportunities toward a*
14 *favorable environment for additional such invest-*
15 *ments; and*

16 *(3) United States development efforts should be*
17 *coordinated with and seek to build on existing efforts*
18 *by like-minded partners and allies and regional and*
19 *international multilateral organizations.*

20 *(b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-*
21 *tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency*
22 *for International Development, the Secretary of the Treas-*
23 *ury, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States*
24 *International Development Finance Corporation, shall de-*
25 *velop and implement a strategy to—*

1 (1) *invest in and improve critical infrastructure,*
2 *including transport connectivity, information and*
3 *communications technology, food security, coastal*
4 *zone management, marine and water resource man-*
5 *agement, and energy security and access to electricity*
6 *in the Pacific Islands, with an emphasis on climate*
7 *resiliency and sustainable development;*

8 (2) *provide technical assistance to assist local*
9 *government and civil society leaders assess risks to*
10 *local infrastructure, especially those posed by climate*
11 *change, consider and implement risk mitigation ef-*
12 *forts and policies to strengthen resilience, and evalu-*
13 *ate proposed projects and solutions for their efficacy*
14 *and sustainability; and*

15 (3) *support investment and improvement in eco-*
16 *system conservation and protection for the long-term*
17 *sustainable use of ecosystem services, especially those*
18 *that mitigate effects of climate change and those that*
19 *support food security and livelihoods.*

20 (c) *CONDUCT OF STRATEGY.—The strategy developed*
21 *under this section shall be coordinated with like-minded*
22 *partners and allies, regional and international multilateral*
23 *organizations, and regional frameworks for development in*
24 *the Pacific Islands.*

1 (d) *INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.*—The
2 *Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representatives*
3 *of the United States to the World Bank Group, the Inter-*
4 *national Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank*
5 *to use the voice and vote of the United States to support*
6 *climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pacific Is-*
7 *lands.*

8 (e) *REPORT.*—

9 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days after
10 *the date of the enactment this Act and annually there-*
11 *after, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-*
12 *propriate congressional committees, the Committee on*
13 *Natural Resources of the House of Representatives,*
14 *and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources*
15 *of the Senate a report on foreign infrastructure devel-*
16 *opments in the Pacific Islands.*

17 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—The report re-
18 *quired by paragraph (1) shall include—*

19 (A) *a review of foreign infrastructure devel-*
20 *opments in the Pacific Islands by non-United*
21 *States allies and partners;*

22 (B) *assessments of the environmental im-*
23 *pact and sustainability of such developments;*
24 *and*

1 *costs of implementation, effectiveness, and capacity of the*
2 *Pacific Islands to participate in the ILEA program.*

3 (c) *BRIEFING REQUIRED.*—*Not later than 180 days*
4 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary*
5 *of State shall provide the appropriate congressional com-*
6 *mittees a briefing on the plan developed under this section.*

7 **SEC. 299E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PACIFIC IS-**
8 **LANDS.**

9 (a) *STRATEGY.*—

10 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, with*
11 *the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in co-*
12 *ordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security,*
13 *shall develop and implement a comprehensive strategy*
14 *to provide assistance to and build the capacity of*
15 *local civilian and national security institutions of the*
16 *Pacific Islands for purposes of—*

17 (A) *enhancing maritime security and mari-*
18 *time domain awareness to address challenges*
19 *such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fish-*
20 *ing;*

21 (B) *assisting local law enforcement in de-*
22 *tecting, preventing, and combatting human and*
23 *drug trafficking and other forms of transnational*
24 *crime;*

1 (C) participating in efforts by regional in-
2 stitutions and frameworks to coordinate and fa-
3 cilitate cooperation on shared security challenges;
4 and

5 (D) expanding information sharing and to
6 work toward operational coordination and inter-
7 operability among Pacific Island maritime secu-
8 rity forces, including through regional fusion
9 centers.

10 (2) *PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES DESCRIBED.*—

11 *The strategy required by this subsection shall build on*
12 *but not be limited to the following programs and au-*
13 *thorities:*

14 (A) *The International Military Education*
15 *and Training program.*

16 (B) *The Foreign Military Financing pro-*
17 *gram.*

18 (C) *The authority to build the capacity of*
19 *foreign security forces under section 333 of title*
20 *10, United States Code.*

21 (D) *The authority to provide excess defense*
22 *articles under section 516 of the Foreign Assist-*
23 *ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).*

24 (E) *The Department of Defense State Part-*
25 *nership Program.*

1 (3) *NATIONAL POLICE FORCES AND COAST*
2 *GUARDS.*—*The national police forces and coast guards*
3 *of the Pacific Islands are eligible to receive assistance*
4 *under the programs and authorities described in*
5 *paragraph (2) (other than the programs and authori-*
6 *ties described in subparagraphs (A), (D), and (F) of*
7 *paragraph (2)) for purposes of the strategy required*
8 *by this subsection.*

9 (b) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—*The strategy re-*
10 *quired by subsection (a) shall seek to preserve peace and*
11 *regional stability in the Pacific Islands and take into con-*
12 *sideration and seek to build upon but not duplicate existing*
13 *assistance provided by United States allies and partners.*

14 (c) *REPORT.*—

15 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 180 days after*
16 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary*
17 *shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-*
18 *tees a report that contains the strategy developed*
19 *under this section.*

20 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—*The report re-*
21 *quired by paragraph (1) shall include—*

22 (A) *an assessment of security challenges to*
23 *the Pacific Islands;*

24 (B) *an analysis of demonstrated needs of*
25 *the Pacific Islands for assistance;*

1 (C) a review of existing security assistance
2 programs in the Pacific Islands, including pro-
3 grams and efforts provided by United States al-
4 lies and partners;

5 (D) a plan for programs for training,
6 equipping, and sustainment, including excess de-
7 fense equipment and related materials;

8 (E) a list of militaries, national police
9 forces, coast guards, and other national security
10 forces of the Pacific Islands receiving assistance
11 under the strategy;

12 (F) a review of existing cross-border mari-
13 time law enforcement operations (commonly
14 known as “shiprider agreements”) with the Pa-
15 cific Islands, an assessment of additional
16 resourcing needs to enhance operational capac-
17 ity, and a plan to improve on these programs
18 and operations;

19 (G) a review of existing Department of De-
20 fense State Partnership Programs with the Pa-
21 cific Islands and an assessment of additional op-
22 portunities to leverage Department of Defense
23 State Partnership Programs to address national
24 security, law enforcement, disaster relief and
25 emergency management, and related priorities;

1 (H) a review of current efforts and progress
2 in removing unexploded ordnance in the Pacific
3 Islands and an assessment of additional
4 resourcing needed to ensure continued progress,
5 including to support coordination with regional
6 efforts and those of United States allies and
7 partners;

8 (I) a review of existing regional fusion cen-
9 ters and other cooperative intelligence sharing ef-
10 forts in the Pacific Islands to address maritime
11 security, transnational crime, natural disasters,
12 and other security challenges and an assessment
13 of opportunities for the United States to partici-
14 pate in such efforts, including by allocating staff
15 and supplying resourcing;

16 (J) measures to evaluate success for the
17 strategy; and

18 (K) a detailed assessment of appropriations
19 required to achieve the objectives for the strategy
20 in future years.

21 (3) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES*
22 *DEFINED.*—In this subsection, the term “appropriate
23 congressional committees” means—

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
25 Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-

1 *mittee on Transportation and Infrastructure of*
2 *the House of Representatives; and*

3 *(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,*
4 *the Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-*
5 *mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-*
6 *tation of the Senate.*

7 **SEC. 299F. COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME.**

8 *(a) RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRU-*
9 *MENTS.—*

10 *(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall*
11 *prioritize efforts to assist the Pacific Islands in rati-*
12 *fying and implementing international legal conven-*
13 *tions related to transnational crime, such as—*

14 *(A) the Convention on International Trade*
15 *in Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and*
16 *Flora;*

17 *(B) the Agreement on Port State Measures;*
18 *and*

19 *(C) relevant protocols supplementing the*
20 *United Nations Convention Against*
21 *Transnational Organized Crime, such as—*

22 *(i) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress,*
23 *and Punish Trafficking in Person, Espe-*
24 *cially Women and Children; and*

1 (ii) *the Protocol Against the Smug-*
2 *gling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air.*

3 (2) *BIENNIAL REPORT.*—*Not later than 180 days*
4 *after the date of the enactment of this Act and every*
5 *two years thereafter as appropriate, the Secretary of*
6 *State shall submit to the appropriate congressional*
7 *committees a report on—*

8 (A) *the status of the progress of each coun-*
9 *try of the Pacific Islands toward ratifying and*
10 *implementing international legal conventions re-*
11 *lated to transnational crime; and*

12 (B) *United States plans for assisting those*
13 *countries that have yet to fully ratify such con-*
14 *ventions with their respective ratification efforts.*

15 (b) *UPDATES OF CERTAIN REPORTS.*—*The Secretary*
16 *of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies as ap-*
17 *propriate, shall identify and update existing reports to in-*
18 *clude forms of transnational crime affecting the Pacific Is-*
19 *lands, such as—*

20 (1) *the International Narcotics Control Strategy*
21 *report;*

22 (2) *the Improving International Fisheries Man-*
23 *agement report; and*

24 (3) *the Trafficking in Persons report.*

25 (c) *ILLEGAL LOGGING AND ASSOCIATED TRADE.*—

1 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act and annually
3 thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination
4 with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, shall sub-
5 mit to appropriate congressional committees a report
6 that identifies countries of the Pacific Islands that are
7 countries of concern with respect to illegal logging
8 and associated trade.

9 (2) *ELEMENTS.*—The report required by para-
10 graph (1) shall include the following:

11 (A) A description of the impact illegal log-
12 ging and associated trade have had on local com-
13 munities, good governance, and biodiversity, in-
14 cluding an identification of those foreign coun-
15 tries that may be financing or in any other
16 manner supporting illegal logging activities.

17 (B) A description of efforts taken by coun-
18 tries identified under paragraph (1) to comply
19 and take appropriate corrective action to miti-
20 gate illegal logging, and an evaluation of the
21 progress of those efforts.

22 (C) A description of steps taken by the
23 heads of relevant Federal agencies to assist the
24 Pacific Islands in adopting and implementing
25 international measures comparable to those of

1 *the United States, such as the Lacey Act, to re-*
2 *duce impacts of illicit logging.*

3 (3) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES*
4 *DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate*
5 *congressional committees” means—*

6 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and*
7 *the Committee on Ways and Means of the House*
8 *of Representatives; and*

9 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Relations*
10 *and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.*

11 (d) *ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED*
12 *FISHING.—Section 3553 of the National Defense Authoriza-*
13 *tion Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (16 U.S.C. 8033) is amend-*
14 *ed—*

15 (1) *in paragraph (7), by striking “and” at the*
16 *end;*

17 (2) *by redesignating paragraph (8) as para-*
18 *graph (9); and*

19 (3) *by inserting after paragraph (7) (as amend-*
20 *ed) the following:*

21 “(8) *an assessment of gaps or limitations in the*
22 *ability of the United States to effectively assist pri-*
23 *ority regions and priority flag states relating to IUU*
24 *fishing due to resource constraints and the additional*

1 (3) *coordination of existing disaster mitigation*
2 *and response plans in the region, including by United*
3 *States allies and partners in the region.*

4 *(c) REPORT.—*

5 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after*
6 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Adminis-*
7 *trator shall submit to the appropriate congressional*
8 *committees a report on the program developed under*
9 *this section.*

10 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-*
11 *quired by paragraph (1) shall include—*

12 (A) *an assessment of disaster risks in the*
13 *Pacific Islands and existing local and regional*
14 *capacity to respond to such risks;*

15 (B) *a review of existing efforts by United*
16 *States allies and partners to provide assistance*
17 *and training for natural disaster preparedness*
18 *and emergency management; and*

19 (C) *objectives, means of implementation,*
20 *and measures of success for the initiative.*

21 (3) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES*
22 *DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate*
23 *congressional committees” means—*

1 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and*
2 *the Committee on Natural Resources of the*
3 *House of Representatives; and*

4 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Relations*
5 *and the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-*
6 *sources of the Senate.*

7 (d) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are*
8 *authorized to be appropriated \$40,000,000 for each of the*
9 *fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.*

10 **SEC. 299H. PEACE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.**

11 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
12 *that—*

13 (1) *the presence of the Peace Corps in the Pacific*
14 *Islands should be expanded and the Peace Corps*
15 *should reopen its programs in as many of the Pacific*
16 *Islands as possible, including where it has previously*
17 *operated but has suspended operations;*

18 (2) *consulting like-minded regional allies and*
19 *partners, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan,*
20 *and Taiwan is crucial for identifying and overcoming*
21 *challenges for increased Peace Corps presence in the*
22 *Pacific Islands;*

23 (3) *the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote*
24 *world peace and friendship in part by helping the*
25 *people of interested countries in meeting their need*

1 *for trained men and women, provides an invaluable*
2 *opportunity to connect the American people with the*
3 *people of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the*
4 *Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of*
5 *Palau; and*

6 *(4) the Peace Corps should promptly reopen its*
7 *programs in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the*
8 *Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of*
9 *Palau.*

10 *(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date*
11 *of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps*
12 *shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a*
13 *report that includes—*

14 *(1) a comparative analysis of the Peace Corps*
15 *presence in the Pacific Islands region to other regions*
16 *of the world, including a cost-benefit analysis of*
17 *placement in the region versus elsewhere globally;*

18 *(2) analysis of current impediments to Peace*
19 *Corps expansion in the Pacific Islands region;*

20 *(3) outcomes of consultations among United*
21 *States agencies, and with regional allies and part-*
22 *ners, on areas in which cooperation can reduce factors*
23 *limiting Peace Corps expansion, particularly those*
24 *related to medical transportation and personal safety;*
25 *and*

1 (4) a plan and timeline for implementing out-
2 comes identified in paragraph (3) to facilitate expan-
3 sion of Peace Corps presence in the region, where ap-
4 propriate.

5 **TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR**
6 **VALUES**

7 **SEC. 301. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED**
8 **VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF**
9 **THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.**

10 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress finds the following:

11 (1) *Despite international condemnation, the*
12 *Government of the People’s Republic of China*
13 *(“PRC”) continues to disregard its international*
14 *legal obligations under the Joint Declaration of the*
15 *Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain*
16 *and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Peo-*
17 *ple’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong*
18 *Kong (“Joint Declaration”), in which the PRC com-*
19 *mitted that—*

20 (A) *Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree*
21 *of autonomy;*

22 (B) *for at least 50 years the “social and*
23 *economic systems in Hong Kong” would remain*
24 *unchanged; and*

1 (C) the personal rights and freedoms of the
2 people of Hong Kong would be protected by law.

3 (2) As part of its continued efforts to undermine
4 the established rights of the Hong Kong people, the
5 PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee
6 (“Standing Committee”) passed and imposed upon
7 Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally vague na-
8 tional security legislation on June 30, 2020, that
9 grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts of
10 “separating the country, subverting state power, and
11 organizing terroristic activities”.

12 (3) The legislative process by which the Standing
13 Committee imposed the national security law on
14 Hong Kong bypassed Hong Kong’s local government
15 in a potential violation of the Basic Law of the Hong
16 Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
17 Republic of China (“Basic Law”), and involved un-
18 usual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact that the
19 legislation was only the second law since 2008 that
20 the Standing Committee has passed without releasing
21 a draft for public comment.

22 (4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the
23 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)
24 disqualified twelve pro-democracy candidates from
25 participating in the September 6 Legislative Council

1 *elections, which were subsequently postponed for a*
2 *year until September 5, 2021, by citing the public*
3 *health risk of holding elections during the COVID–19*
4 *pandemic.*

5 *(5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert*
6 *extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Government*
7 *announced indictments of and arrest warrants for six*
8 *Hong Kong activists living overseas, including United*
9 *States citizen Samuel Chu, for alleged violations of*
10 *the national security law.*

11 *(6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Govern-*
12 *ment removed four lawmakers from office for allegedly*
13 *violating the law after the Standing Committee*
14 *passed additional legislation barring those who pro-*
15 *moted or supported Hong Kong independence and re-*
16 *fused to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong*
17 *Kong, or otherwise violates the national security law,*
18 *from running for or serving in the Legislative Coun-*
19 *cil.*

20 *(7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activ-*
21 *ists Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were*
22 *sentenced to prison for participating in 2019 protests.*

23 *(8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents (also*
24 *known as “the Hong Kong 12”) who sought to flee by*
25 *boat from Hong Kong to Taiwan on August 23, 2020,*

1 *were taken to mainland China and sentenced on De-*
2 *cember 30, 2020, to prison terms ranging from seven*
3 *months to three years for illegal border crossing.*

4 *(9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong's highest*
5 *court revoked bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a pro-*
6 *democracy figure and publisher, who was charged on*
7 *December 12 with colluding with foreign forces and*
8 *endangering national security under the national se-*
9 *curity legislation.*

10 *(10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of*
11 *Justice in Henan and Sichuan province threatened to*
12 *revoke the licenses of two lawyers hired to help the*
13 *Hong Kong 12.*

14 *(11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Police*
15 *Force arrested more than fifty opposition figures, in-*
16 *cluding pro-democracy officials, activists, and an*
17 *American lawyer, for their involvement in an infor-*
18 *mal July 2020 primary to select candidates for the*
19 *general election originally scheduled for September*
20 *2020, despite other political parties having held simi-*
21 *lar primaries without retribution.*

22 *(12) On April 22, 2021, a Hong Kong court con-*
23 *victed Choy Yuk-ling, a video producer with Radio*
24 *Television Hong Kong, in relation to her investigative*
25 *reporting on the Hong Kong police.*

1 (13) *On June 24, 2021, Apple Daily, Hong*
2 *Kong’s only surviving pro-democracy newspaper,*
3 *published its final edition following months of intimi-*
4 *dation and repression by the HKSAR Government,*
5 *including through the arrest of its senior editors, po-*
6 *lice raids on its offices, and the freezing of its finan-*
7 *cial assets.*

8 **(b) STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.—Congress—**

9 (1) *condemns the actions taken by the Govern-*
10 *ment of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and*
11 *the Government of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-*
12 *trative Region (“HKSAR”), including the adoption*
13 *and implementation of national security legislation*
14 *for Hong Kong through irregular procedures, that vio-*
15 *late the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong*
16 *Kong that are guaranteed by the Joint Declaration*
17 *and its implementing document, the Basic Law;*

18 (2) *reaffirms its support for the people of Hong*
19 *Kong, who face grave threats to their rights and free-*
20 *doms;*

21 (3) *calls on the Governments of the PRC and*
22 *HKSAR to—*

23 (A) *respect and uphold—*

1 (i) commitments made to the inter-
2 national community and the people of Hong
3 Kong under the Joint Declaration; and

4 (ii) the judicial independence of the
5 Hong Kong legal system; and

6 (B) release pro-democracy activists and
7 politicians arrested under the national security
8 law; and

9 (4) encourages the President, the Secretary of
10 State, and the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate
11 with allies and partners and continue United States
12 efforts to respond to developments in Hong Kong, in-
13 cluding by—

14 (A) providing protection for Hong Kong
15 residents who fear persecution;

16 (B) supporting those who may seek to file a
17 case before the International Court of Justice to
18 hold the Government of the PRC accountable for
19 violating its binding legal commitments under
20 the Joint Declaration;

21 (C) encouraging allies and partner coun-
22 tries to instruct, as appropriate, their respective
23 representatives to the United Nations to use their
24 voice, vote, and influence to press for the ap-
25 pointment of a United Nations special mandate

1 holder to monitor and report on human rights
2 developments in Hong Kong;

3 (D) ensuring the private sector, particularly
4 United States companies with economic interests
5 in Hong Kong, is aware of risks the national se-
6 curity legislation poses to the security of United
7 States citizens and to the medium and long-term
8 interest of United States businesses in Hong
9 Kong;

10 (E) continuing to implement sanctions au-
11 thorities, especially authorities recently enacted
12 to address actions undermining the rights and
13 freedoms of the Hong Kong people, such as the
14 Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116–
15 149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and
16 Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76),
17 with respect to officials of the Chinese Com-
18 munist Party, the Government of the PRC, or
19 the Government of the HKSAR who are respon-
20 sible for undermining such rights and freedoms;
21 and

22 (F) coordinating with allies and partners to
23 ensure that such implementation of sanctions is
24 multilateral.

1 **SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
2 **MOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG.**

3 (a) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There is*
4 *authorized to be appropriated \$10,000,000 for fiscal year*
5 *2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and*
6 *Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy in*
7 *Hong Kong.*

8 (b) *ADMINISTRATION.*—*The Secretary of State shall*
9 *designate an office with the Department of State to admin-*
10 *ister and coordinate the provision of such funds described*
11 *in subsection (a) within the Department of State and across*
12 *the United States Government.*

13 **SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE'S FREEDOM AND CHOICE.**

14 (a) *DEFINITIONS.*—*For purposes of this section:*

15 (1) *JOINT DECLARATION.*—*The term “Joint Dec-*
16 *laration” means the Joint Declaration of the Govern-*
17 *ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and*
18 *Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s*
19 *Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,*
20 *signed on December 19, 1984, and entered into force*
21 *on May 27, 1985.*

22 (2) *PRIORITY HONG KONG RESIDENT.*—*The term*
23 *“Priority Hong Kong resident” means—*

24 (A) *a permanent resident of Hong Kong*
25 *who—*

1 (i) holds no right to citizenship in any
2 country or jurisdiction other than the Peo-
3 ple’s Republic of China (referred to in this
4 section as the “PRC”), Hong Kong, or
5 Macau as of the date of enactment of this
6 Act;

7 (ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not
8 less than the last ten years as of the date of
9 enactment of this Act; and

10 (iii) has been designated by the Sec-
11 retary of State or Secretary of Homeland
12 Security as having met the requirements of
13 this subparagraph, in accordance with the
14 procedures described in subsection (f) of this
15 section; or

16 (B) the spouse of a person described in sub-
17 paragraph (A), or the child of such person as
18 such term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of the
19 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
20 1101(b)(1)), except that a child shall be an un-
21 married person under twenty-seven years of age.

22 (3) HONG KONG NATIONAL SECURITY LAW.—The
23 term “Hong Kong National Security Law” means the
24 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safe-
25 guarding National Security in the Hong Kong Spe-

1 *cial Administrative Region that was passed unani-*
2 *mously by the National People’s Congress and signed*
3 *by President Xi Jinping on June 30, 2020, and pro-*
4 *mulgated in the Hong Kong Special Administrative*
5 *Region (referred to in this section as “Hong Kong*
6 *SAR”) on July 1, 2020.*

7 (4) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
8 *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
9 *tees” means—*

10 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and*
11 *the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of*
12 *Representatives; and*

13 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Relations*
14 *and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen-*
15 *ate.*

16 (b) *FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:*

17 (1) *The Hong Kong National Security Law pro-*
18 *mulgated on July 1, 2020—*

19 (A) *contravenes the Basic Law of the Hong*
20 *Kong Special Administrative Region (referred to*
21 *in this Act as “the Basic Law”) that provides in*
22 *Article 23 that the Legislative Council of Hong*
23 *Kong shall enact legislation related to national*
24 *security;*

1 (B) violates the PRC's commitments under
2 international law, as defined by the Joint Dec-
3 laration; and

4 (C) causes severe and irreparable damage to
5 the "one country, two systems" principle and
6 further erodes global confidence in the PRC's
7 commitment to international law.

8 (2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the promul-
9 gation of the Hong Kong National Security Law,
10 President Trump signed an Executive order on Hong
11 Kong normalization that, among other policy actions,
12 suspended the special treatment of Hong Kong per-
13 sons under U.S. law with respect to the issuance of
14 immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.

15 (3) The United States has a long and proud his-
16 tory as a destination for refugees and asylees fleeing
17 persecution based on race, religion, nationality, polit-
18 ical opinion, or membership in a particular social
19 group.

20 (4) The United States also shares deep social,
21 cultural, and economic ties with the people of Hong
22 Kong, including a shared commitment to democracy,
23 to the rule of law, and to the protection of human
24 rights.

1 (5) *The United States has sheltered, protected,*
2 *and welcomed individuals who have fled authori-*
3 *tarian regimes, including citizens from the PRC fol-*
4 *lowing the violent June 4, 1989, crackdown in*
5 *Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the people*
6 *of the United States and those individuals seeking to*
7 *contribute to a free, open society founded on democ-*
8 *racy, human rights, and the respect for the rule of*
9 *law.*

10 (6) *The United States has reaped enormous eco-*
11 *nomie, cultural, and strategic benefits from wel-*
12 *coming successive generations of scientists, doctors,*
13 *entrepreneurs, artists, intellectuals, and other free-*
14 *dom-loving people fleeing fascism, communism, vio-*
15 *lent Islamist extremism, and other repressive*
16 *ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany,*
17 *the Soviet Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Eu-*
18 *rope, Cuba, Vietnam, and Iran.*

19 (7) *A major asymmetric advantage of the United*
20 *States in its long-term strategic competition with the*
21 *Communist Party of China is the ability of people*
22 *from every country in the world, irrespective of their*
23 *race, ethnicity, or religion, to immigrate to the*
24 *United States and become American citizens.*

1 (c) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—*It is the policy of the*
2 *United States—*

3 (1) *to reaffirm the principles and objectives set*
4 *forth in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of*
5 *1992 (Public Law 102–383), specifically that—*

6 (A) *the United States has “a strong interest*
7 *in the continued vitality, prosperity, and sta-*
8 *bility of Hong Kong”;*

9 (B) *“support for democratization is a fun-*
10 *damental principle of United States foreign pol-*
11 *icy”, and therefore “naturally applies to United*
12 *States policy toward Hong Kong”;*

13 (C) *“the human rights of the people of Hong*
14 *Kong are of great importance to the United*
15 *States and are directly relevant to United States*
16 *interests in Hong Kong and serve as a basis for*
17 *Hong Kong’s continued economic prosperity”;*
18 *and*

19 (D) *Hong Kong must remain sufficiently*
20 *autonomous from the PRC to “justify treatment*
21 *under a particular law of the United States, or*
22 *any provision thereof, different from that ac-*
23 *corded the People’s Republic of China”;*

1 (2) *to continue to support the high degree of au-*
2 *tonomy and fundamental rights and freedoms of the*
3 *people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by—*

4 (A) *the Joint Declaration;*

5 (B) *the International Covenant on Civil*
6 *and Political Rights, done at New York, Decem-*
7 *ber 19, 1966; and*

8 (C) *the Universal Declaration of Human*
9 *Rights, done at Paris, December 10, 1948;*

10 (3) *to continue to support the democratic aspira-*
11 *tions of the people of Hong Kong, including the “ulti-*
12 *mate aim” of the selection of the Chief Executive and*
13 *all members of the Legislative Council by universal*
14 *suffrage, as articulated in the Basic Law;*

15 (4) *to urge the Government of the PRC, despite*
16 *its recent actions, to uphold its commitments to Hong*
17 *Kong, including allowing the people of Hong Kong to*
18 *govern Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy*
19 *and without undue interference, and ensuring that*
20 *Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right to elect the*
21 *Chief Executive and all members of the Hong Kong*
22 *Legislative Council by universal suffrage;*

23 (5) *to support the establishment of a genuine*
24 *democratic option to freely and fairly nominate and*
25 *elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the estab-*

1 *lishment of open and direct democratic elections for*
2 *all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council;*

3 *(6) to support the robust exercise by residents of*
4 *Hong Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, and*
5 *other fundamental freedoms, as provided by the Basic*
6 *Law, the Joint Declaration, and the International*
7 *Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;*

8 *(7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlaw-*
9 *ful arrest, detention, or imprisonment for all Hong*
10 *Kong residents, as provided by the Basic Law, the*
11 *Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant on*
12 *Civil and Political Rights;*

13 *(8) to draw international attention to any viola-*
14 *tions by the Government of the PRC of the funda-*
15 *mental rights of the people of Hong Kong, as provided*
16 *by the International Covenant on Civil and Political*
17 *Rights, and any encroachment upon the autonomy*
18 *guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law and the*
19 *Joint Declaration;*

20 *(9) to protect United States citizens and long-*
21 *term permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as*
22 *well as people visiting and transiting through Hong*
23 *Kong;*

24 *(10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties*
25 *that provide significant benefits to both the United*

1 *States and Hong Kong, including the reinstatement of*
2 *the Fulbright exchange program with regard to Hong*
3 *Kong at the earliest opportunity;*

4 *(11) to coordinate with allies, including the*
5 *United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the*
6 *Republic of Korea, to promote democracy and human*
7 *rights in Hong Kong; and*

8 *(12) to welcome and protect in the United States*
9 *residents of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or other-*
10 *wise seeking a safe haven from violations by the Gov-*
11 *ernment of the PRC of the fundamental rights of the*
12 *people of Hong Kong.*

13 *(d) TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR HONG KONG*
14 *RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.—*

15 *(1) DESIGNATION.—*

16 *(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section*
17 *244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8*
18 *U.S.C. 1254a), Hong Kong shall be treated as if*
19 *it had been designated under subsection (b)(1)(C)*
20 *of such section, subject to the provisions of this*
21 *section.*

22 *(B) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—The initial*
23 *period of the designation referred to in subpara-*
24 *graph (A) shall be for the 18-month period begin-*
25 *ning on the date of enactment of this Act.*

1 (2) *ALIENS ELIGIBLE.*—As a result of the des-
2 ignation made under subsection (a), an alien is
3 deemed to satisfy the requirements under paragraph
4 (1) of section 244(c) of the Immigration and Nation-
5 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to paragraph
6 (3) of such section, if the alien—

7 (A) was a permanent resident of Hong
8 Kong at the time such individual arrived into
9 the United States and is a national of the PRC
10 (or in the case of an individual having no na-
11 tionality, is a person who last habitually resided
12 in Hong Kong);

13 (B) has been continuously physically
14 present in the United States since the date of the
15 enactment of this Act;

16 (C) is admissible as an immigrant, except
17 as otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of
18 such section, and is not ineligible for temporary
19 protected status under paragraph (2)(B) of such
20 section; and

21 (D) registers for temporary protected status
22 in a manner established by the Secretary of
23 Homeland Security.

24 (3) *CONSENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD.*—

1 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of Home-*
2 *land Security shall give prior consent to travel*
3 *abroad, in accordance with section 244(f)(3) of*
4 *the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.*
5 *1254a(f)(3)), to an alien who is granted tem-*
6 *porary protected status pursuant to the designa-*
7 *tion made under paragraph (1) if the alien es-*
8 *tablishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of*
9 *Homeland Security that emergency and extenu-*
10 *ating circumstances beyond the control of the*
11 *alien require the alien to depart for a brief, tem-*
12 *porary trip abroad.*

13 (B) *TREATMENT UPON RETURN.*—*An alien*
14 *returning to the United States in accordance*
15 *with an authorization described in subparagraph*
16 *(A) shall be treated as any other returning alien*
17 *provided temporary protected status under sec-*
18 *tion 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act*
19 *(8 U.S.C. 1254a).*

20 (4) *FEE.*—

21 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*In addition to any other*
22 *fee authorized by law, the Secretary of Homeland*
23 *Security is authorized to charge and collect a fee*
24 *of \$360 for each application for temporary pro-*
25 *TECTED status under section 244 of the Immigra-*

1 *tion and Nationality Act by a person who is*
2 *only eligible for such status by reason of para-*
3 *graph (1).*

4 (B) *WAIVER.—The Secretary of Homeland*
5 *Security shall permit aliens to apply for a waiv-*
6 *er of any fees associated with filing an applica-*
7 *tion referred to in subparagraph (A).*

8 (e) *TREATMENT OF HONG KONG RESIDENTS FOR IM-*
9 *MIGRATION PURPOSES.—Notwithstanding any other provi-*
10 *sion of law, during the five fiscal year period beginning*
11 *on the first day of the first full fiscal year after the date*
12 *of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to be*
13 *considered a foreign state separate and apart from the PRC*
14 *as mandated under section 103 of the Immigration and Na-*
15 *tionality Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–649) for purposes*
16 *of the numerical limitations on immigrant visas under sec-*
17 *tions 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and Nation-*
18 *ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153).*

19 (f) *VERIFICATION OF PRIORITY HONG KONG RESI-*
20 *DENTS.—*

21 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
22 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
23 *State, in consultation with the Secretary of Home-*
24 *land Security, shall publish in the Federal Register,*
25 *an interim final rule establishing procedures for des-*

1 *ignation of Priority Hong Kong Residents. Notwith-*
2 *standing section 553 of title 5, United States Code,*
3 *the rule shall be effective, on an interim basis, imme-*
4 *diately upon publication, but may be subject to*
5 *change and revision after public notice and oppor-*
6 *tunity for comment. The Secretary of State shall fi-*
7 *nalize such rule not later than one year after the date*
8 *of the enactment of this Act. Such rule shall establish*
9 *procedures—*

10 *(A) for individuals to register with any*
11 *United States embassy or consulate outside of the*
12 *United States, or with the Department of Home-*
13 *land Security in the United States, and request*
14 *designation as a Priority Hong Kong Resident;*
15 *and*

16 *(B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify*
17 *the residency of registered individuals and des-*
18 *ignate those who qualify as Priority Hong Kong*
19 *Residents.*

20 *(2) DOCUMENTATION.—The procedures described*
21 *in paragraph (1) shall include the collection of—*

22 *(A) biometric data;*

23 *(B) copies of birth certificates, residency*
24 *cards, and other documentation establishing resi-*
25 *dency; and*

1 (C) other personal information, data, and
2 records deemed appropriate by the Secretary.

3 (3) *GUIDANCE.*—Not later than 90 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
5 State shall issue guidance outlining actions to en-
6 hance the ability of the Secretary to efficiently send
7 and receive information to and from the United
8 Kingdom and other like-minded allies and partners
9 for purposes of rapid verification of permanent resi-
10 dency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals
11 as Priority Hong Kong Residents.

12 (4) *REPORT.*—Not later than 90 days after the
13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
14 State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
15 committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the
16 House of Representatives, and the Committee on the
17 Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing plans to
18 implement the requirements described in this sub-
19 section.

20 (5) *PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES.*—Nothing in
21 this section may be construed to prevent a Priority
22 Hong Kong Resident from seeking refugee status
23 under section 207 of the Immigration and Nation-
24 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum under
25 section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158).

1 *(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—*

2 *(1) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis, the Sec-*
3 *retary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-*
4 *rity, in consultation with other Federal agencies, as*
5 *appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congres-*
6 *sional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of*
7 *the House of Representatives, and the Committee on*
8 *the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing for the*
9 *previous fiscal year—*

10 *(A) the number of Hong Kong SAR resi-*
11 *dents who have applied for United States visas*
12 *or immigration benefits, disaggregated by visa*
13 *type or immigration benefit, including asylum,*
14 *refugee status, temporary protected status, and*
15 *lawful permanent residence;*

16 *(B) the number of approvals, denials, or re-*
17 *jections of applicants for visas or immigration*
18 *benefits described in subparagraph (A),*
19 *disaggregated by visa type or immigration ben-*
20 *efit and basis for denial;*

21 *(C) the number of pending refugee and asy-*
22 *lum applications for Hong Kong SAR residents,*
23 *and the length of time and reason for which such*
24 *applications have been pending; and*

1 (D) other matters determined relevant by
2 the Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and
3 facilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims
4 of persecution in Hong Kong.

5 (2) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1)
6 shall be submitted in unclassified form and published
7 on a text-searchable, publicly available website of the
8 Department of State and the Department of Home-
9 land Security.

10 (h) STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON
11 HONG KONG.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United
13 States—

14 (A) to support the people of Hong Kong by
15 providing safe haven to Hong Kong SAR resi-
16 dents who are nationals of the PRC following the
17 enactment of the Hong Kong National Security
18 Law that places certain Hong Kong persons at
19 risk of persecution; and

20 (B) to encourage like-minded nations to
21 make similar accommodations for Hong Kong
22 people fleeing persecution by the Government of
23 the PRC.

24 (2) PLAN.—The Secretary of State, in consulta-
25 tion with the heads of other Federal agencies, as ap-

1 *appropriate, shall develop a plan to engage with other*
2 *countries, including the United Kingdom, on coopera-*
3 *tive efforts to—*

4 *(A) provide refugee and asylum protections*
5 *for victims of, and individuals with a fear of,*
6 *persecution in Hong Kong, either by Hong Kong*
7 *authorities or other authorities acting on behalf*
8 *of the PRC;*

9 *(B) enhance protocols to facilitate the resett-*
10 *lement of refugees and displaced persons from*
11 *Hong Kong;*

12 *(C) identify and prevent the exploitation of*
13 *immigration and visa policies and procedures by*
14 *corrupt officials; and*

15 *(D) expedite the sharing of information, as*
16 *appropriate, related to the refusal of individual*
17 *applications for visas or other travel documents*
18 *submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR*
19 *based on—*

20 *(i) national security or related grounds*
21 *under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration*
22 *and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3));*
23 *or*

24 *(ii) fraud or misrepresentation under*
25 *section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration*

1 *and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.*
2 *1182(a)(6)(C)).*

3 (3) *REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the*
4 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
5 *State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal*
6 *agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appro-*
7 *priate congressional committees, the Committee on the*
8 *Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the*
9 *Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on*
10 *the plan described in paragraph (2).*

11 (i) *REFUGEE STATUS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF*
12 *HONG KONG.—*

13 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in paragraph*
14 *(2) may establish, for purposes of admission as a ref-*
15 *ugee under sections 207 of the Immigration and Na-*
16 *tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section*
17 *208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has*
18 *a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,*
19 *religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-*
20 *cial group, or political opinion by asserting such a*
21 *fear and a credible basis for concern about the possi-*
22 *bility of such persecution.*

23 (2) *ALIENS DESCRIBED.—*

24 (A) *IN GENERAL.—An alien is described in*
25 *this subsection if such alien—*

1 *(i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident*
2 *and—*

3 *(I) had a significant role in a*
4 *civil society organization supportive of*
5 *the protests in 2019 and 2020 related*
6 *to the Hong Kong National Security*
7 *Law and the encroachment on the au-*
8 *tonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC;*

9 *(II) was arrested, charged, de-*
10 *tained, or convicted of an offense aris-*
11 *ing from their participation in an ac-*
12 *tion as described in section 206(b)(2)*
13 *of the United States-Hong Kong Policy*
14 *Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5726(b)(2))*
15 *that was not violent in nature; or*

16 *(III) has had their citizenship,*
17 *nationality, or residency revoked for*
18 *having submitted to any United States*
19 *Government agency a nonfrivolous ap-*
20 *plication for refugee status, asylum, or*
21 *any other immigration benefit under*
22 *the immigration laws (as defined in*
23 *section 101(a) of the Immigration and*
24 *Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)));*

1 (ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident
2 spouse or child of an alien described in
3 clause (i); or

4 (iii) is the parent of an alien described
5 in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of
6 the PRC and no other foreign state.

7 (B) OTHER CATEGORIES.—The Secretary of
8 Homeland Security, in consultation with the
9 Secretary of State, may designate other cat-
10 egories of aliens for purposes of establishing a
11 well-founded fear of persecution under paragraph
12 (1) if such aliens share common characteristics
13 that identify them as targets of persecution in
14 the PRC on account of race, religion, nation-
15 ality, membership in a particular social group,
16 or political opinion.

17 (C) SIGNIFICANT ROLE.—For purposes of
18 subclause (I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a signifi-
19 cant role shall include, with respect to the pro-
20 tests described in such clause—

21 (i) an organizing role;

22 (ii) a first aid responder;

23 (iii) a journalist or member of the
24 media covering or offering public com-
25 mentary;

1 (iv) a provider of legal services to one
2 or more individuals arrested for partici-
3 pating in such protests; or

4 (v) a participant who during the pe-
5 riod beginning on June 9, 2019, and ending
6 on June 30, 2020, was arrested, charged,
7 detained, or convicted as a result of such
8 participation.

9 (3) *AGE OUT PROTECTIONS.*—For purposes of
10 this subsection, a determination of whether an alien
11 is a child shall be made using the age of the alien on
12 the date an application for refugee or asylum status
13 in which the alien is a named beneficiary is filed
14 with the Secretary of Homeland Security.

15 (4) *EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITA-*
16 *TIONS.*—Aliens provided refugee status under this
17 subsection shall not be counted against the numerical
18 limitation on refugees established in accordance with
19 the procedures described in section 207 of the *Immi-*
20 *gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157).*

21 (5) *REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.*—

22 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 90 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act and
24 every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State
25 and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall

1 submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
2 tees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the
3 House of Representatives, and the Committee on
4 the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the mat-
5 ters described in subparagraph (B).

6 (B) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—Each re-
7 port required by subparagraph (A) shall include,
8 with respect to applications submitted under this
9 section—

10 (i) the total number of refugee and asy-
11 lum applications that are pending at the
12 end of the reporting period;

13 (ii) the average wait-times for all ap-
14 plicants for refugee status or asylum pend-
15 ing—

16 (I) a prescreening interview with
17 a resettlement support center;

18 (II) an interview with United
19 States Citizenship and Immigration
20 Services; and

21 (III) the completion of security
22 checks;

23 (iii) the number of approvals, referrals
24 including the source of the referral, denials
25 of applications for refugee status or asylum,

1 *disaggregated by the reason for each such*
2 *denial; and*

3 *(iv) the number of refugee circuit rides*
4 *to interview populations that would include*
5 *Hong Kong SAR completed in the last 90*
6 *days, and the number planned for the subse-*
7 *quent 90-day period.*

8 *(C) FORM.—Each report required by sub-*
9 *paragraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified*
10 *form, but may include a classified annex.*

11 *(D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of*
12 *State shall make each report submitted under*
13 *this paragraph available to the public on the*
14 *internet website of the Department of State.*

15 *(j) ADMISSION FOR CERTAIN HIGHLY SKILLED HONG*
16 *KONG RESIDENTS.—*

17 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (c), the*
18 *Secretary of Homeland Security, or, notwithstanding*
19 *any other provision of law, the Secretary of State in*
20 *consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Secu-*
21 *rity, may provide an alien described in subsection (b)*
22 *with the status of a special immigrant under section*
23 *101(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act*
24 *(8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the alien—*

1 (A) or an agent acting on behalf of the
2 alien, submits a petition for classification under
3 section 203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C.
4 1153(b)(4));

5 (B) is otherwise eligible to receive an immi-
6 grant visa;

7 (C) is otherwise admissible to the United
8 States for permanent residence (excluding the
9 grounds for inadmissibility specified in section
10 212(a)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4))); and

11 (D) clears a background check and appro-
12 priate screening, as determined by the Secretary
13 of Homeland Security.

14 (2) *ALIENS DESCRIBED.*—

15 (A) *PRINCIPAL ALIENS.*—An alien is de-
16 scribed in this subsection if—

17 (i) the alien—

18 (I) is a Priority Hong Kong Resi-
19 dent; and

20 (II) has earned a bachelor's or
21 higher degree from an institution of
22 higher education; and

23 (ii) the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
24 rity determines that such alien's relocation

1 to the United States would provide a sig-
2 nificant benefit to the United States.

3 (B) SPOUSES AND CHILDREN.—An alien is
4 described in this subsection if the alien is the
5 spouse or child of a principal alien described in
6 paragraph (1).

7 (3) NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.—

8 (A) IN GENERAL.—The total number of
9 principal aliens who may be provided special
10 immigrant status under this section may not ex-
11 ceed 5,000 per year for each of the five fiscal
12 years beginning after the date of the enactment
13 of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland Security
14 may, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
15 prioritize the issuance of visas to individuals
16 with a bachelor's or higher degree in science,
17 technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine,
18 or health care.

19 (B) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITA-
20 TIONS.—Aliens provided immigrant status under
21 this section shall not be counted against any nu-
22 merical limitation under section 201, 202, 203,
23 or 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
24 (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 1157).

1 (4) *ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER OTHER*
2 *CLASSIFICATION.*—*No alien shall be denied the oppor-*
3 *tunity to apply for admission under this section sole-*
4 *ly because such alien qualifies as an immediate rel-*
5 *ative or is eligible for any other immigrant classifica-*
6 *tion.*

7 (5) *TIMELINE FOR PROCESSING APPLICATIONS.*—

8 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State*
9 *and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall*
10 *ensure that all steps under the control of the*
11 *United States Government incidental to the ap-*
12 *proval of such applications, including required*
13 *screenings and background checks, are completed*
14 *not later than one year after the date on which*
15 *an eligible applicant submits an application*
16 *under subsection (a).*

17 (B) *EXCEPTION.*—*Notwithstanding para-*
18 *graph (1), the relevant Federal agencies may*
19 *take additional time to process applications de-*
20 *scribed in paragraph (1) if satisfaction of na-*
21 *tional security concerns requires such additional*
22 *time, provided that the Secretary of Homeland*
23 *Security, or the designee of the Secretary, has de-*
24 *termined that the applicant meets the require-*

1 *ments for status as a special immigrant under*
2 *this section and has so notified the applicant.*

3 *(k) TERMINATION.—Except as provided in section 6*
4 *of this Act, this section shall cease to have effect on the date*
5 *that is five years after the date of the enactment of this*
6 *Act.*

7 **SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO**
8 **THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE.**

9 *Section 3 of the Act entitled “An Act to prohibit the*
10 *commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong*
11 *Kong Police Force”, approved November 27, 2019 (Public*
12 *Law 116–77; 133 Stat. 1173), is amended by striking “on*
13 *December 31, 2021.” and inserting the following: “on the*
14 *date on which the President certifies to the appropriate con-*
15 *gressional committees that—*

16 *“(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the*
17 *date of the enactment of this paragraph, certified*
18 *under section 205 of the United States-Hong Kong*
19 *Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong warrants treat-*
20 *ment under United States law in the same manner*
21 *as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong be-*
22 *fore July 1, 1997;*

23 *“(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in*
24 *gross violations of human rights during the 1-year pe-*
25 *riod ending on the date of such certification; and*

1 “(3) there has been an independent examination
2 of human rights concerns related to the crowd control
3 tactics of the Hong Kong Police and the Government
4 of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has
5 adequately addressed those concerns.”.

6 **SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF**
7 **UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES**
8 **IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-**
9 **GION.**

10 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress makes the following findings:

11 (1) *The Uyghurs are one of several predomi-*
12 *nantly Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang*
13 *Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the north-*
14 *west of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).*

15 (2) *Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest*
16 *in 2009 and clashes with government security per-*
17 *sonnel and other violent incidents in subsequent*
18 *years, PRC leaders sought to “stabilize” the XUAR*
19 *through large-scale arrests and extreme security meas-*
20 *ures, under the pretext of combatting alleged ter-*
21 *rorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism.*

22 (3) *In May 2014, the PRC launched its “Strike*
23 *Hard Against Violent Extremism” campaign, which*
24 *placed further restrictions on and facilitated addi-*

1 *tional human rights violations against minorities in*
2 *the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism.*

3 (4) *In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party*
4 *(CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet*
5 *Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary, known*
6 *for overseeing intensifying security operations and*
7 *human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as*
8 *Party Secretary of the XUAR.*

9 (5) *Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have*
10 *sought to forcibly “assimilate” Uyghurs and other*
11 *Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a pol-*
12 *icy of cultural erasure known as “Sinicization”.*

13 (6) *Since 2018, credible reporting including from*
14 *the BBC, France24, and the New York Times has*
15 *shown that the Government of the PRC has built mass*
16 *internment camps in the XUAR, which it calls “voca-*
17 *tional training” centers, and detained Uyghurs and*
18 *other groups in them and other facilities.*

19 (7) *Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbi-*
20 *trarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs—*
21 *12.5 percent of the XUAR’s official Uyghur popu-*
22 *lation of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of other*
23 *ethnic minorities in the “vocational training” centers*
24 *and other detention and pre-detention facilities.*

1 (8) *In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than*
2 *two percent of the PRC's total population but 21 per-*
3 *cent of all arrests in China.*

4 (9) *The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other*
5 *sources have revealed that detainees are forced to re-*
6 *nounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs and*
7 *repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and identity.*

8 (10) *Investigations by Human Rights Watch and*
9 *other human rights organizations have documented*
10 *how detainees are subject to political indoctrination,*
11 *forced labor, crowded and unsanitary conditions, in-*
12 *voluntary biometric data collection, both medical ne-*
13 *glect and intrusive medical interventions, food and*
14 *water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and tor-*
15 *ture.*

16 (11) *Research by the Australian Strategic Policy*
17 *Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many detain-*
18 *ees have been placed in higher security facilities and*
19 *convicted of formal crimes.*

20 (12) *Human Rights Watch has reported that the*
21 *PRC uses data collection programs, including facial*
22 *recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the*
23 *XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities*
24 *may detain.*

1 (13) *PRC authorities have placed countless chil-*
2 *dren whose parents are detained or in exile in state-*
3 *run institutions and boarding schools without the*
4 *consent of their parents.*

5 (14) *New York Times reporting revealed that nu-*
6 *merous local PRC officials who did not agree with the*
7 *policies carried out in XUAR have been fired and im-*
8 *prisoned.*

9 (15) *Associated Press reporting documented*
10 *widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities*
11 *to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to*
12 *subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening*
13 *to detain those who do not comply.*

14 (16) *PRC authorities prohibit family members*
15 *and advocates inside and outside China from having*
16 *regular communications with relatives and friends*
17 *imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and en-*
18 *trepreneur Ekpar Asat.*

19 (17) *PRC authorities have imposed pervasive re-*
20 *strictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the*
21 *XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch as-*
22 *serts the PRC “has effectively outlawed the practice of*
23 *Islam”.*

24 (18) *Individuals who are not detained in camps*
25 *have been forced to attend political indoctrination ses-*

1 *sions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass sur-*
2 *veillance systems, involuntary biometric data collec-*
3 *tion, and other human rights abuses.*

4 (19) *International media, nongovernmental or-*
5 *ganizations, scholars, families, and survivors have re-*
6 *ported on the systemic nature of many of these abuses.*

7 (20) *On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 inde-*
8 *pendent United Nations experts jointly expressed*
9 *alarm over China’s deteriorating human rights*
10 *record, including its repression in Xinjiang, and*
11 *called on the international community “to act collec-*
12 *tively and decisively to ensure China respects human*
13 *rights and abides by its international obligations”.*

14 (21) *On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations*
15 *member countries issued a public statement con-*
16 *demning human rights violations by PRC authorities*
17 *and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations*
18 *High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered ac-*
19 *cess to Xinjiang.*

20 (22) *The United States Congress passed the*
21 *Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public*
22 *Law 116–145).*

23 (23) *The United States Congress passed the Glob-*
24 *al Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (sub-*
25 *title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C.*

1 2656 note), which has been used to sanction PRC offi-
2 cials and entities for their activities in the XUAR.

3 (24) The United States Government has imple-
4 mented additional targeted restrictions on trade with
5 Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions
6 on PRC officials and entities for their activities in
7 the XUAR.

8 (25) The United States Government has docu-
9 mented human rights abuses and violations of indi-
10 vidual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019
11 Department of State Report on International Reli-
12 gious Freedom.

13 (26) On January 19, 2021, during his confirma-
14 tion hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken testi-
15 fied that “forcing men, women, and children into con-
16 centration camps, trying to in effect reeducate them
17 to be adherents to the Chinese Communist Party—all
18 of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide”.

19 (27) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the
20 Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation
21 hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of “hor-
22 rendous human rights abuses”.

23 (28) On January 27, 2021, in response to a
24 question from the press regarding the Uyghurs, Sec-

1 *retary Blinken stated that his “judgement remains*
2 *that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs”.*

3 *(29) On March 10, 2021, in response to a ques-*
4 *tion on Xinjiang during his testimony before the*
5 *Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-*
6 *resentatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, “We’ve*
7 *been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as geno-*
8 *cide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and we’ll*
9 *continue to make that clear.”.*

10 *(30) The 2020 Department of State Country Re-*
11 *ports on Human Rights Practices: China states that*
12 *“[g]enocide and crimes against humanity occurred*
13 *during the year against the predominantly Muslim*
14 *Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority*
15 *groups in Xinjiang”.*

16 *(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
17 *that—*

18 *(1) the atrocities committed by the PRC against*
19 *Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim Turkic*
20 *groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor, sexual vi-*
21 *olence, the internment of over 1,000,000 individuals,*
22 *and other horrific abuses must be condemned;*

23 *(2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the*
24 *United States Ambassador to the United Nations*
25 *should speak publicly about the ongoing human rights*

1 *abuses in the XUAR, including in formal speeches at*
2 *the United Nations and other international fora;*

3 *(3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the*
4 *United States Ambassador to the United Nations*
5 *should appeal to the United Nations Secretary-Gen-*
6 *eral to take a more proactive and public stance on the*
7 *situation in the XUAR, including by supporting calls*
8 *for an investigation and accountability for individ-*
9 *uals and entities involved in abuses against the peo-*
10 *ple of the XUAR;*

11 *(4) the United States should continue to use tar-*
12 *geted sanctions and all diplomatic tools available to*
13 *hold those responsible for the atrocities in Xinjiang to*
14 *account;*

15 *(5) United States agencies engaged with China*
16 *on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues*
17 *should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as*
18 *a consideration in developing United States policy;*

19 *(6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia*
20 *Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in*
21 *the world independent of Chinese government influ-*
22 *ence; and*

23 *(7) the United States recognizes the repeated re-*
24 *quests from the United Nations High Commissioner*

1 *for Human Rights for unfettered access to the XUAR*
2 *and the PRC's refusal to comply, and therefore—*

3 *(A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered*
4 *access by the United Nations Office of the High*
5 *Commissioner for Human Rights to the XUAR;*

6 *(B) the United States should urge collabo-*
7 *rative action between the United States Govern-*
8 *ment and international partners to pressure*
9 *PRC authorities to allow unfettered access to the*
10 *XUAR;*

11 *(C) the President, the Secretary of State,*
12 *and the United States Ambassador to the United*
13 *Nations should simultaneously outline a strategy*
14 *to investigate the human rights abuses and*
15 *crimes that have taken place in the XUAR, col-*
16 *lect evidence, and transfer the evidence to a com-*
17 *petent court; and*

18 *(D) United States partners and allies*
19 *should undertake similar strategies in an effort*
20 *to build an international investigation outside of*
21 *the PRC if PRC authorities do not comply with*
22 *a United Nations investigation in the XUAR.*

23 **SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR.**

24 *(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
25 *United States—*

1 (1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, ar-
2 ticles, or merchandise mined, produced, or manufac-
3 tured, wholly or in part, by forced labor from the Peo-
4 ple’s Republic of China and particularly any such
5 goods, wares, articles, or merchandise produced in the
6 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly re-
7 ferred to as “Xinjiang” or “XUAR”) of China;

8 (2) to encourage the international community to
9 reduce the import of any goods made with forced
10 labor from the People’s Republic of China, particu-
11 larly goods mined, manufactured, or produced in the
12 XUAR;

13 (3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to ef-
14 fectively implement Article 23.6 of the United States-
15 Mexico-Canada Agreement to prohibit the importa-
16 tion of goods produced in whole or in part by forced
17 or compulsory labor, which includes goods produced
18 in whole or in part by forced or compulsory labor in
19 the People’s Republic of China;

20 (4) to actively work to prevent, publicly de-
21 nounce, and end human trafficking as a horrific as-
22 sault on human dignity and to restore the lives of
23 those affected by human trafficking, a modern form of
24 slavery;

1 (5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in its
2 national interest, including efforts to prevent torture,
3 enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of liberty,
4 including mass internment, arbitrary detention, and
5 widespread and systematic use of forced labor, and
6 persecution targeting any identifiable ethnic or reli-
7 gious group; and

8 (6) to address gross violations of human rights
9 in the XUAR through bilateral diplomatic channels
10 and multilateral institutions where both the United
11 States and the People's Republic of China are mem-
12 bers and with all the authorities available to the
13 United States Government, including visa and finan-
14 cial sanctions, export restrictions, and import con-
15 trols.

16 (b) *PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF GOODS MADE*
17 *IN THE XUAR.*—

18 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Except as provided in para-*
19 *graph (2), all goods, wares, articles, and merchandise*
20 *mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part*
21 *in the XUAR of China, or by persons working with*
22 *the XUAR government for purposes of the “poverty*
23 *alleviation” program or the “pairing-assistance” pro-*
24 *gram which subsidizes the establishment of manufac-*
25 *turing facilities in the XUAR, shall be deemed to be*

1 *goods, wares, articles, and merchandise described in*
2 *section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307)*
3 *and shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports*
4 *of the United States.*

5 (2) *EXCEPTION.—The prohibition described in*
6 *paragraph (1) shall not apply if the Commissioner of*
7 *U.S. Customs and Border Protection—*

8 (A) *determines, by clear and convincing evi-*
9 *dence, that any specific goods, wares, articles, or*
10 *merchandise described in paragraph (1) were not*
11 *produced wholly or in part by convict labor,*
12 *forced labor, or indentured labor under penal*
13 *sanctions; and*

14 (B) *submits to the appropriate congres-*
15 *sional committees and makes available to the*
16 *public a report that contains such determina-*
17 *tion.*

18 (3) *EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take ef-*
19 *fect on the date that is 120 days after the date of the*
20 *enactment of this Act.*

21 (c) *ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED*
22 *LABOR IN THE XUAR.—*

23 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after*
24 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Forced*
25 *Labor Enforcement Task Force, established under sec-*

1 *tion 741 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agree-*
2 *ment Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681), shall*
3 *submit to the appropriate congressional committees a*
4 *report that contains an enforcement strategy to effec-*
5 *tively address forced labor in the XUAR of China or*
6 *products made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibet-*
7 *ans, or members of other persecuted groups through*
8 *forced labor in any other part of the People’s Repub-*
9 *lic of China. The enforcement strategy shall describe*
10 *the specific enforcement plans of the United States*
11 *Government regarding—*

12 *(A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise*
13 *described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported*
14 *into the United States directly from the XUAR*
15 *or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans,*
16 *or members of other persecuted groups in any*
17 *other part of the People’s Republic of China;*

18 *(B) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise*
19 *described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported*
20 *into the United States from the People’s Republic*
21 *of China and are mined, produced, or manufac-*
22 *tured in part in the XUAR or by persons work-*
23 *ing with the XUAR government or the Xinjiang*
24 *Production and Construction Corps for purposes*

1 of the “poverty alleviation” program or the
2 “pairing-assistance” program; and

3 (C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
4 described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported
5 into the United States from third countries and
6 are mined, produced, or manufactured in part
7 in the XUAR or by persons working with the
8 XUAR government or the Xinjiang Production
9 and Construction Corps for purposes of the “pov-
10 erty alleviation” program or the “pairing-assist-
11 ance” program.

12 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—The strategy
13 required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

14 (A) A description of the actions taken by
15 the United States Government to address forced
16 labor in the XUAR under section 307 of the Tar-
17 iff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307), including a de-
18 scription of all Withhold Release Orders issued,
19 goods detained, and fines issued.

20 (B) A list of products made wholly or in
21 part by forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR
22 or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans,
23 or members of other persecuted groups in any
24 other part of the People’s Republic of China, and
25 a list of businesses that sold products in the

1 *United States made wholly or in part by forced*
2 *or involuntary labor in the XUAR or made by*
3 *Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or mem-*
4 *bers of other persecuted groups in any other part*
5 *of the People’s Republic of China.*

6 *(C) A list of facilities and entities, includ-*
7 *ing the Xinjiang Production and Construction*
8 *Corps, that source material from the XUAR or*
9 *by persons working with the XUAR government*
10 *or the Xinjiang Production and Construction*
11 *Corps for purposes of the “poverty alleviation”*
12 *program or the “pairing-assistance” program, a*
13 *plan for identifying additional such facilities*
14 *and entities, and facility- and entity-specific en-*
15 *forcement plans, including issuing specific With-*
16 *hold Release Orders to support enforcement of*
17 *subsection (b), with regard to each listed facility*
18 *or entity.*

19 *(D) A list of high-priority sectors for en-*
20 *forcement, including cotton, tomatoes,*
21 *polysilicon, and a sector-specific enforcement*
22 *plan for each high-priority sector.*

23 *(E) A description of the additional re-*
24 *sources necessary for U.S. Customs and Border*

1 *Protection to effectively implement the enforce-*
2 *ment strategy.*

3 *(F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate*
4 *with appropriate nongovernmental organizations*
5 *and private sector entities to discuss the enforce-*
6 *ment strategy for products made in the XUAR.*

7 *(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph*
8 *(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may*
9 *include a classified annex, if necessary.*

10 *(4) UPDATES.—The Forced Labor Enforcement*
11 *Task Force shall provide briefings to the appropriate*
12 *congressional committees on a quarterly basis and, as*
13 *applicable, on any updates to the strategy required by*
14 *paragraph (1) or any additional actions taken to ad-*
15 *dress forced labor in the XUAR, including actions de-*
16 *scribed in this section.*

17 *(5) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have ef-*
18 *fect on the earlier of—*

19 *(A) the date that is eight years after the*
20 *date of the enactment of this Act; or*

21 *(B) the date on which the President submits*
22 *to the appropriate congressional committees a*
23 *determination that the Government of the Peo-*
24 *ple’s Republic of China has ended mass intern-*
25 *ment, forced labor, and any other gross viola-*

1 *tions of human rights experienced by Uyghurs,*
2 *Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim*
3 *minority groups in the XUAR.*

4 *(d) DETERMINATION RELATING TO CRIMES AGAINST*
5 *HUMANITY OR GENOCIDE IN THE XUAR.—*

6 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after*
7 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
8 *State shall—*

9 *(A) determine if the practice of forced labor*
10 *or other crimes against Uyghurs, Kazakhs,*
11 *Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority*
12 *groups in the XUAR of China can be considered*
13 *systematic and widespread and therefore con-*
14 *stitutes crimes against humanity or constitutes*
15 *genocide as defined in subsection (a) of section*
16 *1091 of title 18, United States Code; and*

17 *(B) submit to the appropriate congressional*
18 *committees and make available to the public a*
19 *report that contains such determination.*

20 *(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph*
21 *(1)—*

22 *(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form*
23 *but may include a classified annex, if necessary;*
24 *and*

1 (B) may be included in the report required
2 by subsection (e).

3 (e) *DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED*
4 *LABOR IN THE XUAR.*—

5 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 90 days after
6 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
7 State, in coordination with the heads of other appro-
8 priate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit
9 to the appropriate congressional committees a report
10 that contains a United States strategy to promote ini-
11 tiatives to enhance international awareness of and to
12 address forced labor in the XUAR of China.

13 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—The strategy
14 required by paragraph (1) shall include—

15 (A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multi-
16 lateral coordination, including sustained engage-
17 ment with the governments of United States
18 partners and allies, to end forced labor of
19 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of
20 other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR;

21 (B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and
22 counter-messaging efforts to promote awareness
23 of the human rights situation, including forced
24 labor in the XUAR; and

1 (C) opportunities to coordinate and collabo-
2 rate with appropriate nongovernmental organi-
3 zations and private sector entities to raise
4 awareness about forced labor made products from
5 the XUAR and to provide assistance to Uyghurs,
6 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim
7 minority groups in the XUAR, including those
8 formerly detained in mass internment camps in
9 the region.

10 (3) *ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—

11 *The report required by paragraph (1) shall also in-*
12 *clude—*

13 (A) to the extent practicable, a list of—

14 (i) entities in the People’s Republic of
15 China or affiliates of such entities that di-
16 rectly or indirectly use forced or involun-
17 tary labor in the XUAR; and

18 (ii) foreign persons that acted as
19 agents of the entities or affiliates of entities
20 described in clause (i) to import goods into
21 the United States; and

22 (B) a description of actions taken by the
23 United States Government to address forced
24 labor in the XUAR under existing authorities,
25 including—

1 (i) *the Trafficking Victims Protection*
2 *Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–386; 22*
3 *U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);*

4 (ii) *the Elie Wiesel Genocide and*
5 *Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public*
6 *Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and*

7 (iii) *the Global Magnitsky Human*
8 *Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656*
9 *note).*

10 (4) *FORM.—The report required by paragraph*
11 *(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may*
12 *include a classified annex, if necessary.*

13 (5) *UPDATES.—The Secretary of State shall in-*
14 *clude any updates to the strategy required by para-*
15 *graph (1) in the annual Trafficking in Persons report*
16 *required by section 110(b) of the Trafficking Victims*
17 *Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)).*

18 (6) *SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have ef-*
19 *fect the earlier of—*

20 (A) *the date that is eight years after the*
21 *date of the enactment of this Act; or*

22 (B) *the date on which the President submits*
23 *to the appropriate congressional committees a*
24 *determination that the Government of the Peo-*
25 *ple’s Republic of China has ended mass intern-*

1 *ment, forced labor, and any other gross viola-*
2 *tions of human rights experienced by Uyghurs,*
3 *Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim*
4 *minority groups in the XUAR.*

5 *(f) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO FORCED*
6 *LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-*
7 *GION.—*

8 *(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—*

9 *(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days*
10 *after the date of the enactment of this Act and*
11 *not less frequently than annually thereafter, the*
12 *President shall submit to the appropriate con-*
13 *gressional committees a report that identifies*
14 *each foreign person, including any official of the*
15 *Government of the People’s Republic of China,*
16 *that the President determines—*

17 *(i) knowingly engages in, is responsible*
18 *for, or facilitates the forced labor of*
19 *Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of*
20 *other Muslim minority groups in the*
21 *XUAR; and*

22 *(ii) knowingly engages in, contributes*
23 *to, assists, or provides financial, material*
24 *or technological support for efforts to con-*
25 *travene United States law regarding the*

1 *importation of forced labor goods from the*
2 *XUAR.*

3 *(B) FORM.—The report required under sub-*
4 *paragraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified*
5 *form, but may contain a classified annex.*

6 *(2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President*
7 *shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (3)*
8 *with respect to each foreign person identified in the*
9 *report required under paragraph (1)(A).*

10 *(3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-*
11 *scribed in this subsection are the following:*

12 *(A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President shall*
13 *exercise all of the powers granted to the Presi-*
14 *dent under the International Emergency Eco-*
15 *nomics Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the*
16 *extent necessary to block and prohibit all trans-*
17 *actions in property and interests in property of*
18 *a foreign person identified in the report required*
19 *under paragraph (1)(A) if such property and in-*
20 *terests in property—*

21 *(i) are in the United States;*

22 *(ii) come within the United States; or*

23 *(iii) come within the possession or con-*
24 *trol of a United States person.*

1 (B) *INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION,*
2 *OR PAROLE.*—

3 (i) *VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.*—

4 *An alien described in paragraph (1)(A)*
5 *is—*

6 (I) *inadmissible to the United*
7 *States;*

8 (II) *ineligible to receive a visa or*
9 *other documentation to enter the*
10 *United States; and*

11 (III) *otherwise ineligible to be ad-*
12 *mitted or paroled into the United*
13 *States or to receive any other benefit*
14 *under the Immigration and Nation-*
15 *ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).*

16 (ii) *CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.*—

17 (I) *IN GENERAL.*—*An alien de-*
18 *scribed in paragraph (1)(A) is subject*
19 *to revocation of any visa or other entry*
20 *documentation regardless of when the*
21 *visa or other entry documentation is or*
22 *was issued.*

23 (II) *IMMEDIATE EFFECT.*—*A rev-*
24 *ocation under subclause (I) shall—*

1 (aa) take effect immediately;
2 and
3 (bb) automatically cancel
4 any other valid visa or entry doc-
5 umentation that is in the alien's
6 possession.

7 (4) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

8 (A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may
9 exercise all authorities provided under sections
10 203 and 205 of the International Emergency
11 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
12 1704) to carry out this section.

13 (B) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided
14 for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of
15 the International Emergency Economic Powers
16 Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign
17 person that engages in an activity described in
18 paragraph (1)(A) to the same extent that such
19 penalties apply to a person that commits an un-
20 lawful act described in subsection (a) of such sec-
21 tion 206.

22 (5) WAIVER.—The President may waive the ap-
23 plication of sanctions under this section with respect
24 to a foreign person identified in the report required
25 under paragraph (1)(A) if the President determines

1 *and certifies to the appropriate congressional commit-*
2 *tees that such a waiver is in the national interest of*
3 *the United States.*

4 (6) *EXCEPTIONS.—*

5 (A) *EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-*
6 *TIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not*
7 *apply to any activity subject to the reporting re-*
8 *quirements under title V of the National Secu-*
9 *rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any*
10 *authorized intelligence activities of the United*
11 *States.*

12 (B) *EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER-*
13 *NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCE-*
14 *MENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under paragraph*
15 (3)(B) *shall not apply with respect to an alien*
16 *if admitting or paroling the alien into the*
17 *United States is necessary—*

18 (i) *to permit the United States to com-*
19 *ply with the Agreement regarding the Head-*
20 *quarters of the United Nations, signed at*
21 *Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered*
22 *into force November 21, 1947, between the*
23 *United Nations and the United States, or*
24 *other applicable international obligations;*
25 *or*

1 (ii) to carry out or assist law enforce-
2 ment activity in the United States.

3 (7) *TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.*—*The President*
4 *may terminate the application of sanctions under this*
5 *section with respect to a foreign person if the Presi-*
6 *dent determines and reports to the appropriate con-*
7 *gressional committees not less than 15 days before the*
8 *termination takes effect that—*

9 (A) *information exists that the person did*
10 *not engage in the activity for which sanctions*
11 *were imposed;*

12 (B) *the person has been prosecuted appro-*
13 *priately for the activity for which sanctions were*
14 *imposed;*

15 (C) *the person has credibly demonstrated a*
16 *significant change in behavior, has paid an ap-*
17 *propriate consequence for the activity for which*
18 *sanctions were imposed, and has credibly com-*
19 *mitted in the future to not engage in such activ-*
20 *ity; or*

21 (D) *the termination of the sanctions is in*
22 *the national security interests of the United*
23 *States.*

24 (8) *SUNSET.*—*This section, and any sanctions*
25 *imposed under this section, shall terminate on the*

1 *date that is five years after the date of the enactment*
2 *of this Act.*

3 (9) *DEFINITIONS OF ADMISSION; ADMITTED;*
4 *ALIEN.—In this section, the terms “admission”, “ad-*
5 *mitted”, and “alien” have the meanings given those*
6 *terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nation-*
7 *ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).*

8 (g) *DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EX-*
9 *CHANGE COMMISSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO*
10 *THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—*

11 (1) *POLICY STATEMENT.—It is the policy of the*
12 *United States to protect American investors, through*
13 *stronger disclosure requirements, alerting them to the*
14 *presence of Chinese and other companies complicit in*
15 *gross violations of human rights in United States*
16 *capital markets, including American and foreign*
17 *companies listed on United States exchanges that en-*
18 *able the mass internment and population surveillance*
19 *of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim mi-*
20 *norities and source products made with forced labor*
21 *in the XUAR. Such involvements represent clear, ma-*
22 *terial risks to the share values and corporate reputa-*
23 *tions of certain of these companies and hence to pro-*
24 *spective American investors, particularly given that*
25 *the United States Government has employed sanctions*

1 *and export restrictions to target individuals and enti-*
2 *ties contributing to human rights abuses in the Peo-*
3 *ple’s Republic of China.*

4 (2) *DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELAT-*
5 *ING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-*
6 *GION.—Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of*
7 *1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the*
8 *end the following new subsection:*

9 “(s) *DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING*
10 *TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.—*

11 “(1) *IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file*
12 *an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a)*
13 *shall disclose in that report the information required*
14 *by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by the*
15 *report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer—*

16 “(A) *knowingly engaged in an activity with*
17 *an entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in*
18 *creating or providing technology or other assist-*
19 *ance to create mass population surveillance sys-*
20 *tems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-*
21 *gion (commonly referred to as ‘Xinjiang’ or*
22 *‘XUAR’) of China, including any entity in-*
23 *cluded on the Department of Commerce’s ‘Entity*
24 *List’ in the XUAR;*

1 “(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with
2 an entity or an affiliate of an entity building
3 and running detention facilities for Uyghurs,
4 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim
5 minority groups in the XUAR;

6 “(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with
7 an entity or an affiliate of an entity described
8 in section 306(e)(3)(A)(i) of the *Ensuring Amer-*
9 *ican Global Leadership and Engagement Act*, in-
10 cluding—

11 “(i) any entity engaged in the ‘pair-
12 ing-assistance’ program which subsidizes the
13 establishment of manufacturing facilities in
14 the XUAR; or

15 “(ii) any entity for which the Depart-
16 ment of Homeland Security has issued a
17 ‘Withhold Release Order’ under section 307
18 of the *Tariff Act of 1930* (19 U.S.C. 1307);
19 or

20 “(D) knowingly conducted any transaction
21 or had dealings with—

22 “(i) any person the property and in-
23 terests in property of which were sanctioned
24 by the Secretary of State for the detention
25 or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or

1 *other members of Muslim minority groups*
2 *in the XUAR;*

3 “(ii) *any person the property and in-*
4 *terests in property of which are sanctioned*
5 *pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human*
6 *Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656*
7 *note); or*

8 “(iii) *any person or entity responsible*
9 *for, or complicit in, committing atrocities*
10 *in the XUAR.*

11 “(2) *INFORMATION REQUIRED.—*

12 “(A) *IN GENERAL.—If an issuer described*
13 *under paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer*
14 *has engaged in any activity described in para-*
15 *graph (1), the information required by this*
16 *paragraph is a detailed description of each such*
17 *activity, including—*

18 “(i) *the nature and extent of the activ-*
19 *ity;*

20 “(ii) *the gross revenues and net profits,*
21 *if any, attributable to the activity; and*

22 “(iii) *whether the issuer or the affiliate*
23 *of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to*
24 *continue the activity.*

1 “(B) *EXCEPTION.*—*The requirement to dis-*
2 *close information under this paragraph shall not*
3 *include information on activities of the issuer or*
4 *any affiliate of the issuer activities relating to—*

5 “(i) *the import of manufactured goods,*
6 *including electronics, food products, textiles,*
7 *shoes, and teas, that originated in the*
8 *XUAR; or*

9 “(ii) *manufactured goods containing*
10 *materials that originated or are sourced in*
11 *the XUAR.*

12 “(3) *NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.*—*If an issuer re-*
13 *ports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affil-*
14 *iate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activ-*
15 *ity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall sepa-*
16 *rately file with the Commission, concurrently with the*
17 *annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a*
18 *notice that the disclosure of that activity has been in-*
19 *cluded in that annual or quarterly report that identi-*
20 *fies the issuer and contains the information required*
21 *by paragraph (2).*

22 “(4) *PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.*—
23 *Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an*
24 *annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an*

1 activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission
2 shall promptly—

3 “(A) transmit the report to—

4 “(i) the President;

5 “(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs
6 and the Committee on Financial Services of
7 the House of Representatives; and

8 “(iii) the Committee on Foreign Rela-
9 tions and the Committee on Banking, Hous-
10 ing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

11 “(B) make the information provided in the
12 disclosure and the notice available to the public
13 by posting the information on the Internet
14 website of the Commission.

15 “(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report
16 under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an
17 activity described in paragraph (1), the President
18 shall—

19 “(A) make a determination with respect to
20 whether any investigation is needed into the pos-
21 sible imposition of sanctions under the Global
22 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
23 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or section 306(f) of the
24 Ensuring American Global Leadership and En-
25 gagement Act or whether criminal investigations

1 *are warranted under statutes intended to hold*
2 *accountable individuals or entities involved in*
3 *the importation of goods produced by forced*
4 *labor, including under section 545, 1589, or*
5 *1761 of title 18, United States Code; and*

6 *“(B) not later than 180 days after initi-*
7 *ating any such investigation, make a determina-*
8 *tion with respect to whether a sanction should be*
9 *imposed or criminal investigations initiated*
10 *with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the*
11 *issuer (as the case may be).*

12 *“(6) ATROCITIES DEFINED.—In this subsection,*
13 *the term ‘atrocities’ has the meaning given the term*
14 *in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atroc-*
15 *ities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22*
16 *U.S.C. 2656 note).”.*

17 *(3) SUNSET.—Section 13(s) of the Securities Ex-*
18 *change Act of 1934, as added by paragraph (2), is re-*
19 *pealed on the earlier of—*

20 *(A) the date that is eight years after the*
21 *date of the enactment of this Act; or*

22 *(B) the date on which the President submits*
23 *to the appropriate congressional committees a*
24 *determination that the Government of the Peo-*
25 *ple’s Republic of China has ended mass intern-*

1 *ment, forced labor, and any other gross viola-*
2 *tions of human rights experienced by Uyghurs,*
3 *Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim*
4 *minority groups in the XUAR.*

5 (4) *EFFECTIVE DATE.*—*The amendment made by*
6 *paragraph (2) shall take effect with respect to reports*
7 *required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange*
8 *Commission after the date that is 180 days after the*
9 *date of the enactment of this Act.*

10 (h) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

11 (1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
12 *TEES.*—*The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
13 *tees” means—*

14 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the*
15 *Committee on Financial Services, and the Com-*
16 *mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep-*
17 *resentatives; and*

18 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Relations,*
19 *the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban*
20 *Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the*
21 *Senate.*

22 (2) *ATROCITIES.*—*The term “atrocities” has the*
23 *meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie*
24 *Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of*
25 *2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).*

1 (3) *CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.*—*The term*
2 *“crimes against humanity” includes, when committed*
3 *as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed*
4 *against any civilian population, with knowledge of*
5 *the attack—*

6 (A) *murder;*

7 (B) *deportation or forcible transfer of popu-*
8 *lation;*

9 (C) *torture;*

10 (D) *extermination;*

11 (E) *enslavement;*

12 (F) *rape, sexual slavery, or any other form*
13 *of sexual violence of comparable severity;*

14 (G) *persecution against any identifiable*
15 *group or collectivity on political, racial, na-*
16 *tional, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other*
17 *grounds that are universally recognized as im-*
18 *permissible under international law; and*

19 (H) *enforced disappearance of persons.*

20 (4) *FORCED LABOR.*—*The term “forced labor”*
21 *has the meaning given the term in section 307 of the*
22 *Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307).*

23 (5) *FOREIGN PERSON.*—*The term “foreign per-*
24 *son” means a person that is not a United States per-*
25 *son.*

1 (6) *PERSON.*—*The term “person” means an in-*
2 *dividual or entity.*

3 (7) *MASS POPULATION SURVEILLANCE SYS-*
4 *TEM.*—*The term “mass population surveillance sys-*
5 *tem” means installation and integration of facial rec-*
6 *ognition cameras, biometric data collection, cell phone*
7 *surveillance, and artificial intelligence technology*
8 *with the “Sharp Eyes” and “Integrated Joint Oper-*
9 *ations Platform” or other technologies that are used*
10 *by Chinese security forces for surveillance and big-*
11 *data predictive policing.*

12 (8) *UNITED STATES PERSON.*—*The term “United*
13 *States person” means—*

14 (A) *a United States citizen or an alien law-*
15 *fully admitted for permanent residence to the*
16 *United States; or*

17 (B) *an entity organized under the laws of*
18 *the United States or any jurisdiction within the*
19 *United States, including a foreign branch of*
20 *such an entity.*

21 **SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION.**

22 (a) *SHORT TITLE.*—*This section may be cited as the*
23 *“Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act”.*

24 (b) *FINDINGS.*—*Congress makes the following findings:*

1 (1) *The Government of the People’s Republic of*
2 *China (PRC) has a long history of repressing Turkic*
3 *Muslims and other Muslim minority groups, particu-*
4 *larly Uyghurs, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous*
5 *Region (commonly referred to as “Xinjiang” or*
6 *“XUAR”), also known as East Turkestan. Central*
7 *and regional PRC government policies have system-*
8 *atically discriminated against these minority groups*
9 *by denying them a range of civil and political rights,*
10 *particularly freedom of religion. Senior Chinese Com-*
11 *munist Party (CCP) officials bear direct responsi-*
12 *bility for these gross human rights violations.*

13 (2) *PRC government abuses include the arbi-*
14 *trary detention of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, eth-*
15 *nic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim*
16 *minority groups, separation of working age adults*
17 *from their children and elderly parents, and the inte-*
18 *gration of forced labor into supply chains. Those held*
19 *in detention facilities and internment camps in the*
20 *XUAR have described forced political indoctrination,*
21 *torture, beatings, food deprivation, sexual assault, co-*
22 *ordinated campaigns to reduce birth rates among*
23 *Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims through forced*
24 *sterilization, and denial of religious, cultural, and*
25 *linguistic freedoms. Recent media reports indicate*

1 *that since 2019, the PRC government has newly con-*
2 *structed, expanded, or fortified at least 60 detention*
3 *facilities with higher security or prison-like features*
4 *in Xinjiang.*

5 *(3) The PRC government's actions against*
6 *Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of*
7 *other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR violate*
8 *international human rights laws and norms, includ-*
9 *ing—*

10 *(A) the International Convention on the*
11 *Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-*
12 *tion, to which the PRC has acceded;*

13 *(B) the Convention against Torture and*
14 *Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment*
15 *or Punishment, which the PRC has signed and*
16 *ratified;*

17 *(C) The Convention on the Prevention and*
18 *Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which the*
19 *PRC has signed and ratified;*

20 *(D) the International Covenant on Civil*
21 *and Political Rights, which the PRC has signed;*
22 *and*

23 *(E) the Universal Declaration of Human*
24 *Rights and the International Labor Organiza-*

1 *tion's Force Labor Convention (no. 29) and the*
2 *Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (no. 105).*

3 (c) *REFUGEE PROTECTIONS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS*
4 *OF THE XUAR.—*

5 (1) *POPULATIONS OF SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN*
6 *CONCERN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation*
7 *with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall des-*
8 *ignate, as Priority 2 refugees of special humanitarian*
9 *concern—*

10 (A) *aliens who were nationals of the PRC*
11 *and residents of the XUAR on January 1, 2021;*

12 (B) *aliens who fled the XUAR after June*
13 *30, 2009, and reside in other provinces of the*
14 *PRC or in a third country where such alien is*
15 *not firmly resettled; and*

16 (C) *the spouses, children, and parents (as*
17 *such terms are defined in subsections (a) and (b)*
18 *of section 101 of the Immigration and Nation-*
19 *ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)) of individuals de-*
20 *scribed in subparagraphs (A) and (B), except*
21 *that a child shall be an unmarried person under*
22 *27 years of age.*

23 (2) *PROCESSING OF XUAR REFUGEES.—The*
24 *processing of individuals described in paragraph (1)*

1 *for classification as refugees may occur in the PRC*
2 *or a third country.*

3 (3) *ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION AS A REF-*
4 *UGEE.—*

5 (A) *IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in sub-*
6 *paragraph (B) may establish, for purposes of ad-*
7 *mission as a refugee under section 207 of the Im-*
8 *migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157)*
9 *or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8*
10 *U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well-founded*
11 *fear of persecution on account of race, religion,*
12 *nationality, membership in a particular social*
13 *group, or political opinion by asserting such a*
14 *fear and asserting a credible basis for concern*
15 *about the possibility of such persecution.*

16 (B) *ALIENS DESCRIBED.—An alien is de-*
17 *scribed in this subsection if such alien has been*
18 *identified as a person of special humanitarian*
19 *concern pursuant to paragraph (1) and—*

20 (i) *has experienced persecution in the*
21 *XUAR by the PRC government, includ-*
22 *ing—*

23 (I) *forced and arbitrary detention*
24 *including in an internment or re-edu-*
25 *cation camp;*

1 (II) *forced political indoctrina-*
2 *tion, torture, beatings, food depriva-*
3 *tion, and denial of religious, cultural,*
4 *and linguistic freedoms;*

5 (III) *forced labor;*

6 (IV) *forced separation from fam-*
7 *ily members;*

8 (V) *other forms of systemic*
9 *threats, harassment, and gross human*
10 *rights violations; or*

11 (VI) *has been formally charged,*
12 *detained, or convicted on account of*
13 *their peaceful actions as described in*
14 *the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act*
15 *of 2020 (Public Law 116–145).*

16 (ii) *is currently a national of the PRC*
17 *whose residency in the XUAR, or any other*
18 *area within the jurisdiction of the PRC,*
19 *was revoked for having submitted to any*
20 *United States Government agency a non-*
21 *frivolous application for refugee status, asy-*
22 *lum, or any other immigration benefit*
23 *under United States law.*

24 (C) *ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER*
25 *OTHER CLASSIFICATION.—An alien may not be*

1 *denied the opportunity to apply for admission as*
2 *a refugee or asylum under this section solely be-*
3 *cause such alien qualifies as an immediate rel-*
4 *ative of a national of the United States or is eli-*
5 *gible for admission to the United States under*
6 *any other immigrant classification.*

7 (4) *PRIORITY.*—*The Secretary of State shall*
8 *prioritize bilateral diplomacy with third countries*
9 *hosting former residents of the XUAR and who face*
10 *significant diplomatic pressures from the PRC gov-*
11 *ernment.*

12 (5) *REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.*—

13 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 180 days*
14 *after the date of the enactment of this Act and*
15 *every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State*
16 *and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall*
17 *submit to the appropriate congressional commit-*
18 *tees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the*
19 *House of Representatives, and the Committee on*
20 *the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the mat-*
21 *ters described in subparagraph (B).*

22 (B) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—*Each re-*
23 *port required by subparagraph (A) shall include,*
24 *with respect to applications submitted under this*
25 *section—*

1 (i) *the total number of applications*
2 *that are pending at the end of the reporting*
3 *period;*

4 (ii) *the average wait-times and number*
5 *of applicants who are currently pending—*

6 (I) *a pre-screening interview with*
7 *a resettlement support center;*

8 (II) *an interview with United*
9 *States Citizenship and Immigration*
10 *Services;*

11 (III) *the completion of security*
12 *checks;*

13 (IV) *receipt of a final decision*
14 *after completion of an interview with*
15 *United States Citizenship and Immi-*
16 *gration Services; and*

17 (iii) *the number of denials of applica-*
18 *tions for refugee status, disaggregated by the*
19 *reason for each such denial.*

20 (C) *FORM.—Each report required by para-*
21 *graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified*
22 *form, but may include a classified annex.*

23 (D) *PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of*
24 *State shall make each report submitted under*

1 *this subsection available to the public on the*
2 *internet website of the Department of State.*

3 *(d) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENCOURAGING ALLIES*
4 *AND PARTNERS TO MAKE SIMILAR ACCOMMODATIONS.—It*
5 *is the policy of the United States to encourage United States*
6 *allies and partners to make accommodations similar to the*
7 *accommodations made in this section for residents of the*
8 *XUAR who are fleeing oppression by the PRC Government.*

9 *(e) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on the*
10 *date that is ten years after the date of the enactment of*
11 *this Act.*

12 **SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS**
13 **HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT**
14 **HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.**

15 *The President shall direct the Permanent Representa-*
16 *tive of the United States to the United Nations to use the*
17 *voice, vote, and influence of the United States to—*

18 *(1) reform the process for removing Member*
19 *States of the United Nations Human Rights Council*
20 *that commit gross and systemic violations of human*
21 *rights, including—*

22 *(A) lowering the threshold vote at the*
23 *United Nations General Assembly for removal to*
24 *a simple majority;*

1 (B) ensuring information detailing the
2 Member State's human rights record is publicly
3 available before the vote on removal; and

4 (C) making the vote of each country on the
5 removal from the United Nations Human Rights
6 Council publicly available;

7 (2) reform the rules on electing members to the
8 United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure
9 United Nations Member States that have committed
10 gross and systemic violations of human rights are not
11 elected to the Human Rights Council; and

12 (3) oppose the election to the United Nations
13 Human Rights Council of any United Nations Mem-
14 ber State—

15 (A) currently designated as a country en-
16 gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations
17 of internationally recognized human rights pur-
18 suant to section 116 or section 502B of the For-
19 eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n or
20 2304);

21 (B) the government of which the Secretary
22 of State currently determines has repeatedly pro-
23 vided support for international terrorism pursu-
24 ant to—

1 (i) section 1754(c) of the National De-
2 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
3 2019;

4 (ii) section 620A of the Foreign Assist-
5 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);

6 (iii) section 40 of the Arms Export
7 Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2779A); or

8 (iv) any other provision of law;

9 (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 coun-
10 try under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
11 of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

12 (D) the government of which is identified on
13 the list published by the Secretary of State pur-
14 suant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Pre-
15 vention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)) as a
16 government that recruits and uses child soldiers;

17 or

18 (E) the government of which the United
19 States determines to have committed genocide or
20 crimes against humanity.

21 **SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.**

22 (a) RANK OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR
23 FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy
24 Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

1 (1) *by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and*
2 *(e), as subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively;*
3 *and*

4 (2) *by inserting after subsection (a) the following*
5 *new subsection:*

6 “(b) *RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be*
7 *appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of*
8 *the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank of*
9 *Under Secretary of State or higher.”.*

10 (b) *TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN BEI-*
11 *JING.—*

12 (1) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall*
13 *establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the*
14 *United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic*
15 *of China (PRC).*

16 (2) *OPERATION.—The Tibet Unit established*
17 *under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as*
18 *the Government of the PRC permits—*

19 (A) *the United States Consulate General in*
20 *Chengdu, PRC, to reopen; or*

21 (B) *a United States Consulate General in*
22 *Lhasa, Tibet, to open.*

23 (3) *STAFF.—*

24 (A) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall—*

1 (i) assign not fewer than two United
2 States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet
3 Unit established under paragraph (1); and
4 (ii) hire not fewer than one locally en-
5 gaged staff member for such unit.

6 (B) *LANGUAGE TRAINING.*—The Secretary
7 shall make Tibetan language training available
8 to the personnel assigned under subparagraph
9 (A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of
10 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

11 **SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EN-**
12 **GAGEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OR REIN-**
13 **CARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELI-**
14 **GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.**

15 (a) *REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.*—It is the policy of
16 the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of divi-
17 sion FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Pub-
18 lic Law 116–260), that any “interference by the Govern-
19 ment of the People’s Republic of China or any other govern-
20 ment in the process of recognizing a successor or reincarna-
21 tion of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas
22 would represent a clear abuse of the right to religious free-
23 dom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people”.

24 (b) *INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS*
25 *FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.*—The Secretary of

1 *State should engage with United States allies and partners*
2 *to—*

3 *(1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders’*
4 *sole religious authority to identify and install the*
5 *15th Dalai Lama;*

6 *(2) oppose claims by the Government of the Peo-*
7 *ple’s Republic of China (PRC) that the PRC has the*
8 *authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th*
9 *Dalai Lama; and*

10 *(3) reject interference by the Government of the*
11 *PRC in the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.*

12 **SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET**
13 **FREEDOM AND GREAT FIREWALL CIR-**
14 **CUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF**
15 **HONG KONG.**

16 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

17 *(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has*
18 *repeatedly violated its obligations under the Joint*
19 *Declaration by suppressing the basic rights and free-*
20 *doms of the people of Hong Kong.*

21 *(2) On June 30, 2020, the National People’s*
22 *Congress passed a “National Security Law” that fur-*
23 *ther erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables au-*
24 *thorities to suppress dissent.*

1 (3) *The Government of the PRC continues to uti-*
2 *lize the National Security Law to undermine the fun-*
3 *damental rights of the Hong Kong people through*
4 *suppression of the freedom of speech, assembly, reli-*
5 *gion, and the press.*

6 (4) *Article 9 of the National Security Law au-*
7 *thorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of*
8 *internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded*
9 *police powers to force internet service providers to*
10 *censor content, hand over user information, and block*
11 *access to platforms.*

12 (5) *On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong*
13 *Broadband Network blocked public access to HK*
14 *Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy view-*
15 *points, under the authorities of the National Security*
16 *Law.*

17 (6) *On February 12, 2021, internet service pro-*
18 *viders blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Jus-*
19 *tice Commission website in Hong Kong.*

20 (7) *Major tech companies, including Facebook,*
21 *Twitter, WhatsApp and Google, have stopped review-*
22 *ing requests for user data from Hong Kong authori-*
23 *ties.*

24 (8) *On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy ac-*
25 *tivists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged*

1 *under the National Security Law on the charge of*
2 *“conspiracy to commit subversion”.*

3 **(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—*It is the sense of Congress*
4 *that the United States should—*

5 *(1) support the ability of the people of Hong*
6 *Kong to maintain their freedom to access information*
7 *online; and*

8 *(2) focus on investments in technologies that fa-*
9 *cilitate the unhindered exchange of information in*
10 *Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the*
11 *Chinese Communist Party—*

12 *(A) to suppress internet access;*

13 *(B) to increase online censorship; or*

14 *(C) to inhibit online communication and*
15 *content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong.*

16 **(c) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.**—

17 **(1) WORKING GROUP.**—

18 **(A) IN GENERAL.**—*The Secretary of State is*
19 *authorized to establish a working group to de-*
20 *velop a strategy to bolster internet resiliency and*
21 *online access in Hong Kong.*

22 **(B) MEMBERSHIP.**—*The working group*
23 *under subparagraph (A) shall consist of—*

1 (i) *the Under Secretary of State for Ci-*
2 *vilian Security, Democracy, and Human*
3 *Rights;*

4 (ii) *the Assistant Secretary of State for*
5 *East Asian and Pacific Affairs;*

6 (iii) *the Chief Executive Officer of the*
7 *United States Agency for Global Media and*
8 *the President of the Open Technology Fund*
9 *of the Agency; and*

10 (iv) *the Administrator of the United*
11 *States Agency for International Develop-*
12 *ment.*

13 (2) *HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PRO-*
14 *GRAMS.—*

15 (A) *DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—The Sec-*
16 *retary of State shall establish a Hong Kong*
17 *Internet Freedom Program in the Bureau of De-*
18 *mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the De-*
19 *partment of State.*

20 (B) *OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—The Presi-*
21 *dent of the Open Technology Fund of the United*
22 *States Agency for Global Media is authorized to*
23 *establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Pro-*
24 *gram.*

1 (C) *OPERATION.*—*The Programs referred to*
2 *in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall operate*
3 *independently, but in strategic coordination with*
4 *other entities in the working group under para-*
5 *graph (1). The Open Technology Fund shall re-*
6 *main independent from Department of State di-*
7 *rection in its implementation of the Program of*
8 *such Fund, and any other internet freedom pro-*
9 *grams.*

10 (3) *INDEPENDENCE.*—*During the period begin-*
11 *ning on the date of the enactment of this Act and end-*
12 *ing on September 30, 2023, the Hong Kong Internet*
13 *Freedom Programs described in paragraph (2) shall*
14 *be carried out independently from any other internet*
15 *freedom programs relating to the People’s Republic of*
16 *China carried out by the Department of State or the*
17 *Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency*
18 *for Global Media, as the case may be, in order that*
19 *such Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs may*
20 *focus on supporting liberties presently enjoyed by the*
21 *people of Hong Kong.*

22 (4) *CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE*
23 *PROGRAM.*—*Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Sec-*
24 *retary of State may—*

1 (A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet
2 Freedom Program of the Department of State
3 with any other internet freedom programs relat-
4 ing to the People’s Republic of China carried out
5 by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
6 and Labor; or

7 (B) continue to carry out the Program in
8 accordance with paragraph (3).

9 (5) CONSOLIDATION OF OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND
10 PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Presi-
11 dent of the Open Technology Fund of the United
12 States Agency for Global Media may—

13 (A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet
14 Freedom Program of the Fund with any other
15 internet freedom programs relating to the Peo-
16 ple’s Republic of China carried out by the Fund;
17 or

18 (B) continue to carry out the Program in
19 accordance with paragraph (3).

20 (d) SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECHNOLOGY
21 PROGRAMS.—

22 (1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State,
24 working through the Bureau of Democracy,
25 Human Rights, and Labor, and President of the

1 *Open Technology Fund of the United States*
2 *Agency for Global Media, are each separately*
3 *and independently authorized to award grants*
4 *and contracts to private organizations to support*
5 *and develop programs in Hong Kong that pro-*
6 *mote or expand—*

7 *(i) an open, interoperable, reliable and*
8 *secure internet; and*

9 *(ii) the online exercise of human rights*
10 *and fundamental freedoms of individual*
11 *citizens, activists, human rights defenders,*
12 *independent journalists, civil society orga-*
13 *nizations, and marginalized populations in*
14 *Hong Kong.*

15 *(B) GOALS.—The goals of the programs de-*
16 *veloped pursuant to grants awarded pursuant to*
17 *subparagraph (A) should be—*

18 *(i) to make the internet available in*
19 *Hong Kong;*

20 *(ii) to increase the number of the tools*
21 *in the technology portfolio;*

22 *(iii) to promote the availability of such*
23 *technologies and tools in Hong Kong;*

1 (iv) to encourage the adoption of such
2 technologies and tools by the people of Hong
3 Kong;

4 (v) to scale up the distribution of such
5 technologies and tools throughout Hong
6 Kong;

7 (vi) to prioritize the development of
8 tools, components, code, and technologies
9 that are fully open-source, to the extent
10 practicable;

11 (vii) to conduct research on repressive
12 tactics that undermine internet freedom in
13 Hong Kong;

14 (viii) to ensure digital safety guidance
15 and support is available to repressed indi-
16 vidual citizens, human rights defenders,
17 independent journalists, civil society orga-
18 nizations and marginalized populations in
19 Hong Kong; and

20 (ix) to engage United States private
21 industry, including e-commerce firms and
22 social networking companies, on the impor-
23 tance of preserving internet access in Hong
24 Kong.

1 (C) *GRANT RECIPIENTS.*—*Grants awarded*
2 *pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be distrib-*
3 *uted to multiple vendors and suppliers through*
4 *an open, fair, competitive, and evidence-based*
5 *decision process—*

6 *(i) to diversify the technical base; and*

7 *(ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad*
8 *actors.*

9 (D) *SECURITY AUDITS.*—*New technologies*
10 *developed using grants awarded pursuant to sub-*
11 *paragraph (A) shall undergo comprehensive secu-*
12 *rity audits to ensure such technologies are secure*
13 *and have not been compromised in a manner*
14 *detrimental to the interests of the United States*
15 *or to individuals or organizations benefitting*
16 *from programs supported by the Open Tech-*
17 *nology Fund.*

18 (2) *FUNDING SOURCE.*—*The Secretary of State is*
19 *authorized to expend funds made available to the*
20 *Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the Bureau*
21 *of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the De-*
22 *partment of State for each of fiscal years 2022 and*
23 *2023 for grants authorized under paragraph (1) by*
24 *any entity in the working group established under*
25 *subsection (c)(1).*

1 (3) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—

2 (A) *OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.*—*In addition*
3 *to the funds authorized to be expended pursuant*
4 *to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be ap-*
5 *propriated to the Open Technology Fund of the*
6 *United States Agency for Global Media*
7 *\$5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and*
8 *2023 for grants to carry out this subsection.*
9 *Such amounts are in addition to any amounts*
10 *authorized to be appropriated for the Open Tech-*
11 *nology Fund under section 1299P of the Na-*
12 *tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year*
13 *2021 (Public Law 116–283).*

14 (B) *BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN*
15 *RIGHTS, AND LABOR.*—*In addition to the funds*
16 *authorized to be expended pursuant to para-*
17 *graph (2), there are authorized to be appro-*
18 *priated to the Office of Internet Freedom Pro-*
19 *grams of the Bureau of Democracy, Human*
20 *Rights, and Labor of the Department of State*
21 *\$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and*
22 *2023 to carry out this subsection.*

23 (C) *AVAILABILITY.*—*Amounts authorized to*
24 *be appropriated pursuant to subparagraphs (A)*
25 *and (B) shall remain available until expended.*

1 (e) *STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT*.—Not later than
2 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
3 Secretary of State and the working group under subsection
4 (c)(1) shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
5 mittees a classified report that—

6 (1) describes the Federal Government’s plan to
7 bolster and increase the availability of Great Firewall
8 circumvention and internet freedom technology in
9 Hong Kong during fiscal year 2022;

10 (2) outlines a plan for—

11 (A) supporting the preservation of an open,
12 interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in
13 Hong Kong;

14 (B) increasing the supply of the technology
15 referred to in paragraph (1);

16 (C) accelerating the dissemination of such
17 technology;

18 (D) promoting the availability of internet
19 freedom in Hong Kong;

20 (E) utilizing presently-available tools in the
21 existing relevant portfolios for further use in the
22 unique context of Hong Kong;

23 (F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order
24 to diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and
25 resiliency of the circumvention efforts;

1 (G) providing training for high-risk groups
2 and individuals in Hong Kong; and

3 (H) detecting analyzing, and responding to
4 new and evolving censorship threats;

5 (3) includes a detailed description of the tech-
6 nical and fiscal steps necessary to safely implement
7 the plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), in-
8 cluding an analysis of the market conditions in Hong
9 Kong;

10 (4) describes the Federal Government’s plans for
11 awarding grants to private organizations for the pur-
12 poses described in subsection (d)(1)(A);

13 (5) outlines the working group’s consultations re-
14 garding the implementation of this section to ensure
15 that all Federal efforts are aligned and well coordi-
16 nated; and

17 (6) outlines the Department of State’s strategy to
18 influence global internet legal standards at inter-
19 national organizations and multilateral fora.

20 (f) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

21 (1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
22 *TEES.*—*The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
23 *tees” means—*

1 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
2 *Committee on Appropriations, and the Select*
3 *Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and*

4 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the*
5 *Committee on Appropriations, and the Perma-*
6 *nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the*
7 *House of Representatives.*

8 (2) *JOINT DECLARATION.—The term “Joint Dec-*
9 *laration” means the Joint Declaration of the Govern-*
10 *ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and*
11 *Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s*
12 *Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,*
13 *done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.*

14 **SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
15 **TECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE’S**
16 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

17 (a) *IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to be appro-*
18 *priated or otherwise made available to carry out section*
19 *409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2019 (Public*
20 *Law 115–409) should include programs that prioritize the*
21 *protection and advancement of the freedoms of association,*
22 *assembly, religion, and expression for women, human rights*
23 *activists, and ethnic and religious minorities in the People’s*
24 *Republic of China (PRC).*

1 **(b) USE OF FUNDS.**—Amounts appropriated pursuant
2 to section 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of
3 2019 (Public Law 115–409) may be used to fund non-
4 governmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that
5 are focused on the issues described in subsection (a).

6 **(c) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.**—In carrying out
7 this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human
8 Rights and Labor shall consult with the appropriate con-
9 gressional committees and representatives of civil society re-
10 garding—

11 (1) strengthening the capacity of the organiza-
12 tions referred to in subsection (b);

13 (2) protecting members of the groups referred to
14 in subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest,
15 harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abortions,
16 forced labor, or intimidation, including members re-
17 siding outside of the PRC; and

18 (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest pos-
19 sible audiences within the PRC about United States
20 Government efforts to protect freedom of association,
21 expression, assembly, and the rights of ethnic minori-
22 ties.

1 **SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO AND REAUTHORIZATION OF**
2 **SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN**
3 **RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.**

4 (a) *DEFINITIONS.*—Section 1262 of the Global
5 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F
6 of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)
7 is amended by striking paragraph (2).

8 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—(1) The Global Magnitsky
9 Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII
10 of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended
11 by inserting after section 1262 the following new section:

12 **“SEC. 1262A. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

13 *“It is the sense of Congress that the President should*
14 *establish and regularize information sharing and sanctions-*
15 *related decision making with like-minded governments pos-*
16 *sessing human rights and anti-corruption sanctions pro-*
17 *grams similar in nature to those authorized under this sub-*
18 *title.”; and*

19 (2) *The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title*
20 *XII of division A of the National Defense Authorization Act*
21 *for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) are each*
22 *amended by inserting after the items relating to section*
23 *1262 the following:*

“Sec. 1262A. Sense of Congress.”.

24 (c) *IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.*—

1 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Subsection (a) of section 1263
2 of the *Global Magnitsky Human Rights Account-*
3 *ability Act* (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law
4 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended to read as
5 follows:

6 “(a) *IN GENERAL.*—The President may impose the
7 sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any
8 foreign person that the President determines, based on cred-
9 ible information—

10 “(1) is responsible for or complicit in, or has di-
11 rectly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights
12 abuse or any violation of internationally recognized
13 human rights;

14 “(2) is a current or former government official,
15 or a person acting for or on behalf of such an official,
16 who is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly
17 or indirectly engaged in—

18 “(A) corruption; or

19 “(B) the transfer or facilitation of the
20 transfer of the proceeds of corruption;

21 “(3) is or has been a leader or official of—

22 “(A) an entity, including a government en-
23 tity, that has engaged in, or whose members have
24 engaged in, any of the activities described in

1 *subparagraph (A) or (B) related to the tenure of*
2 *the leader or official; or*

3 *“(B) an entity whose property and interests*
4 *in property are blocked pursuant to this section*
5 *as a result of activities related to the tenure of*
6 *the leader or official;*

7 *“(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or pro-*
8 *vided financial, material, or technological support*
9 *for, or goods or services to or in support of—*

10 *“(A) an activity described in subparagraph*
11 *(A) or (B) that is conducted by a foreign person;*

12 *“(B) a person whose property and interests*
13 *in property are blocked pursuant to this section;*
14 *or*

15 *“(C) an entity, including a government en-*
16 *tity, that has engaged in, or whose members have*
17 *engaged in, an activity described in subpara-*
18 *graph (A) or (B) conducted by a foreign person;*
19 *or*

20 *“(5) is owned or controlled by, or acts or is pur-*
21 *ported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly,*
22 *a person whose property and interests in property are*
23 *blocked pursuant to this section.”.*

1 (2) *CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN INFORMA-*
2 *TION.—Subsection (c)(2) of such section is amended*
3 *by inserting “corruption and” after “monitor”.*

4 (3) *REQUESTS BY CONGRESS.—Subsection (d) of*
5 *such section is amended—*

6 (A) *in paragraph (1), in the matter pre-*
7 *ceding subparagraph (A), by striking “subsection*
8 *(a)” and inserting “subsection (a)(1)”;*

9 (B) *in paragraph (2)—*

10 (i) *in subparagraph (A)—*

11 (I) *in the subparagraph heading,*
12 *by striking “HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLA-*
13 *TIONS” and inserting “SERIOUS*
14 *HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE OR VIOLATIONS*
15 *OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED*
16 *HUMAN RIGHTS”;* and

17 (II) *by striking “described in*
18 *paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)”*
19 *and inserting “described in subsection*
20 *(a)(1) relating to serious human rights*
21 *abuse or any violation of internation-*
22 *ally recognized human rights”;* and

23 (ii) *in subparagraph (B)—*

24 (I) *in the matter preceding clause*
25 *(i), by striking “described in para-*

1 *graph (3) or (4) of subsection (a)” and*
2 *inserting “described in subsection*
3 *(a)(1) relating to corruption or the*
4 *transfer or facilitation of the transfer*
5 *of the proceeds of corruption”; and*
6 *(II) by striking “ranking member*
7 *of” and all that follows through the pe-*
8 *riod at the end and inserting “ranking*
9 *member of one of the appropriate con-*
10 *gressional committees.”.*

11 *(d) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Section 1264(a) of the*
12 *Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Sub-*
13 *title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656*
14 *note) is amended—*

15 *(1) in paragraph (5), by striking “; and” and*
16 *inserting a semicolon;*

17 *(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at*
18 *the end and inserting “;”; and*

19 *(3) by adding at the end the following:*

20 *“(7) a description of additional steps taken by*
21 *the President through diplomacy, international en-*
22 *gagement, and assistance to foreign or security sectors*
23 *to address persistent underlying causes of serious*
24 *human rights abuse, violations of internationally rec-*
25 *ognized human rights, and corruption in each coun-*

1 *try in which foreign persons with respect to which*
2 *sanctions have been imposed under section 1263 are*
3 *located; and*

4 *“(8) a description of additional steps taken by*
5 *the President to ensure the pursuit of judicial ac-*
6 *countability in appropriate jurisdictions with respect*
7 *to those foreign persons subject to sanctions under sec-*
8 *tion 1263 for serious human rights abuse, violations*
9 *of internationally recognized human rights, and cor-*
10 *ruption.”.*

11 *(e) REPEAL OF SUNSET.—(1) Section 1265 of the*
12 *Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Sub-*
13 *title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656*
14 *note) is repealed.*

15 *(2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title*
16 *XII of division A of the National Defense Authorization Act*
17 *for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) are each*
18 *amended by striking the items relating to section 1265.*

19 **SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN**
20 **RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION.**

21 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

22 *(1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pandemic,*
23 *crimes and discrimination against Asians and those*
24 *of Asian descent have risen dramatically worldwide.*

25 *In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-General An-*

1 *tonio Guterres said “the pandemic continues to un-*
2 *leash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating*
3 *and scare-mongering” and urged governments to “act*
4 *now to strengthen the immunity of our societies*
5 *against the virus of hate”.*

6 *(2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI)*
7 *workers make up a large portion of the essential*
8 *workers on the frontlines of the COVID–19 pandemic,*
9 *making up 8.5 percent of all essential healthcare*
10 *workers in the United States. AAPI workers also*
11 *make up a large share—between 6 percent and 12*
12 *percent based on sector—of the biomedical field.*

13 *(3) The United States Census notes that Ameri-*
14 *cans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 per-*
15 *cent of the United States population in 2019, and*
16 *that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial*
17 *group in the United States, projected to represent 14*
18 *percent of the United States population by 2065.*

19 *(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
20 *that—*

21 *(1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian*
22 *descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian senti-*
23 *ment and racism in the United States and around the*
24 *world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and toler-*
25 *ant world;*

1 (2) *the United States is a diverse country with*
2 *a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength*
3 *and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the*
4 *diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citi-*
5 *zens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Island-*
6 *ers;*

7 (3) *the United States Government should encour-*
8 *age foreign governments to use the official and sci-*
9 *entific names for the COVID–19 pandemic, as rec-*
10 *ommended by the World Health Organization and the*
11 *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and*

12 (4) *the United States Government and other gov-*
13 *ernments around the world must actively oppose rac-*
14 *ism and intolerance, and use all available and appro-*
15 *priate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian racism*
16 *and discrimination.*

17 **SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE**
18 **SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL**
19 **ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS.**

20 *Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*
21 *(227 U.S.C. 2151n(d)) is amended—*

22 (1) *in paragraph (11)(C), by striking “and” at*
23 *the end;*

24 (2) *in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the pe-*
25 *riod at the end and inserting a semicolon; and*

1 (3) *by adding at the end the following:*

2 “(13) *wherever applicable, instances in which the*
3 *government of each country has attempted to*
4 *extraterritorially intimidate or pressure a company*
5 *or entity to censor or self-censor the speech of its em-*
6 *ployees, contractors, customers, or associated staff*
7 *with regards to the abuse of human rights in such*
8 *country, or sought retaliation against such employees*
9 *or contractors for the same, including any instance in*
10 *which the Government of the People’s Republic of*
11 *China has sought to extraterritorially censor or pun-*
12 *ish speech that is otherwise legal in the United States*
13 *on the topics of—*

14 “(A) *repression and violation of funda-*
15 *mental freedoms in Hong Kong;*

16 “(B) *repression and persecution of religious*
17 *and ethnic minorities in China, including in the*
18 *Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the*
19 *Tibet Autonomous Region;*

20 “(C) *efforts to proliferate and use surveil-*
21 *lance technologies to surveil activists, journalists,*
22 *opposition politicians, or to profile persons of*
23 *different ethnicities; and*

24 “(D) *other gross violations of human rights;*
25 *and*

1 “(14) wherever applicable, instances in which a
2 company or entity located in or based in a third
3 country has censored or self-censored the speech of its
4 employees, contractors, customers, or associated staff
5 on the topic of abuse of human rights in each country
6 or sought to retaliate against such employees for the
7 same, due to intimidation or pressure from or the fear
8 of intimidation by the foreign government.”.

9 **SEC. 316. POLICY TOWARD THE XXIV OLYMPIC WINTER**
10 **GAMES AND THE XIII PARALYMPIC WINTER**
11 **GAMES.**

12 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress finds the following:

13 (1) *In October 2020, 39 countries at the United*
14 *Nations Third Committee of the General Assembly ap-*
15 *pealed for action on the mass arbitrary detentions*
16 *and other crimes against the Uyghur Muslim popu-*
17 *lation of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.*

18 (2) *The 2018 concluding observations of the*
19 *United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Ra-*
20 *cial Discrimination decried reports of mass arbitrary*
21 *detention of Uyghurs.*

22 (3) *Over 400 international nongovernmental or-*
23 *ganizations have joined together to decry the mass ar-*
24 *bitrary detentions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur*
25 *Autonomous Region.*

1 (4) *The Olympic Charter states that the practice*
2 *of sport “is a human right” that “shall be secured*
3 *without discrimination of any kind, such as race, col-*
4 *our, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, polit-*
5 *ical or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-*
6 *erty, birth or other status”, a right that by definition*
7 *cannot be secured in a country in which over*
8 *1,000,000 people are imprisoned in camps because of*
9 *their race, language, and religion.*

10 (5) *The 2008 Olympics in Beijing were accom-*
11 *panied by widespread tracking, arrest, and intimidat-*
12 *ion of foreign journalists and bloggers, as well as re-*
13 *strictions on movement of journalists, contrary to ex-*
14 *PLICIT commitments made by the Government of the*
15 *People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the Inter-*
16 *national Olympic Committee.*

17 (6) *The Government of the PRC denied visas for*
18 *some journalists granted press accreditation for the*
19 *2008 Olympic Games, and the Beijing Organising*
20 *Committee of the Olympic Games repeatedly refused*
21 *to address incidents involving freedom of expression.*

22 (7) *The International Olympic Committee faced*
23 *broad criticism for failing to adequately anticipate*
24 *infringements by the Government of the PRC’s on*
25 *freedom of expression and press for international*

1 *media and 2008 Olympics participants, and failing*
2 *to hold the Government of the PRC to their own com-*
3 *mitments to safeguard human rights during the 2008*
4 *games.*

5 *(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
6 *that the International Olympic Committee should—*

7 *(1) consider that the Olympic Charter’s prin-*
8 *ciples of solidarity and nondiscrimination are hard*
9 *to reconcile with holding the 2022 Winter Games in*
10 *a country the government of which stands credibly ac-*
11 *cused of perpetrating crimes against humanity and*
12 *genocide against ethnic and religious minorities;*

13 *(2) take into account the recent precedent of the*
14 *2008 games, at which Olympic athletes, spectators,*
15 *and international media had their fundamental free-*
16 *doms severely challenged, and the likely limitations*
17 *the Government of the PRC will seek to enforce on*
18 *participants speaking out about ongoing persecution*
19 *of the Uyghurs and other human rights abuses in the*
20 *PRC, despite repeated commitments by the Govern-*
21 *ment of the PRC;*

22 *(3) emphasize that the International Olympic*
23 *Committee is not opposed to moving an Olympic*
24 *competition in all circumstances, and should imme-*
25 *diately rebid the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to be*

1 *hosted by a country that recognizes and respects*
2 *human rights;*

3 *(4) affirm the International Olympic Commit-*
4 *tee's—*

5 *(A) desire to stay above politics does not*
6 *permit turning a blind eye to mass atrocity*
7 *crimes, which cannot and should not be dis-*
8 *missed as mere political concerns; and*

9 *(B) commitment to the fundamental rights*
10 *instruments of the international system, which*
11 *are beyond partisan or domestic policy, and*
12 *upon which the success of the entire Olympic*
13 *project depends;*

14 *(5) propose a set of clear, executable actions to*
15 *be taken by the International Olympic Committee*
16 *upon infringement of freedom of expression by a host*
17 *country's government during any Olympics event, in-*
18 *cluding the 2022 Winter Olympics, against athletes,*
19 *participants, and international media; and*

20 *(6) rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter,*
21 *which restricts the freedom of expression by athletes*
22 *when competing during Olympics events, and affirm*
23 *the rights of athletes to political and other speech dur-*
24 *ing athletic competitions, including speech that is*
25 *critical of their host countries.*

1 (c) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—*It shall be the policy of*
2 *the United States—*

3 (1) *to implement a presidential and cabinet level*
4 *diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter*
5 *Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games in*
6 *the PRC;*

7 (2) *to encourage other nations, especially demo-*
8 *cratic partners and allies, to do the same; and*

9 (3) *to call for an end to the Chinese Communist*
10 *Party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including the*
11 *Uyghur genocide.*

12 **SEC. 317. REVIEW AND CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF ITEMS**
13 **WITH CRITICAL CAPABILITIES TO ENABLE**
14 **HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.**

15 (a) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—*It is the policy of the*
16 *United States to use export controls to the extent necessary*
17 *to further the protection of internationally recognized*
18 *human rights.*

19 (b) *REVIEW OF ITEMS WITH CRITICAL CAPABILITIES*
20 *TO ENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.*—*Not later than 180*
21 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and as*
22 *appropriate thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with*
23 *the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence,*
24 *and the heads of other Federal agencies as appropriate,*
25 *shall conduct a review of items subject to controls for crime*

1 *control reasons pursuant to section 742.7 of the Export Ad-*
2 *ministration Regulations.*

3 (c) *CONTROLS.*—*In furtherance of the policy set forth*
4 *in subsection (a), not later than 60 days after completing*
5 *the review required by subsection (b), the Secretary, in co-*
6 *ordination with the heads of other Federal agencies as ap-*
7 *propriate, shall determine whether additional export con-*
8 *trols are needed to protect human rights, including wheth-*
9 *er—*

10 (1) *controls for crime control reasons pursuant*
11 *to section 742.7 of the Export Administration Regula-*
12 *tions should be imposed on additional items, includ-*
13 *ing items with critical capabilities to enable human*
14 *rights abuses involving—*

15 (A) *ensorship or social control;*

16 (B) *surveillance, interception, or restriction*
17 *of communications;*

18 (C) *monitoring or restricting access to or*
19 *use of the internet;*

20 (D) *identification of individuals through fa-*
21 *cial or voice recognition or biometric indicators;*

22 *or*

23 (E) *DNA sequencing; or*

24 (2) *end-use and end-user controls should be im-*
25 *posed on the export, reexport, or in-country transfer*

1 *of certain items with critical capabilities to enable*
2 *human rights abuses that are subject to the Export*
3 *Administration Regulations if the person seeking to*
4 *export, reexport, or transfer the item has knowledge,*
5 *or the Secretary determines and so informs that per-*
6 *son, that the end-user or ultimate consignee will use*
7 *the item to enable human rights abuses.*

8 *(d) COOPERATION OF OTHER AGENCIES.—Upon re-*
9 *quest from the Secretary, the head of a Federal agency shall*
10 *provide full support and cooperation to the Secretary in*
11 *carrying out this section.*

12 *(e) INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION ON CONTROLS TO*
13 *PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS.—It shall be the policy of the*
14 *United States to seek to secure the cooperation of other gov-*
15 *ernments to impose export controls that are consistent, to*
16 *the extent possible, with the controls imposed under this sec-*
17 *tion.*

18 *(f) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1752(2)(A) of*
19 *the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 20*
20 *4811(2)(A)) is amended—*

21 *(1) in clause (iv), by striking “; or” and insert-*
22 *ing a semicolon;*

23 *(2) in clause (v), by striking the period and in-*
24 *serting “; or”; and*

25 *(3) by adding at the end the following:*

1 “(vi) serious human rights abuses.”.

2 (g) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

3 (1) *END-USER; KNOWLEDGE; ULTIMATE CON-*
4 *SIGNEE.*—*The terms “end-user”, “knowledge”, and*
5 *“ultimate consignee” have the meanings given those*
6 *terms in section 772.1 of the Export Administration*
7 *Regulations.*

8 (2) *EXPORT; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULA-*
9 *TIONS; IN-COUNTRY TRANSFER; ITEM; REEXPORT.*—
10 *The terms “export”, “Export Administration Regula-*
11 *tions”, “in-country transfer”, “item”, and “reexport”*
12 *have the meanings given those terms in section 1742*
13 *of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C.*
14 *4801).*

15 (3) *SECRETARY.*—*The term “Secretary” means*
16 *the Secretary of Commerce.*

17 **SEC. 318. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT**
18 **CONTROL POLICY.**

19 *It is the sense of Congress that the President should*
20 *reexamine United States commercial export control policy*
21 *for any country, including the People’s Republic of China,*
22 *that is known to supply arms or dual use items to any*
23 *country the government of which has been designated pursu-*
24 *ant to any applicable provision of law as a state sponsor*

1 of terrorism or to any entity designated by the Secretary
2 of State as a foreign terrorist organization.

3 **SEC. 319. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
4 **SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION,**
5 **FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY**
6 **CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE**
7 **XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

8 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
9 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
10 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by inserting after sub-
11 paragraph (E) the following:

12 “(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion,
13 forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive
14 implantation policies and practices.”

15 (b) *EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.*—The amend-
16 ment made by subsection (a)—

17 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
18 this Act; and

19 (2) applies with respect to the first report re-
20 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human
21 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date
22 of enactment.

23 **SEC. 320. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CENSORSHIP**
24 **OF POLITICAL SPEECH.**

25 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) *The People’s Republic of China censors political*
2 *speech of throughout the country through many*
3 *means including through mass censorship of the*
4 *Internet, the Great Firewall, radical curtailment of*
5 *the freedom of the press.*

6 (2) *The PRC employs several other means to sti-*
7 *fle dissent including instigating private person to tar-*
8 *get dissenting individuals and private companies to*
9 *target offending companies.*

10 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
11 *that—*

12 (1) *copyright of political speech in China is*
13 *contrary to the human rights of the Chinese people;*

14 (2) *copyright of political speech, whether con-*
15 *ducted by the government, or private or quasi-private*
16 *entities is antithetical to United States values and in-*
17 *terests; and*

18 (3) *the democratic way to conduct political dis-*
19 *putes is through argument and persuasion, not force*
20 *or political speech.*

1 **SEC. 321. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE**
2 **GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG**
3 **KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS**
4 **AND PROTECTIONS.**

5 *Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act*
6 *of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at*
7 *the end the following:*

8 **“SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH**
9 **THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS**
10 **HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED**
11 **STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.**

12 *“(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
13 *date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State*
14 *shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a*
15 *report on the manner and extent to which the Government*
16 *of China uses the status of Hong Kong to circumvent the*
17 *laws and protections of the United States.*

18 *“(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection*
19 *(a) shall include the following:*

20 *“(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Com-*
21 *merce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the*
22 *Director of National Intelligence—*

23 *“(A) an assessment of how the Government*
24 *of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent United*
25 *States export controls; and*

1 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
2 which the Government of China used Hong Kong
3 to circumvent such controls during the reporting
4 period.

5 “(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the
6 Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce—

7 “(A) an assessment of how the Government
8 of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent duties
9 on merchandise exported to the United States
10 from the People’s Republic of China; and

11 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
12 which the Government of China used Hong Kong
13 to circumvent such duties during the reporting
14 period.

15 “(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the
16 Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
17 the Director of National Intelligence—

18 “(A) an assessment of how the Government
19 of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent sanc-
20 tions imposed by the United States or pursuant
21 to multilateral regimes; and

22 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
23 which the Government of China used Hong Kong
24 to circumvent such sanctions during the report-
25 ing period.

1 “(4) *In consultation with the Secretary of Home-*
2 *land Security and the Director of National Intel-*
3 *ligence, an assessment of how the Government of*
4 *China uses formal or informal means to extradite or*
5 *coercively move individuals, including United States*
6 *persons, from Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of*
7 *China.*

8 “(5) *In consultation with the Secretary of De-*
9 *fense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the*
10 *Director of Homeland Security—*

11 “(A) *an assessment of how the intelligence,*
12 *security, and law enforcement agencies of the*
13 *Government of China, including the Ministry of*
14 *State Security, the Ministry of Public Security,*
15 *and the People’s Armed Police, use the Hong*
16 *Kong Security Bureau and other security agen-*
17 *cies in Hong Kong to conduct espionage on for-*
18 *ign nationals, including United States persons,*
19 *conduct influence operations, or violate civil lib-*
20 *erties guaranteed under the laws of Hong Kong;*
21 *and*

22 “(B) *a list of all significant incidents of*
23 *such espionage, influence operations, or viola-*
24 *tions of civil liberties during the reporting pe-*
25 *riod.*

1 “(c) *FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.*—

2 “(1) *FORM.*—*The report required by subsection*
3 *(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may*
4 *include a classified index.*

5 “(2) *AVAILABILITY.*—*The unclassified portion of*
6 *the report required by subsection (a) shall be posted*
7 *on a publicly available internet website of the Depart-*
8 *ment of State.*

9 “(d) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

10 “(1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
11 *TEES.*—*The term ‘appropriate congressional commit-*
12 *tees’ means—*

13 “(A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations,*
14 *the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban*
15 *Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Se-*
16 *lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and*

17 “(B) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the*
18 *Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent*
19 *Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-*
20 *mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep-*
21 *resentatives.*

22 “(2) *FOREIGN NATIONAL.*—*The term ‘foreign na-*
23 *tional’ means a person that is neither—*

24 “(A) *an individual who is a citizen or na-*
25 *tional of the People’s Republic of China; or*

1 “(B) an entity organized under the laws of
2 the People’s Republic of China or of a jurisdic-
3 tion within the People’s Republic of China.

4 “(3) *REPORTING PERIOD.*—The term ‘reporting
5 period’ means the 5-year period preceding submission
6 of the report required by subsection (a).

7 “(4) *UNITED STATES PERSON.*—The term
8 ‘United States person’ means—

9 “(A) a United States citizen or an alien
10 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the
11 United States; or

12 “(B) an entity organized under the laws of
13 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
14 the United States, including a foreign branch of
15 such an entity.”.

16 **SEC. 322. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ANNUAL COUN-**
17 **TRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-**
18 **TICES.**

19 *It is the sense of Congress that the Department of*
20 *State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-*
21 *tices should include relevant information regarding whether*
22 *a particular country has provided assistance to the PRC*
23 *or any entity under the influence of the Chinese Communist*
24 *Party in its genocide against the Uyghurs, including*
25 *through the forcible repatriation of Uyghurs to the PRC*

1 *without reasonable opportunity for them to be assessed and*
2 *protected as refugees.*

3 **SEC. 323. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PRESS FREE-**
4 **DOM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

5 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that the People's Re-*
6 *public of China maintains one of the worst media environ-*
7 *ments in the world and seeks to curtail political speech in-*
8 *side and outside the country, including by—*

9 *(1) targeting independent and foreign media in*
10 *China through systematic harassment including the*
11 *denial of visas to foreign journalists, imprisonment,*
12 *the denial of medical care to imprisoned journalists,*
13 *and curtailing access to legal representation;*

14 *(2) pervasively monitoring and censoring online*
15 *and social media content, including through the ban-*
16 *ning of virtual private networks;*

17 *(3) using the full force of the State to stifle inter-*
18 *nal dissent including dissent online, particularly dis-*
19 *sent that could lead to political change and content*
20 *that criticizes China's leaders, however trivial, report-*
21 *edly even to the point of censoring comparisons of Xi*
22 *Jingping's looks with Winnie the Pooh;*

23 *(4) spreading propaganda to foreign audiences*
24 *through the United Front Work Department and re-*
25 *lated activities;*

1 (b) *APPOINTMENT.*—*The Secretary may appoint an*
2 *individual to the position of Special Envoy from among*
3 *officers and employees of the Department of State. The Sec-*
4 *retary may allow such officer or employee to retain the posi-*
5 *tion (and the responsibilities associated with such position)*
6 *held by such officer or employee prior to the appointment*
7 *of such officer or employee to the position of Special Envoy.*

8 (c) *DUTIES.*—*The Special Envoy shall coordinate dip-*
9 *lomatic, political, public diplomacy, financial assistance,*
10 *sanctions, counterterrorism, security resources, and congres-*
11 *sional reporting requirements within the United States*
12 *Government to respond to the gross violations of universally*
13 *recognized human rights occurring in Xinjiang Province of*
14 *the People’s Republic of China, including by addressing—*

15 (1) *the mass detentions of Uyghurs and other*
16 *predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities;*

17 (2) *the deployment of technologically advanced*
18 *surveillance and police detection methods; and*

19 (3) *the counterterrorism and counter-radicalism*
20 *claims used to justify the policies of the Chinese Gov-*
21 *ernment in Xinjiang Province.*

1 **SEC. 325. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION**
2 **GROUP.**

3 (a) *REPORT ON CENSORSHIP AND INTIMIDATION OF*
4 *UNITED STATES PERSONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE*
5 *PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—*

6 (1) *REPORT.—*

7 (A) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days*
8 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, the*
9 *Secretary of State shall select and seek to enter*
10 *into an agreement with a qualified research enti-*
11 *ty that is independent of the Department of*
12 *State to write a report on censorship and in-*
13 *timidation in the United States and its posses-*
14 *sions and territories of United States persons,*
15 *including United States companies that conduct*
16 *business in the People's Republic of China, which*
17 *is directed or directly supported by the Govern-*
18 *ment of the People's Republic of China.*

19 (B) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The re-*
20 *port required under subparagraph (A) shall—*

21 (i) *assess major trends, patterns, and*
22 *methods of the Government of the People's*
23 *Republic of China's efforts to direct or di-*
24 *rectly support censorship and intimidation*
25 *of United States persons, including United*
26 *States companies that conduct business in*

1 *the People’s Republic of China, which are*
2 *exercising their right to freedom of speech;*

3 *(ii) assess, including through the use of*
4 *illustrative examples, as appropriate, the*
5 *impact on and consequences for United*
6 *States persons, including United States*
7 *companies that conduct business in the Peo-*
8 *ple’s Republic of China, that criticize—*

9 *(I) the Government of the People’s*
10 *Republic of China;*

11 *(II) the Chinese Communist*
12 *Party;*

13 *(III) the authoritarian model of*
14 *government of the People’s Republic of*
15 *China; or*

16 *(IV) a particular policy advanced*
17 *by the Chinese Communist Party or*
18 *the Government of the People’s Repub-*
19 *lic of China;*

20 *(iii) identify the implications for the*
21 *United States of the matters described in*
22 *clauses (i) and (ii);*

23 *(iv) assess the methods and evaluate*
24 *the efficacy of the efforts by the Government*
25 *of the People’s Republic of China to limit*

1 *freedom of expression in the private sector,*
2 *including with respect to media, social*
3 *media, film, education, travel, financial*
4 *services, sports and entertainment, tech-*
5 *nology, telecommunication, and internet in-*
6 *frastructure interests;*

7 *(v) include policy recommendations for*
8 *the United States Government, including*
9 *recommendations regarding collaboration*
10 *with United States allies and partners, to*
11 *address censorship and intimidation by the*
12 *Government of the People’s Republic of*
13 *China; and*

14 *(vi) include policy recommendations*
15 *for United States persons, including United*
16 *States companies that conduct business in*
17 *China, to address censorship and intima-*
18 *tion by the Government of the People’s Re-*
19 *public of China.*

20 (C) *APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES AL-*
21 *LIES AND PARTNERS.—To the extent practicable,*
22 *the report required under subparagraph (A)*
23 *should identify implications and policy rec-*
24 *ommendations that are relevant to United States*
25 *allies and partners facing censorship and intimi-*

1 *dation directed or directly supported by the Gov-*
2 *ernment of the People’s Republic of China.*

3 (2) *SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—*

4 (A) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year*
5 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, the*
6 *Secretary of State shall submit the report writ-*
7 *ten by the qualified research entity selected pur-*
8 *suant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appropriate*
9 *congressional committees.*

10 (B) *PUBLICATION.—The report referred to*
11 *in subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to*
12 *the public online through relevant United States*
13 *Government websites.*

14 (3) *FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT.—The Sec-*
15 *retary of State and other Federal agencies selected by*
16 *the President shall provide the qualified research enti-*
17 *ty selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) with timely*
18 *access to appropriate information, data, resources,*
19 *and analyses necessary for such entity to write the re-*
20 *port described in paragraph (1) in a thorough and*
21 *independent manner.*

22 (b) *CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION*
23 *GROUP.—*

24 (1) *CERTIFICATION.—Upon receipt and review of*
25 *the report described in subsection (a), the President*

1 *shall make a determination on whether the Govern-*
2 *ment of the People’s Republic of China engages in the*
3 *ensorship and intimidation of United States persons,*
4 *including United States companies that conduct busi-*
5 *ness in the People’s Republic of China, which are ex-*
6 *ercising their right to freedom of speech, taking into*
7 *account the contents of the report and other informa-*
8 *tion available to the government of the United States.*

9 (2) *IN GENERAL.—If there is a determination*
10 *under paragraph (1) that the Government of the Peo-*
11 *ple’s Republic of China engages in the censorship and*
12 *intimidation of United States persons, including*
13 *United States companies that conduct business in the*
14 *People’s Republic of China, which are exercising their*
15 *right to freedom of speech, the President shall estab-*
16 *lish an interagency task force, which shall be known*
17 *as the “China Censorship Monitor and Action*
18 *Group” (referred to in this section as the “Task*
19 *Force”).*

20 (3) *MEMBERSHIP.—If, upon receipt and review*
21 *of the report described in subsection (a), he deems it*
22 *in the national interest, the President shall—*

23 (A) *appoint the chair of the Task Force*
24 *from among the staff of the National Security*
25 *Council;*

1 (B) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force
2 from among the staff of the National Economic
3 Council; and

4 (C) direct the head of each of the following
5 executive branch agencies to appoint personnel to
6 participate in the Task Force:

7 (i) The Department of State.

8 (ii) The Department of Commerce.

9 (iii) The Department of the Treasury.

10 (iv) The Department of Justice.

11 (v) The Office of the United States
12 Trade Representative.

13 (vi) The Office of the Director of Na-
14 tional Intelligence, and other appropriate
15 elements of the intelligence community (as
16 defined in section 3 of the National Secu-
17 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).

18 (vii) The Federal Communications
19 Commission.

20 (viii) The United States Agency for
21 Global Media.

22 (ix) Other agencies designated by the
23 President.

24 (4) *RESPONSIBILITIES.*—The Task Force shall—

1 (A) oversee the development and execution of
2 an integrated Federal Government strategy to
3 monitor and address the impacts of efforts di-
4 rected, or directly supported, by the Government
5 of the People's Republic of China to censor or in-
6 timidate, in the United States or in any of its
7 possessions or territories, any United States per-
8 son, including United States companies that
9 conduct business in the People's Republic of
10 China, which are exercising their right to free-
11 dom of speech; and

12 (B) submit the strategy developed pursuant
13 to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congress-
14 sional committees not later than 120 days after
15 the date of the enactment of this Act.

16 (5) *MEETINGS.*—The Task Force shall meet not
17 less frequently than twice per year.

18 (6) *CONSULTATIONS.*—The Task Force should
19 regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appro-
20 priate, with—

21 (A) Federal agencies that are not rep-
22 resented on the Task Force;

23 (B) independent agencies of the United
24 States Government that are not represented on
25 the Task Force;

1 (C) *relevant stakeholders in the private sec-*
2 *tor and the media; and*

3 (D) *relevant stakeholders among United*
4 *States allies and partners facing similar chal-*
5 *lenges related to censorship or intimidation by*
6 *the Government of the People’s Republic of*
7 *China.*

8 (7) *REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—*

9 (A) *ANNUAL REPORT.—The Task Force*
10 *shall submit an annual report to the appropriate*
11 *congressional committees that describes, with re-*
12 *spect to the reporting period—*

13 (i) *the strategic objectives and policies*
14 *pursued by the Task Force to address the*
15 *challenges of censorship and intimidation of*
16 *United States persons while in the United*
17 *States or any of its possessions or terri-*
18 *tories, which is directed or directly sup-*
19 *ported by the Government of the People’s*
20 *Republic of China;*

21 (ii) *the activities conducted by the*
22 *Task Force in support of the strategic objec-*
23 *tives and policies referred to in clause (i);*
24 *and*

1 (iii) the results of the activities referred
2 to in clause (ii) and the impact of such ac-
3 tivities on the national interests of the
4 United States.

5 (B) *FORM OF REPORT.*—Each report sub-
6 mitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be
7 unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

8 (C) *CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.*—Not later
9 than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
10 this Act, and annually thereafter, the Task Force
11 shall provide briefings to the appropriate con-
12 gressional committees regarding the activities of
13 the Task Force to execute the strategy developed
14 pursuant to paragraph (3)(A).

15 (c) *SUNSET.*—This section shall terminate on the date
16 that is five years after the date of the enactment of this
17 Act.

18 (d) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this section:

19 (1) *QUALIFIED RESEARCH ENTITY.*—The term
20 “qualified research entity” means an entity that—

21 (A) is a nonpartisan research organization
22 or a federally funded research and development
23 center;

1 (B) has appropriate expertise and analyt-
2 ical capability to write the report required under
3 section 3; and

4 (C) is free from any financial, commercial,
5 or other entanglements, which could undermine
6 the independence of such report or create a con-
7 flict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of
8 interest, with—

9 (i) the Government of the People’s Re-
10 public of China;

11 (ii) the Chinese Communist Party;

12 (iii) any company incorporated in the
13 People’s Republic of China or a subsidiary
14 of such company; or

15 (iv) any company or entity incor-
16 porated outside of the People’s Republic of
17 China that is believed to have a substantial
18 financial or commercial interest in the Peo-
19 ple’s Republic of China.

20 (2) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United
21 States person” means—

22 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
23 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
24 United States; or

1 *directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United*
2 *States must adopt policies that—*

3 *(A) expose the full scope and scale of intel-*
4 *lectual property theft and mass subsidization of*
5 *Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the*
6 *United States, foreign markets, and the global*
7 *economy;*

8 *(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs*
9 *and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;*

10 *(C) provide options for affected United*
11 *States persons to address and respond to unrea-*
12 *sonable and discriminatory CCP-directed indus-*
13 *trial policies; and*

14 *(D) strengthen the protection of critical*
15 *technology and sensitive data, while still fos-*
16 *tering an environment that provides incentives*
17 *for secure but open investment, innovation, and*
18 *competition;*

19 *(3) the United States must work with its allies*
20 *and partners and multilateral venues and fora—*

21 *(A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac-*
22 *cepted principles of fair competition and market*
23 *behavior and address the PRC's anticompetitive*
24 *economic and industrial policies that undermine*
25 *decades of global growth and innovation;*

1 (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted
2 the same treatment as that of a free-market econ-
3 omy until it ceases the implementation of laws,
4 regulations, policies, and practices that provide
5 unfair advantage to PRC firms in furtherance of
6 national objectives and impose unreasonable, dis-
7 criminatory, and illegal burdens on market-
8 based international commerce; and

9 (C) to align policies with respect to curbing
10 state-directed subsidization of the private sector,
11 such as advocating for global rules related to
12 transparency and adherence to notification re-
13 quirements, including through the efforts cur-
14 rently being advanced by the United States,
15 Japan, and the European Union;

16 (4) the United States and its allies and partners
17 must collaborate to provide incentives to their respec-
18 tive companies to cooperate in areas such as—

19 (A) advocating for protection of intellectual
20 property rights in markets around the world;

21 (B) fostering open technical standards; and

22 (C) increasing joint investments in overseas
23 markets; and

24 (5) the United States should develop policies
25 that—

1 (A) insulate United States entities from
2 PRC pressure against complying with United
3 States laws;

4 (B) together with the work of allies and
5 partners and multilateral institutions, counter
6 the potential impact of the blocking regime of the
7 PRC established by the Ministry of Commerce of
8 the PRC on January 9, 2021, when it issued
9 Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled “Rules on Counter-
10 acting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application
11 of Foreign Legislation and other Measures”; and

12 (C) plan for future actions that the Govern-
13 ment of the PRC may take to undermine the
14 lawful application of United States legal au-
15 thorities, including with respect to the use of
16 sanctions.

17 **SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.**

18 (a) *PILOT PROGRAM.*—Not later than 180 days after
19 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
20 develop and implement a pilot program for the creation of
21 deployable economic defense response teams to help provide
22 emergency technical assistance and support to a country
23 subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic measures
24 (in this section referred to as a “partner country”) and to
25 play a liaison role between the legitimate government of

1 *that country and the United States Government. Such as-*
2 *sistance and support may include the following activities:*

3 (1) *Reducing the partner country's vulnerability*
4 *to coercive economic measures.*

5 (2) *Minimizing the damage that such measures*
6 *by an adversary could cause to the partner country.*

7 (3) *Implementing any bilateral or multilateral*
8 *contingency plans that may exist for responding to*
9 *the threat or use of such measures.*

10 (4) *In coordination with the partner country, de-*
11 *veloping or improving plans and strategies by the*
12 *country for reducing vulnerabilities and improving*
13 *responses to such measures in the future.*

14 (5) *Assisting the partner country in dealing with*
15 *foreign sovereign investment in infrastructure or re-*
16 *lated projects that may undermine the partner coun-*
17 *try's sovereignty.*

18 (6) *Assisting the partner country in responding*
19 *to specific efforts from an adversary attempting to*
20 *employ economic coercion that undermines the part-*
21 *ner country's sovereignty, including efforts in the*
22 *cyber domain, such as efforts that undermine cyberse-*
23 *curity or digital security of the partner country or*
24 *initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a*

1 *manner that undermines freedom, security, and sov-*
2 *ereignty of the partner country.*

3 *(7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant*
4 *short-to-medium term economic or other assistance*
5 *from the United States and marshalling other re-*
6 *sources in support of effective responses to such meas-*
7 *ures.*

8 *(b) REPORTS REQUIRED.—*

9 *(1) REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT.—Upon estab-*
10 *lishment of the pilot program required by subsection*
11 *(a), the Secretary of State shall provide the appro-*
12 *priate congressional committees with a detailed report*
13 *and briefing describing the pilot program, the major*
14 *elements of the program, the personnel and institu-*
15 *tions involved, and the degree to which the program*
16 *incorporates the elements described in subsection (a).*

17 *(2) FOLLOW-UP REPORT.—Not later than one*
18 *year after the date on which the report required by*
19 *paragraph (1) is submitted, the Secretary of State*
20 *shall provide the appropriate congressional commit-*
21 *tees with a detailed report and briefing describing the*
22 *operations over the previous year of the pilot program*
23 *established pursuant to subsection (a), as well as the*
24 *Secretary's assessment of its performance and suit-*
25 *ability for becoming a permanent program.*

1 (3) *FORM.*—Each report required under this sub-
2 section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
3 may include a classified annex.

4 (c) *DECLARATION OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS RE-*
5 *QUIRED.*—

6 (1) *NOTIFICATION.*—The President may activate
7 an economic defense response team for a period of 180
8 days under the authorities of this section to assist a
9 partner country in responding to an unusual and ex-
10 traordinary economic coercive threat by an adversary
11 of the United States upon the declaration of a coer-
12 cive economic emergency, together with notification to
13 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
14 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
15 Representatives.

16 (2) *EXTENSION AUTHORITY.*—The President may
17 activate the response team for an additional 180 days
18 upon the submission of a detailed analysis to the com-
19 mittees described in paragraph (1) justifying why the
20 continued deployment of the economic defense re-
21 sponse team in response to the economic emergency is
22 in the national security interest of the United States.

23 (d) *SUNSET.*—The authorities provided under this sec-
24 tion shall expire on December 31, 2026.

1 (e) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.*—Neither the authority
2 to declare an economic crisis provided for in subsection (d),
3 nor the declaration of an economic crisis pursuant to sub-
4 section (d), shall confer or be construed to confer any au-
5 thority, power, duty, or responsibility to the President other
6 than the authority to activate an economic defense response
7 team as described in this section.

8 (f) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
9 *FINED.*—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
10 sional committees” means—

11 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
12 *Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,*
13 *the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-*
14 *tion, the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-*
15 *sources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and*
16 *Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Sen-*
17 *ate; and*

18 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
19 *mittee on Financial Services, the Committee on En-*
20 *ergy and Commerce, the Committee on Agriculture,*
21 *and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House*
22 *of Representatives.*

23 **SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY.**

24 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) *Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries*
2 *abuse their power to steal assets from state institu-*
3 *tions, enrich themselves at the expense of their coun-*
4 *tries' economic development, and use corruption as a*
5 *strategic tool both to solidify their grip on power and*
6 *to undermine democratic institutions abroad.*

7 (2) *Global corruption harms the competitiveness*
8 *of United States businesses, weakens democratic gov-*
9 *ernance, feeds terrorist recruitment and transnational*
10 *organized crime, enables drug smuggling and human*
11 *trafficking, and stymies economic growth.*

12 (3) *Illicit financial flows often penetrate coun-*
13 *tries through what appear to be legitimate financial*
14 *transactions, as kleptocrats launder money, use shell*
15 *companies, amass offshore wealth, and participate in*
16 *a global shadow economy.*

17 (4) *The Government of the Russian Federation is*
18 *a leading model of this type of kleptocratic system,*
19 *using state-sanctioned corruption to both erode demo-*
20 *cratic governance from within and discredit democ-*
21 *racy abroad, thereby strengthening the authoritarian*
22 *rule of Vladimir Putin.*

23 (5) *Corrupt individuals and entities in the Rus-*
24 *sian Federation, often with the backing and encour-*
25 *agement of political leadership, use stolen money—*

1 (A) to purchase key assets in other coun-
2 tries, often with a goal of attaining monopolistic
3 control of a sector;

4 (B) to gain access to and influence the poli-
5 cies of other countries; and

6 (C) to advance Russian interests in other
7 countries, particularly those that undermine con-
8 fidence and trust in democratic systems.

9 (6) Systemic corruption in the People's Republic
10 of China (PRC), often tied to, directed by, or backed
11 by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party
12 (CCP) and the Government of the PRC is used—

13 (A) to provide unfair advantage to certain
14 PRC economic entities;

15 (B) to increase other countries' economic de-
16 pendence on the PRC to secure greater deference
17 to the PRC's diplomatic and strategic goals; and

18 (C) to exploit corruption in foreign govern-
19 ments and among other political elites to enable
20 PRC state-backed firms to pursue predatory and
21 exploitative economic practices.

22 (7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chinese,
23 and other kleptocratic actors requires the inter-
24 national community to strengthen democratic govern-
25 ance and the rule of law. International cooperation in

1 *combating corruption and illicit finance is vital to*
2 *such efforts, especially by empowering reformers in*
3 *foreign countries during historic political openings*
4 *for the establishment of the rule of law in those coun-*
5 *tries.*

6 (8) *Technical assistance programs that combat*
7 *corruption and strengthen the rule of law, including*
8 *through assistance provided by the Department of*
9 *State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law*
10 *Enforcement Affairs and the United States Agency for*
11 *International Development, and through programs*
12 *like the Department of Justice's Office of Overseas*
13 *Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training*
14 *and the International Criminal Investigative Train-*
15 *ing Assistance Program, can have lasting and signifi-*
16 *cant impacts for both foreign and United States in-*
17 *terests.*

18 (9) *There currently exist numerous international*
19 *instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and*
20 *illicit finance, including—*

21 (A) *the Inter-American Convention against*
22 *Corruption of the Organization of American*
23 *States, done at Caracas March 29, 1996;*

24 (B) *the Convention on Combating Bribery*
25 *of Foreign Public Officials in International*

1 *Business Transactions of the Organisation of*
2 *Economic Co-operation and Development, done*
3 *at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly referred*
4 *to as the “Anti-Bribery Convention”);*

5 *(C) the United Nations Convention against*
6 *Transnational Organized Crime, done at New*
7 *York November 15, 2000;*

8 *(D) the United Nations Convention against*
9 *Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003;*

10 *(E) Recommendation of the Council for*
11 *Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public*
12 *Officials in International Business Transactions,*
13 *adopted November 26, 2009; and*

14 *(F) recommendations of the Financial Ac-*
15 *tion Task Force comprising the International*
16 *Standards on Combating Money Laundering*
17 *and the Financing of Terrorism and Prolifera-*
18 *tion.*

19 *(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

20 *(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
21 *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
22 *tees” means—*

23 *(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
24 *Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-*

1 *fairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Com-*
2 *mittee on the Judiciary of the Senate;*

3 *(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the*
4 *Committee on Financial Services, the Committee*
5 *on Ways and Means, and the Committee on the*
6 *Judiciary of the House of Representatives.*

7 (2) *FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.*—*The term “foreign*
8 *assistance” means foreign assistance authorized under*
9 *the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2251*
10 *et seq.).*

11 (3) *FOREIGN STATE.*—*The term “foreign state”*
12 *has the meaning given such term in section 1603(a)*
13 *of title 28, United States Code.*

14 (4) *INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.*—*The term “in-*
15 *telligence community” has the meaning given such*
16 *term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of*
17 *1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).*

18 (5) *PUBLIC CORRUPTION.*—*The term “public cor-*
19 *ruption” includes the unlawful exercise of entrusted*
20 *public power for private gain, such as through brib-*
21 *ery, nepotism, fraud, extortion, or embezzlement.*

22 (6) *RULE OF LAW.*—*The term “rule of law”*
23 *means the principle of governance in which all per-*
24 *sons, institutions, and entities, whether public or pri-*

1 *vate, including the state, are accountable to laws that*
2 *are—*

3 *(A) publicly promulgated;*

4 *(B) equally enforced;*

5 *(C) independently adjudicated; and*

6 *(D) consistent with international human*
7 *rights norms and standards.*

8 *(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
9 *United States—*

10 *(1) to leverage United States diplomatic engage-*
11 *ment and foreign assistance to promote the rule of*
12 *law;*

13 *(2)(A) to promote international instruments to*
14 *combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance,*
15 *including instruments referred to in subsection (a)(9),*
16 *and other relevant international standards and best*
17 *practices, as such standards and practices develop;*
18 *and*

19 *(B) to promote the adoption and implementation*
20 *of such laws, standards, and practices by foreign*
21 *states;*

22 *(3) to support foreign states in promoting good*
23 *governance and combating public corruption;*

24 *(4) to encourage and assist foreign partner coun-*
25 *tries to identify and close loopholes in their legal and*

1 *financial architecture, including the misuse of anony-*
2 *mous shell companies, free trade zones, and other legal*
3 *structures, that are enabling illicit finance to pene-*
4 *trate their financial systems;*

5 *(5) to help foreign partner countries to inves-*
6 *tigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally com-*
7 *bat the use of corruption by malign actors, including*
8 *authoritarian governments, particularly the Govern-*
9 *ment of the Russian Federation and the Government*
10 *of the People’s Republic of China, as a tool of malign*
11 *influence worldwide;*

12 *(6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-related*
13 *stolen assets for victims, including through the use of*
14 *appropriate bilateral arrangements and international*
15 *agreements, such as the United Nations Convention*
16 *against Corruption, done at New York October 31,*
17 *2003, and the United Nations Convention against*
18 *Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York*
19 *November 15, 2000;*

20 *(7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the Glob-*
21 *al Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (sub-*
22 *title F of title XII of the National Defense Authoriza-*
23 *tion Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328;*
24 *22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section 7031(c) of the De-*
25 *partment of State, Foreign Operations, and Related*

1 *Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of*
2 *Public Law 116–94), to identify and take action*
3 *against corrupt foreign actors;*

4 *(8) to ensure coordination between relevant Fed-*
5 *eral departments and agencies with jurisdiction over*
6 *the advancement of good governance in foreign states;*
7 *and*

8 *(9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of*
9 *like-minded states—*

10 *(A) to coordinate efforts to counter corrup-*
11 *tion, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and*

12 *(B) to strengthen collective financial de-*
13 *fense.*

14 *(d) ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION FUND.—*

15 *(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in*
16 *the United States Treasury a fund, to be known as*
17 *the “Anti-Corruption Action Fund”, only for the pur-*
18 *poses of—*

19 *(A) strengthening the capacity of foreign*
20 *states to prevent and fight public corruption;*

21 *(B) assisting foreign states to develop rule*
22 *of law-based governance structures, including ac-*
23 *countable civilian police, prosecutorial, and judi-*
24 *cial institutions;*

1 (C) supporting foreign states to strengthen
2 domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to
3 combat public corruption, including the adoption
4 of best practices under international law; and

5 (D) supplementing existing foreign assist-
6 ance and diplomacy with respect to efforts de-
7 scribed in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).

8 (2) FUNDING.—

9 (A) TRANSFERS.—Beginning on or after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, if total crimi-
11 nal fines and penalties in excess of \$50,000,000
12 are imposed against a person under the Foreign
13 Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-
14 213) or section 13, 30A, or 32 of the Securities
15 Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78dd-1,
16 and 78ff), whether pursuant to a criminal pros-
17 ecution, enforcement proceeding, deferred pros-
18 ecution agreement, nonprosecution agreement, a
19 declination to prosecute or enforce, or any other
20 resolution, the court (in the case of a conviction)
21 or the Attorney General shall impose an addi-
22 tional prevention payment equal to \$5,000,000
23 against such person, which shall be deposited in
24 the Anti-Corruption Action Fund established
25 under paragraph (1).

1 (B) *AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.*—Amounts de-
2 posited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund
3 pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be available
4 to the Secretary of State only for the purposes
5 described in paragraph (1), without fiscal year
6 limitation or need for subsequent appropriation.

7 (C) *LIMITATION.*—None of the amounts
8 made available to the Secretary of State from the
9 Anti-Corruption Action Fund may be used in-
10 side the United States, except for administrative
11 costs related to overseas program implementation
12 pursuant to paragraph (1).

13 (3) *SUPPORT.*—The Anti-Corruption Action
14 Fund—

15 (A) may support governmental and non-
16 governmental parties in advancing the purposes
17 described in paragraph (1); and

18 (B) shall be allocated in a manner com-
19 plementary to existing United States foreign as-
20 sistance, diplomacy, and anti-corruption activi-
21 ties.

22 (4) *ALLOCATION AND PRIORITIZATION.*—In pro-
23 gramming foreign assistance made available through
24 the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, the Secretary of

1 *State, in coordination with the Attorney General,*
2 *shall prioritize projects that—*

3 *(A) assist countries that are undergoing his-*
4 *toric opportunities for democratic transition,*
5 *combating corruption, and the establishment of*
6 *the rule of law; and*

7 *(B) are important to United States na-*
8 *tional interests.*

9 (5) *TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS.—For*
10 *any technical assistance to a foreign governmental*
11 *party under this section, the Secretary of State, in co-*
12 *ordination with the Attorney General, shall prioritize*
13 *United States Government technical assistance pro-*
14 *viders as implementers, in particular the Office of*
15 *Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and*
16 *Training and the International Criminal Investiga-*
17 *tive Training Assistance Program at the Department*
18 *of Justice.*

19 (6) *PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.—The Secretary of State*
20 *shall announce that funds deposited in the Anti-Cor-*
21 *ruption Action Fund are derived from actions*
22 *brought under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to*
23 *demonstrate that the use of such funds are—*

24 *(A) contributing to international anti-cor-*
25 *ruption work; and*

1 (B) reducing the pressure that United
2 States businesses face to pay bribes overseas,
3 thereby contributing to greater competitiveness of
4 United States companies.

5 (7) *REPORTING.*—Not later than 1 year after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act and not less fre-
7 quently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of
8 State shall submit a report to the appropriate con-
9 gressional committees that contains—

10 (A) the balance of the funding remaining in
11 the Anti-Corruption Action Fund;

12 (B) the amount of funds that have been de-
13 posited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund;
14 and

15 (C) a summary of the obligation and ex-
16 penditure of such funds.

17 (8) *NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.*—None of the
18 amounts made available to the Secretary of State
19 from the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to
20 this section shall be available for obligation, or for
21 transfer to other departments, agencies, or entities,
22 unless the Secretary of State notifies the Committee
23 on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on
24 Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on For-
25 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the

1 *Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-*
2 *resentatives, not later than 15 days in advance of*
3 *such obligation or transfer.*

4 *(e) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE.—*

5 *(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in co-*
6 *operation with the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task*
7 *Force established pursuant to paragraph (2), shall*
8 *manage a whole-of-government effort to improve co-*
9 *ordination among Federal departments and agencies*
10 *and donor organizations with a role in—*

11 *(A) promoting good governance in foreign*
12 *states; and*

13 *(B) enhancing the ability of foreign states*
14 *to combat public corruption.*

15 *(2) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK*
16 *FORCE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the*
17 *enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall es-*
18 *tablish and convene the Interagency Anti-Corruption*
19 *Task Force (referred to in this section as the “Task*
20 *Force”), which shall be composed of representatives*
21 *appointed by the President from appropriate depart-*
22 *ments and agencies, including the Department of*
23 *State, the United States Agency for International De-*
24 *velopment, the Department of Justice, the Department*
25 *of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Secu-*

1 *riety, the Department of Defense, the Department of*
2 *Commerce, the Millennium Challenge Corporation,*
3 *and the intelligence community.*

4 (3) *ADDITIONAL MEETINGS.—The Task Force*
5 *shall meet not less frequently than twice per year.*

6 (4) *DUTIES.—The Task Force shall—*

7 (A) *evaluate, on a general basis, the effec-*
8 *tiveness of existing foreign assistance programs,*
9 *including programs funded by the Anti-Corrup-*
10 *tion Action Fund, that have an impact on—*

11 (i) *promoting good governance in for-*
12 *ign states; and*

13 (ii) *enhancing the ability of foreign*
14 *states to combat public corruption;*

15 (B) *assist the Secretary of State in man-*
16 *aging the whole-of-government effort described in*
17 *paragraph (1);*

18 (C) *identify general areas in which such*
19 *whole-of-government effort could be enhanced;*
20 *and*

21 (D) *recommend specific programs for for-*
22 *ign states that may be used to enhance such*
23 *whole-of-government effort.*

24 (5) *BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1*
25 *year after the date of the enactment of this Act and*

1 *not less frequently than annually thereafter through*
2 *the end of fiscal year 2026, the Secretary of State*
3 *shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congress-*
4 *sional committees regarding the ongoing work of the*
5 *Task Force. Each briefing shall include the participa-*
6 *tion of a representative of each of the departments*
7 *and agencies described in paragraph (2), to the extent*
8 *feasible.*

9 (f) *DESIGNATION OF EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION*
10 *POINTS OF CONTACT.—*

11 (1) *EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION POINT OF CON-*
12 *TACT.—The chief of mission of each United States*
13 *embassy shall designate an anti-corruption point of*
14 *contact for each such embassy.*

15 (2) *DUTIES.—The designated anti-corruption*
16 *points of contact designated pursuant to paragraph*
17 *(1) shall—*

18 (A) *coordinate, in accordance with guidance*
19 *from the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task*
20 *Force established pursuant to subsection (e)(2),*
21 *an interagency approach within United States*
22 *embassies to combat public corruption in the for-*
23 *foreign states in which such embassies are located*
24 *that is tailored to the needs of such foreign*
25 *states, including all relevant Federal depart-*

1 *ments and agencies with a presence in such for-*
2 *ign states, such as the Department of State, the*
3 *United States Agency for International Develop-*
4 *ment, the Department of Justice, the Department*
5 *of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland*
6 *Security, the Department of Defense, the Millen-*
7 *ium Challenge Corporation, and the intelligence*
8 *community;*

9 *(B) make recommendations regarding the*
10 *use of the Anti-Corruption Action Fund and*
11 *other foreign assistance funding related to anti-*
12 *corruption efforts in their respective countries of*
13 *responsibility that aligns with United States*
14 *diplomatic engagement; and*

15 *(C) ensure that anti-corruption activities*
16 *carried out within their respective countries of*
17 *responsibility are included in regular reporting*
18 *to the Secretary of State and the Interagency*
19 *Anti-Corruption Task Force, including United*
20 *States embassy strategic planning documents*
21 *and foreign assistance-related reporting, as ap-*
22 *propriate.*

23 *(3) TRAINING.—The Secretary of State shall de-*
24 *velop and implement appropriate training for the*
25 *designated anti-corruption points of contact.*

1 (g) *REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.*—

2 (1) *REPORT OR BRIEFING ON PROGRESS TOWARD*
3 *IMPLEMENTATION.*—Not later than 180 days after the
4 *date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-*
5 *after for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State,*
6 *in consultation with the Administrator of the United*
7 *States Agency for International Development, the At-*
8 *torney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury,*
9 *shall submit a report or provide a briefing to the ap-*
10 *propriate congressional committees that summarizes*
11 *progress made in combating public corruption and in*
12 *implementing this Act, including—*

13 (A) *identifying opportunities and priorities*
14 *for outreach with respect to promoting the adop-*
15 *tion and implementation of relevant inter-*
16 *national law and standards in combating public*
17 *corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance;*

18 (B) *describing—*

19 (i) *the bureaucratic structure of the of-*
20 *fices within the Department of State and*
21 *the United States Agency for International*
22 *Development that are engaged in activities*
23 *to combat public corruption, kleptocracy,*
24 *and illicit finance; and*

1 (ii) how such offices coordinate their
2 efforts with each other and with other rel-
3 evant Federal departments and agencies;

4 (C) providing a description of how the pro-
5 visions under paragraphs (4) and (5) of sub-
6 section (d) have been applied to each project
7 funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund;

8 (D) providing an explanation as to why a
9 United States Government technical assistance
10 provider was not used if technical assistance to
11 a foreign governmental entity is not imple-
12 mented by a United States Government technical
13 assistance provider;

14 (E) describing the activities of the Inter-
15 agency Anti-Corruption Task Force established
16 pursuant to subsection (e)(2);

17 (F) identifying—

18 (i) the designated anti-corruption
19 points of contact for foreign states; and

20 (ii) any training provided to such
21 points of contact; and

22 (G) recommending additional measures that
23 would enhance the ability of the United States
24 Government to combat public corruption,
25 kleptocracy, and illicit finance overseas.

1 (2) *ONLINE PLATFORM.*—*The Secretary of State,*
2 *in conjunction with the Administrator of the United*
3 *States Agency for International Development, should*
4 *consolidate existing reports with anti-corruption com-*
5 *ponents into a single online, public platform that in-*
6 *cludes—*

7 (A) *the Annual Country Reports on Human*
8 *Rights Practices required under section 116 of*
9 *the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.*
10 *2151n);*

11 (B) *the Fiscal Transparency Report re-*
12 *quired under section 7031(b) of the Department*
13 *of State, Foreign Operations and Related Pro-*
14 *grams Appropriations Act, 2019 (division F of*
15 *Public Law 116–6);*

16 (C) *the Investment Climate Statement re-*
17 *ports;*

18 (D) *the International Narcotics Control*
19 *Strategy Report;*

20 (E) *any other relevant public reports; and*

21 (F) *links to third-party indicators and com-*
22 *pliance mechanisms used by the United States*
23 *Government to inform policy and programming,*
24 *as appropriate, such as—*

1 (i) *the International Finance Corpora-*
2 *tion's Doing Business surveys;*

3 (ii) *the International Budget Partner-*
4 *ship's Open Budget Index; and*

5 (iii) *multilateral peer review anti-cor-*
6 *ruption compliance mechanisms, such as—*

7 (I) *the Organisation for Economic*
8 *Co-operation and Development's Work-*
9 *ing Group on Bribery in International*
10 *Business Transactions;*

11 (II) *the Follow-Up Mechanism for*
12 *the Inter-American Convention*
13 *Against Corruption; and*

14 (III) *the United Nations Conven-*
15 *tion Against Corruption, done at New*
16 *York October 31, 2003.*

17 **SEC. 404. ANNUAL REPORT ON CHINESE SURVEILLANCE**
18 **COMPANIES.**

19 (a) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
20 *date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter*
21 *until 2040, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the*
22 *Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Com-*
23 *mittee on Foreign Affairs and Permanent Select Committee*
24 *on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the*
25 *Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee*

1 *on Intelligence of the Senate, a report with respect to per-*
2 *sons in China that the Secretary determines—*

3 *(1) have operated, sold, leased, or otherwise pro-*
4 *vided, directly or indirectly, items or services related*
5 *to targeted digital surveillance to—*

6 *(A) a foreign government or entity located*
7 *primarily inside a foreign country where a rea-*
8 *sonable person would assess that such transfer*
9 *could result in a use of the items or services in*
10 *a manner contrary to human rights; or*

11 *(B) a country or any governmental unit*
12 *thereof, entity, or other person determined by the*
13 *Secretary of State, in a notice published in the*
14 *Federal Register, to have used items or services*
15 *for targeted digital surveillance in a manner*
16 *contrary to human rights; or*

17 *(2) have materially assisted, sponsored, or pro-*
18 *vided financial, material, or technological support*
19 *for, or items or services to or in support of, the activi-*
20 *ties described in paragraph (1).*

21 *(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required*
22 *by subsection (a) shall include the following:*

23 *(1) The name of each foreign person that the Sec-*
24 *retary determines—*

1 (A) meets the requirements of subsection
2 (a)(1); and

3 (B) meets the requirements of subsection
4 (a)(2).

5 (2) The name of each intended and actual recipi-
6 ent of items or services described in subsection (a).

7 (3) A detailed description of such items or serv-
8 ices.

9 (4) An analysis of the appropriateness of includ-
10 ing the persons listed in (b)(1) on the entity list
11 maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security.

12 (c) CONSULTATION.—In compiling data and making
13 assessments for the purposes of preparing the report re-
14 quired by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult
15 with a wide range of organizations, including with respect
16 to—

17 (1) classified and unclassified information pro-
18 vided by the Director of National Intelligence;

19 (2) information provided by the Bureau of De-
20 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Free-
21 dom, Business and Human Rights section;

22 (3) information provided by the Department of
23 Commerce, including the Bureau of Industry and Se-
24 curity;

1 (4) *information provided by the advisory com-*
2 *mittees established by the Secretary to advise the*
3 *Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Secu-*
4 *rity on controls under the Export Administration*
5 *Regulations, including the Emerging Technology and*
6 *Research Advisory Committee;*

7 (5) *information on human rights and technology*
8 *matters, as solicited from civil society and human*
9 *rights organizations through regular consultative*
10 *processes; and*

11 (6) *information contained in the Country Re-*
12 *ports on Human Rights Practices published annually*
13 *by the Department of State.*

14 (d) *FORM AND PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF REPORT.—*
15 *The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in*
16 *unclassified form. The report shall be posted by the Presi-*
17 *dent not later than 14 days after being submitted to Con-*
18 *gress on a text-based, searchable, and publicly available*
19 *internet website.*

20 (e) *DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

21 (1) *TARGETED DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE.—The*
22 *term “targeted digital surveillance” means the use of*
23 *items or services that enable an individual or entity*
24 *to detect, monitor, intercept, collect, exploit, preserve,*
25 *protect, transmit, retain, or otherwise gain access to*

1 *the communications, protected information, work*
2 *product, browsing data, research, identifying infor-*
3 *mation, location history, or online and offline activi-*
4 *ties of other individuals, organizations, or entities,*
5 *with or without the explicit authorization of such in-*
6 *dividuals, organizations, or entities.*

7 (2) *FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-*
8 *son” means an individual or entity that is not a*
9 *United States person.*

10 (3) *IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO HUMAN*
11 *RIGHTS.—The term “in a manner contrary to human*
12 *rights”, with respect to targeted digital surveillance,*
13 *means engaging in targeted digital surveillance—*

14 (A) *in violation of basic human rights, in-*
15 *cluding to silence dissent, sanction criticism,*
16 *punish independent reporting (and sources for*
17 *that reporting), manipulate or interfere with*
18 *democratic or electoral processes, persecute mi-*
19 *norities or vulnerable groups, or target advocates*
20 *or practitioners of human rights and democratic*
21 *rights (including activists, journalists, artists,*
22 *minority communities, or opposition politi-*
23 *cians); or*

1 *(B) in a country in which there is lacking*
2 *a minimum legal framework governing its use,*
3 *including established—*

4 *(i) authorization under laws that are*
5 *accessible, precise, and available to the pub-*
6 *lic;*

7 *(ii) constraints limiting its use under*
8 *principles of necessity, proportionality, and*
9 *legitimacy;*

10 *(iii) oversight by bodies independent of*
11 *the government's executive agencies;*

12 *(iv) involvement of an independent*
13 *and impartial judiciary branch in author-*
14 *izing its use; or*

15 *(v) legal remedies in case of abuse.*

16 ***TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC***
17 ***SECURITY***

18 ***SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA-***
19 ***LOGUE.***

20 *(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
21 *United States—*

22 *(1) to pursue, in coordination with United*
23 *States allies and partners, arms control negotiations*
24 *and sustained and regular engagement with the Peo-*
25 *ple's Republic of China (PRC)—*

1 (A) to enhance understanding of each oth-
2 er's respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca-
3 pabilities;

4 (B) to improve transparency; and

5 (C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula-
6 tion and misperception;

7 (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Govern-
8 ment of the PRC on relevant issues that lays the
9 groundwork for a constructive arms control frame-
10 work, including—

11 (A) fostering dialogue on arms control lead-
12 ing to the convening of strategic security talks;

13 (B) negotiating norms for outer space;

14 (C) developing pre-launch notification re-
15 gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation;

16 and

17 (D) expanding lines of communication be-
18 tween both governments for the purposes of re-
19 ducing the risks of conventional war and in-
20 creasing transparency;

21 (3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordina-
22 tion with United States allies and partners to ensure
23 the security of United States and allied interests to
24 slow the PRC's military modernization and expan-
25 sion, including on—

1 (A) *ground-launched cruise and ballistic*
2 *missiles;*

3 (B) *integrated air and missile defense;*

4 (C) *hypersonic missiles;*

5 (D) *intelligence, surveillance, and recon-*
6 *naissance;*

7 (E) *space-based capabilities;*

8 (F) *cyber capabilities; and*

9 (G) *command, control, and communica-*
10 *tions; and*

11 (4) *to ensure that the United States policy con-*
12 *tinues to reassure United States allies and partners.*

13 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
14 *that—*

15 (1) *it is in the interest of the United States and*
16 *China to cooperate in reducing risks of conventional*
17 *and nuclear escalation;*

18 (2) *a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other*
19 *People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attack on United*
20 *States early warning satellites, other portions of the*
21 *nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical*
22 *infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but*
23 *rapid escalation;*

24 (3) *the United States and its allies and partners*
25 *should promote international norms on military oper-*

1 *ations in space, the employment of cyber capabilities,*
2 *and the military use of artificial intelligence, as an*
3 *element of risk reduction regarding nuclear command*
4 *and control; and*

5 *(4) United States allies and partners should*
6 *share the burden of promoting and protecting norms*
7 *regarding the weaponization of space, highlighting*
8 *unsafe behavior that violates international norms,*
9 *such as in rendezvous and proximity operations, and*
10 *promoting responsible behavior in space and all other*
11 *domains.*

12 **SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE**
13 **THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NU-**
14 **CLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE**
15 **ISSUES.**

16 *(a) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-*
17 *PRC ARMS CONTROL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
18 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,*
19 *in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-*
20 *retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres-*
21 *sional committees a report, and if necessary a separate clas-*
22 *sified annex, that outlines the approaches and strategies*
23 *such Secretaries will pursue to engage the Government of*
24 *the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on arms control and*
25 *risk reduction, including—*

1 (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Gov-
2 ernments of the United States and the PRC, includ-
3 ing on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles,
4 conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace
5 issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which
6 could reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if
7 a conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing
8 arms race in the Indo-Pacific region;

9 (2) how the United States Government can en-
10 gage the Government of the PRC in a constructive
11 arms control dialogue;

12 (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of
13 the PRC that the United States Government is most
14 concerned about and how limiting these capabilities
15 may benefit United States and allied security inter-
16 ests;

17 (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nu-
18 clear, conventional, and unconventional military es-
19 calation between the United States and the PRC;

20 (5) the personnel and expertise required to effec-
21 tively engage the PRC in strategic stability and arms
22 control dialogues; and

23 (6) opportunities and methods to encourage
24 transparency from the PRC.

1 **(b) REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH PRC.**—

2 *Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of*
3 *this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the*
4 *Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall sub-*
5 *mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report*
6 *that describes—*

7 (1) *a concrete plan for arms control talks with*
8 *the PRC;*

9 (2) *if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not*
10 *arise, what alternative plans the Department of State*
11 *envisages for ensuring the security of the United*
12 *States and its allies through international arms con-*
13 *trol negotiations;*

14 (3) *effects on the credibility of United States ex-*
15 *tended deterrence assurances to allies and partners if*
16 *arms control negotiations do not materialize and the*
17 *implications for regional security architectures;*

18 (4) *efforts at engaging the PRC to join arms con-*
19 *trol talks, whether on a bilateral or international*
20 *basis; and*

21 (5) *the interest level of the Government of PRC*
22 *in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral*
23 *or international basis, including through—*

24 (A) *a formal invitation to appropriate offi-*
25 *cial from the PRC, and to each of the perma-*

1 *ment members of the United Nations Security*
2 *Council, to observe a United States-Russian Fed-*
3 *eration New START Treaty on-site inspection to*
4 *demonstrate the security benefits of transparency*
5 *into strategic nuclear forces;*

6 *(B) discussions on how to advance inter-*
7 *national negotiations on the fissile material cut-*
8 *off;*

9 *(C) an agreement with the PRC that allows*
10 *for advance notifications of ballistic missile*
11 *launches, through the Hague Code of Conduct or*
12 *other data exchanges or doctrine discussions re-*
13 *lated to strategic nuclear forces;*

14 *(D) an agreement not to target or interfere*
15 *in nuclear command, control, and communica-*
16 *tions (commonly referred to as “NC3”) infra-*
17 *structure; or*

18 *(E) any other cooperative measure that ben-*
19 *efits United States-PRC strategic stability.*

20 *(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-*
21 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-*
22 *sional committees” means—*

23 *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
24 *Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on*
25 *Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and*

1 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
2 *mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on En-*
3 *ergy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.*

4 **SEC. 503. COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHI-**
5 **NA'S PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MIS-**
6 **SILES AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE**
7 **MIDDLE EAST.**

8 (a) *MTCR TRANSFERS.*—*Not later than 30 days after*
9 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall*
10 *submit to the appropriate congressional committees a writ-*
11 *ten determination, and any documentation to support that*
12 *determination detailing—*

13 (1) *whether any foreign person in the People's*
14 *Republic of China (PRC) knowingly exported, trans-*
15 *ferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated*
16 *under Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign*
17 *person in the previous three fiscal years; and*

18 (2) *the sanctions the President has imposed or*
19 *intends to impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the*
20 *Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.*
21 *4612(b)) against any foreign person who knowingly*
22 *engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item*
23 *or items.*

24 (b) *PRC'S NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COOPERATION.*—
25 *Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of*

1 *this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate com-*
2 *mittees of Congress a report detailing—*

3 (1) *whether any foreign person in the PRC en-*
4 *gaged in cooperation with any other foreign person in*
5 *the previous three fiscal years in the construction of*
6 *any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity that*
7 *has not been notified to the International Atomic En-*
8 *ergy Agency and would be subject to complementary*
9 *access if an Additional Protocol was in force; and*

10 (2) *the policy options required to prevent and re-*
11 *spond to any future effort by the PRC to export to*
12 *any foreign person an item classified as “plants for*
13 *the separation of isotopes of uranium” or “plants for*
14 *the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel ele-*
15 *ments” under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory*
16 *Commission export licensing authority.*

17 (c) *FORM OF REPORT.—The determination required*
18 *under subsection (b) and the report required under sub-*
19 *section (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.*

20 (d) *DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

21 (1) *The term “appropriate congressional com-*
22 *mittees” means—*

23 (A) *the Select Committee on Intelligence*
24 *and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
25 *Senate; and*

1 (B) the Permanent Select Committee on In-
2 telligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
3 of the House of Representatives.

4 (2) *FOREIGN PERSON; PERSON.*—The terms “for-
5 eign person” and “person” mean—

6 (A) a natural person that is an alien;

7 (B) a corporation, business association,
8 partnership, society, trust, or any other non-
9 governmental entity, organization, or group, that
10 is organized under the laws of a foreign country
11 or has its principal place of business in a foreign
12 country;

13 (C) any foreign governmental entity oper-
14 ating as a business enterprise; and

15 (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of
16 any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).

17 **TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A**
18 **SUSTAINABLE FUTURE**

19 **SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC**
20 **PRIORITIES WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC**
21 **OF CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ACCOUNT**
22 **FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND CLIMATE**
23 **CHANGE.**

24 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) *The Special Report: Global Warming of*
2 *1.5°C, published by the Intergovernmental Panel on*
3 *Climate Change on October 8, 2018, and the Fourth*
4 *National Climate Assessment, first published by the*
5 *United States Global Change Research Program in*
6 *2018, concluded that—*

7 (A) *the release of greenhouse gas emissions,*
8 *most notably the combustion of fossil fuels and*
9 *the degradation of natural resources that absorb*
10 *atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the*
11 *dominant causes of climate change during the*
12 *past century;*

13 (B) *changes in the Earth’s climate are—*

14 (i) *causing sea levels to rise;*

15 (ii) *increasing the global average tem-*
16 *perature of the Earth;*

17 (iii) *increasing the incidence and se-*
18 *verity of wildfires; and*

19 (iv) *intensifying the severity of extreme*
20 *weather, including hurricanes, cyclones, ty-*
21 *phoons, flooding, droughts, and other disas-*
22 *ters that threaten human life, healthy com-*
23 *munities, and critical infrastructure.*

1 (2) *An increase in the global average tempera-*
2 *ture of 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industri-*
3 *alized levels would cause—*

4 (A) *the displacement, and the forced inter-*
5 *nal migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 peo-*
6 *ple in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Sa-*
7 *haran Africa by 2050 if insufficient action is*
8 *taken (according to the World Bank);*

9 (B) *the displacement of an average of*
10 *17,800,000 people worldwide by floods every year*
11 *(according to the Internal Displacement Moni-*
12 *toring Centre) because of the exacerbating effects*
13 *of climate change;*

14 (C) *more than \$500,000,000,000 in lost an-*
15 *nuual economic output in the United States (a 10*
16 *percent contraction from 2018 levels) by 2100*
17 *(according to the Fourth National Climate As-*
18 *essment);*

19 (D) *an additional 100,000,000 people*
20 *worldwide to be driven into poverty by 2030 (ac-*
21 *ording to the World Bank);*

22 (E) *greater food insecurity and decreased*
23 *agricultural production due to climate change's*
24 *effects on the increased frequency and intensity*
25 *of extreme weather events;*

1 (F) the proliferation of agricultural pests
2 and crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading
3 ecosystems, and water scarcity; and

4 (G) more than 350,000,000 additional peo-
5 ple worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress
6 by 2050.

7 (3) According to the International Energy Agen-
8 cy, the United States, China, India, and the Euro-
9 pean Union (including the United Kingdom) account
10 for more than 58 percent of global greenhouse gas
11 emissions. China, which is the world's top greenhouse
12 gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the
13 United States' core interest in climate stability—

14 (A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions
15 mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, con-
16 tained in its 2015 nationally determined con-
17 tribution, to “peak” emissions around 2030
18 ahead of schedule;

19 (B) announced, on September 22, 2020, and
20 repeated on April 22, 2021, a pledge to achieve
21 carbon neutrality by 2060;

22 (C) announced on April 22, 2021, its intent
23 to strictly control coal fired power generation
24 projects, as well as strictly limit the increase in
25 coal consumption over the 14th five year plan

1 *period and phase it down in the 15th five year*
2 *plan period; and*

3 *(D) however, remains uncommitted to inter-*
4 *nationally recognized metrics for achieving these*
5 *goals.*

6 **(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—*It is the sense of Congress*
7 *that—*

8 *(1) to address the climate crisis, the United*
9 *States must leverage the full weight of its diplomatic*
10 *engagement and foreign assistance to promote our na-*
11 *tional security and economic interests related to cli-*
12 *mate change;*

13 *(2) in the absence of United States leadership on*
14 *global issues driving international climate-related*
15 *policymaking, it would lead to a substantial and*
16 *harmful decline in the Nation’s global competitive-*
17 *ness;*

18 *(3) promoting international instruments on cli-*
19 *mate action and other relevant international stand-*
20 *ards and best practices, as such standards and prac-*
21 *tices develop, serve the interests of the American peo-*
22 *ple and protect United States environmental resources*
23 *and the planet;*

24 *(4) promoting the adoption and implementation*
25 *of international climate-related agreements, stand-*

1 *ards, and practices by foreign states ensures a level*
2 *playing field for United States businesses and other*
3 *stakeholders;*

4 *(5) working with international allies and part-*
5 *ners to promote environmental justice and climate*
6 *justice serves the American people's interests;*

7 *(6) finding common ground with the People's*
8 *Republic of China (PRC) on climate action where*
9 *possible is important, but the United States must also*
10 *continue to hold the PRC accountable where its ac-*
11 *tions undermine the interests of the United States*
12 *and its allies and partners;*

13 *(7) and in furtherance of the previous clauses,*
14 *the United States should—*

15 *(A) explore opportunities for constructive*
16 *cooperation on climate action initiatives with*
17 *the PRC and other countries while ensuring the*
18 *United States maintains its competitive advan-*
19 *tage in climate-related fields of expertise and in-*
20 *dustry, including—*

21 *(i) support for international coopera-*
22 *tive policies, measures, and technologies to*
23 *decarbonize industry and power, including*
24 *through circular economy, energy storage*

1 *and grid reliability, carbon capture, and*
2 *green hydrogen; and*

3 (ii) *increased deployment of clean en-*
4 *ergy, including renewable and advanced nu-*
5 *clear power; green and climate resilient ag-*
6 *riculture; energy efficient buildings; green,*
7 *and low-carbon transportation;*

8 (B) *cooperate on addressing emissions of*
9 *methane and other non-CO₂ greenhouse gases;*

10 (C) *cooperate on addressing emissions from*
11 *international civil aviation and maritime activi-*
12 *ties;*

13 (D) *reduce emissions from coal, oil, and*
14 *gas;*

15 (E) *implement the Paris Agreement that*
16 *significantly advances global climate ambition*
17 *on mitigation, adaptation, and support;*

18 (F) *coordinate among relevant federal, state,*
19 *and local departments and agencies on climate*
20 *action related initiatives;*

21 (G) *provide resources, authorities and sup-*
22 *port for enhancing United States ambition and*
23 *commitment to solving the climate crisis includ-*
24 *ing climate action specific assistance and multi-*
25 *lateral fund contributions; and*

1 (H) *integrate considerations for climate*
2 *change into broader United States foreign policy*
3 *decision-making and the United States national*
4 *security apparatus.*

5 (c) *PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to pro-*
6 *vide authorities, resources, policies, and recommended ad-*
7 *ministrative actions—*

8 (1) *to restore United States global leadership on*
9 *addressing the climate crisis and make United States*
10 *climate action and climate diplomacy a more central*
11 *tenet of United States foreign policy;*

12 (2) *to improve the United States commitment to*
13 *taking more ambitious action to help mitigate global*
14 *greenhouse gas emission and improve developing*
15 *countries' resilience and adaptation capacities to the*
16 *effects of climate change;*

17 (3) *to ensure the United States maintains com-*
18 *petitive advantage over global strategic competitors in*
19 *diplomacy and new technological development;*

20 (4) *to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral co-*
21 *operation agreements with other world powers on ini-*
22 *tiatives to advance global clean energy innovation*
23 *and other measures to mitigate global greenhouse gas*
24 *emissions and improve climate change adaptation ca-*
25 *pacities;*

1 (5) to ensure that the United States national se-
2 curity apparatus integrates critically important data
3 on the compounding effects that climate change is
4 having on global security risks by enhancing our un-
5 derstanding of how, where, and when such effects are
6 destabilizing countries and regions in ways that may
7 motivate conflict, displacement, and other drivers of
8 insecurity; and

9 (6) to authorize funding and programs to sup-
10 port a reaffirmation of the United States' commit-
11 ments to international cooperation and support for
12 developing and vulnerable countries to take climate
13 action.

14 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this title:

15 (1) CLEAN ENERGY.—The term “clean energy”
16 means—

17 (A) renewable energy and related systems;

18 (B) energy production processes that emit
19 zero greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear
20 power;

21 (C) systems and processes that capture and
22 permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from
23 fossil fuel production and electricity generation
24 units; and

1 (D) products, processes, facilities, or systems
2 designed to retrofit and improve the energy effi-
3 ciency and electricity generated from electrical
4 generation units, while using less fuel, less or
5 fewer power production resources, or less feed-
6 stocks.

7 (2) *CLIMATE ACTION*.—The term “climate ac-
8 tion” means enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
9 emissions and strengthen resilience and adaptive ca-
10 pacity to climate-induced impacts, including—

11 (A) climate-related hazards in all countries;

12 (B) integrating climate change measures
13 into national policies, strategies and planning;
14 and

15 (C) improving education, awareness-rais-
16 ing, and human and institutional capacity with
17 respect to climate change mitigation, adaptation,
18 impact reduction, and early warning.

19 (3) *CLIMATE CRISIS*.—The term “climate crisis”
20 means the social, economic, health, safety, and secu-
21 rity impacts on people, and the threats to biodiversity
22 and natural ecosystem health, which are attributable
23 to the wide-variety of effects on global environmental
24 and atmospheric conditions as a result of disruptions
25 to the Earth’s climate from anthropogenic activities

1 *that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce nat-*
2 *ural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmos-*
3 *pheric carbon.*

4 (4) *CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.—The term “climate*
5 *diplomacy” means methods of influencing the deci-*
6 *sions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples*
7 *through dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and other*
8 *peaceful measures on or about issues related to ad-*
9 *dressing global climate change, including—*

10 (A) *the mitigation of global greenhouse gas*
11 *emissions;*

12 (B) *discussion, analysis, and sharing of sci-*
13 *entific data and information on the cause and*
14 *effects of climate change;*

15 (C) *the security, social, economic, and polit-*
16 *ical instability risks associated with the effects of*
17 *climate change;*

18 (D) *economic cooperation efforts and trade*
19 *matters that are related to or associated with cli-*
20 *mate change and greenhouse gas mitigation from*
21 *the global economy;*

22 (E) *building resilience capacities and*
23 *adapting to the effects of change;*

24 (F) *sustainable land use and natural re-*
25 *source conservation;*

1 (G) accounting for loss and damage attrib-
2 uted to the effects of climate change;

3 (H) just transition of carbon intense econo-
4 mies to low or zero carbon economies and ac-
5 counting for laborers within affected economies;

6 (I) technological innovations that reduce or
7 eliminate carbon emissions; and

8 (J) clean energy and energy systems.

9 (5) *CLIMATE FINANCING*.—The term “climate fi-
10 nancing” means the transfer of new and additional
11 public funds from developed countries to developing
12 countries for projects and programs that—

13 (A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas
14 emissions;

15 (B) enhance and restore natural carbon se-
16 questration; and

17 (C) promote adaptation to climate change.

18 (6) *CLIMATE SECURITY*.—The term “climate se-
19 curity” means the effects of climate change on—

20 (A) United States national security con-
21 cerns and subnational, national, and regional
22 political stability; and

23 (B) overseas security and conflict situations
24 that are potentially exacerbated by dynamic en-
25 vironmental factors and events, including—

1 (i) the intensification and frequency of
2 droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms,
3 and other extreme weather events;

4 (ii) changes in historical severe weath-
5 er, drought, and wildfire patterns;

6 (iii) the expansion of geographical
7 ranges of droughts, floods, and wildfires
8 into regions that had not regularly experi-
9 enced such phenomena;

10 (iv) global sea level rise patterns and
11 the expansion of geographical ranges af-
12 fected by drought; and

13 (v) changes in marine environments
14 that effect critical geostrategic waterways,
15 such as the Arctic Ocean, the South China
16 Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents
17 Sea, and the Beaufort Sea.

18 (7) *GREEN CLIMATE FUND*.—The term “Green
19 Climate Fund” means the independent, multilateral
20 fund—

21 (A) established by parties to the United Na-
22 tions Framework Convention on Climate Change;
23 and

1 (B) adopted by decision as part of the fi-
2 nancial mechanism of the United Nations
3 Framework Convention on Climate Change.

4 (8) *PARIS AGREEMENT.*—The term “Paris Agree-
5 ment” means the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 adopted
6 by the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Na-
7 tions Framework Convention on Climate Change in
8 Paris, France, on December 12, 2015.

9 (9) *RESILIENCE.*—The term “resilience” means
10 the ability of human made and natural systems (in-
11 cluding their component parts) to anticipate, absorb,
12 cope, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a
13 hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, in-
14 cluding through ensuring the preservation, restora-
15 tion, or improvement of its essential basic structures
16 and functions. It is not preparedness or response.

17 **SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR**
18 **GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS.**

19 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—The Secretary of State, in consulta-
20 tion with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall
21 conduct biennial comprehensive evaluations of present and
22 ongoing disruptions to the global climate system, includ-
23 ing—

24 (1) the intensity, frequency, and range of nat-
25 ural disasters;

1 (2) *the scarcity of global natural resources, in-*
2 *cluding fresh water;*

3 (3) *global food, health, and energy insecurities;*

4 (4) *conditions that contribute to—*

5 (A) *intrastate and interstate conflicts;*

6 (B) *foreign political and economic insta-*
7 *bility;*

8 (C) *international migration of vulnerable*
9 *and underserved populations;*

10 (D) *the failure of national governments;*

11 *and*

12 (E) *gender-based violence; and*

13 (5) *United States and allied military readiness,*
14 *operations, and strategy.*

15 (b) *PURPOSES.—The purposes of the evaluations con-*
16 *ducted under subsection (a) are—*

17 (1) *to support the practical application of sci-*
18 *entific data and research on climate change’s dy-*
19 *namic effects around the world to improve resilience,*
20 *adaptability, security, and stability despite growing*
21 *global environmental risks and changes;*

22 (2) *to ensure that the strategic planning and*
23 *mission execution of United States international de-*
24 *velopment and diplomatic missions adequately ac-*

1 *count for heightened and dynamic risks and chal-*
2 *lenges associated with the effects of climate change;*

3 *(3) to improve coordination between United*
4 *States science agencies conducting research and fore-*
5 *casts on the causes and effects of climate change and*
6 *United States national security agencies;*

7 *(4) to better understand the disproportionate ef-*
8 *fects of global climate disruptions on women, girls,*
9 *indigenous communities, and other historically*
10 *marginalized populations; and*

11 *(5) to inform the development of the climate se-*
12 *curity strategy described in subsection (d).*

13 *(c) SCOPE.—The evaluations conducted under sub-*
14 *section (a) shall—*

15 *(1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities*
16 *and risks associated with global, regional, and local-*
17 *ized effects of climate change; and*

18 *(2) assess and make recommendations on nec-*
19 *essary measures to mitigate risks and reduce*
20 *vulnerabilities associated with effects, including—*

21 *(A) sea level rise;*

22 *(B) freshwater resource scarcity;*

23 *(C) wildfires; and*

24 *(D) increased intensity and frequency of ex-*
25 *treme weather conditions and events, such as*

1 *flooding, drought, and extreme storm events, in-*
2 *cluding tropical cyclones.*

3 (d) *CLIMATE SECURITY STRATEGY.*—*The Secretary*
4 *shall use the evaluations required under subsection (a)—*
5 (1) *to inform the development and implementa-*
6 *tion of a climate security strategy for the Bureau of*
7 *Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of*
8 *Political-Military Affairs, embassies, consulates, re-*
9 *gional bureaus, and other offices and programs oper-*
10 *ating chief of mission authority, including those with*
11 *roles in conflict avoidance, prevention and security*
12 *assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, preven-*
13 *tion, and assistance; and*

14 (2) *in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, de-*
15 *velop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement*
16 *plans, policies, and actions—*

17 (A) *to account for the impacts of climate*
18 *change to global human health, safety, govern-*
19 *ance, oceans, food production, fresh water and*
20 *other critical natural resources, settlements, in-*
21 *frastructure, marginalized groups, and economic*
22 *activity;*

23 (B) *to evaluate the climate change vulner-*
24 *ability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of*

1 *United States interests and non-defense assets*
2 *abroad;*

3 *(C) to coordinate the integration of climate*
4 *change risk and vulnerability assessments into*
5 *all foreign policy and security decision-making*
6 *processes, including awarding foreign assistance;*

7 *(D) to evaluate specific risks to certain re-*
8 *gions and countries that are—*

9 *(i) vulnerable to the effects of climate*
10 *change; and*

11 *(ii) strategically significant to the*
12 *United States;*

13 *(E) to enhance the resilience capacities of*
14 *foreign countries to the effects of climate change*
15 *as a means of reducing the risks of conflict and*
16 *instability;*

17 *(F) to advance principles of good govern-*
18 *ance by encouraging foreign governments, par-*
19 *ticularly nations that are least capable of coping*
20 *with the effects of climate change—*

21 *(i) to conduct climate security evalua-*
22 *tions; and*

23 *(ii) to facilitate the development of cli-*
24 *mate security action plans to ensure sta-*

1 *bility and public safety in disaster situa-*
2 *tions in a humane and responsible fashion;*

3 *(G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security,*
4 *susceptibility, and resiliency of United States in-*
5 *terests and nondefense assets abroad;*

6 *(H) to build international institutional ca-*
7 *capacity to address climate security implications*
8 *and to advance United States interests, regional*
9 *stability, and global security; and*

10 *(I) other activities that advance—*

11 *(i) the utilization and integration of*
12 *climate science in national security plan-*
13 *ning; and*

14 *(ii) the clear understanding of how the*
15 *effects of climate change can exacerbate se-*
16 *curity risks and threats.*

17 *(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date*
18 *of the enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter*
19 *for the following 20 years, the Secretary of State, in con-*
20 *sultation with the heads of other relevant Federal depart-*
21 *ments and agencies shall submit to the Committee on For-*
22 *ign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the*
23 *Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Com-*
24 *mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives*

1 *an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary,*
2 *that includes—*

3 *(1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and pro-*
4 *grams in support of the strategy in subsection (c), as*
5 *well as—*

6 *(A) an assessment of the funding expended*
7 *by relevant Federal departments and agencies on*
8 *emerging events exacerbated by climate change*
9 *and the legal, procedural, and resource con-*
10 *straints faced by the Department of State and*
11 *the United States Agency for International De-*
12 *velopment throughout respective budgeting, stra-*
13 *tegic planning, and management cycles to sup-*
14 *port the prevention of and response to emerging*
15 *events exacerbated by climate change;*

16 *(B) current annual global assessments of*
17 *emerging events exacerbated by climate change;*

18 *(C) recommendations to further strengthen*
19 *United States capabilities described in this sec-*
20 *tion; and*

21 *(D) consideration of analysis, reporting,*
22 *and policy recommendations by civil society,*
23 *academic, and nongovernmental organizations*
24 *and institutions, and partner countries to pre-*

1 *vent and respond to emerging events exacerbated*
2 *by climate change;*

3 (2) *recommendations to ensure shared responsi-*
4 *bility by—*

5 (A) *enhancing multilateral mechanisms for*
6 *preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerg-*
7 *ing events exacerbated by climate change; and*

8 (B) *strengthening regional organizations;*
9 *and*

10 (3) *the implementation status of the rec-*
11 *ommendations included in the review under para-*
12 *graph (1).*

13 (f) *REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL-*
14 *LIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is encour-*
15 *aged to include, in the Director’s annual (or more often as*
16 *appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a*
17 *classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to*
18 *United States national security—*

19 (1) *a review of countries and regions at risk of*
20 *emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and*

21 (2) *whenever possible, specific identification of*
22 *countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging*
23 *events exacerbated by climate change.*

1 **SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION**
2 **WITH CHINA.**

3 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

4 *(1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas*
5 *emissions and changes to the environment require*
6 *global cooperation and coordination of efforts, as well*
7 *as holding other countries such as the People’s Repub-*
8 *lic of China (PRC) accountable for their actions and*
9 *commitments to ensure a level playing field with the*
10 *United States and its allies and partners;*

11 *(2) other countries look toward the United States*
12 *and the PRC, as the world’s largest emitters and larg-*
13 *est economies, for leadership by example to effectively*
14 *mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, develop and deploy*
15 *energy generation technologies, and integrate sustain-*
16 *able adaptation solutions to the inevitable effects of*
17 *climate change;*

18 *(3) given the volume of the PRC’s greenhouse gas*
19 *emissions and the scientific imperative to swiftly re-*
20 *duce global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emis-*
21 *sions around 2050, China should—*

22 *(A) revise its long-term pledge;*

23 *(B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;*

24 *(C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emis-*
25 *sions significantly to meet a more ambitious*
26 *long-term 2050 reductions target; and*

1 (D) update its nationally determined con-
2 tribution along a trajectory that aligns with
3 achieving a more ambitious net-zero by 2050
4 emissions target;

5 (4) it is in the United States national interest
6 to emphasize the environment and climate change in
7 its bilateral engagement with the PRC, as global cli-
8 mate risks cannot be mitigated without a significant
9 reduction in PRC domestic and overseas emissions;

10 (5) the United States and the PRC, to the extent
11 practicable, should coordinate on making and deliv-
12 ering ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas
13 emissions, with aspirations towards achieving net
14 zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;

15 (6) the United States and its allies and partners
16 should work together, using diplomatic and economic
17 tools, to hold the PRC accountable for any failure by
18 the PRC—

19 (A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nation-
20 ally determined contribution, in line with net
21 zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 before the
22 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
23 scheduled for November 2021 and meeting a
24 more ambitious nationally determined contribu-
25 tion;

1 (B) to work faithfully to uphold the prin-
2 ciples, goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;

3 (C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to under-
4 mine or devolve the Paris Agreement’s rule or
5 underlying framework, particularly within areas
6 of accountability transparency, and shared re-
7 sponsibility among all parties;

8 (D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive
9 projects from the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative
10 and other overseas investments, including—

11 (i) working with United States allies
12 and partners to eliminate support for coal
13 power production projects in the Belt and
14 Road Initiative;

15 (ii) providing financing and project
16 support for cleaner and less risky alter-
17 natives; and

18 (iii) undertaking “parallel initiatives”
19 to enhance capacity building programs and
20 overseas sustainable investment criteria, in-
21 cluding in areas such as integrated energy
22 planning, power sector reform, just transi-
23 tion, distributed generation, procurement,
24 transparency, and standards to support

1 *low-emissions growth in developing coun-*
2 *tries; and*

3 *(E) to phase out existing coal power plants*
4 *and reduce net coal power production;*

5 *(7) the United States should pursue confidence-*
6 *building opportunities for the United States and the*
7 *PRC to undertake “parallel initiatives” on clean en-*
8 *ergy research, development, finance, and deployment,*
9 *including through economic and stimulus measures*
10 *with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and policies*
11 *to protect intellectual property, ensure equitable, non-*
12 *punitive provision of support, and verify implementa-*
13 *tion, which would provide catalytic progress towards*
14 *delivering a global clean energy transformation that*
15 *benefits all people;*

16 *(8) the United States should pursue cooperative*
17 *initiatives to reduce global deforestation, including ef-*
18 *forts to shift toward the import and consummation of*
19 *forest and agricultural commodities that are produced*
20 *in a manner that does not contribute to deforestation;*
21 *and*

22 *(9) the United States should pursue appropriate*
23 *scientific cooperative exchanges and research that*
24 *align with United States interests and those of its*
25 *international partners and allies, provide reciprocity*

1 of access, protect intellectual property rights, and pre-
2 serve the values and human rights interests of the
3 American people.

4 **SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AL-**
5 **TERNATIVES TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF**
6 **CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.**

7 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—The President should seek opportu-
8 nities to partner with multilateral development finance in-
9 stitutions to develop financing tools based on shared devel-
10 opment finance criteria and mechanisms to support invest-
11 ments in developing countries that—

12 (1) support low carbon economic development;
13 and

14 (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to envi-
15 ronmental changes and natural disasters.

16 (b) *PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.*—The Chief Executive
17 Officer of the United States International Development Fi-
18 nance Corporation should seek to partner with other multi-
19 lateral development finance institutions and development
20 finance institutions to leverage the respective available
21 funds to support low carbon economic development, which
22 may include clean energy including renewable and nuclear
23 energy projects, environmental adaptation, and resilience
24 activities in countries.

25 (c) *CO-FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.*—

1 (1) *AUTHORIZATION.*—Subject to paragraph (2),
2 the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the
3 United States Agency for International Development,
4 and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies are
5 authorized to co-finance infrastructure, resilience, and
6 environmental adaptation projects that advance the
7 development objectives of the United States overseas
8 and provide viable alternatives to projects that would
9 otherwise be included within the People’s Republic of
10 China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

11 (2) *CONDITIONS.*—Co-financing arrangements
12 authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be ap-
13 proved unless—

14 (A) *the projects to be financed—*

15 (i) *promote the public good;*

16 (ii) *promote United States national se-*
17 *curity or economic interests;*

18 (iii) *promote low carbon emissions, in-*
19 *cluding clean energy renewable and nuclear*
20 *energy projects; and*

21 (iv) *will have substantially lower envi-*
22 *ronmental impact than the proposed Belt*
23 *and Road Initiative alternative; and*

24 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
25 *the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs*

1 *of the House of Representatives are notified not*
2 *later than 15 days in advance of entering into*
3 *such co-financing arrangements.*

4 **SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE**
5 **NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTER-**
6 **ESTS.**

7 *(a) IN GENERAL.—The President and the Secretary of*
8 *State shall prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy*
9 *in United States foreign policy by—*

10 *(1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and inter-*
11 *agency coordination for bilateral and multilateral ac-*
12 *tions to address the climate crisis; and*

13 *(2) improving coordination and integration of*
14 *climate action across all bureaus and United States*
15 *missions abroad.*

16 *(b) CLIMATE ACTION INTEGRATION.—The Secretary of*
17 *State shall—*

18 *(1) prioritize climate action and clean energy*
19 *within the bureaus and offices under the leadership of*
20 *the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy,*
21 *and the Environment;*

22 *(2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are co-*
23 *ordinating with other bureaus of the Department of*
24 *State regarding the integration of climate action and*

1 *climate diplomacy as a cross-cutting imperative*
2 *across the Department of State;*

3 *(3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State—*

4 *(A) to assess how issues related to climate*
5 *change and United States climate action are in-*
6 *tegrated into their operations and programs;*

7 *(B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and*
8 *diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action;*
9 *and*

10 *(C) to make available the technical assist-*
11 *ance and resources of the bureaus and offices*
12 *with relevant expertise to provide technical as-*
13 *sistance and expert support to other bureaus*
14 *within the Department of State regarding cli-*
15 *mate action, clean energy development, and cli-*
16 *mate diplomacy;*

17 *(4) manage the integration of scientific data on*
18 *the current and anticipated effects of climate change*
19 *into applied strategies and diplomatic engagements*
20 *across programmatic and regional bureaus of the De-*
21 *partment of State and into the Department of State's*
22 *decision making processes;*

23 *(5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices*
24 *provide appropriate technical support and re-*
25 *sources—*

1 (A) to the President, the Secretary of State,
2 and their respective designees charged with ad-
3 dressing climate change and associated issues;

4 (B) to United States diplomats advancing
5 United States foreign policy related to climate
6 action; and

7 (C) for the appropriate engagement and in-
8 tegration of relevant domestic agencies in inter-
9 national climate change affairs, including
10 United States participation in multilateral fora;
11 and

12 (6) carry out other activities, as directed by the
13 Secretary of State, that advance United States cli-
14 mate-related foreign policy objectives, including global
15 greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adaptation
16 activities, and global climate security.

17 (c) *RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF*
18 *STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS.*—*The Under Secretary of*
19 *State for Political Affairs shall ensure that all foreign mis-*
20 *sions are—*

21 (1) *advancing United States bilateral climate di-*
22 *plomacy;*

23 (2) *engaging strategically on opportunities for*
24 *bilateral climate action cooperation with foreign gov-*
25 *ernments; and*

1 (3) *utilizing the technical resources and coordi-*
2 *nating adequately with the bureaus reporting to the*
3 *Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, En-*
4 *ergy and the Environment.*

5 (d) *REPORT.—Not later than 200 days after the date*
6 *of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State*
7 *for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in co-*
8 *operation with the Under Secretary of State for Political*
9 *Affairs, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-*
10 *mittees a report that—*

11 (1) *assesses how climate action and United*
12 *States climate diplomacy is integrated across the Bu-*
13 *reaus of the Department of State; and*

14 (2) *includes recommendations on strategies to*
15 *improve cross bureau coordination and understanding*
16 *of United States climate action and climate diplo-*
17 *macy.*

18 (e) *EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS.—If the*
19 *positions of Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth,*
20 *Energy, and the Environment and the Undersecretary of*
21 *State for Political Affairs are eliminated or undergo name*
22 *changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries*
23 *under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secre-*
24 *taries of State, as appropriate.*

25 (f) *CLIMATE CHANGE OFFICERS.—*

1 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State shall*
2 *establish and staff Climate Change Officer positions.*
3 *Such Officers shall serve under the supervision of the*
4 *appropriate chief of mission or the Under Secretary*
5 *for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment*
6 *of the Department of State, as the case may be. The*
7 *Secretary shall ensure each embassy, consulate, and*
8 *diplomatic mission to which such Officers are as-*
9 *signed pursuant to paragraph (2) has sufficient addi-*
10 *tional and appropriate staff to support such Officers.*

11 (2) *ASSIGNMENT.*—*Climate Change Officers shall*
12 *be assigned to the following posts:*

13 (A) *United States embassies, or, if appro-*
14 *priate, consulates.*

15 (B) *United States diplomatic missions to,*
16 *or liaisons with, regional and multilateral orga-*
17 *nizations, including the United States diplo-*
18 *matic missions to the European Union, African*
19 *Union, Organization of American States, Arctic*
20 *Council, and any other appropriate regional or-*
21 *ganization, and the United Nations and its rel-*
22 *evant specialized agencies.*

23 (C) *Other posts as designated by the Sec-*
24 *retary.*

1 (3) *RESPONSIBILITIES.—Each Climate Change*
2 *Officer shall—*

3 (A) *provide expertise on effective approaches*
4 *to—*

5 (i) *mitigate the emission of gases*
6 *which contribute to global climate change*
7 *and formulate national and global plans for*
8 *reducing such gross and net emissions; and*

9 (ii) *reduce the detrimental impacts at-*
10 *tributable to global climate change, and*
11 *adapt to such impacts;*

12 (B) *engage and convene, in a manner that*
13 *is equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals*
14 *and organizations which represent a government*
15 *office, a nongovernmental organization, a social*
16 *or political movement, a private sector entity, an*
17 *educational or scientific institution, or any other*
18 *entity concerned with—*

19 (i) *global climate change; the emission*
20 *of gases which contribute to global climate*
21 *change; or*

22 (ii) *reducing the detrimental impacts*
23 *attributable to global climate change;*

1 (C) facilitate engagement by United States
2 entities in bilateral and multilateral cooperation
3 on climate change; and

4 (D) carry out such other responsibilities as
5 the Secretary may assign.

6 (4) RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNDER SECRETARY.—
7 The Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy,
8 and the Environment of the Department of State
9 shall, including by acting through the Bureau of
10 Oceans and International Environmental and Sci-
11 entific Affairs of the Department of State—

12 (A) provide policy guidance to Climate
13 Change Officers established under this subsection;

14 (B) develop relations with, consult with,
15 and provide assistance to relevant individuals
16 and organizations concerned with studying,
17 mitigating, and adapting to global climate
18 change, or reducing the emission of gases which
19 contribute to global climate change; and

20 (C) assist officers and employees of regional
21 bureaus of the Department of State to develop
22 strategies and programs to promote studying,
23 mitigating, and adapting to global climate
24 change, or reducing the emission of gases which
25 contribute to global climate change.

1 (g) *ACTIONS BY CHIEFS OF MISSION.*—*Each chief of*
2 *mission in a foreign country shall—*

3 (1) *develop, as part of annual joint strategic*
4 *plans or equivalent program and policy planning, a*
5 *strategy to promote actions to improve and increase*
6 *studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate*
7 *change, or reducing the emission of gases which con-*
8 *tribute to global climate change by—*

9 (A) *consulting and coordinating with and*
10 *providing support to relevant individuals and*
11 *organizations, including experts and other pro-*
12 *fessionals and stakeholders on issues related to*
13 *climate change; and*

14 (B) *holding periodic meetings with such rel-*
15 *evant individuals and organizations relating to*
16 *such strategy; and*

17 (2) *hold ongoing discussions with the officials*
18 *and leaders of such country regarding progress to im-*
19 *prove and increase studying, mitigating, and adapt-*
20 *ing to global climate change, or reducing the emission*
21 *of gases which contribute to global climate change in*
22 *a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and just in such*
23 *country; and*

24 (3) *certify annually to the Secretary of State*
25 *that to the maximum extent practicable, consider-*

1 *ations related to climate change adaptation and miti-*
2 *gation, sustainability, and the environment were in-*
3 *corporated in activities, management, and operations*
4 *of the United States embassy or other diplomatic post*
5 *under the director of the chief of mission.*

6 *(h) TRAINING.—Not later than 180 days after the date*
7 *of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall*
8 *establish curriculum at the Department of State’s Foreign*
9 *Service Institute that supplements political and economic*
10 *reporting tradecraft courses in order to provide employees*
11 *of the Department with specialized training with respect*
12 *to studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate*
13 *change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute*
14 *to global climate change. Such training shall include the*
15 *following:*

16 *(1) Awareness of the full range of national and*
17 *subnational agencies, offices, personnel, statutory au-*
18 *thorities, funds, and programs involved in the inter-*
19 *national commitments of the United States regarding*
20 *global climate change and the emission of gases which*
21 *contribute to global climate change, the science of*
22 *global climate change, and methods for mitigating*
23 *and adapting to global climate change.*

24 *(2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and*
25 *adapting to global climate change and reducing the*

1 *emission of gases which contribute to global climate*
2 *change that are equitable, inclusive, and just.*

3 (3) *Familiarity with United States agencies,*
4 *multilateral agencies, international financial institu-*
5 *tions, and the network of donors providing assistance*
6 *to mitigate and adapt to global climate change.*

7 (4) *Awareness of the most frequently announced*
8 *goals and methods of the entities specified in sub-*
9 *section (f)(3)(B).*

10 (i) *CONTRACTING.*—*Contracting and agreements offi-*
11 *cers of the Department of State, and other United States*
12 *embassy personnel responsible for contracts, grants, or ac-*
13 *quisitions, shall receive training on evaluating proposals,*
14 *solicitations, and bids, for considerations related to sustain-*
15 *ability and adapting to or mitigating impacts from climate*
16 *change.*

17 (j) *REPORTING.*—*Not later than 180 days after the*
18 *date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter,*
19 *the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-*
20 *gressional committees a report that includes a detailed*
21 *breakdown of posts at which staff are assigned the role of*
22 *Climate Change Officer, the responsibilities to which they*
23 *have been assigned, and the strategies developed by the chief*
24 *of mission, as applicable.*

1 (k) *CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT AND FINANCING.*—The
2 Secretary of State shall facilitate the coordination among
3 the Department of State and other relevant Federal depart-
4 ments and agencies toward contributing technical coopera-
5 tion, engagement, development finance, or foreign assistance
6 relevant to United States international climate action and
7 in support of United States climate diplomacy.

8 (l) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress
9 that climate diplomacy tools as described in this section are
10 critical for demonstrating the commitment to include cli-
11 mate changes issues as core tenets of foreign policy prior-
12 ities, as well as preserving the United States’ role as a glob-
13 al leader on climate change action.

14 **SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESIL-**
15 **IENCE STRATEGY.**

16 (a) *AMENDMENT.*—Section 117 of the Foreign Assist-
17 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended—

18 (1) in subsection (b)—

19 (A) by inserting “(1)” after “(b)”; and

20 (B) by adding at the end the following:

21 “(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish assist-
22 ance to programs and initiatives that—

23 “(i) promote resilience among communities fac-
24 ing harmful impacts from climate change; and

1 “(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected
2 by climate change.

3 “(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a Co-
4 ordinator of Climate Change Resilience.”; and

5 (2) by adding at the end the following:

6 “(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with
7 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
8 national Development, shall establish a comprehensive, inte-
9 grated, 10-year strategy, which shall be referred to as the
10 ‘Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy’, to mitigate the
11 impacts of climate change on displacement and humani-
12 tarian emergencies.

13 “(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy
14 shall—

15 “(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid-
16 onset effects of events caused by climate change, con-
17 sider the effects of events caused by climate change,
18 and describe the key features of successful strategies to
19 prevent such conditions;

20 “(B) include specific objectives and multisectoral
21 approaches to the effects of events caused by climate
22 change;

23 “(C) promote United States national security
24 and economic interests while leading international
25 climate-related policymaking efforts, on which the ab-

1 *sence of United States leadership would lead to a sub-*
2 *stantial and harmful decline in the nation’s global*
3 *competitiveness;*

4 “(D) *promote international instruments on cli-*
5 *mate action and other relevant international stand-*
6 *ards and best practices, as such standards and prac-*
7 *tices develop, that serve the interests of the American*
8 *people and protect United States environmental re-*
9 *sources and the planet;*

10 “(E) *promote the adoption and implementation*
11 *of such international climate-related agreements,*
12 *standards, and practices by foreign states;*

13 “(F) *work with United States allies and part-*
14 *ners to ensure a level playing field exists when it*
15 *comes to climate action and to encourage and assist*
16 *foreign countries to make similar or even greater com-*
17 *mitments than the United States;*

18 “(G) *describe approaches that ensure national*
19 *leadership, as appropriate, and substantively engage*
20 *with civil society, local partners, and the affected*
21 *communities, including marginalized populations*
22 *and underserved populations, in the design, imple-*
23 *mentation, and monitoring of climate change pro-*
24 *grams to best safeguard the future of those subject to*
25 *displacement;*

1 “(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies to
2 avoid duplication of efforts, while ensuring that—

3 “(i) the Department of State is responsible
4 for—

5 “(I) leading the Global Climate Change
6 Resilience Strategy;

7 “(II) establishing United States foreign
8 policy;

9 “(III) advancing diplomatic and polit-
10 ical efforts; and

11 “(IV) guiding security assistance and
12 related civilian security efforts to mitigate
13 climate change threats;

14 “(i) the United States Agency for Inter-
15 national Development is—

16 “(I) responsible for overseeing pro-
17 grams to prevent the effects of events caused
18 by climate change;

19 “(II) the lead implementing agency for
20 development and related nonsecurity pro-
21 gram policy related to building resilience
22 and achieving recovery; and

23 “(III) responsible for providing over-
24 seas humanitarian assistance to respond to
25 international and internal displacement

1 *caused by climate change and to coordinate*
2 *the pursuit of durable solutions for climate-*
3 *displaced persons; and*

4 “(iii) other Federal agencies support the ac-
5 *tivities of the Department of State and the*
6 *United States Agency for International Develop-*
7 *ment, as appropriate, with the concurrence of the*
8 *Secretary of State and the Administrator of the*
9 *United States Agency for International Develop-*
10 *ment;*

11 “(I) describe programs that agencies will under-
12 *take to achieve the stated objectives, including descrip-*
13 *tions of existing programs and funding by fiscal year*
14 *and account;*

15 “(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordina-
16 *tion between the United States, foreign governments,*
17 *and international organizations, including the World*
18 *Bank, the United Nations, regional organizations,*
19 *and private sector organizations;*

20 “(K) address efforts to expand public-private
21 *partnerships and leverage private sector resources;*

22 “(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mecha-
23 *nisms for monitoring and evaluation of programs and*
24 *objectives in the Global Climate Change Resilience*
25 *Strategy;*

1 “(M) describe how the Global Climate Change
2 Resilience Strategy will ensure that programs are
3 country-led and context-specific;

4 “(N) establish a program to monitor climate and
5 social conditions to anticipate and prevent climate
6 and environmental stressors from evolving into na-
7 tional security risks;

8 “(O) include an assessment of climate risks in
9 the Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy
10 and Development Review; and

11 “(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent prac-
12 ticable, for international climate resilience in support
13 of this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.

14 “(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the en-
15 actment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the
16 President shall submit a report to the Committee on For-
17 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
18 Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in part on
19 the information collected pursuant to this section, that de-
20 tails the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. The
21 report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
22 clude a classified annex, if necessary.

23 “(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the en-
24 actment of this subsection, the Secretary of State and the
25 Coordinator of Global Climate Change Resilience shall brief

1 *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the*
2 *Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-*
3 *tives regarding the progress made by the Federal Govern-*
4 *ment in implementing the Global Climate Change Resil-*
5 *ience Strategy.*

6 “(5)(A) *Not later than 270 days after the date of the*
7 *enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the*
8 *Comptroller General of the United States, in cooperation*
9 *and consultation with the Secretary of State, shall produce*
10 *a report evaluating the progress that the Federal Govern-*
11 *ment has made toward incorporating climate change into*
12 *department and agency policies, including the resources*
13 *that have been allocated for such purpose.*

14 “(B) *The report required under subparagraph (A)*
15 *shall assess—*

16 “(i) *the degree to which the Department of State*
17 *and the United States Agency for International De-*
18 *velopment (USAID) are—*

19 “(I) *developing climate change risk assess-*
20 *ments; and*

21 “(II) *providing guidance to missions on*
22 *how to include climate change risks in their inte-*
23 *grated country strategies;*

1 “(ii) whether the Department of State and
2 USAID have sufficient resources to fulfill the require-
3 ments described in paragraph (2); and

4 “(iii) any areas in which the Department of
5 State and USAID may lack sufficient resources to
6 fulfill such requirements.”.

7 (b) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—There are
8 authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be nec-
9 essary to carry out this Global Climate Change Resilience
10 Strategy.

11 **SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE**
12 **MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY.**

13 (a) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this section:

14 (1) *CONVENTION.*—The term “Convention”
15 means the United Nations Framework Convention on
16 Climate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992, and
17 entered into force March 21, 1994.

18 (2) *MOST VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES AND POPU-*
19 *LATIONS.*—The term “most vulnerable communities
20 and populations” means communities and popu-
21 lations that are at risk of substantial adverse effects
22 of climate change and have limited capacity to re-
23 spond to such effects, including women, impoverished
24 communities, children, indigenous peoples, and infor-
25 mal workers.

1 (3) *MOST VULNERABLE DEVELOPING COUN-*
2 *TRIES.*—*The term “most vulnerable developing coun-*
3 *tries” means, as determined by the Administrator of*
4 *the United States Agency for International Develop-*
5 *ment, developing countries that are at risk of substan-*
6 *tial adverse effects of climate change and have limited*
7 *capacity to respond to such effects, considering the*
8 *approaches included in any international treaties*
9 *and agreements.*

10 (4) *PROGRAM.*—*The term “Program” means the*
11 *International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitiga-*
12 *tion, and Security Program established pursuant to*
13 *subsection (c).*

14 (b) *PURPOSE.*—*The purpose of this section is to pro-*
15 *vide authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing*
16 *bilateral and regional international development assistance,*
17 *and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources, in sup-*
18 *port of host country driven projects, planning, policies, and*
19 *initiatives designed to improve the ability of host coun-*
20 *tries—*

21 (1) *to primarily produce reliable renewable en-*
22 *ergy and reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from*
23 *the power sector while facilitating the transition in*
24 *key global markets from electricity generated from fos-*
25 *sil fuel power to low-cost clean energy sources, in a*

1 *manner that is equitable for workers and commu-*
2 *nities;*

3 *(2) to adapt and become more resilient to cur-*
4 *rent and forecasted effects of climate change; and*

5 *(3) to employ—*

6 *(A) sustainable land use practices that*
7 *mitigate desertification and reduce greenhouse*
8 *gas emissions from deforestation and forest deg-*
9 *radation; and*

10 *(B) agricultural production practices that*
11 *reduce poverty while improving soil health, pro-*
12 *tecting water quality, and increasing food secu-*
13 *rity and nutrition.*

14 *(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary of*
15 *State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury*
16 *and the Administrator of the United States Agency for*
17 *International Development (USAID), shall establish a pro-*
18 *gram, to be known as the “International Climate Change*
19 *Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program”, to provide*
20 *bilateral and regional assistance to developing countries for*
21 *programs, projects, and activities described in subsection*
22 *(e).*

23 *(d) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—Assistance pro-*
24 *vided under this section shall be used to supplement, and*
25 *not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local resources*

1 *available to carry out activities that fit the characteristics*
2 *of the Program.*

3 *(e) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States*
4 *to ensure that the Program provides resources to developing*
5 *countries, particularly the most vulnerable communities*
6 *and populations in such countries, to support the develop-*
7 *ment and implementation of programs, projects, and activi-*
8 *ties that—*

9 *(1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the*
10 *integration and deployment of clean energy, including*
11 *transmission, distribution, and interconnections to re-*
12 *newable energy, while facilitating the transition from*
13 *electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost*
14 *renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equi-*
15 *table for workers and communities;*

16 *(2) address financial or other barriers to the*
17 *widespread deployment of clean energy technologies*
18 *that reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas emis-*
19 *sions;*

20 *(3) improve the availability, viability, and ac-*
21 *cessibility of zero emission vehicles, including support*
22 *for design and development of transportation net-*
23 *works and land use practices that mitigate carbon*
24 *emissions in the transportation sector;*

1 (4) support building capacities that may in-
2 clude—

3 (A) developing and implementing meth-
4 odologies and programs for measuring green-
5 house gas emissions and verifying emissions
6 mitigation, including building capacities to con-
7 duct emissions inventories and meet reporting
8 requirements under the Paris Agreement;

9 (B) assessing, developing, and implementing
10 technology and policy options for greenhouse gas
11 emissions mitigation and avoidance of future
12 emissions, including sector-based and cross-sector
13 mitigation strategies;

14 (C) enhancing the technical capacity of reg-
15 ulatory authorities, planning agencies, and re-
16 lated institutions in developing countries to im-
17 prove the deployment of clean energy technologies
18 and practices, including through increased trans-
19 parency;

20 (D) training and instruction regarding the
21 installation and maintenance of renewable en-
22 ergy technologies; and

23 (E) activities that support the development
24 and implementation of frameworks for intellec-
25 tual property rights in developing countries;

1 (5) *improve resilience, sustainable economic*
2 *growth, and adaptation capacities in response to the*
3 *effects of climate change;*

4 (6) *promote appropriate job training and access*
5 *to new job opportunities in new economic sectors and*
6 *industries that emerge due to the transition from fos-*
7 *sil fuel energy to clean energy;*

8 (7) *reduce the vulnerability and increase the re-*
9 *silience capacities of communities to the effects of cli-*
10 *mate change, including effects on—*

11 (A) *water availability;*

12 (B) *agricultural productivity and food secu-*
13 *rity;*

14 (C) *flood risk;*

15 (D) *coastal resources;*

16 (E) *biodiversity;*

17 (F) *economic livelihoods;*

18 (G) *health and diseases;*

19 (H) *housing and shelter; and*

20 (I) *human migration;*

21 (8) *help countries and communities adapt to*
22 *changes in the environment through enhanced commu-*
23 *nity planning, preparedness, and growth strategies*
24 *that take into account current and forecasted regional*
25 *and localized effects of climate change;*

1 (9) *conserve and restore natural resources, eco-*
2 *systems, and biodiversity threatened by the effects of*
3 *climate change to ensure such resources, ecosystems,*
4 *and biodiversity are healthy and continue to provide*
5 *natural protections from the effects of climate change*
6 *such as extreme weather;*

7 (10) *provide resources, information, scientific*
8 *data and modeling, innovative best practices, and*
9 *technical assistance to support vulnerable developing*
10 *countries to adapt to the effects of climate change;*

11 (11) *promote sustainable and climate-resilient*
12 *societies, including through improvements to make*
13 *critical infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects of*
14 *climate change;*

15 (12) *encourage the adoption of policies and*
16 *measures, including sector-based and cross-sector poli-*
17 *cies and measures, that substantially reduce, seques-*
18 *ter, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the do-*
19 *mestic energy and transportation sectors of developing*
20 *countries;*

21 (13) *reduce deforestation and land degradation*
22 *to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement*
23 *sustainable forestry practices;*

24 (14) *promote sustainable land use activities, in-*
25 *cluding supporting development planning, design,*

1 *and construction with respect to transportation sys-*
2 *tems and land use;*

3 *(15) promote sustainable agricultural practices*
4 *that mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and im-*
5 *prove food and water security of communities;*

6 *(16) foster partnerships with private sector enti-*
7 *ties and nongovernmental international development*
8 *organizations to assist with developing solutions and*
9 *economic opportunities that support projects, plan-*
10 *ning, policies, and initiatives described in subsection*
11 *(b);*

12 *(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen*
13 *capacities of developing countries to meet the goals of*
14 *the conditional nationally determined contributions of*
15 *those countries;*

16 *(18) establish investment channels designed to le-*
17 *verage private sector financing in—*

18 *(A) clean energy;*

19 *(B) sustainable agriculture and natural re-*
20 *source management; and*

21 *(C) the transportation sector as described in*
22 *paragraph (3); and*

23 *(19) provide technical assistance and support for*
24 *non-extractive activities that provide alternative eco-*

1 *nomie growth opportunities while preserving critical*
2 *habitats and natural carbon sinks.*

3 *(f) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE.—*

4 *(1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of USAID,*
5 *in consultation with other Federal departments and*
6 *agencies, shall provide assistance under the Pro-*
7 *gram—*

8 *(A) in the form of bilateral assistance pur-*
9 *suant to the requirements under subsection (g);*

10 *(B) to multilateral funds or international*
11 *institutions with programs for climate mitiga-*
12 *tion or adaptation in developing countries con-*
13 *sistent with the policy described in subsection*
14 *(e); or*

15 *(C) through a combination of the mecha-*
16 *nisms specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).*

17 *(2) LIMITATION.—*

18 *(A) CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION TO MULTI-*
19 *LATERAL FUNDS OR INTERNATIONAL INSTITU-*
20 *TIONS.—In any fiscal year, the Administrator of*
21 *USAID may provide up to 40 percent of the as-*
22 *sistance available to carry out the Program to 1*
23 *or more multilateral funds or international in-*
24 *stitutions that meet the requirements of subpara-*
25 *graph (B).*

1 (B) *MULTILATERAL FUND OR INTER-*
2 *NATIONAL INSTITUTION ELIGIBILITY.*—*A multi-*
3 *lateral fund or international institution is eligi-*
4 *ble to receive assistance under subparagraph*
5 *(A)*—

6 (i) *if*—

7 (I) *such fund or institution is es-*
8 *tablished pursuant to*—

9 (aa) *the Convention; or*

10 (bb) *an agreement negotiated*
11 *under the Convention; or*

12 (II) *the assistance is directed to 1*
13 *or more multilateral funds or inter-*
14 *national development institutions, pur-*
15 *suant to an agreement negotiated*
16 *under the Convention; and*

17 (ii) *if such fund or institution*—

18 (I) *specifies the terms and condi-*
19 *tions under which the United States is*
20 *to provide assistance to the fund or in-*
21 *stitution, and under which the fund or*
22 *institution is to provide assistance to*
23 *recipient countries;*

24 (II) *ensures that assistance from*
25 *the United States to the fund or insti-*

1 *tution and the principal and income of*
2 *the fund or institution are disbursed*
3 *only—*

4 *(aa) to support projects,*
5 *planning, policies, and initiatives*
6 *described in subsection (b);*

7 *(bb) consistent with the pol-*
8 *icy described in subsection (e);*
9 *and*

10 *(cc) in regular consultation*
11 *with relevant governing bodies of*
12 *the fund or institution that—*

13 *(AA) include representa-*
14 *tion from countries among*
15 *the most vulnerable devel-*
16 *oping countries; and*

17 *(BB) provide public ac-*
18 *cess.*

19 *(C) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The*
20 *Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID,*
21 *or the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the*
22 *appropriate congressional committees not later*
23 *than 15 days before providing assistance to a*
24 *multilateral fund or international institution*
25 *under this subsection.*

1 (3) *LOCAL CONSULTATIONS.*—*Programs, projects,*
2 *and activities supported by assistance provided under*
3 *this subsection shall require consultations with local*
4 *communities, particularly the most vulnerable com-*
5 *munities and populations in such communities, and*
6 *indigenous peoples in areas in which any programs,*
7 *projects, or activities are planned to engage such com-*
8 *munities and peoples through adequate disclosure of*
9 *information, public participation, and consultation,*
10 *including full consideration of the interdependence of*
11 *vulnerable communities and ecosystems to promote*
12 *the resilience of local communities.*

13 (g) *BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.*—

14 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Except to the extent incon-*
15 *sistent with this subsection, the administrative au-*
16 *thorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22*
17 *U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall apply to the implementa-*
18 *tion of this subsection to the same extent and in the*
19 *same manner as such authorities apply to the imple-*
20 *mentation of such Act in order to provide the Admin-*
21 *istrator of USAID with the authority to provide as-*
22 *sistance to countries, including the most vulnerable*
23 *developing countries, for programs, projects, and ac-*
24 *tivities consistent with the purposes described in sub-*
25 *section (b) and the policy described in subsection (e).*

1 (2) *CONSIDERATIONS.*—*In carrying out this sub-*
2 *section, the Administrator shall ensure that—*

3 (A) *the environmental impact of proposed*
4 *programs, projects, and activities is considered*
5 *through adequate consultation, public participa-*
6 *tion, and public disclosure of relevant informa-*
7 *tion; and*

8 (B) *programs, projects, and activities under*
9 *this subsection—*

10 (i) *avoid environmental degradation,*
11 *to the maximum extent practicable; and*

12 (ii) *are aligned, to the maximum ex-*
13 *tent practicable, with broader development,*
14 *poverty alleviation, or natural resource*
15 *management objectives and initiatives in*
16 *the recipient country.*

17 (3) *COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT.*—*The Adminis-*
18 *trator shall seek to ensure that—*

19 (A) *local communities, particularly the*
20 *most vulnerable communities and populations in*
21 *areas in which any programs, projects, or activi-*
22 *ties are carried out under this subsection, are en-*
23 *gaged in the design, implementation, monitoring,*
24 *and evaluation of such programs, projects, and*

1 *ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate*
2 *Change.*

3 (b) *IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the*
4 *United States representatives to appropriate international*
5 *bodies and conferences to use the voice, vote, and influence*
6 *of the United States, consistent with the broad foreign pol-*
7 *icy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such*
8 *body or conference—*

9 (1) *commit to significantly increasing efforts to*
10 *reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;*

11 (2) *invest in and develop alternative energy*
12 *sources, industrial and agricultural processes, appli-*
13 *ances, and products to replace sources of black carbon,*
14 *methane, and high-GWP HFC;*

15 (3) *enhance coordination with the private sec-*
16 *tor—*

17 (A) *to increase production and distribution*
18 *of clean energy alternatives, industrial processes,*
19 *and products that will replace sources of black*
20 *carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;*

21 (B) *to develop action plans to mitigate*
22 *black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC*
23 *from various private sector operations;*

1 (C) to encourage best technology, methods,
2 and management practices for reducing black
3 carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

4 (D) to craft specific financing mechanisms
5 for the incremental costs associated with miti-
6 gating black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
7 HFC pollutants; and

8 (E) to grow economic opportunities and de-
9 velop markets, as appropriate, for reducing black
10 carbon, methane, tropospheric ozone, and
11 hydrofluorocarbons;

12 (4) provide technical assistance to foreign regu-
13 latory authorities and governments to remove unnec-
14 essary barriers to investment in short-lived climate
15 mitigation solutions, including—

16 (A) the use of safe and affordable clean en-
17 ergy;

18 (B) the implementation of policies requiring
19 industrial and agricultural best practices for
20 capturing or mitigating the release of methane
21 from extractive, agricultural, and industrial
22 processes; and

23 (C) climate assessment, scientific research,
24 monitoring, and technological development ac-
25 tivities;

1 (5) develop and implement clear, accountable,
2 and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness
3 of projects described in paragraph (4); and

4 (6) engage international partners in an existing
5 multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through
6 an international agreement a new multilateral
7 forum) to improve global cooperation for—

8 (A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating
9 efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and
10 high-GWP HFC;

11 (B) developing and implementing best prac-
12 tices for phasing out sources of black carbon,
13 methane, and high-GWP HFC, including ex-
14 panding capacity for innovative instruments to
15 mitigate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
16 HFC at the national and subnational levels of
17 foreign countries, particularly countries with lit-
18 tle capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
19 and deploy clean energy facilities, and countries
20 that lack sufficient policies to advance such de-
21 velopment;

22 (C) encouraging the development of stand-
23 ards and practices, and increasing transparency
24 and accountability efforts for the reduction of
25 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC;

1 (D) *integrating tracking and monitoring*
2 *systems into industrial processes;*

3 (E) *fostering research to improve scientific*
4 *understanding of—*

5 (i) *how high concentrations of black*
6 *carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC affect*
7 *human health, safety, and our environment;*

8 (ii) *changes in the amount and re-*
9 *gional concentrations of black carbon and*
10 *methane emissions, based on scientific mod-*
11 *eling and forecasting;*

12 (iii) *effective means to sequester black*
13 *carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and*

14 (iv) *other related areas of research the*
15 *United States representatives deem nec-*
16 *essary;*

17 (F) *encouraging the World Bank, the Inter-*
18 *national Monetary Fund, and other inter-*
19 *national finance organizations—*

20 (i) *to prioritize efforts to combat black*
21 *carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and*

22 (ii) *to enhance transparency by pro-*
23 *viding sufficient and adequate information*
24 *to facilitate independent verification of*
25 *their climate finance reporting;*

1 (G) encouraging observers of the Arctic
2 Council (including India and China) to adopt
3 mitigation plans consistent with the findings
4 and recommendations of the Arctic Council's
5 Framework for Action on Black Carbon and
6 Methane;

7 (H) collaborating on technological advances
8 in black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC
9 pollutant mitigation, sequestration and reduc-
10 tion technologies; and

11 (I) advising foreign countries, at both the
12 national and subnational levels, regarding the
13 development and execution of regulatory policies,
14 services, and laws pertaining to reducing the cre-
15 ation and the collection and safe management of
16 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC.

17 (c) *ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND*
18 *PARTNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES INVOLVED IN*
19 *GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS.—*

20 (1) *FINDING.—Congress recognizes the success of*
21 *the United States Climate Alliance and the green-*
22 *house gas reduction programs and strategies estab-*
23 *lished by the Environmental Protection Agency's Cen-*
24 *ter for Corporate Climate Leadership.*

1 (2) *AUTHORIZATION OF EFFORTS TO BUILD FOR-*
2 *EIGN PARTNERSHIPS.—The Secretary of State shall*
3 *work with the Administrator of the Environmental*
4 *Protection Agency to build partnerships, as appro-*
5 *priate, with the governments of foreign countries and*
6 *to support international efforts to reduce black car-*
7 *bon, methane, and high-GWP HFC.*

8 (d) *NEGOTIATION OF NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREE-*
9 *MENTS AND REASSERTION OF TARGETS IN EXISTING*
10 *AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the*
11 *enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit*
12 *a report to Congress that—*

13 (1) *assesses the potential for negotiating new*
14 *international agreements, new targets within existing*
15 *international agreements or cooperative bodies, and*
16 *the creation of a new international forum to mitigate*
17 *globally black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC*
18 *to support the efforts described in subsection (b);*

19 (2) *describes the provisions that could be in-*
20 *cluded in such agreements;*

21 (3) *assesses potential parties to such agreements;*

22 (4) *describes a process for reengaging with Can-*
23 *ada and Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed*
24 *to at the 2016 North American Leaders' Summit; and*

1 (5) describes a process for reengaging with the
2 countries of the Arctic Council regarding the methane
3 and black carbon targets that were negotiated in 2015
4 through the Framework for Action.

5 (e) *CONSIDERATION OF BLACK CARBON, METHANE,*
6 *AND HIGH-GWP HFC IN NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL*
7 *AGREEMENTS.*—In negotiating any relevant international
8 agreement with any country or countries after the date of
9 the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

10 (1) consider the impact black carbon, methane,
11 and high-GWP HFC are having on the increase in
12 global average temperatures and the resulting global
13 climate change;

14 (2) consider the effects that climate change is
15 having on the environment; and

16 (3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts
17 to eliminate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
18 HFC from such country or countries.

19 (f) *PLAN TO REDUCE BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS*
20 *FROM SHIPS.*—Consistent with strategies adopted by the
21 International Maritime Organization to reduce greenhouse
22 gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in con-
23 sultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Sec-
24 retary of Commerce, the Administrator, and the Com-
25 mandant of the Coast Guard, shall develop a comprehensive

1 *plan to reduce black carbon emissions from ships based on*
2 *appropriate emissions data from oceangoing vessels. The*
3 *plan shall provide for such reduction through—*

4 (1) *a clean freight partnership;*

5 (2) *limits on black carbon emissions; and*

6 (3) *efforts that include protection of access to*
7 *critical fuel shipments and emergency needs of coastal*
8 *communities.*

9 (g) *ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY WORKING*
10 *GROUP ON BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP*
11 *HFC POLLUTANT MITIGATION.—*

12 (1) *ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 90 days*
13 *after the date of enactment of this Act, the President*
14 *shall establish a task force, to be known as the Inter-*
15 *agency Working Group on Black Carbon, Methane,*
16 *and High-GWP HFC Pollutant Mitigation.*

17 (2) *MEMBERSHIP.—The members of the Working*
18 *Group shall include the head (or a designee thereof)*
19 *of each relevant Federal agency.*

20 (3) *DUTIES.—The Working Group shall—*

21 (A) *not later than 180 days after the date*
22 *of enactment of this Act, submit to the appro-*
23 *priate congressional committees a report that in-*
24 *cludes specific plans of each relevant Federal*
25 *agency—*

1 (B) look for opportunities with other coun-
2 tries to promote alternatives to high-GWP HFC,
3 and transition over time to equipment that uses
4 safer and more sustainable alternatives to high-
5 GWP HFC;

6 (C) review the policy recommendations
7 made by—

8 (i) the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
9 mate Change;

10 (ii) the United States Climate Alli-
11 ance;

12 (iii) the Interagency Strategy to Re-
13 duce Methane Emissions;

14 (iv) the Council on Climate Prepared-
15 ness and Resilience;

16 (v) the Clean Cooking Alliance;

17 (vi) the International Maritime Orga-
18 nization; and

19 (vii) other relevant organizations and
20 institutions; and

21 (D) develop an action plan to reduce black
22 carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants
23 that incorporates any appropriate proposals or
24 recommendations made by the entities referred to
25 in subparagraph (C).

1 **SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH**
2 **AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION**
3 **THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.**

4 (a) *GREEN CLIMATE FUND.*—

5 (1) *FINDINGS.*—Congress finds that—

6 (A) *climate change most severely impacts*
7 *vulnerable and disadvantaged communities in*
8 *the United States and around the world;*

9 (B) *it is the responsibility of the United*
10 *States Government to work with and press other*
11 *countries to address environmental justice and*
12 *climate justice;*

13 (C) *the report of the United Nations Envi-*
14 *ronment Programme entitled “Climate Change*
15 *and the Cost of Capital in Developing Coun-*
16 *tries”, dated May 2018, found that, in the 10*
17 *years prior to the publication of the report, cli-*
18 *mate vulnerability has cost the 20 nations most*
19 *affected by catastrophes rooted in climate change*
20 *an additional \$62,000,000,000 in interest pay-*
21 *ments alone;*

22 (D) *individuals and families, particularly*
23 *communities of color, indigenous communities,*
24 *and low-income communities, that are on the*
25 *frontlines of climate change across the globe are*

1 *often in close proximity to environmental*
2 *stressors or sources of pollution;*

3 *(E) the communities described in subpara-*
4 *graph (D)—*

5 *(i) are often the first exposed to the*
6 *causes and impacts of climate change; and*

7 *(ii) have the fewest resources with*
8 *which to mitigate those impacts or to relo-*
9 *cate;*

10 *(F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate cli-*
11 *mate change must include specific protections for*
12 *and acknowledgment of the harm of climate*
13 *change to communities of color, indigenous peo-*
14 *ples, women, and other frontline communities*
15 *and marginalized peoples around the world;*

16 *(G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the*
17 *parties to the United Nations Framework Con-*
18 *vention on Climate Change adopted the Paris*
19 *Agreement, a benchmark agreement—*

20 *(i) to combat climate change;*

21 *(ii) to accelerate and intensify the ac-*
22 *tions and investments needed for a sustain-*
23 *able low carbon future; and*

24 *(iii) that acknowledges, “Parties*
25 *should, when taking action to address cli-*

1 *mate change, respect, promote and consider*
2 *their respective obligations on human*
3 *rights, the right to health, the rights of in-*
4 *igenous peoples, local communities, mi-*
5 *grants, children, persons with disabilities*
6 *and people in vulnerable situations and the*
7 *right to development, as well as gender*
8 *equality, empowerment of women and inter-*
9 *generational equity”;*

10 *(H) the Paris Agreement—*

11 *(i) notes the importance of “climate*
12 *justice” when mitigating and adapting to*
13 *climate change; and*

14 *(ii) recognizes “the need for an effective*
15 *and progressive response to the urgent*
16 *threat of climate change”;*

17 *(I) it is imperative for all countries to un-*
18 *dertake mitigation activities to rapidly meet the*
19 *goal of limiting global warming to not more*
20 *than 1.5 degrees Celsius;*

21 *(J) developed countries have the greatest ca-*
22 *capacity to mitigate their greenhouse gas emis-*
23 *sions, while—*

1 (i) *developing countries have the least*
2 *capacity to engage in mitigation activities;*
3 *and*

4 (ii) *the capacity of developing coun-*
5 *tries to engage in mitigation activities is*
6 *less than the national mitigation potential*
7 *of those developing countries;*

8 (K) *the determination for the fair share of*
9 *mitigation and adaptation activities for each*
10 *country must take into account—*

11 (i) *the historic greenhouse gas emis-*
12 *sions of each country; and*

13 (ii) *the current capacity of each coun-*
14 *try to both mitigate greenhouse gas emis-*
15 *sions and adapt to climate impacts;*

16 (L) *developed countries that have histori-*
17 *cally emitted a disproportionately high share of*
18 *greenhouse gas emissions, and reaped the eco-*
19 *nomical benefits of those polluting activities, have*
20 *a corresponding disproportionately greater re-*
21 *sponsibility to engage in global mitigation and*
22 *adaptation activities, as compared to less indus-*
23 *trialized countries that have historically polluted*
24 *far less;*

1 (M) the only realistic way for less industri-
2 alized countries to meet their full mitigation po-
3 tential is through international climate financ-
4 ing by more developed countries;

5 (N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, devel-
6 oped countries committed to jointly mobilize,
7 starting in 2020, \$100,000,000,000 per year in
8 public climate financing (as well as private in-
9 vestment and other alternative forms of finance),
10 for developing countries, a commitment re-
11 affirmed in 2015 in Decision 1/CP.21 of the
12 United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
13 mate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement;

14 (O) the \$100,000,000,000 commitment de-
15 scribed in subparagraph (N) was a political
16 compromise that falls short of the actual financ-
17 ing needs for climate action in developing coun-
18 tries;

19 (P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has es-
20 timated that the transition to renewable energy
21 sources in developing countries will require hun-
22 dreds of billions of dollars annually;

23 (Q) the United Nations Environment Pro-
24 gramme has estimated that adaptation needs re-
25 lating to climate change in developing countries

1 *may be as much as \$300,000,000,000 annually*
2 *by 2030;*

3 *(R) the Green Climate Fund was created in*
4 *2010 by 194 countries to serve as a crucial fi-*
5 *nancing mechanism to help developing countries*
6 *limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions and*
7 *adapt to climate change;*

8 *(S) in 2015, the United Nations Framework*
9 *Convention on Climate Change agreed that the*
10 *Green Climate Fund should serve the goals of the*
11 *Paris Agreement, which states that “developed*
12 *country Parties shall provide financial resources*
13 *to assist developing country Parties with respect*
14 *to both mitigation and adaptation in continu-*
15 *ation of their existing obligations under the Con-*
16 *vention”;*

17 *(T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential*
18 *institution for climate financing, as the Green*
19 *Climate Fund ensures—*

20 *(i) balanced governance between devel-*
21 *oped and developing countries;*

22 *(ii) stakeholder engagement and dis-*
23 *course;*

24 *(iii) a balanced approach between*
25 *mitigation and adaptation;*

1 (iv) fair and equal labor and working
2 conditions;

3 (v) conservation of biodiversity and
4 critical habitats; and

5 (vi) strong environmental, social, and
6 gender protections;

7 (U) the Green Climate Fund—

8 (i) promotes and protects human rights
9 and the rights of marginalized groups, in-
10 cluding indigenous peoples, women, chil-
11 dren, and people with disabilities; and

12 (ii) continues to take steps to strength-
13 en protection for marginalized groups;

14 (iii) the United States committed
15 \$3,000,000,000 of the first \$10,000,000,000
16 raised for the initial resource mobilization
17 period of the Green Climate Fund, though
18 only $\frac{1}{3}$ of this pledge was fulfilled, leaving
19 the United States the only country to fall
20 substantially short of a commitment of a
21 country to the Green Climate Fund; and

22 (V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully oper-
23 ational and proven institution supporting well
24 over 100 projects and programs in developing
25 countries around the world.

1 (2) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of*
2 *the United States to provide climate financing—*

3 (A) *as an essential part of the global effort*
4 *to combat climate change; and*

5 (B) *that—*

6 (i) *upholds the principles of environ-*
7 *mental justice and climate justice;*

8 (ii) *supports programs and projects de-*
9 *veloped by recipient countries and commu-*
10 *nities;*

11 (iii) *is designed and implemented with*
12 *the free, prior, and informed consent of in-*
13 *igenous peoples and other impacted com-*
14 *munities;*

15 (iv) *promotes gender equality as essen-*
16 *tial in all of the projects and programs sup-*
17 *ported by climate financing;*

18 (v) *includes best practices for environ-*
19 *mental and social safeguards to ensure that*
20 *projects and programs supported by climate*
21 *financing respect fundamental human*
22 *rights; and*

23 (vi) *addresses both mitigation and ad-*
24 *aptation as essential aspects of responding*
25 *to climate change.*

1 (b) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There are*
2 *authorized to be appropriated for contributions to the Green*
3 *Climate Fund \$4,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years*
4 *2022 and 2023.*

5 (c) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
6 *that the climate financing needs to achieve the greenhouse*
7 *gas emissions reductions required to keep the planet at or*
8 *below 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming are signifi-*
9 *cantly greater than the amount of funds authorized to be*
10 *appropriated under subsection (a).*

11 **SEC. 610. ENSURING A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE**
12 **TO CLIMATE ACTION.**

13 (a) *ESTABLISHMENT.*—*The Secretary of State shall es-*
14 *tablish a Climate Impacts Task Force (referred to in this*
15 *section as the “Task Force”) with the mandate to—*

16 (1) *monitor climate and related impacted social*
17 *conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and en-*
18 *vironmental stressors from evolving into national se-*
19 *curity risks;*

20 (2) *monitor and assess climate action under-*
21 *taken by other countries in response to national strat-*
22 *egies and international commitments, and coordinate*
23 *closely with allies and partners to ensure a coordi-*
24 *nated response against any state or non-state actors,*
25 *including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and*

1 *PRC companies, undermining global climate objec-*
2 *tives, norms, and practices;*

3 (3) *strengthen the efforts of the Department of*
4 *State and the United States Government to act*
5 *proactively to mitigate the human harms and poten-*
6 *tial for national security risks resulting from emerg-*
7 *ing events exacerbated by climate change; and*

8 (4) *assist other Federal departments and agen-*
9 *cies, foreign partners, and multilateral organizations*
10 *in their efforts to do the same.*

11 (b) *LEADERSHIP.*—*The Secretary of State shall des-*
12 *ignate a senior career official, as appropriate, of the De-*
13 *partment of State to serve as the Chair of the Task Force.*
14 *Such official shall report to the Secretary of State.*

15 (c) *RESPONSIBILITIES.*—*Under the direction of the*
16 *Chair, the Task Force shall—*

17 (1) *meet regularly to ensure that events exacer-*
18 *bated by climate change and the risk of emerging*
19 *events exacerbated by climate change throughout the*
20 *world are adequately considered and addressed;*

21 (2) *facilitate the development and execution of*
22 *policies and tools to enhance the capacity of the*
23 *United States to prevent and respond to emerging*
24 *events exacerbated by climate change worldwide;*

1 (3) *monitor developments throughout the world*
2 *that heighten the risk of emerging events exacerbated*
3 *by climate change;*

4 (4) *identify gaps in United States foreign policy*
5 *related to the prevention of and response to emerging*
6 *events exacerbated by climate change with respect to*
7 *certain regions or particular countries;*

8 (5) *incorporate lessons learned from past United*
9 *States efforts to prevent and respond to emerging*
10 *events exacerbated by climate change and other im-*
11 *pacts that are comparable in scope or severity;*

12 (6) *provide the Secretary of State with rec-*
13 *ommendations and potential improvements to poli-*
14 *cies, programs, resources, and tools related to the pre-*
15 *vention of and response to emerging events exacer-*
16 *bated by climate change;*

17 (7) *coordinate the Department of State's engage-*
18 *ment in interagency processes led by the National Se-*
19 *curity Council that share the Task Force's objectives;*

20 (8) *conduct outreach not less frequently than bi-*
21 *annually, with representatives of nongovernmental or-*
22 *ganizations dedicated to the prevention of and re-*
23 *sponse to emerging events exacerbated by climate*
24 *change and other appropriate parties, to—*

1 (A) receive assistance relating to the Task
2 Force's efforts to address emerging events exacer-
3 bated by climate change and develop new or im-
4 proved policies, programs, resources, and tools;
5 and

6 (B) provide a public understanding of the
7 work of the Task Force;

8 (9) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9),
9 focus on particular ways for the United States to de-
10 velop, strengthen, and enhance its capabilities to—

11 (A) monitor, receive early warning of, and
12 coordinate responses to potential emerging events
13 exacerbated by climate change;

14 (B) engage allies and partners, including
15 multilateral and regional institutions, to build
16 capacities and mobilize action for preventing
17 and responding to emerging events exacerbated
18 by climate change;

19 (C) encourage the deployment of civilian
20 advisors to prevent and respond to emerging
21 events exacerbated by climate change;

22 (D) increase the capacity of and develop
23 doctrine for the United States Foreign Service,
24 civil service, Armed Forces, development profes-
25 sionals, and other actors to engage in the full

1 *spectrum of activities to prevent and respond to*
2 *emerging events exacerbated by climate change;*

3 *(E) develop and implement tailored foreign*
4 *assistance programs that address and mitigate*
5 *the risks of emerging events exacerbated by cli-*
6 *mate change;*

7 *(F) ensure intelligence collection, analysis,*
8 *and sharing of appropriate information; and*

9 *(G) address any other issues that the Task*
10 *Force determines appropriate;*

11 *(10) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9),*
12 *receive support from bureaus and offices of the De-*
13 *partment of State, as the Secretary of State deter-*
14 *mines appropriate; and*

15 *(11) facilitate annual coordination between the*
16 *Department of State and other appropriate depart-*
17 *ments and agencies to ensure international and do-*
18 *mestic climate change objectives are aligned.*

19 *(d) COMPOSITION.—The Task Force shall—*

20 *(1) seek to ensure that its efforts complement and*
21 *support interagency processes led by the National Se-*
22 *curity Council that share the Task Force’s objectives;*
23 *and*

24 *(2) operate with regular consultation and par-*
25 *ticipation of designated representatives, at the Assist-*

1 *ant Secretary level or higher, from all such executive*
2 *departments, agencies, or offices as the Chair may*
3 *designate.*

4 *(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date*
5 *of the enactment of this Act and every 2 years thereafter*
6 *for the following 10 years, the Secretary of State, in con-*
7 *sultation with the Task Force, shall submit to the Com-*
8 *mittee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appro-*
9 *priations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-*
10 *airs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House*
11 *of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified*
12 *annex if necessary, that includes—*

13 *(1) a review, in consultation with the designated*
14 *representatives specified in subsection (d), consisting*
15 *of—*

16 *(A) an evaluation of the efficacy of current*
17 *efforts based on United States and locally identi-*
18 *fied indicators, including capacities and con-*
19 *straints for United States Government-wide de-*
20 *tection, early warning and response, informa-*
21 *tion-sharing, contingency planning, and coordi-*
22 *nation of efforts to prevent and respond to*
23 *emerging events exacerbated by climate change;*

24 *(B) an assessment of the funding expended*
25 *by relevant Federal departments and agencies on*

1 *emerging events exacerbated by climate change*
2 *and the legal, procedural, and resource con-*
3 *straints faced by the Department of State and*
4 *the United States Agency for International De-*
5 *velopment throughout respective budgeting, stra-*
6 *tegic planning, and management cycles to sup-*
7 *port the prevention of and response to emerging*
8 *events exacerbated by climate change;*

9 *(C) current annual global assessments of*
10 *emerging events exacerbated by climate change;*

11 *(D) recommendations to further strengthen*
12 *United States capabilities described in subpara-*
13 *graph (A); and*

14 *(E) consideration of analysis, reporting,*
15 *and policy recommendations by civil society,*
16 *academic, and other nongovernmental organiza-*
17 *tions and institutions to prevent and respond to*
18 *emerging events exacerbated by climate change;*

19 *(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsi-*
20 *bility by—*

21 *(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for*
22 *preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerg-*
23 *ing events exacerbated by climate change; and*

24 *(B) strengthening regional organizations;*
25 *and*

1 (3) *the implementation status of the rec-*
2 *ommendations included in the review under para-*
3 *graph (1).*

4 (f) *BRIEFINGS AND MATERIALS.—The Chair and*
5 *members of the Task Force shall, not less frequently than*
6 *annually, provide briefings and materials to the Committee*
7 *on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on*
8 *Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.*

9 (g) *REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL-*
10 *LIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is encour-*
11 *aged to include, in his or her annual (or more often as ap-*
12 *propriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a classi-*
13 *fied annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to United*
14 *States national security—*

15 (1) *a review of countries and regions at risk of*
16 *emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and*

17 (2) *whenever possible, specific identification of*
18 *countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging*
19 *events exacerbated by climate change.*

20 (h) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
21 *that rapid and robust climate change response mechanisms,*
22 *including the establishment of the Task Force, are critical*
23 *for ensuring other countries remain accountable to their cli-*
24 *mate action commitments as well as preserving the national*
25 *security and economic interests of the United States.*

1 **SEC. 611. WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS TO**
2 **REDUCE DEFORESTATION.**

3 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress finds the following:

4 (1) *The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is*
5 *having a substantial impact on the most important*
6 *forest ecosystems in the world, and illegal logging and*
7 *agricultural expansion have caused the massive forest*
8 *loss. According to the World Resources Institute, the*
9 *PRC has become the world’s leading importer and*
10 *consumer of timber products, soybeans, and palm oil,*
11 *as well as the largest manufacturing and export coun-*
12 *try of forest products.*

13 (2) *In 2016, the PRC imported logs from more*
14 *than 100 countries in the world. According to a Glob-*
15 *al Witness report, between January 2013 and April*
16 *2020, Chinese financial institutions provided more*
17 *than \$22.5 billion to major companies that produce*
18 *and trade commodities at high risk of driving defor-*
19 *estation. These commodities include beef, soy, palm*
20 *oil, paper, pulp, rubber, and timber.*

21 (3) *Further, the growing international demand*
22 *for such agricultural commodities causes the majority*
23 *of deforestation emissions globally, and most of the as-*
24 *sociated land-clearing violates applicable national or*
25 *local laws. According to a 2021 Forest Trends report,*

1 *at least 69 percent of forest land converted to pasture*
2 *or cropland was cleared illegally.*

3 *(4) The growing demand for timber and agricul-*
4 *tural commodities has accelerated unsustainable—and*
5 *often illegal—logging and the trade of timber prod-*
6 *ucts, which harms the countries in which it takes*
7 *place by siphoning away government tax revenue,*
8 *transforming the livelihoods of communities depend-*
9 *ent on forests, and hurting legal businesses’ competi-*
10 *tiveness. Further, illegal logging and illegal conver-*
11 *sion of forest to agricultural land threatens biodiver-*
12 *sity and accelerates deforestation and forest degrada-*
13 *tion in key timber supply countries, undermining*
14 *United States and global climate goals.*

15 *(5) The United States should work with inter-*
16 *national partners to ensure that Chinese and other*
17 *banks factor into lending practices the environmental*
18 *and social impact of the companies they finance. This*
19 *should include pressuring the PRC and other coun-*
20 *tries to revise regulations to require the banking sec-*
21 *tor not to finance companies linked to deforestation*
22 *and include rigorous checks on the companies oper-*
23 *ating in sectors or regions where there is a high risk*
24 *of deforestation to ensure they are not associated with*
25 *deforestation.*

1 (b) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

2 (1) *ADMINISTRATOR.*—*Except as otherwise ex-*
3 *pressly provided, the term “Administrator” means the*
4 *Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-*
5 *national Development.*

6 (2) *DEFORESTATION.*—*The term “deforestation”*
7 *means a change in land use from a forest (including*
8 *peatlands) to any other land use.*

9 (3) *DEVELOPING COUNTRY.*—*The term “devel-*
10 *oping country” means a country eligible to receive of-*
11 *ficial development assistance according to the income*
12 *guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee*
13 *of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and*
14 *Development.*

15 (4) *EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS.*—*The term “emis-*
16 *sions reductions” means greenhouse gas emissions re-*
17 *ductions achieved from reduced or avoided deforest-*
18 *ation under this section.*

19 (5) *FOREST.*—

20 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*The term “forest” means*
21 *a terrestrial ecosystem, including wetland forests,*
22 *comprised of native tree species generated and*
23 *maintained primarily through natural ecological*
24 *and evolutionary processes.*

1 (B) *EXCLUSION.*—*The term “forest” does*
2 *not include plantations, such as crops of trees*
3 *planted by humans primarily for the purposes of*
4 *harvesting.*

5 (6) *FOREST DEGRADATION.*—*The term “forest*
6 *degradation” is any reduction in the carbon stock of*
7 *a forest due to the effects of human land-use activities,*
8 *including such land-use activities on peatlands.*

9 (7) *INTACT FOREST.*—*The term “intact forest”*
10 *means an unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems*
11 *within the global extent of forest cover that—*

12 (A) *covers an area of at least 500 square*
13 *kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each*
14 *direction; and*

15 (B) *contains forest and non-forest eco-*
16 *systems minimally influenced by human eco-*
17 *nomie activity and large enough that all native*
18 *biodiversity, including viable populations of*
19 *wide-ranging species, could be maintained.*

20 (9) *LEAKAGE.*—*The term “leakage” means the*
21 *unexpected loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to*
22 *the displacement of activities in a project area to*
23 *areas outside the project, resulting in carbon emis-*
24 *sions.*

1 (10) *LEAKAGE PREVENTION ACTIVITIES.*—The
2 term “leakage prevention activities” means activities
3 in developing countries that are directed at preserving
4 existing forest carbon stocks, including forested wet-
5 lands and peatlands that might, absent such activi-
6 ties, be lost through leakage.

7 (11) *NATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION AC-*
8 *TIVITIES.*—The term “national deforestation reduc-
9 tion activities” means activities in developing coun-
10 tries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas emis-
11 sions from deforestation that is calculated by meas-
12 uring actual emissions against a national deforest-
13 ation baseline established pursuant to subparagraphs
14 (B) and (C) of subsection (d)(4).

15 (12) *SUBNATIONAL DEFORESTATION AND FOREST*
16 *DEGRADATION REDUCTION ACTIVITIES.*—The term
17 “subnational deforestation and forest degradation re-
18 duction activities” means activities in developing
19 countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas
20 emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
21 that is calculated by measuring actual emissions
22 using an appropriate baseline, or an alternative de-
23 termined under subsection (d)(4)(B)(ii), established
24 by the Administrator at the State or provincial level.

1 (c) *PURPOSES.*—*The purposes of this section are to*
2 *provide United States assistance to developing countries to*
3 *develop, implement, and improve actions that reduce defor-*
4 *estation and forest degradation or conserve or restore forest*
5 *ecosystems—*

6 (1) *to protect the value of forest ecosystems with*
7 *respect to permanent carbon capture and sequestra-*
8 *tion in a manner in which such value is measurable,*
9 *reportable, and verifiable; and*

10 (2) *in a manner that—*

11 (A) *is consistent with and enhances the im-*
12 *plementation of complementary United States*
13 *policies that support the good governance of for-*
14 *ests, biodiversity conservation, and environ-*
15 *mentally sustainable development;*

16 (B) *takes into consideration the views and*
17 *participation of local communities and most vul-*
18 *nerable communities and populations, particu-*
19 *larly forest-dependent communities; and*

20 (C) *incorporates the right to free prior and*
21 *informed consent of indigenous peoples.*

22 (d) *EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS THROUGH REDUCED DE-*
23 *FORESTATION.*—

24 (1) *ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.*—*Not later*
25 *than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this*

1 *Act, the Administrator, in consultation with other ap-*
2 *propriate agencies, shall establish a program to pro-*
3 *vide assistance to reduce deforestation in developing*
4 *countries and its impacts, in accordance with this*
5 *section.*

6 (2) *OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the program*
7 *established under paragraph (1) shall be—*

8 (A) *to achieve—*

9 (i) *emissions reductions of at least*
10 *7,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equiva-*
11 *lent in 2025;*

12 (ii) *cumulative emissions reductions of*
13 *at least 11,000,000,000 tons of carbon diox-*
14 *ide equivalent by December 31, 2030; and*

15 (iii) *additional emissions reductions in*
16 *subsequent years;*

17 (B) *to build capacity to reduce deforestation*
18 *at a national level in developing countries expe-*
19 *riencing deforestation, which may include—*

20 (i) *preparing developing countries to*
21 *participate in international markets for*
22 *international offset credits for reduced emis-*
23 *sions from deforestation;*

24 (ii) *supporting the development of*
25 *overseas domestic policy frameworks to en-*

1 *sure effective, efficient, and equitable ben-*
2 *efit-sharing of the proceeds of such credits*
3 *issued by national and subnational govern-*
4 *ments; and*

5 *(iii) promoting and expanding land ti-*
6 *tling initiatives and programs in other*
7 *countries;*

8 *(C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in coun-*
9 *tries where such forest carbon may be vulnerable*
10 *to leakage, particularly in developing countries*
11 *with largely intact native forests;*

12 *(D) to build the scientific knowledge and in-*
13 *stitutional capacity to help developing coun-*
14 *tries—*

15 *(i) monitor the effects of climate*
16 *change on their forests;*

17 *(ii) develop and implement strategies*
18 *to conserve their forests; and*

19 *(iii) support forest-dependent commu-*
20 *nities adapt to climate change;*

21 *(E) to the extent practicable, to reduce de-*
22 *forestation in ways that reduce the vulnerability*
23 *and increase the resilience to climate effects for*
24 *forests and forest-dependent communities;*

1 (F) to prevent degradation and fragmenta-
2 tion of forests and other intact ecosystems, par-
3 ticularly in tropical countries, including by pro-
4 viding assistance or supporting policies to—

5 (i) conserve, protect, and restore the in-
6 tegrity of such ecosystems; and

7 (ii) support the rights of Indigenous
8 People and local communities and their
9 ability to continue their effective steward-
10 ship of their intact traditional lands and
11 territories;

12 (G) to build capacity to address illegal de-
13 forestation for agricultural commodities; and

14 (H) to remove subsidies that favor deforest-
15 ation;

16 (e) *REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEFOREST-*
17 *ATION REDUCTION PROGRAM.*—

18 (1) *ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.*—

19 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*Except as provided in*
20 *subparagraph (B), the Administrator may pro-*
21 *vide assistance under this section only with re-*
22 *spect to a developing country that—*

23 (i) *the Administrator, in consultation*
24 *with other appropriate agencies, deter-*
25 *mines—*

1 (I) is experiencing deforestation
2 or forest degradation; or

3 (II) has standing forest carbon
4 stocks that may be at risk of deforest-
5 ation or degradation;

6 (ii) has the legal regimes, standards,
7 and safeguards to ensure that the rights and
8 interests of indigenous peoples and forest-de-
9 pendent communities are protected in ac-
10 cordance with the standards established
11 under paragraph (4); and

12 (iii) has entered into a bilateral or
13 multilateral agreement or arrangement with
14 the United States, or is part of an inter-
15 national program supported by the United
16 States to prevent deforestation, that estab-
17 lishes the conditions of participation by the
18 country in the program established under
19 this section, which shall include an agree-
20 ment to meet the standards established
21 under paragraph (4) for the activities to
22 which such standards apply.

23 (B) *EXCEPTION.*—A developing country
24 that does not meet the requirement described in
25 paragraph (1)(A)(ii) may receive assistance

1 *under this section for the purpose of building ca-*
2 *capacity to meet such requirement.*

3 (2) *AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.*—*Subject to the re-*
4 *quirements of this section, in providing assistance*
5 *under this section, the Administrator may support*
6 *activities to achieve the objectives described in sub-*
7 *section (c)(2), such as—*

8 (A) *national deforestation reduction activi-*
9 *ties;*

10 (B) *subnational deforestation and forest*
11 *degradation reduction activities, including pilot*
12 *activities, policies, and measures that reduce*
13 *greenhouse gas emissions and are subject to sig-*
14 *nificant uncertainty;*

15 (C) *activities to measure, monitor, and*
16 *verify deforestation, avoided deforestation, and*
17 *rates of deforestation, including, if applicable,*
18 *spatially explicit land use plans that identify in-*
19 *tact and primary forest areas and managed for-*
20 *est areas;*

21 (D) *leakage prevention activities;*

22 (E) *the development and implementation of*
23 *measurement, monitoring, reporting, and*
24 *verification capacities and governance structures,*
25 *including legal regimes, standards, processes,*

1 *and safeguards, as established under paragraph*
2 *(4), to enable a country to quantify emissions re-*
3 *ductions for purposes of purchasing or trading*
4 *subnational emissions reduction credits in car-*
5 *bon markets;*

6 *(F) the identification of, and actions to ad-*
7 *dress, the drivers of land use emissions;*

8 *(G) programs that would exclude from the*
9 *United States illegally harvested timber or prod-*
10 *ucts made from illegally harvested timber, in ac-*
11 *cordance with and consistent with the objectives*
12 *of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C.*
13 *3371 et seq.);*

14 *(H) the development and strengthening of*
15 *governance capacities to reduce deforestation and*
16 *other land use emissions and to combat illegal*
17 *logging and associated trade, including the devel-*
18 *opment of systems for independent monitoring of*
19 *the efficacy of forest law enforcement and in-*
20 *creased enforcement cooperation, including joint*
21 *efforts with Federal agencies, to enforce the*
22 *Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 3371*
23 *et seq.);*

24 *(I) programs to help countries strengthen*
25 *the necessary governance and technological ca-*

1 *capacity to trace and make publicly available the*
2 *origin of agricultural commodities associated*
3 *with tropical deforestation, such as beef, soy,*
4 *palm oil, paper, pulp, cocoa, and rubber;*

5 *(J) the development and strengthening of*
6 *governance capacities and associated implemen-*
7 *tation activities to combat illegal deforestation*
8 *related to the production of agricultural com-*
9 *modities, such as those described in subpara-*
10 *graph (I);*

11 *(K) the provision of incentives for policy re-*
12 *forms to achieve the objectives described in sub-*
13 *section (c)(2);*

14 *(L) the development of pilot projects—*

15 *(i) to examine where mitigation and*
16 *adaptation activities in forest ecosystems*
17 *coincide; and*

18 *(ii) to explore means for enhancing the*
19 *resilience of forest ecosystems and forest-de-*
20 *pendent communities;*

21 *(M) the promotion of mechanisms to deliver*
22 *resources for local action and to address the*
23 *needs, rights, interests, and participation of local*
24 *and indigenous communities;*

1 (N) the promotion of land tenure and ti-
2 tling programs, including legal recognition and
3 effective protection of the land tenure, access and
4 use rights of Indigenous People and local com-
5 munities; and

6 (O) the monitoring and evaluation of the
7 results of the activities conducted under this sec-
8 tion.

9 (3) *MECHANISMS.*—The Administrator shall
10 apply the administrative authorities under the For-
11 eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.),
12 except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of
13 this section, to the same extent and in the same man-
14 ner as such authorities apply to the implementation
15 of such Act in order to support activities to achieve
16 the objectives described in subsection (c)(2) by—

17 (A) developing and implementing programs
18 and project-level activities that achieve such ob-
19 jectives;

20 (B) to the extent practicable, giving priority
21 in any review process to activities under para-
22 graph (2)(A); and

23 (C) as appropriate, considering multi-year
24 funding arrangements in carrying out the pur-
25 poses of this section.

1 (4) *STANDARDS.*—*The Administrator, in con-*
2 *sultation with other appropriate agencies, shall estab-*
3 *lish program standards that—*

4 (A) *ensure that emissions reductions*
5 *achieved through supported activities—*

6 (i) *are additional, measurable,*
7 *verifiable, and monitored;*

8 (ii) *account for leakage, uncertainty,*
9 *and permanence; and*

10 (iii) *at a minimum, meet the stand-*
11 *ards established under the emissions unit*
12 *criteria of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduc-*
13 *tion Scheme for International Aviation*
14 *(CORSIA) developed by the International*
15 *Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);*

16 (B) *require—*

17 (i) *the establishment of a national de-*
18 *forestation baseline for each country with*
19 *national deforestation reduction activities*
20 *that is used to account for reductions*
21 *achieved from such activities; or*

22 (ii) *if a developing country has estab-*
23 *lished policies and taken measures to reduce*
24 *emissions from disturbed peatlands, defor-*
25 *estation, or forest degradation, but has not*

1 *established a national baseline, the provi-*
2 *sion of a credible, transparent, accurate,*
3 *and conservative alternative for quantifying*
4 *emissions;*

5 *(C) provide that each national deforestation*
6 *baseline established under subparagraph (B)(i)—*

7 *(i) is national, or subnational on an*
8 *interim basis, in scope; and*

9 *(ii) is consistent with nationally ap-*
10 *propriate mitigation commitments or ac-*
11 *tions with respect to deforestation, taking*
12 *into consideration—*

13 *(I) the average annual historical*
14 *deforestation rates of the country dur-*
15 *ing a period of at least 5 years; and*

16 *(II) the applicable drivers of de-*
17 *forestation and other factors to ensure*
18 *additionality;*

19 *(iii) establishes a trajectory that would*
20 *result in zero net deforestation by not later*
21 *than 20 years after the date on which the*
22 *baseline is established;*

23 *(iv) is adjusted over time to account*
24 *for changing national circumstances; and*

1 (v) is designed to account for all sig-
2 nificant sources of greenhouse gas emissions
3 from deforestation in the country;

4 (D) with respect to assistance provided for
5 activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B)
6 of paragraph (2), require emissions reductions to
7 be achieved and verified before the provision of
8 any assistance under this section;

9 (E) with respect to accounting for sub-
10 national deforestation and forest degradation re-
11 duction activities that lack the standardized or
12 precise measurement and monitoring techniques
13 needed for a full accounting of changes in emis-
14 sions or baselines, or are subject to other sources
15 of uncertainty, apply a conservative discount
16 factor to reflect the uncertainty regarding the
17 levels of reductions achieved;

18 (F) ensure that activities under this section
19 are designed, carried out, and managed—

20 (i) using forest management practices
21 that, in an open and transparent process—

22 (I) improve the livelihoods of for-
23 est communities in a manner that pro-
24 motes the maintenance of intact forests,
25 protects associated biodiversity, and re-

1 *stores native forest species and eco-*
2 *systems while avoiding the introduc-*
3 *tion of invasive nonnative species;*

4 *(II) maintain natural biodiver-*
5 *sity, resilience, and carbon storage ca-*
6 *capacity of forests;*

7 *(III) to the extent practicable, do*
8 *not adversely affect the permanence of*
9 *forest carbon stocks or emissions reduc-*
10 *tions;*

11 *(IV) include broad stakeholder*
12 *participation and the free prior and*
13 *informed consent of affected indigenous*
14 *peoples; and*

15 *(V) take into account the needs*
16 *and interests of local communities, for-*
17 *est-dependent communities, indigenous*
18 *peoples, and vulnerable social groups;*

19 *(ii) in consultation with, and with the*
20 *full and effective participation of, local*
21 *communities, indigenous peoples, and for-*
22 *est-dependent communities in affected areas,*
23 *as partners and primary stakeholders, be-*
24 *fore and during the design, planning, im-*

1 *plementation, monitoring, and evaluation of*
2 *activities; and*

3 *(iii) with equitable sharing of profits*
4 *and benefits derived from the activities with*
5 *local communities, indigenous peoples, and*
6 *forest-dependent communities; and*

7 *(G) with respect to assistance for all activi-*
8 *ties under this section, seek to ensure the estab-*
9 *lishment and enforcement of legal regimes, stand-*
10 *ards, processes, and safeguards by the country in*
11 *which the activities are conducted, as a condition*
12 *of such assistance or as a proposed activity for*
13 *which such assistance may be provided, which—*

14 *(i) protect the rights and interests of*
15 *local communities, indigenous peoples, for-*
16 *est-dependent communities, human rights*
17 *defenders, and vulnerable social groups; and*

18 *(ii) promote consultations with local*
19 *communities, indigenous peoples, and for-*
20 *est-dependent communities in affected areas,*
21 *as partners and primary stakeholders, be-*
22 *fore and during the design, planning, im-*
23 *plementation, monitoring, and evaluation of*
24 *activities under this section; and*

1 (iii) ensure equitable sharing of profits
2 and benefits from incentives for emissions
3 reductions or leakage prevention with local
4 communities, indigenous peoples, and for-
5 est-dependent communities.

6 (5) SCOPE.—

7 (A) REDUCED EMISSIONS.—The Adminis-
8 trator shall include reduced emissions from forest
9 degradation and disturbance of peatlands within
10 the scope of activities under this section.

11 (B) EXPANSION OF AUTHORIZED ACTIVI-
12 TIES.—If the Administrator determines, in con-
13 sultation with other appropriate agencies, that
14 sufficient methodologies and technical capacities
15 exist to measure, monitor, and account for the
16 emissions referred to in subparagraph (A), the
17 Administrator may expand the authorized ac-
18 tivities under this section, as appropriate, to in-
19 clude reduced soil carbon-derived emissions asso-
20 ciated with deforestation and degradation of for-
21 ested wetlands and peatlands, consistent with a
22 comprehensive approach to maintaining and en-
23 hancing forests, increasing climate resiliency, re-
24 ducing emissions, and increasing removals of
25 greenhouse gases.

1 (6) *ACCOUNTING.*—*The Administrator shall use*
2 *a publicly accessible registry to account for and reg-*
3 *ister the emissions reductions achieved through assist-*
4 *ance provided under this section each year, after ap-*
5 *propriately discounting for uncertainty and other rel-*
6 *evant factors as required by the standards established*
7 *under paragraph (4).*

8 (7) *INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION*
9 *PROGRAM INSURANCE ACCOUNT FOR NONCOMPLETION*
10 *OR REVERSAL.*—*In furtherance of the objectives de-*
11 *scribed in subsection (c)(2), the Administrator shall*
12 *develop and implement a program that—*

13 (A) *addresses noncompletion or reversal*
14 *with respect to any greenhouse gas emissions*
15 *that were not, or are no longer, sequestered; and*

16 (B) *may include a mechanism to hold in re-*
17 *serve a portion of the amount allocated for*
18 *projects to support the program.*

19 (8) *EXTENSION OF ASSISTANCE.*—

20 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Administrator may*
21 *extend, for an additional 5 years, the period dur-*
22 *ing which assistance is authorized for activities*
23 *supported by assistance under this section, if the*
24 *Administrator determines that—*

1 (i) the country in which the activities
2 are conducted is making substantial
3 progress toward adopting and implementing
4 a program to achieve reductions in deforest-
5 ation measured against a national baseline;

6 (ii) the greenhouse gas emissions reduc-
7 tions achieved as a result of the activities
8 are not resulting in significant leakage;

9 (iii) such greenhouse gas emissions re-
10 ductions are being appropriately discounted
11 to account for any leakage that is occurring;
12 and

13 (iv) such extension would further ad-
14 vance or ensure achievement of the objectives
15 of the activities.

16 (B) ASSISTANCE FOR SUBNATIONAL DEFOR-
17 ESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION REDUC-
18 TION ACTIVITIES.—

19 (i) IN GENERAL.—If the Administrator
20 extends the period during which assistance
21 is authorized for activities under subpara-
22 graph (A), the Administrator shall deter-
23 mine, based on the criteria specified that
24 subparagraph, whether such assistance
25 should include assistance for subnational

1 *deforestation and forest degradation reduc-*
2 *tion activities.*

3 (ii) *CONTINUED ASSISTANCE.—The Ad-*
4 *ministrator may extend the period during*
5 *which assistance is authorized for sub-*
6 *national deforestation and forest degrada-*
7 *tion reduction activities beyond the 5-year*
8 *period described in subparagraph (A) in*
9 *order to further the objectives described in*
10 *subparagraph (B) or (C) of subsection*
11 *(c)(2).*

12 (9) *COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN ASSIST-*
13 *ANCE.—Subject to the direction of the President, the*
14 *Administrator shall, to the extent practicable and*
15 *consistent with the objectives described in subsection*
16 *(c)(2), seek to align activities under this section with*
17 *broader development, poverty alleviation, or natural*
18 *resource management objectives and initiatives in*
19 *countries receiving assistance under this section.*

20 (10) *ASSISTANCE AS SUPPLEMENT.—The provi-*
21 *sion of assistance for activities under this section*
22 *shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any*
23 *other Federal, State, or local support available to*
24 *carry out activities under this section.*

1 (11) *FUNDING LIMITATION.*—*Of the funds made*
2 *available to carry out this section in any fiscal year,*
3 *not more than 7 percent may be used for the adminis-*
4 *trative expenses of the United States Agency for Inter-*
5 *national Development in support of activities de-*
6 *scribed in paragraph (2). Such amount shall be in*
7 *addition to other amounts otherwise available for*
8 *such purposes.*

9 (f) *LEGAL EFFECT.*—

10 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Nothing in this section may*
11 *be construed to supersede, limit, or otherwise affect*
12 *any restriction imposed by Federal law (including*
13 *regulations) on any interaction between an entity lo-*
14 *cated in the United States and an entity located in*
15 *a foreign country.*

16 (2) *ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.*—*Noth-*
17 *ing in this section may be construed to affect the role*
18 *of the Secretary of State or the responsibilities of the*
19 *Secretary under section 622(c) of the Foreign Assist-*
20 *ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).*

21 (g) *INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.*—*The*
22 *President shall direct the United States representatives to*
23 *the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and*
24 *other international financial institutions (as defined in sec-*
25 *tion 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act*

1 *(22 U.S.C. 262r(c)) to prioritize efforts to combat deforest-*
2 *ation.*

3 **SEC. 612. CONTROLLING THE EXPORT OF ELECTRONIC**
4 **WASTE TO PROTECT UNITED STATES SUPPLY**
5 **CHAINS.**

6 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:*

7 *(1) It is in the national security interests of the*
8 *United States to ensure that the export of electronic*
9 *waste does not become the source of counterfeit goods*
10 *that may reenter electronics supply chains in the*
11 *United States, and for other purposes.*

12 *(2) A 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee*
13 *Report “discovered counterfeit electronic parts from*
14 *China in the Air Force’s largest cargo plane, in as-*
15 *semblies intended for Special Operations helicopters,*
16 *and in a Navy surveillance plane among 1,800 cases*
17 *of bogus parts”.*

18 *(3) Further, exporting such material has often*
19 *resulted in environmental damage because of illegal*
20 *dumping or inadequate environmental regulations in*
21 *other countries for ensuring their safe and secure dis-*
22 *posal.*

23 *(4) China, the single largest producer of elec-*
24 *tronic waste, is on track for its e-waste industry to*
25 *total \$23,800,000,000 by 2030, given its high supply*

1 of used products, demand for recycled materials, and
2 capacity to transport these materials.

3 (5) *As the second largest producer of electronic*
4 *waste, the United States has a strong economic and*
5 *national security incentive to enhance domestic e-*
6 *waste recycling capacity rather than exporting to*
7 *China and other countries.*

8 (6) *Given China’s lack of regulations and worker*
9 *protections, workers in the e-waste industry have been*
10 *exposed to over 1,000 harmful substances, including*
11 *lead and mercury, endangering the health and*
12 *wellbeing of workers.*

13 (b) *DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

14 (1) *ELECTRONIC WASTE.—*

15 (A) *IN GENERAL.—The term “electronic*
16 *waste” means any of the following used items*
17 *containing electronic components, or fragments*
18 *thereof, including parts or subcomponents of such*
19 *items:*

20 (i) *Computers and related equipment.*

21 (ii) *Data center equipment (including*
22 *servers, network equipment, firewalls, bat-*
23 *tery backup systems, and power distribution*
24 *units).*

1 (iii) *Mobile computers (including note-*
2 *books, netbooks, tablets, and e-book readers).*

3 (iv) *Televisions (including portable*
4 *televisions and portable DVD players).*

5 (v) *Video display devices (including*
6 *monitors, digital picture frames, and port-*
7 *able video devices).*

8 (vi) *Digital imaging devices (including*
9 *printers, copiers, facsimile machines, image*
10 *scanners, and multifunction machines).*

11 (vii) *Consumer electronics—*

12 (I) *including digital cameras,*
13 *projectors, digital audio players, cel-*
14 *lular phones and wireless internet com-*
15 *munication devices, audio equipment,*
16 *video cassette recorders, DVD players,*
17 *video game systems (including portable*
18 *systems), video game controllers, signal*
19 *converter boxes, and cable and satellite*
20 *receivers; and*

21 (II) *not including appliances that*
22 *have electronic features.*

23 (viii) *Portable global positioning sys-*
24 *tem navigation devices.*

1 *(ix) Other used electronic items that*
2 *the Secretary determines to be necessary to*
3 *carry out this section.*

4 *(B) EXEMPT ITEMS.—The term “electronic*
5 *waste” does not include—*

6 *(i) exempted electronic waste items;*

7 *(ii) electronic parts of a motor vehicle;*

8 *or*

9 *(iii) electronic components, or items*
10 *containing electronic components, that are*
11 *exported or reexported to an entity under*
12 *the ownership or control of the person ex-*
13 *porting or reexporting the components or*
14 *items, with the intent that the components*
15 *or items be used for the purpose for which*
16 *the components or items were used in the*
17 *United States.*

18 *(2) EXEMPTED ELECTRONIC WASTE ITEMS.—*

19 *(A) IN GENERAL.—The term “exempted*
20 *electronic waste items” means the following:*

21 *(i) Tested, working used electronics.*

22 *(ii) Low-risk counterfeit electronics.*

23 *(iii) Recalled electronics.*

24 *(B) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:*

1 (i) *TESTED, WORKING USED ELEC-*
2 *TRONICS.—The term “tested, working used*
3 *electronics” means any used electronic items*
4 *that—*

5 (I) *are determined, through test-*
6 *ing methodologies established by the*
7 *Secretary, to be—*

8 (aa) *fully functional for the*
9 *purpose for which the items were*
10 *designed; or*

11 (bb) *in the case of multi-*
12 *function devices, fully functional*
13 *for at least one of the primary*
14 *purposes for which the items were*
15 *designed;*

16 (II) *are exported with the intent*
17 *to reuse the products as functional*
18 *products; and*

19 (III) *are appropriately packaged*
20 *for shipment to prevent the items from*
21 *losing functionality as a result of dam-*
22 *age during shipment.*

23 (ii) *LOW-RISK COUNTERFEIT ELEC-*
24 *TRONICS.—The term “low-risk counterfeit*

1 *electronics” means any electronic compo-*
2 *ments or items that—*

3 *(I) have been subjected to destruc-*
4 *tion processes that render the items un-*
5 *usable for their original purpose; and*

6 *(II) are exported as a feedstock,*
7 *with no additional mechanical or hand*
8 *separation required, in a reclamation*
9 *process to render the electronic compo-*
10 *nents or items recycled consistent with*
11 *the laws of the foreign country per-*
12 *forming the reclamation process.*

13 *(iii) RECALLED ELECTRONICS.—The*
14 *term “recalled electronics” means any elec-*
15 *tronic items that—*

16 *(I) because of a defect in the de-*
17 *sign or manufacture of the items—*

18 *(aa) are subject to a recall*
19 *notice issued by the Consumer*
20 *Product Safety Commission or*
21 *other pertinent Federal authority*
22 *and have been received by the*
23 *manufacturer or its agent and re-*
24 *paired by the manufacturer or its*
25 *agent to cure the defect; or*

1 *(bb) have been recalled by the*
2 *manufacturer as a condition of*
3 *the validity of the warranty on*
4 *the items and have been repaired*
5 *by the manufacturer or its agent*
6 *to cure the defect; and*

7 *(II) are exported by the manufac-*
8 *turer of the items.*

9 *(iv) FEEDSTOCK.—The term “feed-*
10 *stock” means any raw material constituting*
11 *the principal input for an industrial proc-*
12 *ess.*

13 *(3) COUNTERFEIT GOOD.—The term “counterfeit*
14 *good” means any good on which, or in connection*
15 *with which, a counterfeit mark is used.*

16 *(4) COUNTERFEIT MILITARY GOOD.—The term*
17 *“counterfeit military good” means a counterfeit good*
18 *that—*

19 *(A) is falsely identified or labeled as meet-*
20 *ing military specifications; or*

21 *(B) is intended for use in a military or na-*
22 *tional security application.*

23 *(5) COUNTERFEIT MARK.—The term “counterfeit*
24 *mark” has the meaning given that term in section*
25 *2320 of title 18, United States Code.*

1 (6) *EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.*—
2 *The term “Export Administration Regulations”*
3 *means the regulations set forth in subchapter C of*
4 *chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations,*
5 *or successor regulations.*

6 (7) *EXPORT; REEXPORT.*—*The terms “export”*
7 *and “reexport” have the meanings given such terms*
8 *in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of*
9 *2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).*

10 (8) *SECRETARY.*—*The term “Secretary” means*
11 *the Secretary of Commerce.*

12 (9) *USED.*—*The term “used”, with respect to an*
13 *item, means the item has been operated or employed.*

14 (c) *PROHIBITION.*—*Except as provided in subsections*
15 (c) and (d), *no person or entity may export or reexport*
16 *electronic waste or exempted electronic waste items.*

17 (d) *EXPORT PROHIBITION EXEMPTIONS.*—*A person or*
18 *entity may export or reexport exempted electronic waste*
19 *items, but only if the following requirements are met:*

20 (1) *REGISTRATION.*—*The person or entity is list-*
21 *ed on a publicly available registry maintained by the*
22 *Secretary.*

23 (2) *FILING OF EXPORT INFORMATION.*—*For each*
24 *export transaction, the person or entity files in the*
25 *Automated Export System, in accordance with part*

1 758 of the *Export Administration Regulations* (or
2 any corresponding similar regulation or ruling), elec-
3 tronic export information that contains at least the
4 following information:

5 (A) A description of the type and total
6 quantity of exempted electronic waste items ex-
7 ported.

8 (B) The name of each country that received
9 the exempted electronic waste items for reuse or
10 recycling.

11 (C)(i) The name of the ultimate consignee to
12 which the exempted electronic waste items were
13 received for reclamation, recall, or reuse; and

14 (ii) documentation and a declaration that
15 such consignee has the necessary permits, re-
16 sources, and competence to manage the exempted
17 electronic waste items as reusable products or re-
18 cyclable feedstock and prevent its release as a
19 counterfeit good or counterfeit military good.

20 (3) *COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS.*—The ex-
21 port or reexport of exempted electronic waste items
22 otherwise comply with applicable international agree-
23 ments to which the United States is a party and with
24 other trade and export control laws of the United
25 States.

1 (4) *EXPORT DECLARATIONS AND REQUIRE-*
2 *MENTS.—The exempted electronic waste items are ac-*
3 *companied by—*

4 (A) *documentation of the registration of the*
5 *exporter required under paragraph (1);*

6 (B) *a declaration signed by an officer or*
7 *designated representative of the exporter assert-*
8 *ing that the exempted electronic waste items meet*
9 *the applicable requirements for exempted elec-*
10 *tronic waste items under this section;*

11 (C) *a description of the contents and condi-*
12 *tion of the exempted electronic waste items in the*
13 *shipment;*

14 (D) *for tested, working electronics, a de-*
15 *scription of the testing methodologies and test re-*
16 *sults for each item;*

17 (E) *the name of the ultimate consignee and*
18 *declaration of the consignee's applicable permits,*
19 *resources, and competence to process or use the*
20 *items as intended; and*

21 (F) *with respect to low-risk counterfeit elec-*
22 *tronics only and when required by the importing*
23 *country, the written consent of the competent au-*
24 *thority of the receiving country to allow the*
25 *products in such country.*

1 (e) *EXCEPTION FOR PERSONAL USE.*—The Secretary
2 may provide for an exception to the requirements of this
3 section, subject to such recordkeeping requirements as the
4 Secretary may impose, for the export or reexport of 5 or
5 fewer items that are or contain electronic components in-
6 tended for personal use.

7 (f) *EFFECTIVE DATE.*—

8 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Subject to paragraph (2), this
9 section shall take effect upon the expiration of the 1-
10 year period beginning on the date of the enactment of
11 this Act.

12 (2) *MODIFICATION OF EAR.*—The Secretary shall,
13 not later than the effective date under paragraph (1),
14 ensure that the Export Administration Regulations
15 are modified to carry out this section.

16 (g) *PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS.*—Any person who
17 violates this section or the regulations issued under sub-
18 section (e)(2) shall be subject to the same penalties as those
19 that apply to any person violating any other provision of
20 the Export Administration Regulations.

Union Calendar No. 486

117TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

H. R. 3524

[Report No. 117-667, Part I]

A BILL

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

DECEMBER 30, 2022

Reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs with an amendment

DECEMBER 30, 2022

Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Select) discharged; committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed