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To address issues involving the People’s Republic of China.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 15, 2021

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. RISCH, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. COONS, Mr. KAINE, and Mr. VAN HOLLEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

MAY 10, 2021

Reported by Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself and Mr. RISCH), with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To address issues involving the People’s Republic of China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) ~~SHORT TITLE.~~—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Strategic Competition Act of 2021”.

6 (b) ~~TABLE OF CONTENTS.~~—The table of contents for
7 ~~this Act~~ is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Definitions.
- Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

Subtitle A—Science and Technology

- Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure Development

- Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
- Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment standards.
- Sec. 113. United States support for infrastructure.
- Sec. 114. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
- Sec. 115. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
- Sec. 116. Report on China's investments in foreign energy development.

Subtitle C—Digital Technology and Connectivity

- Sec. 121. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
- Sec. 122. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.

Subtitle D—Countering Chinese Communist Party Influence

- Sec. 131. Short title.
- Sec. 132. Authorization.
- Sec. 133. Findings on Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations.
- Sec. 134. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program.
- Sec. 135. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
- Sec. 136. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
- Sec. 137. Global engagement center.
- Sec. 138. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of certain foreign gifts to and contracts with institutions of higher education.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

- Sec. 201. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
- Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
- Sec. 204. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
- Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States-ASEAN cooperation on technology issues with respect to the People's Republic of China.
- Sec. 206. Report on Chinese influence in international organizations.
- Sec. 207. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
- Sec. 208. Technology partnership office at the Department of State.

- Sec. 209. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
- Sec. 210. Sense of Congress on centrality of sanctions and other restrictions to strategic competition with China.
- Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 countries on the People's Republic of China.
- Sec. 212. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
- Sec. 213. Treatment of Taiwan government.
- Sec. 214. Report on origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Sec. 215. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement with Pacific island countries.
- Sec. 216. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 217. Advancing United States leadership in the United Nations System.

Subtitle B—International Security Matters

- Sec. 221. Definitions.
- Sec. 222. Findings.
- Sec. 223. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 224. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 225. Foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific and authorization of appropriations for Southeast Asia maritime security programs and diplomatic outreach activities.
- Sec. 226. Foreign military financing compact pilot program in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 227. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 228. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 229. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 230. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea.
- Sec. 231. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners.
- Sec. 232. Report on national technology and industrial base.
- Sec. 233. Report on diplomatic outreach with respect to Chinese military installations overseas.
- Sec. 234. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
- Sec. 235. Limitation on assistance to countries hosting Chinese military installations.

Subtitle C—Regional Strategies To Counter the People's Republic of China

- Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the world with respect to the People's Republic of China.

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- Sec. 246. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China's arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian citizens.
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- Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.

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- Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
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- Sec. 301. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong Kong.
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TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

Sec. 401. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial policy.

Sec. 402. Intellectual property violators list.

Sec. 403. Government of the People's Republic of China subsidies list.

Sec. 404. Countering foreign corrupt practices.

Sec. 405. Debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from the International Development Association.

Sec. 406. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United States laws and protections.

Sec. 407. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies in United States capital markets.

TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

Sec. 501. Findings on strategic security and arms control.

Sec. 502. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.

Sec. 503. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's Republic of China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is
 4 leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili-
 5 tary, technological, and ideological power to become
 6 a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the
 7 United States. The policies increasingly pursued by
 8 the PRC in these domains are contrary to the inter-
 9 ests and values of the United States, its partners,
 10 and much of the rest of the world.

11 (2) The current policies being pursued by the
 12 PRC—

13 (A) threaten the future character of the
 14 international order and are shaping the rules,

1 norms, and institutions that govern relations
2 among states;

3 (B) will put at risk the ability of the
4 United States to secure its national interests;
5 and

6 (C) will put at risk the future peace, pros-
7 perity, and freedom of the international commu-
8 nity in the coming decades.

9 (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with
10 the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked
11 to advance the PRC's economic and social develop-
12 ment to ensure that it participated in, and benefitted
13 from, the free and open international order. The
14 United States pursued these goals and contributed
15 to the welfare of the Chinese people by—

16 (A) increasing the PRC's trade relations
17 and access to global capital markets;

18 (B) promoting the PRC's accession to the
19 World Trade Organization;

20 (C) providing development finance and
21 technical assistance;

22 (D) promoting research collaboration;

23 (E) educating the PRC's top students;

24 (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge
25 technologies and scientific knowledge; and

1 (G) providing intelligence and military as-
2 sistance.

3 (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to
4 pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an
5 increasingly authoritarian governance model at home
6 through increased restrictions on personal freedoms,
7 and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These
8 policies frequently and deliberately undermine
9 United States interests and are contrary to core
10 United States values and the values of other nations,
11 both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to
12 this strategic decision of the CCP, the United States
13 has been compelled to reexamine and revise its strat-
14 egy towards the PRC.

15 (5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Com-
16 munist Party and the President of the People's Re-
17 public of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the "Great
18 Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation" as central to
19 the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His pro-
20 gram demands—

21 (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;

22 (B) concentration of military power;

23 (C) a strong role for the CCP in the state
24 and the economy;

1 (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking
2 control over broadly asserted territorial claims;
3 and

4 (E) the denial of any universal values and
5 individual rights that are deemed to threaten
6 the CCP.

7 (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of gov-
8 ernance, “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, as
9 superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional
10 models of the United States and other democracies.
11 This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP
12 as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a global
13 leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a
14 2013 speech, President Xi said, “We firmly believe
15 that as socialism with Chinese characteristics devel-
16 ops further : : : it is : : : inevitable that the superi-
17 ority of our socialist system will be increasingly ap-
18 parent : : : [and] our country’s road of development
19 will have increasingly greater influence on the
20 world.”.

21 (7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish
22 regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to
23 use that dominant position to propel the PRC to be-
24 come the “leading world power,” shaping an inter-
25 national order that is conducive to the CCP’s inter-

1 ests. Achieving these objectives requires turning the
2 PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by
3 using a strong military and advanced technological
4 capability to pursue the PRC's objectives, regardless
5 of other countries' interests.

6 (8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter-
7 national order, which is built upon the rule of law
8 and free and open ideals and principles, by con-
9 ducting global information and influence operations,
10 seeking to redefine international laws and norms to
11 align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the
12 legitimacy of internationally recognized human
13 rights, and seeking to co-opt the leadership and
14 agenda of multinational organizations for the benefit
15 of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the
16 expense of the interests of the United States and the
17 international community. In December 2018, Presi-
18 dent Xi suggested that the CCP views its "historic
19 mission" as not only to govern China, but also to
20 profoundly influence global governance to benefit the
21 CCP.

22 (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to
23 follow its model of "socialism with Chinese charac-
24 teristics". During the 19th Party Congress in 2017,
25 President Xi said that the PRC could serve as a

1 model of development for other countries by utilizing
2 “Chinese wisdom” and a “Chinese approach to solv-
3 ing problems”.

4 (10) The PRC is promoting its governance
5 model and attempting to weaken other models of
6 governance by—

7 (A) undermining democratic institutions;

8 (B) subverting financial institutions;

9 (C) coercing businesses to accommodate
10 the policies of the PRC; and

11 (D) using disinformation to disguise the
12 nature of the actions described in subpara-
13 graphs (A) through (C).

14 (11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming
15 the global leader in science and technology. In May
16 2018, President Xi said that for the PRC to reach
17 “prosperity and rejuvenation”, it needs to “endeavor
18 to be a major world center for science and innova-
19 tion”. The PRC has invested the equivalent of bil-
20 lions of dollars into education and research and de-
21 velopment and established joint scientific research
22 centers and science universities.

23 (12) The PRC’s drive to become a “manufac-
24 turing and technological superpower” and to pro-
25 mote “innovation with Chinese characteristics” is

1 coming at the expense of human rights and long-
2 standing international rules and norms with respect
3 to economic competition, and presents a challenge to
4 United States national security and the security of
5 allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the
6 PRC advances its illiberal political and social policies
7 through mass surveillance, social credit systems, and
8 a significant role of the state in internet governance.
9 Through these means, the PRC increases direct and
10 indirect government control over its citizens' every-
11 day lives. Its national strategy of "civil-military fu-
12 sion" mandates that civil and commercial research,
13 which increasingly drives global innovation, is lever-
14 aged to develop new military capabilities.

15 (13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means
16 to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing
17 and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-
18 directed industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to
19 ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP
20 engages in and encourages actions that actively un-
21 dermine a free and open international market, such
22 as intellectual property theft, forced technology
23 transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and
24 mandatory CCP access to proprietary data as part

1 of business and commercial agreements between Chi-
2 nese and foreign companies.

3 (14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13)
4 are designed to freeze United States and other for-
5 eign firms out of the PRC market, while eroding
6 competition in other important markets. The heavy
7 subsidization of Chinese companies includes poten-
8 tial violation of its World Trade Organization com-
9 mitments. In May 2018, President Xi said that the
10 PRC aims to keep the “initiatives of innovation and
11 development security : : : in [China’s] own hands”.

12 (15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives
13 through a variety of avenues, including its signature
14 initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to
15 in this section as “BRI”), which is enshrined in the
16 Chinese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk
17 Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes
18 BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan
19 for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to advance an
20 economic system with the PRC at its center, making
21 it the most concrete geographical representation of
22 the PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases the eco-
23 nomic influence of state-owned Chinese firms in
24 global markets, enhances the PRC’s political lever-
25 age with government leaders around the world, and

1 provides greater access to strategic nodes such as
2 ports and railways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks
3 political deference through economic dependence.

4 (16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish
5 regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and dis-
6 place the United States from the region. As a Pa-
7 cific power, the United States has built and sup-
8 ported enduring alliances and economic partnerships
9 that secure peace and prosperity and promote the
10 rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open
11 Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic
12 and military coercion in the region to secure its own
13 interests.

14 (17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep
15 the United States military from operating in the
16 Western Pacific and erodes United States security
17 guarantees.

18 (18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclu-
19 sive control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air
20 space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually
21 exercising greater influence beyond the region. This
22 includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy
23 exploration, transport, and the exercise of security
24 operations in areas permitted under international
25 law.

1 (19) The PRC seeks so-called “reunification”
2 with Taiwan through whatever means may ulti-
3 mately be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-
4 called “reunification” is Taiwan’s only option makes
5 this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019,
6 President Xi stated that the PRC “make[s] no
7 promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s]
8 the option of taking all necessary means”. Taiwan’s
9 embodiment of democratic values and economic lib-
10 eralism challenges President Xi’s goal of achieving
11 national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Tai-
12 wan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island
13 Chain and to project power into the Second Island
14 Chain and beyond.

15 (20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe-
16 cuted an illegal island-building campaign that
17 threatens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of
18 commerce, damages the environment, bolsters the
19 PLA power projection capabilities, and coerces and
20 intimidates other regional claimants in an effort to
21 advance its unlawful claims and control the waters
22 around neighboring countries. Despite President Xi’s
23 September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC
24 was not militarizing the South China Sea, during
25 the 2017 19th Party Congress, President Xi an-

1 nounced that “construction on islands and reefs in
2 the South China Sea have seen steady progress”.

3 (21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA
4 to attain a level of capacity and capability superior
5 to the United States in terms of equipment and con-
6 duct of modern military operations by shifting its
7 military doctrine from having a force “adequate
8 [for] China’s defensive needs” to having a force
9 “commensurate with China’s international status”.
10 Ultimately, this transformation could enable China
11 to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through
12 the threat of military force. In 2017, President Xi
13 established the following developmental benchmarks
14 for the advancement of the PLA:

15 (A) A mechanized force with increased
16 informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.

17 (B) The complete modernization of China’s
18 national defense by 2035.

19 (C) The full transformation of the PLA
20 into a world-class force by 2050.

21 (22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting poli-
22 cies described in this section undermine United
23 States interests, such as—

24 (A) upholding a free and open inter-
25 national order;

1 (B) maintaining the integrity of inter-
2 national institutions with liberal norms and val-
3 ues;

4 (C) preserving a favorable balance of
5 power in the Indo-Pacific;

6 (D) ensuring the defense of its allies;

7 (E) preserving open sea and air lanes;

8 (F) fostering the free flow of commerce
9 through open and transparent markets; and

10 (G) promoting individual freedom and
11 human rights.

12 (23) The global COVID-19 pandemic has in-
13 tensified and accelerated these trends in the PRC's
14 behavior and therefore increased the need for United
15 States global leadership and a competitive posture.
16 The PRC has capitalized on the world's focus on the
17 COVID-19 pandemic by—

18 (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong
19 Kong's autonomy, including imposing a so-
20 called "national security law" on Hong Kong;

21 (B) aggressively imposing its will in the
22 East and South China Seas;

23 (C) contributing to increased tensions with
24 India; and

1 (D) engaging in a widespread and govern-
2 ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob-
3 scure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up
4 the seriousness of COVID-19, sow confusion
5 about the origination of the outbreak, and dis-
6 credit the United States, its allies, and global
7 health efforts.

8 (24) In response to the PRC’s strategy and
9 policies, the United States must adopt a policy of
10 strategic competition with the PRC to protect and
11 promote our vital interests and values.

12 (25) The United States policy of strategic com-
13 petition with respect to the People’s Republic of
14 China is part of a broader strategic approach to the
15 Indo-Pacific and the world which centers with
16 United States allies and partners to advance shared
17 values and interests and to preserve and enhance a
18 free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable,
19 and diverse region.

20 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

21 In this Act:

22 (1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-**
23 **TEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional com-
24 mittees” means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
2 the Senate; and

3 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
4 the House of Representatives.

5 (2) CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese
6 Communist Party.

7 (3) INDO-PACIFIC REGION.—The terms “Indo-
8 Pacific” and “Indo-Pacific region” mean the 36
9 countries and the surrounding waterways that are
10 under the area of responsibility of the U.S. Indo-Pa-
11 cific Command. These countries are: Australia, Ban-
12 gladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China,
13 Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malay-
14 sia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mon-
15 golia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea,
16 Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of
17 Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri
18 Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga,
19 Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

20 (4) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The
21 terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean
22 the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.

23 (5) PRC; CHINA.—The terms “PRC” and
24 “China” mean the People’s Republic of China.

1 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

2 (a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United
3 States, in pursuing strategic competition with the PRC,
4 to pursue the following objectives:

5 (1) The United States global leadership role is
6 sustained and its political system and major founda-
7 tions of national power are postured for long-term
8 political, economic, technological, and military com-
9 petition with the PRC.

10 (2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific re-
11 mains favorable to the United States and its allies.
12 The United States and its allies maintain unfettered
13 access to the region, including through freedom of
14 navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent
15 with international law and practice, and the PRC
16 neither dominates the region nor coerces its neigh-
17 bors.

18 (3) The allies and partners of the United
19 States—

20 (A) maintain confidence in United States
21 leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-
22 cific region;

23 (B) can withstand and combat subversion
24 and undue influence by the PRC; and

1 (C) align themselves with the United
2 States in setting global rules, norms, and stand-
3 ards that benefit the international community.

4 (4) The combined weight of the United States
5 and its allies and partners is strong enough to dem-
6 onstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to
7 dominate other states outweigh the potential bene-
8 fits.

9 (5) The United States leads the free and open
10 international order, which is comprised of resilient
11 states and institutions that uphold and defend prin-
12 ciples, including sovereignty, rule of law, individual
13 freedom, and human rights. The international order
14 is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization
15 by illiberal and authoritarian actors.

16 (6) The key rules, norms, and standards of
17 international engagement in the 21st century are
18 maintained, including the—

19 (A) protection of human rights, commer-
20 cial engagement and investment, and tech-
21 nology; and

22 (B) that such rules, norms, and standards
23 are in alignment with the values and interests
24 of the United States, its allies and partners,
25 and the free world.

1 (7) Assure that the CCP does not—

2 (A) subvert open and democratic societies;

3 (B) distort global markets;

4 (C) manipulate the international trade sys-
5 tem;

6 (D) coerce other nations via economic and
7 military means; or

8 (E) use its technological advantages to un-
9 dermine individual freedoms or other states' na-
10 tional security interests.

11 (8) The United States deters military con-
12 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to
13 reduce the risk of conflict.

14 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States;
15 in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

16 (1) to strengthen the United States domestic
17 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic
18 growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
19 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that
20 improve the United States ability to pursue its vital
21 economic, foreign policy, and national security inter-
22 ests;

23 (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition
24 with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic,
25 development, military, informational, and techno-

1 logical realms that maximizes United States
2 strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of
3 harming United States interests and values of those
4 of United States allies and partners;

5 (3) to lead a free, open, and secure inter-
6 national system characterized by freedom from coer-
7 cion, rule of law, open markets and the free flow of
8 commerce, and a shared commitment to security and
9 peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and
10 good and transparent governance;

11 (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
12 ances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific
13 and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multi-
14 lateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared in-
15 terests and values and bolster partner countries'
16 confidence that the United States is and will remain
17 a strong, committed, and constant partner;

18 (5) to encourage and aid United States allies
19 and partners in boosting their own capabilities and
20 resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared in-
21 terests and values, free from coercion and external
22 pressure;

23 (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and
24 healthy competition in United States-China economic
25 relations by—

1 (A) advancing policies that harden the
2 United States economy against unfair and ille-
3 gal commercial or trading practices and the co-
4 ercion of United States businesses; and

5 (B) tightening United States laws and reg-
6 ulations as necessary to prevent the PRC's at-
7 tempts to harm United States economic com-
8 petitiveness;

9 (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-
10 led growth in emerging markets around the world;
11 including through the use of United States Govern-
12 ment tools that—

13 (A) support greater private sector invest-
14 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives
15 that are grounded in the rule of law;

16 (B) promote open markets;

17 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory
18 frameworks;

19 (D) improve the management of key eco-
20 nomic sectors;

21 (E) combat corruption; and

22 (F) foster and support greater collabora-
23 tion with and among partner countries and the
24 United States private sector to develop secure
25 and sustainable infrastructure;

1 (8) to lead in the advancement of international
2 rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade
3 and open and integrated markets;

4 (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy
5 in support of United States companies and busi-
6 nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi-
7 tion;

8 (10) to ensure that the United States leads in
9 the innovation of critical and emerging technologies,
10 such as next-generation telecommunications, artifi-
11 cial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconduc-
12 tors, and biotechnology, by—

13 (A) providing necessary investment and
14 concrete incentives for the private sector to ac-
15 celerate development of such technologies;

16 (B) modernizing and harmonizing with al-
17 lies and partners export controls and invest-
18 ment screening regimes and associated policies
19 and regulations;

20 (C) enhancing United States leadership in
21 technical standards-setting bodies and avenues
22 for developing norms regarding the use of
23 emerging critical technologies;

24 (D) reducing United States barriers and
25 increasing incentives for collaboration with al-

1 lies and partners on the research and codevelop-
2 ment of critical technologies;
3 ~~(E)~~ collaborating with allies and partners
4 to protect critical technologies by—
5 (i) crafting multilateral export control
6 measures;
7 (ii) building capacity for defense tech-
8 nology security;
9 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in the
10 supply chains; and
11 (iv) ensuring diversification; and
12 ~~(F)~~ designing major defense capabilities
13 for export to allies and partners;
14 (11) to enable the people of the United States,
15 including the private sector, civil society, universities
16 and other academic institutions, State and local leg-
17 islators, and other relevant actors to identify and re-
18 main vigilant to the risks posed by undue influence
19 of the CCP in the United States;
20 (12) to implement measures to mitigate the
21 risks referred to in paragraph (11), while still pre-
22 serving opportunities for economic engagement, aca-
23 demic research, and cooperation in other areas
24 where the United States and the PRC share inter-
25 ests;

1 (13) to collaborate with advanced democracies
2 and other willing partners to promote ideals and
3 principles that—

4 (A) advance a free and open international
5 order;

6 (B) strengthen democratic institutions;

7 (C) protect and promote human rights;

8 and

9 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
10 porting;

11 (14) to demonstrate effective leadership at the
12 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other
13 multilateral organizations and defend the integrity
14 of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal
15 and authoritarian nations;

16 (15) to prioritize the defense of fundamental
17 freedoms and human rights in the United States re-
18 lationship with the PRC;

19 (16) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
20 tilateral organizations, leveraging their significant
21 and growing capabilities to build a network of like-
22 minded states that sustains and strengthens a free
23 and open order and addresses regional and global
24 challenges to hold the Government of the PRC ac-
25 countable for—

1 (A) violations and abuses of human rights;
2 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and,
3 (C) undermining and abrogating treaties,
4 other international agreements, and other inter-
5 national norms related to human rights;

6 (17) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, re-
7 pression, coercion, and other malign behavior to at-
8 tain unfair economic advantage and deference of
9 other nations to its political and strategic objectives;

10 (18) to maintain United States access to the
11 Western Pacific, including by—

12 (A) increasing United States forward-de-
13 ployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region;

14 (B) modernizing the United States military
15 through investments in existing and new plat-
16 forms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater
17 force structure and enabling capabilities, joint
18 operational concepts, and a diverse, operation-
19 ally resilient and politically sustainable posture;
20 and

21 (C) operating and conducting exercises
22 with allies and partners—

23 (i) to mitigate the PLA's ability to
24 project power and establish contested zones
25 within the First and Second Island Chains;

1 (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA
2 to coerce its neighbors;

3 (iii) to maintain open sea and air
4 lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait,
5 the East China Sea, and the South China
6 Sea; and

7 (iv) to project power from the United
8 States and its allies and partners to dem-
9 onstrate the ability to conduct contested lo-
10 gistics;

11 (19) to deter the PRC from—

12 (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, includ-
13 ing by developing more combat-credible forces
14 that are integrated with allies and partners in
15 contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to de-
16 feat any PRC theory of victory in the First or
17 Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific
18 and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National
19 Defense Strategy;

20 (B) using gray-zone tactics below the level
21 of armed conflict; or

22 (C) initiating armed conflict;

23 (20) to strengthen United States-PRC military-
24 to-military communication and improve de-escalation
25 procedures to deconflict operations and reduce the

1 risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-
2 level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian
3 and military officials and other measures, in align-
4 ment with United States interests; and

5 (21) to cooperate with the PRC if interests
6 align, including through bilateral or multilateral
7 means and at the United Nations, as appropriate.

8 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

9 It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the
10 policy described in section 4(b) requires the following ac-
11 tions:

12 (1) Strategic competition with the PRC will re-
13 quire the United States—

14 (A) to marshal sustained political will to
15 protect its vital interests, promote its values,
16 and advance its economic and national security
17 objectives for decades to come; and

18 (B) to achieve this sustained political will,
19 persuade the American people and United
20 States allies and partners of—

21 (i) the challenges posed by the PRC;

22 and

23 (ii) the need for long-term competition
24 to defend shared interests and values.

1 (2) The United States must coordinate closely
2 with allies and partners to compete effectively with
3 the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners
4 to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing
5 and checking the aggressive and assertive behavior
6 of the PRC.

7 (3) The President of the United States must
8 lead and direct the entire executive branch to make
9 the People's Republic of China as the greatest geo-
10 political and geoeconomic challenge for United
11 States foreign policy, increasing the prioritization of
12 strategic competition with the PRC and broader
13 United States interests in the Indo-Pacific region in
14 the conduct of foreign policy and assuring the alloca-
15 tion of appropriate resources adequate to the chal-
16 lenge.

17 (4) The head of every Federal department and
18 agency should designate a senior official at the level
19 of Under Secretary or above to coordinate the de-
20 partment's or agency's policies with respect to stra-
21 tegic competition with the PRC.

22 (5) The ability of the United States to execute
23 a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC will
24 be undermined if our attention is repeatedly diverted

1 to challenges that are not vital to United States eco-
2 nomic and national security interests.

3 (6) In the coming decades, the United States
4 must prevent the PRC from—

5 (A) establishing regional hegemony in the
6 Indo-Pacific; and

7 (B) using that position to advance its as-
8 sertive political, economic, and foreign policy
9 goals around the world.

10 (7) The United States must ensure that the
11 Federal budget is properly aligned with the strategic
12 imperative to compete with the PRC by—

13 (A) ensuring sufficient levels of funding to
14 resource all instruments of United States na-
15 tional power; and

16 (B) coherently prioritizing how such funds
17 are used.

18 (8) Sustained prioritization of the challenge
19 posed by the PRC requires—

20 (A) bipartisan cooperation within Con-
21 gress; and

22 (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
23 collaboration and consultation between the exec-
24 utive branch and Congress.

1 (9) The United States must ensure close inte-
2 gration among economic and foreign policymakers;
3 the private sector, civil society, universities and aca-
4 demic institutions, and other relevant actors in free
5 and open societies affected by the challenges posed
6 by the PRC to enable such actors—

7 (A) to collaborate to advance common in-
8 terests; and

9 (B) to identify appropriate policies—

10 (i) to strengthen the United States
11 and its allies;

12 (ii) to promote a compelling vision of
13 a free and open order; and

14 (iii) to push back against detrimental
15 policies pursued by the CCP.

16 (10) The United States must ensure that all
17 Federal departments and agencies are organized to
18 reflect the fact that strategic competition with the
19 PRC is the United States top foreign policy priority,
20 including through the assigned missions and location
21 of United States Government personnel, by—

22 (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-
23 Pacific region, at posts around the world, and
24 in Washington DC, with priorities directly rel-

1 evant to advancing competition with the Peo-
2 ple's Republic of China;

3 (B) placing greater numbers of foreign
4 service officers, international development pro-
5 fessionals, members of the foreign commercial
6 service, intelligence professionals, and other
7 United States Government personnel in the
8 Indo-Pacific region; and

9 (C) ensuring that this workforce, both ei-
10 vilian and military, has the training in lan-
11 guage, technical skills, and other competencies
12 required to advance a successful competitive
13 strategy with the PRC.

14 (11) The United States must place renewed em-
15 phasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments
16 of national power, including diplomacy, information,
17 technology, economics, foreign assistance and devel-
18 opment finance, commerce, intelligence, and law en-
19 forcement, which are crucial for addressing the
20 unique economic, political, and ideological challenges
21 posed by the PRC.

22 (12) The United States must sustain resourcing
23 for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be
24 aligned with the overarching political and diplomatic
25 objectives articulated in the Asia Reassurance Initia-

1 tive Act (Public Law 115-409), and must prioritize
 2 the military investments necessary to achieve United
 3 States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, includ-
 4 ing—

5 (A) promoting regional security in the
 6 Indo-Pacific;

7 (B) reassuring allies and partners while
 8 protecting them from coercion; and

9 (C) deterring conflict with the PRC.

10 (13) Competition with the PRC requires the
 11 United States skillful adaptation to the information
 12 environment of the 21st century. United States pub-
 13 lic diplomacy and messaging efforts must effec-
 14 tively—

15 (A) promote the value of partnership with
 16 the United States;

17 (B) highlight the risks and costs of
 18 enmeshment with the PRC; and

19 (C) counter CCP propaganda and
 20 disinformation.

21 **SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

22 (a) **APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON**
 23 **ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.**—Nothing
 24 in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, super-
 25 sede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the

1 United States Government under section 620M of the
 2 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or sec-
 3 tion 362 of title 10, United States Code.

4 (b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY
 5 FORCE.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author-
 6 izing the use of military force.

7 **TITLE I—INVESTING IN A**
 8 **COMPETITIVE FUTURE**
 9 **Subtitle A—Science and**
 10 **Technology**

11 **SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-**
 12 **PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-**
 13 **SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.**

14 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The
 15 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
 16 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili-
 17 tate the contracting by United States embassies for the
 18 professional services of qualified experts, on a reimburs-
 19 able fee for service basis, to assist interested United States
 20 persons and business entities with supply chain manage-
 21 ment issues related to the PRC, including—

22 (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating
 23 certain production facilities to locations outside the
 24 PRC;

1 (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-
2 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside
3 of the PRC;

4 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-
5 lenges in the course of the activities described in
6 paragraphs (1) and (2); and

7 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc-
8 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including
9 through providing market intelligence, facilitating
10 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate,
11 and other services.

12 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons
13 hired to perform the services described in subsection (a)
14 shall—

15 (1) be under the authority of the United States
16 Chief of Mission in the country in which they are
17 hired, in accordance with existing United States
18 laws;

19 (2) coordinate with Department of State and
20 Department of Commerce officers; and

21 (3) coordinate with United States missions and
22 relevant local partners in other countries as needed
23 to carry out the services described in subsection (a).

24 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-
25 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in

1 subsection (a) shall be prioritized to assisting micro-,
2 small-, and medium-sized enterprises.

3 (d) ~~AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.~~—There is
4 authorized to be appropriated \$15,000,000 for each of fis-
5 cal years 2022 through 2027 for the purposes of carrying
6 out this section.

7 (e) ~~PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY~~
8 ~~FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.~~—None of the funds appropriated
9 pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity—

10 (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in-
11 fluence of the Government of China or the Chinese
12 Communist Party, or other foreign adversary; or

13 (2) determined to have beneficial ownership
14 from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction,
15 direction, or influence of foreign adversaries.

16 (f) ~~DEFINITIONS.~~—The terms “foreign ownership,
17 control, or influence” and “FOCI” have the meanings
18 given those terms in the National Industrial Security Pro-
19 gram Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M), or a suc-
20 cessor document.

1 **Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure**
 2 **Development**

3 **SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
 4 **FINED.**

5 In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of
 6 Congress” means—

- 7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
 8 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
 9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
 10 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
 11 resentatives.

12 **SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL-**
 13 **ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND-**
 14 **ARDS.**

15 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 16 gress that the United States should initiate collaboration
 17 among governments, the private sector, and civil society
 18 to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality
 19 global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at
 20 Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following
 21 issues:

- 22 (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in
 23 which infrastructure investments are made.
 24 (2) Anti-corruption.
 25 (3) Rule of law.

1 (4) Human rights and labor rights.

2 (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.

3 (6) Social and governance safeguards.

4 (7) Transparency.

5 (8) Environmental and energy standards.

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 7 gress that the United States should launch a series of fora
 8 around the world showcasing the commitment of the
 9 United States and partners of the United States to high-
 10 quality development cooperation, including with respect to
 11 the issues as described in subsection (a).

12 **SEC. 113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUC-**
 13 **TURE.**

14 (a) FINDINGS.—The Global Infrastructure Coordi-
 15 nating Committee (GICC) was established to coordinate
 16 the efforts of the Department of State, the Department
 17 of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the De-
 18 partment of Energy, the Department of Transportation,
 19 the United States Agency for International Development,
 20 the United States Trade and Development Agency, the
 21 Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import
 22 Bank of the United States, and other agencies to catalyze
 23 private sector investments around the world and the de-
 24 ployment of United States Government technical assist-

1 ance and development finance tools, including project
2 preparation services and commercial advocacy.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the world’s infrastructure needs, including
6 in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast
7 and growing;

8 (2) total or partial acquisition of, or a signifi-
9 cant financial stake or physical presence in, certain
10 types of infrastructure, including ports, energy grids,
11 5G telecommunications networks, and undersea ca-
12 bles, can provide an advantage to countries that do
13 not share the interests and values of the United
14 States and its allies and partners, and could there-
15 fore be deleterious to the interests and values of the
16 United States and its allies and partners;

17 (3) the United States must continue to
18 prioritize support for infrastructure projects that are
19 physically secure, financially viable, economically
20 sustainable, and socially responsible;

21 (4) achieving the objective outlined in para-
22 graph (3) requires the coordination of all United
23 States Government economic tools across the inter-
24 agency, so that such tools are deployed way to maxi-

1 mize United States interests and that of its allies
2 and partners;

3 (5) the GICC represents an important and con-
4 crete step toward better communication and coordi-
5 nation across the United States Government of eco-
6 nomic tools relevant to supporting infrastructure
7 that is physically secure, financially viable, economi-
8 cally sustainable, and socially responsible, and
9 should be continued; and

10 (6) the executive branch and Congress should
11 have consistent consultations on United States sup-
12 port for strategic infrastructure projects, including
13 how the Congress can support such initiatives in the
14 future.

15 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180
16 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-
17 annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination
18 with other Federal agencies that participate in the GICC,
19 and, as appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence,
20 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
21 a report that identifies—

22 (1) current and pending or future infrastruc-
23 ture projects, particularly in the transport, energy,
24 and digital sectors, that the United States is sup-

1 porting or will support through financing, foreign
2 assistance, technical assistance, or other means;

3 (2) a detailed explanation of the United States
4 and partner country interests served by the United
5 States providing support to such projects; and

6 (3) a detailed description of any support pro-
7 vided by other United States allies and partners to
8 such projects.

9 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-
10 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
11 include a classified annex.

12 **SEC. 114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSIST-**
13 **ANCE NETWORK.**

14 (a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State is author-
15 ized to establish a program, to be known as the “Infra-
16 structure Transaction and Assistance Network”, under
17 which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other
18 relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on
19 the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may
20 advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and
21 high-quality infrastructure, in the Indo-Pacific region
22 by—

23 (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to
24 improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and
25 procurement environments, and project preparation

1 capacity of countries that are partners of the United
2 States in such development;

3 ~~(2) providing transaction advisory services and~~
4 ~~project preparation assistance to support sustainable~~
5 ~~infrastructure; and~~

6 ~~(3) coordinating the provision of United States~~
7 ~~assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-~~
8 ~~cluding infrastructure that utilizes United States-~~
9 ~~manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing in-~~
10 ~~vestment led by the private sector.~~

11 ~~(b) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the~~
12 ~~“Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” de-~~
13 ~~scribed under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is au-~~
14 ~~thorized to provide support, including through flexible fi-~~
15 ~~nancing mechanisms such as the Transaction Advisory~~
16 ~~Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of~~
17 ~~partner countries to evaluate contracts and assess the fi-~~
18 ~~nancial and environmental impacts of potential infrastruc-~~
19 ~~ture projects, including through providing services such~~
20 ~~as—~~

21 ~~(1) legal services;~~

22 ~~(2) pre-feasibility studies;~~

23 ~~(3) debt sustainability analyses;~~

24 ~~(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and~~

1 (5) other services relevant to advancing the de-
2 velopment of sustainable, transparent, and high-
3 quality infrastructure.

4 (c) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is
5 authorized to be appropriated \$75,000,000 to the Infra-
6 structure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which
7 \$20,000,000 is to be provided for the Transaction Advi-
8 sory Fund.

9 **SEC. 115. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN-**
10 **ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.**

11 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall direct a com-
12 prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con-
13 sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory
14 lending and financing by the Government of China, includ-
15 ing support to companies incorporated in the PRC that
16 engage in such activities, in the energy sectors of devel-
17 oping countries.

18 (b) **POLICY.**—It is the policy of the United States
19 to—

20 (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted
21 energy needs and capacities of developing countries
22 and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC
23 state-owned industries and other companies incor-
24 porated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing
25 labor, and financing of energy projects, including di-

1 rect financing by the Government of China, PRC fi-
2 nancial institutions, or direct state support to state-
3 owned enterprises and other companies incorporated
4 in the PRC;

5 (2) pursue strategic support and investment op-
6 portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power
7 sector reforms, to expand the development and de-
8 ployment of advanced energy technologies in devel-
9 oping countries;

10 (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants,
11 and other financial products on terms that advance
12 domestic economic and local employment opportuni-
13 ties, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage
14 private sector growth, and when appropriate United
15 States equity and sovereign lending products as al-
16 ternative to the predatory lending tools offered by
17 Chinese international finance institutions;

18 (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-
19 national financing and multilateral institutions to le-
20 verage investment in advanced energy technologies
21 in developing countries; and

22 (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the
23 cooperative development of advanced energy tech-
24 nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-
25 ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the

1 effects of energy engagement by the PRC through
2 predatory lending or other actions that negatively
3 impact other countries.

4 (c) **ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.**—

5 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
6 of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Sec-
7 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of En-
8 ergy, shall establish a United States Government strategy
9 to increase United States exports of advanced energy tech-
10 nologies to—

11 (1) improve energy security in allied and devel-
12 oping countries;

13 (2) create open, efficient, rule-based, and trans-
14 parent energy markets;

15 (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy
16 trading relationships; and

17 (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

18 **SEC. 116. REPORT ON CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN**

19 **ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.**

20 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—No later than 180 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
22 for five years, the Administrator of the United States
23 Agency for International Development, in consultation
24 with the Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources, shall

1 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
2 port that—

3 (1) identifies priority countries for deepening
4 United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
5 cordance with the economic and national security in-
6 terests of the United States and where deeper en-
7 ergy partnerships are most achievable;

8 (2) describes the involvement of the PRC gov-
9 ernment and companies incorporated in the PRC in
10 the development, operation, financing, or ownership
11 of energy generation facilities, transmission infra-
12 structure or energy resources in the countries identi-
13 fied in paragraph (1);

14 (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and
15 implications for United States national interests and
16 the interests of the countries identified in paragraph
17 (1), with respect to the PRC's involvement and in-
18 fluence in developing country energy production or
19 transmission; and

20 (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the
21 United States to partner with the countries identi-
22 fied in paragraph (1) on energy matters that sup-
23 port shared interests between the United States and
24 such countries.

1 (b) TRANSMITTAL.—The assessment required in sub-
2 section (a) shall be published on the United States Agency
3 for International Development’s website and transmitted
4 to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Secretary
5 of State, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United
6 States International Development Finance Corporation.

7 **Subtitle C—Digital Technology and** 8 **Connectivity**

9 **SEC. 121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY** 10 **ISSUES.**

11 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON LEADERSHIP IN
12 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SETTING.—It is the sense of
13 Congress that the United States must lead in international
14 standard-setting bodies that set the governance norms and
15 rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to
16 ensure that these technologies operate within a free, se-
17 cure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that the United States, along with allies and part-
20 ners, should lead an international effort that utilizes all
21 of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to
22 combat the expanding use of information and communica-
23 tions technology products and services to surveil, repress,
24 and manipulate populations (also known as “digital
25 authoritarianism”).

1 (e) NEGOTIATIONS FOR DIGITAL TRADE AGREE-
2 MENT.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
3 Trade Representative should negotiate bilateral and
4 plurilateral agreements relating to digital goods with the
5 European Union, Japan, Taiwan, the member countries
6 of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other
7 nations, as appropriate.

8 (d) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL
9 AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
10 should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-
11 mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish
12 information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained
13 as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral
14 mechanism for communication.

15 (e) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVEL-
16 OPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERN-
17 ANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress
18 that the United States should lead a global effort to de-
19 velop and adopt a set of common principles and standards
20 for critical technologies to ensure that the such tech-
21 nologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether they
22 are governments or other entities, and that they do not
23 threaten democratic governance or human rights.

24 (f) FORMATION OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY TRADE
25 ALLIANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United

1 States should examine opportunities for diplomatic nego-
 2 tiations regarding the formation of mutually beneficial al-
 3 liances relating to digitally enabled technologies and serv-
 4 ices.

5 **SEC. 122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY**
 6 **PARTNERSHIP.**

7 (a) **DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY**
 8 **PARTNERSHIP.**—The Secretary of State is authorized to
 9 establish a program, to be known as the “Digital
 10 Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership” to help for-
 11 eign countries—

12 (1) expand and increase secure Internet access
 13 and digital infrastructure in emerging markets;

14 (2) protect technological assets, including data;

15 (3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that
 16 foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable,
 17 and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi-
 18 stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-
 19 competitive and security information communica-
 20 tions technology policies and regulations;

21 (4) promote exports of United States informa-
 22 tion and communications technology (ICT) goods
 23 and services and increase United States company
 24 market share in target markets;

1 (5) promote the diversification of ICT goods
2 and supply chain services to be less reliant on Chi-
3 nese imports; and

4 (6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-
5 operability, and promote best practices for a national
6 approach to cybersecurity.

7 (b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180
8 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
9 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees
10 of Congress an implementation plan for the coming year
11 to advance the goals identified in subsection (a).

12 (c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the strategy re-
13 quired by subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall con-
14 sult with—

15 (1) leaders of the United States industry;

16 (2) other relevant technology experts, including
17 the Open Technology Fund;

18 (3) representatives from relevant United States
19 Government agencies; and

20 (4) representatives from like-minded allies and
21 partners.

22 (d) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not
23 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
24 this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Sec-
25 retary of State shall provide to the Committee on Foreign

1 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
2 Affairs of the House of Representatives a briefing on the
3 implementation of the plan required by subsection (b).

4 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
5 authorized to be appropriated \$100,000,000 for each of
6 fiscal years 2022 through 2026.

7 **Subtitle D—Countering Chinese** 8 **Communist Party Influence**

9 **SEC. 131. SHORT TITLE.**

10 This subtitle may be cited as the “Countering Chi-
11 nese Communist Party Malign Influence Act”.

12 **SEC. 132. AUTHORIZATION.**

13 (a) COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.—
14 There is authorized to be appropriated \$300,000,000 for
15 each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering
16 Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign influence
17 of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appro-
18 priated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to
19 remain available until expended and shall supplement, not
20 supplant, amounts otherwise authorized to be appro-
21 priated to counter such influence.

22 (b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of
23 funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter
24 the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party
25 globally, including pursuant to the authorization under

1 subsection (a), shall be subject to prior consultation with,
 2 and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assist-
 3 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notifica-
 4 tion procedures of—

5 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
 6 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
 8 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
 9 resentatives.

10 (c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND AP-
 11 PROVAL.—

12 (1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State
 13 shall designate an existing senior official of the De-
 14 partment at the rank of Assistant Secretary or
 15 above to provide policy guidance, coordination, and
 16 approval for the obligation of funds authorized pur-
 17 suant to subsection (a).

18 (2) DUTIES.—The senior official designated
 19 pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

20 (A) on an annual basis, the identification
 21 of specific strategic priorities for using the
 22 funds authorized to be appropriated by sub-
 23 section (a), such as geographic areas of focus or
 24 functional categories of programming that
 25 funds are to be concentrated within, consistent

1 with the national interests of the United States
2 and the purposes of this Act;

3 ~~(B) the coordination and approval of all~~
4 ~~programming conducted using the funds au-~~
5 ~~thorized to be appropriated by subsection (a),~~
6 ~~based on a determination that such program-~~
7 ~~ming directly counters the malign influence of~~
8 ~~the Chinese Communist Party, including spe-~~
9 ~~cific activities or policies advanced by the Chi-~~
10 ~~nese Communist Party, pursuant to the stra-~~
11 ~~tegic objectives of the United States, as estab-~~
12 ~~lished in the 2017 National Security Strategy,~~
13 ~~the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other~~
14 ~~relevant national and regional strategies as ap-~~
15 ~~propriate;~~

16 ~~(C) ensuring that all programming ap-~~
17 ~~proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such~~
18 ~~acts by the Chinese Communist Party described~~
19 ~~in subsection (d) and adheres to the require-~~
20 ~~ments outlined in subsection (e); and~~

21 ~~(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and~~
22 ~~evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-~~
23 ~~ming conducted using the funds authorized to~~
24 ~~be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure~~
25 ~~that it advances United States interests and de-~~

1 grades the ability of the Chinese Communist
2 Party, to advance activities that align with sub-
3 section (d) of this section.

4 ~~(3)~~ INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior
5 official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall,
6 in coordinating and approving programming pursu-
7 ant to paragraph (2), seek to—

8 (A) conduct appropriate interagency con-
9 sultation; and

10 (B) ensure, to the maximum extent prac-
11 ticable, that all approved programming func-
12 tions in concert with other Federal activities to
13 counter the malign influence and activities of
14 the Chinese Communist Party.

15 ~~(4)~~ ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Adminis-
16 trator of the United States Agency for International
17 Development shall designate a senior official at the
18 rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist
19 and consult the senior official designated pursuant
20 to paragraph (1).

21 ~~(d)~~ MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, the term
22 “malign influence” with respect to the Chinese Com-
23 munist Party should be construed to include acts con-
24 ducted by the Chinese Communist Party or entities acting
25 on its behalf that—

1 (1) undermine a free and open international
2 order;

3 (2) advance an alternative, repressive inter-
4 national order that bolsters the Chinese Communist
5 Party's hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by
6 coercion and dependency;

7 (3) undermine the national security or sov-
8 ereignty of the United States or other countries; or

9 (4) undermine the economic security of the
10 United States or other countries, including by pro-
11 moting corruption.

12 (c) COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this sec-
13 tion countering malign influence through the use of funds
14 authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall in-
15 clude efforts to—

16 (1) promote transparency and accountability,
17 and reduce corruption, including in governance
18 structures targeted by the malign influence of the
19 Chinese Communist Party;

20 (2) support civil society and independent media
21 to raise awareness of and increase transparency re-
22 garding the negative impact of activities related to
23 the Belt and Road Initiative;

1 (3) counter transnational criminal networks
2 that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of
3 the Chinese Communist Party;

4 (4) encourage economic development structures
5 that help protect against predatory lending schemes,
6 including support for market-based alternatives in
7 key economic sectors, such as digital economy, en-
8 ergy, and infrastructure;

9 (5) counter activities that provide undue influ-
10 ence to the security forces of the People's Republic
11 of China;

12 (6) expose misinformation and disinformation
13 of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda, in-
14 cluding through programs carried out by the Global
15 Engagement Center; and

16 (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist
17 Party to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology
18 and governance models.

19 **SEC. 133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE**
20 **AND MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.**

21 (a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following find-
22 ings:

23 (1) In the report to Congress required under
24 section 1261(b) of the John S. McCain National De-
25 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Pub-

1 lie Law 115–232), the President laid out a broad
2 range of malign activities conducted by the Govern-
3 ment of China and its agents and entities, includ-
4 ing—

5 (A) propaganda and disinformation, in
6 which “Beijing communicates its narrative
7 through state-run television, print, radio, and
8 online organizations whose presence is prolifer-
9 ating in the United States and around the
10 world”;

11 (B) malign political influence operations,
12 in which “front organizations and agents which
13 target businesses, universities, think tanks,
14 scholars, journalists, and local state and Fed-
15 eral officials in the United States and around
16 the world, attempting to influence discourse”;
17 and

18 (C) malign financial influence operations,
19 characterized as “misappropriation of tech-
20 nology and intellectual property, failure to ap-
21 propriately disclose relationships with foreign
22 government sponsored entities, breaches of con-
23 tract and confidentiality, and manipulation of
24 processes for fair and merit-based allocation of
25 Federal research and development funding”.

1 (2) Chinese information warfare and malign in-
2 fluence operations are ongoing. In January 2019,
3 the Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats,
4 stated, “China will continue to use legal, political,
5 and economic levers—such as the lure of Chinese
6 markets—to shape the information environment. It
7 is also capable of using cyber attacks against sys-
8 tems in the United States to censor or suppress
9 viewpoints it deems politically sensitive.”.

10 (3) In February 2020, the Director of the Fed-
11 eral Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, tes-
12 tified to the Committee on the Judiciary of the
13 House of Representatives that the People’s Republic
14 of China has “very active [malign] foreign influence
15 efforts in this country,” with the goal of “trying to
16 shift our policy and our public opinion to be more
17 pro-China on a variety of issues”.

18 (4) The People’s Republic of China’s informa-
19 tion warfare and malign influence operations con-
20 tinue to adopt new tactics and evolve in sophistica-
21 tion. In May 2020, the Special Envoy and Coordi-
22 nator of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), Lea
23 Gabrielle, stated that there was a convergence of
24 Russian and Chinese narratives surrounding
25 COVID-19 and that the GEC had “uncovered a new

1 network of inauthentic Twitter accounts” that it as-
2 sessed was “created with the intent to amplify Chi-
3 nese propaganda and disinformation”. In June
4 2020, Google reported that Chinese hackers at-
5 tempted to access email accounts of the campaign
6 staff of a presidential candidate.

7 (5) Chinese information warfare and malign in-
8 fluence operations are a threat to the national secu-
9 rity, democracy and the economic systems of the
10 United States, its allies and partners. In October
11 2018, Vice President Mike Pence warned that “Bei-
12 jing is employing a whole-of-government approach,
13 using political, economic, and military tools, as well
14 as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit
15 its interests in the United States.”.

16 (6) In February 2018, the Director of the Fed-
17 eral Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, tes-
18 tified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
19 Senate that the People’s Republic of China is taking
20 advantage of and exploiting the open research and
21 development environments of United States institu-
22 tions of higher education to utilize “professors, sci-
23 entists and students” as “nontraditional collectors”
24 of information.

25 (b) **PRESIDENTIAL DUTIES.**—The President shall—

1 (1) protect our democratic institutions and
2 processes from malign influence from the People's
3 Republic of China and other foreign adversaries; and

4 (2) consistent with the policy specified in para-
5 graph (1), direct the heads of the appropriate Fed-
6 eral departments and agencies to implement Acts of
7 Congress to counter and deter Chinese and other
8 foreign information warfare and malign influence op-
9 erations without delay, including—

10 (A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain
11 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
12 Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232), which au-
13 thORIZes a coordinator position within the Na-
14 tional Security Council for countering malign
15 foreign influence operations and campaigns;

16 (B) section 228 of the National Defense
17 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public
18 Law 116–92), which authorizes additional re-
19 search of foreign malign influence operations on
20 social media platforms;

21 (C) section 847 of such Act, which requires
22 the Secretary of Defense to modify contracting
23 regulations regarding vetting for foreign owner-
24 ship, control and influence in order to mitigate
25 risks from malign foreign influence;

1 (D) section ~~1239~~ of such Act, which re-
2 quires an update of the comprehensive strategy
3 to counter the threat of malign influence to in-
4 clude the People's Republic of China;

5 (E) section ~~5323~~ of such Act, which au-
6 thorizes the Director of National Intelligence to
7 facilitate the establishment of Social Media
8 Data and Threat Analysis Center to detect and
9 study information warfare and malign influence
10 operations across social media platforms; and

11 (F) section 119C of the National Security
12 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes
13 the establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence
14 Response Center inside the Office of the Direc-
15 tor of National Intelligence.

16 **SEC. 134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE**
17 **FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.**

18 There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 6-
19 year period beginning on September 30, 2021,
20 \$105,500,000, which shall be expended to promote edu-
21 cation, training, research, and foreign language skills
22 through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with
23 section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural
24 Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

1 **SEC. 135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN**
2 **RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
4 ings:

5 (1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pan-
6 demic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and
7 those of Asian descent have risen dramatically
8 worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-
9 General Antonio Guterres said “the pandemic con-
10 tinues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia,
11 scapegoating and scare-mongering” and urged gov-
12 ernments to “act now to strengthen the immunity of
13 our societies against the virus of hate”.

14 (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI)
15 workers make up a large portion of the essential
16 workers on the frontlines of the COVID-19 pan-
17 demic, making up 8.5 percent of all essential
18 healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI
19 workers also make up a large share—between 6 per-
20 cent and 12 percent based on sector—of the bio-
21 medical field.

22 (3) The United States Census notes that Amer-
23 icans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 per-
24 cent of the United States population in 2019, and
25 that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial

1 group in the United States, projected to represent
2 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian
6 descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian senti-
7 ment and racism in the United States and around
8 the world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and
9 tolerant world;

10 (2) the United States is a diverse nation with
11 a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength
12 and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by
13 the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its
14 citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Is-
15 landers;

16 (3) the United States Government should en-
17 courage other foreign governments to use the official
18 and scientific names for the COVID-19 pandemic,
19 as recommended by the World Health Organization
20 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
21 and

22 (4) the United States Government and other
23 governments around the world must actively oppose
24 racism and intolerance, and use available and appro-

1 appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian rac-
2 ism and discrimination.

3 **SEC. 136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN-**
4 **TERING DISINFORMATION.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
6 ings:

7 (1) China is increasing its spending on public
8 diplomacy including influence campaigns, adver-
9 tising, and investments into state-sponsored media
10 publications outside of China. These include, for ex-
11 ample, more than \$10,000,000,000 in foreign direct
12 investment in communications infrastructure, plat-
13 forms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists
14 to China for training programs.

15 (2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the
16 United Front Work Department, and UFWD's
17 many affiliates and proxies, has obtained unfettered
18 access to radio, television, and digital dissemination
19 platforms in numerous languages targeted at citi-
20 zens in other regions where China has an interest in
21 promoting public sentiment in support of the Chi-
22 nese Communist Party and expanding the reach of
23 its misleading narratives and propaganda.

24 (3) Even in Western countries, China spends
25 extensively on influence operations, such as a

1 \$500,000,000 advertising campaign to attract cable
2 viewers in Australia and a more than \$20,000,000
3 campaign to influence United States public opinion
4 via the China Daily newspaper supplement.

5 (b) THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR GLOBAL
6 MEDIA.—The United States Agency for Global Media
7 (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal entities
8 shall undertake the following actions to support inde-
9 pendent journalism, countering disinformation, and break-
10 ing the firewall and combatting surveillance in countries
11 where the Chinese Communist Party and other malign ac-
12 tors are promoting disinformation, propaganda, and ma-
13 nipulated media markets:

14 (1) Radio Free Asia shall expand domestic cov-
15 erage and digital programming for all RFA China
16 services and other affiliate language broadcasting
17 services.

18 (2) USAGM shall increase funding for Radio
19 Free Asia's Mandarin, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Can-
20 tonese language services.

21 (3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time
22 disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for
23 Russian language propaganda and misinformation.

24 (4) USAGM shall expand existing training and
25 partnership programs that promote journalistic

1 standards, investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and
2 digital analytics to help expose and counter false
3 CCP narratives.

4 (5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue
5 and expand work to support tools and technology to
6 circumvent censorship and surveillance by the CCP,
7 both inside China as well as abroad where China has
8 exported censorship technology, and increase secure
9 peer to peer connectivity and privacy tools.

10 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
11 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years
12 2022 through 2026 for the United States Agency for
13 Global Media, \$100,000,000 for ongoing and new pro-
14 grams to support local media, build independent media,
15 combat Chinese disinformation inside and outside of
16 China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and
17 monitor and evaluate these programs.

18 (d) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of
19 State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for
20 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordina-
21 tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency
22 for International Development, shall support and train
23 journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure
24 public accountability related to the Belt and Road Initia-
25 tive, the PRC's surveillance and digital export of tech-

1 nology, and other influence operations abroad direct or di-
2 rectly supported by the Communist Party or the Chinese
3 government.

4 (e) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau
5 of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue
6 to support internet freedom programs.

7 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
8 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years
9 2022 through 2026, \$170,000,000 for ongoing and new
10 programs in support of press freedom, training, and pro-
11 tection of journalists.

12 **SEC. 137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.**

13 (a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global En-
14 gagement Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts”
15 of the Federal Government to “recognize, understand, ex-
16 pose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda
17 and disinformation globally”.

18 (b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National
19 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22
20 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that
21 is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act”
22 and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

23 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
24 gress that the Global Engagement Center should expand
25 its coordinating capacity through the exchange of liaison

1 officers with Federal departments and agencies that man-
 2 age aspects of identifying and countering foreign
 3 disinformation, including the National Counterterrorism
 4 Center at the Office of the Director of National Intel-
 5 ligence and from combatant commands.

6 (d) **HIRING AUTHORITY.**—Notwithstanding any
 7 other provision of law, the Secretary of State, during the
 8 five year period beginning on the date of the enactment
 9 of this Act and solely to carry out functions of the Global
 10 Engagement Center, may—

11 (1) appoint employees without regard to the
 12 provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding
 13 appointments in the competitive service; and

14 (2) fix the basic compensation of such employ-
 15 ees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III
 16 of chapter 53 of such title regarding classification
 17 and General Schedule pay rates.

18 **SEC. 138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVEST-**
 19 **MENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN**
 20 **FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH**
 21 **INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.**

22 (a) **AMENDMENTS TO DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT**
 23 **OF 1950.**—

1 (1) DEFINITION OF COVERED TRANSACTION.—

2 Subsection (a)(4) of section 721 of the Defense Pro-
3 duction Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565) is amended—

4 (A) in subparagraph (A)—

5 (i) in clause (i), by striking “; and”
6 and inserting a semicolon;

7 (ii) in clause (ii), by striking the pe-
8 riod at the end and inserting “; and”; and

9 (iii) by adding at the end the fol-
10 lowing:

11 “(iii) any transaction described in
12 subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending
13 after the date of the enactment of the
14 Strategic Competition Act of 2021.”;

15 (B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the
16 end the following:

17 “(vi) Any gift to an institution of
18 higher education from a foreign person, or
19 the entry into a contract by such an insti-
20 tution with a foreign person, if—

21 “(I)(aa) the value of the gift or
22 contract equals or exceeds
23 \$1,000,000; or

24 “(bb) the institution receives, di-
25 rectly or indirectly, more than one gift

1 from or enters into more than one
2 contract, directly or indirectly, with
3 the same foreign person for the same
4 purpose the aggregate value of which,
5 during the period of 2 consecutive cal-
6 endar years, equals or exceeds
7 \$1,000,000; and

8 “(H) the gift or contract—

9 “(aa) relates to research, de-
10 velopment, or production of crit-
11 ical technologies and provides the
12 foreign person potential access to
13 any material nonpublic technical
14 information (as defined in sub-
15 paragraph (D)(ii)) in the posses-
16 sion of the institution; or

17 “(bb) is a restricted or con-
18 ditional gift or contract (as de-
19 fined in section 117(h) of the
20 Higher Education Act of 1965
21 (20 U.S.C. 2011f(h))) that estab-
22 lishes control.”; and

23 (C) by adding at the end the following:

1 “(G) FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS
2 WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—

3 For purposes of subparagraph (B)(vi):

4 “(i) CONTRACT.—The term ‘contract’
5 means any agreement for the acquisition
6 by purchase, lease, or barter of property or
7 services by a foreign person, for the direct
8 benefit or use of either of the parties.

9 “(ii) GIFT.—The term ‘gift’ means
10 any gift of money or property.

11 “(iii) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDU-
12 CATION.—The term ‘institution of higher
13 education’ means any institution, public or
14 private, or, if a multicampus institution,
15 any single campus of such institution, in
16 any State—

17 “(I) that is legally authorized
18 within such State to provide a pro-
19 gram of education beyond secondary
20 school;

21 “(II) that provides a program for
22 which the institution awards a bach-
23 elor’s degree (or provides not less
24 than a 2-year program which is ac-

1 ceptable for full credit toward such a
2 degree) or a more advanced degree;

3 ~~“(III)~~ that is accredited by a na-
4 tionally recognized accrediting agency
5 or association; and

6 ~~“(IV)~~ to which the Federal Gov-
7 ernment extends Federal financial as-
8 sistance (directly or indirectly through
9 another entity or person); or that re-
10 ceives support from the extension of
11 Federal financial assistance to any of
12 the institution’s subunits.”.

13 (2) MANDATORY DECLARATIONS.—Subsection
14 ~~(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa)~~ of such section is amended by
15 adding at the end the following: “Such regulations
16 shall require a declaration under this subclause with
17 respect to a covered transaction described in sub-
18 section ~~(a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa)~~.”.

19 (3) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.—Subsection
20 ~~(f)~~ of such section is amended—

21 (A) in paragraph ~~(10)~~, by striking “; and”
22 and inserting a semicolon;

23 (B) by redesignating paragraph ~~(11)~~ as
24 paragraph ~~(12)~~; and

1 (C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the
2 following:

3 “(11) as appropriate, and particularly with re-
4 spect to covered transactions described in subsection
5 (a)(4)(B)(vi), the importance of academic freedom at
6 institutions of higher education in the United States;
7 and”.

8 (4) MEMBERSHIP OF CFIUS.—Subsection (k)(2)
9 of such section is amended—

10 (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (H),
11 (I), and (J) as subparagraphs (I), (J), and (K),
12 respectively; and

13 (B) by inserting after subparagraph (G)
14 the following:

15 “(G) In the case of a covered transaction
16 involving an institution of higher education (as
17 defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary
18 of Education.”.

19 (5) CONTENTS OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING
20 TO CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.—Subsection (m)(3) of
21 such section is amended—

22 (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking “;
23 and” and inserting a semicolon;

1 ~~(B)~~ in subparagraph ~~(C)~~, by striking the
 2 period at the end and inserting a semicolon;
 3 and

4 ~~(C)~~ by adding at the end the following:

5 “~~(D)~~ an evaluation of whether there are
 6 foreign malign influence or espionage activities
 7 directed or directly assisted by foreign govern-
 8 ments against institutions of higher education
 9 (as defined in subsection ~~(a)(4)(G)~~) aimed at
 10 obtaining research and development methods or
 11 secrets related to critical technologies; and

12 “~~(E)~~ an evaluation of, and recommenda-
 13 tion for any changes to, reviews conducted
 14 under this section that relate to institutions of
 15 higher education; based on an analysis of disclo-
 16 sure reports submitted to the chairperson under
 17 section 117(a) of the Higher Education Act of
 18 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(a)).”.

19 (b) ~~INCLUSION OF CFIUS IN REPORTING ON FOR-~~
 20 ~~EIGN GIFTS UNDER HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965.—~~
 21 Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
 22 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended—

23 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting after “the
 24 Secretary” the following: “and the Secretary of the
 25 Treasury (in the capacity of the Secretary as the

1 chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Investment
2 in the United States under section 721(k)(3) of the
3 Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
4 4565(k)(3)))”;

5 (2) in subsection (d)—

6 (A) in paragraph (1)—

7 (i) by striking “with the Secretary”
8 and inserting “with the Secretary and the
9 Secretary of the Treasury”; and

10 (ii) by striking “to the Secretary” and
11 inserting “to each such Secretary”; and

12 (B) in paragraph (2); by striking “with the
13 Secretary” and inserting “with the Secretary
14 and the Secretary of the Treasury”.

15 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend-
16 ments made by subsection (a) shall—

17 (1) take effect on the date of the enactment of
18 this Act, subject to the requirements of subsections
19 (d) and (e); and

20 (2) apply with respect to any covered trans-
21 action the review or investigation of which is initi-
22 ated under section 721 of the Defense Production
23 Act of 1950 on or after that date.

24 (d) REGULATIONS.—

1 (1) ~~IN GENERAL.~~—The Committee on Foreign
2 Investment in the United States, which shall include
3 the Secretary of Education for purposes of this sub-
4 section, shall prescribe regulations as necessary and
5 appropriate to implement the amendments made by
6 subsection (a).

7 (2) ~~ELEMENTS.~~—The regulations prescribed
8 under paragraph (1) shall include—

9 (A) regulations accounting for the burden
10 on institutions of higher education likely to re-
11 sult from compliance with the amendments
12 made by subsection (a), structuring penalties
13 and filing fees to reduce such burdens, and im-
14 plementing any procedures necessary to protect
15 academic freedom; and

16 (B) guidance with respect to the meaning
17 of “control”, as defined in section 721(a) of the
18 Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
19 4565(a)), as that term applies to covered trans-
20 actions described in clause (vi) of paragraph
21 (4)(B) of that section, as added by subsection
22 (a)(1).

23 (3) ~~ISSUANCE OF FINAL RULE.~~—The Com-
24 mittee shall issue a final rule to carry out the
25 amendments made by subsection (a) after assessing

1 the findings of the pilot program required by sub-
2 section (e).

3 ~~(e) PILOT PROGRAM.—~~

4 ~~(1) IN GENERAL.—~~Beginning on the date that
5 is 30 days after the publication in the Federal Reg-
6 ister of the matter required by paragraph ~~(2)~~ and
7 ending on the date that is 570 days thereafter, the
8 Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
9 States shall conduct a pilot program to assess meth-
10 ods for implementing the review of covered trans-
11 actions described in clause ~~(vi)~~ of section
12 ~~721(a)(4)(B)~~ of the Defense Production Act of
13 1950, as added by subsection ~~(a)(1)~~.

14 ~~(2) PROPOSED DETERMINATION.—~~Not later
15 than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
16 this Act, the Committee shall, in consultation with
17 the Secretary of Education, publish in the Federal
18 Register—

19 ~~(A)~~ a proposed determination of the scope
20 of and procedures for the pilot program re-
21 quired by paragraph ~~(1)~~;

22 ~~(B)~~ an assessment of the burden on insti-
23 tutions of higher education likely to result from
24 compliance with the pilot program;

1 (C) recommendations for addressing any
 2 such burdens, including structuring penalties
 3 and filing fees to reduce such burdens; and

4 (D) any procedures necessary to ensure
 5 that the pilot program does not infringe upon
 6 academic freedom.

7 **TITLE II—INVESTING IN**
 8 **ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS**

9 **Subtitle A—Strategic and**
 10 **Diplomatic Matters**

11 **SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES**

12 **DEFINED.**

13 In this subtitle, the term “appropriate congressional
 14 committees” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
 16 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

17 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
 18 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
 19 resentatives.

20 **SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT**

21 **FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PA-**

22 **CIFIC.**

23 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 24 gress that—

1 (1) the United States treaty alliances in the
2 Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to
3 the United States and are among the Nation's most
4 precious assets, enabling the United States to ad-
5 vance its vital national interests, defend its territory,
6 expand its economy through international trade and
7 commerce, establish enduring cooperation among
8 like-minded countries, prevent the domination of the
9 Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air
10 lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter poten-
11 tial aggressors;

12 (2) the Governments of the United States,
13 Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Aus-
14 tralia, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing
15 a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and
16 tackling challenges with unity purpose, and have col-
17 laborated to advance specific efforts of shared inter-
18 est in areas such as defense and security, economic
19 prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and funda-
20 mental freedoms;

21 (3) the United States greatly values other part-
22 nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with
23 India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand,
24 and Vietnam as well as regional architecture such as
25 the Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Na-

1 tions (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic
2 Community (APEC), which are essential to further
3 shared interests;

4 (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific
5 demands consistent United States and allied com-
6 mitment to strengthening and advancing our alli-
7 ances so that they are postured to meet these chal-
8 lenges, and will require sustained political will, con-
9 crete partnerships, economic, commercial, and tech-
10 nological cooperation, consistent and tangible com-
11 mitments, high-level and extensive consultations on
12 matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared co-
13 operation in the acquisition of key capabilities im-
14 portant to allied defenses, and unified mutual sup-
15 port in the face of political, economic, or military co-
16 ercion;

17 (5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-
18 tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-
19 versaries and weaken collective ability to advance
20 shared interests; and

21 (6) the United States will work with allies to
22 prioritize promoting human rights throughout the
23 region.

24 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
25 of the United States—

1 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and secu-
2 rity cooperation between and among the United
3 States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Phil-
4 ippines, Thailand, and Australia, including through
5 diplomatic engagement, regional development, en-
6 ergy security and development, scientific and health
7 partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges,
8 missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber,
9 and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;

10 (2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral
11 treaty obligations, including—

12 (A) defending Japan, including all areas
13 under the administration of Japan, under arti-
14 cle V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
15 Security Between the United States of America
16 and Japan;

17 (B) defending the Republic of Korea under
18 article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
19 tween the United States and the Republic of
20 Korea;

21 (C) defending the Philippines under article
22 IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
23 United States and the Republic of the Phil-
24 ippines;

1 (D) defending Thailand under the 1954
2 Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique
3 of 1962; and

4 (E) defending Australia under article IV of
5 the Australia, New Zealand, United States Se-
6 curity Treaty;

7 (3) to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and
8 regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan,
9 ASEAN, and New Zealand;

10 (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of
11 Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to
12 promote human rights bilaterally and through re-
13 gional and multilateral fora and pacts; and

14 (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
15 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-
16 ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
17 Indonesia, and India.

18 **SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH**

19 **THE QUAD.**

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) the United States should reaffirm our com-
22 mitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Aus-
23 tralia, India, Japan, and the United States (the
24 “Quad”) to enhance and implement a shared vision
25 to meet shared regional challenges and to promote

1 a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-
2 Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule-of-
3 law, and market-driven economic growth and is free
4 from undue influence and coercion;

5 (2) the United States should seek to expand
6 sustained dialogue and cooperation through the
7 Quad with a range of partners to support the rule
8 of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peace-
9 ful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and
10 territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and pros-
11 perity and strengthen democratic resilience;

12 (3) the United States should seek to expand
13 avenues of cooperation with the Quad, including
14 more regular military-to-military dialogues, joint ex-
15 ercises, and coordinated policies related to shared in-
16 terests such as protecting cyberspace and advancing
17 maritime security; and

18 (4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad
19 leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to
20 the economic and health impacts of COVID-19, in-
21 cluding expanding safe, affordable, and effective vac-
22 cine production and equitable access, and to address
23 shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical
24 technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure
25 investment, and humanitarian assistance and dis-

1 (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
2 ter greater integration and unity within the ASEAN
3 community, as well as to foster greater integration
4 and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and
5 security partners, including Japan, the Republic of
6 Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and
7 India;

8 (5) recognize the value of strategic economic
9 initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect,
10 which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and
11 the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in
12 the region;

13 (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mar-
14 itime and territorial disputes in a constructive man-
15 ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-
16 matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and
17 international arbitration mechanisms, consistent
18 with international law, including through the adop-
19 tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea
20 that represents the interests of all parties and pro-
21 motes peace and stability in the region;

22 (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime
23 and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region,
24 including the Government of China—

1 (A) to cease any current activities, and
2 avoid undertaking any actions in the future,
3 that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-
4 late disputes through the use of coercion, in-
5 timidation, or military force;

6 (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals,
7 and other features, and refrain from new ef-
8 forts to militarize, including the construction of
9 new garrisons and facilities and the relocation
10 of additional military personnel, material, or
11 equipment;

12 (C) to oppose actions by any country that
13 prevent other countries from exercising their
14 sovereign rights to the resources in their exclu-
15 sive economic zones and continental shelves by
16 enforcing claims to those areas in the South
17 China Sea that lack support in international
18 law; and

19 (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
20 ministrative and military districts in contested
21 areas in the South China Sea;

22 (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
23 tions that cause permanent physical damage to the
24 marine environment and support the efforts of the
25 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

1 and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
2 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the
3 region;

4 (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
5 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the
6 Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in
7 favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case
8 against the People's Republic of China's excessive
9 maritime claims;

10 (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United
11 States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt
12 human smuggling and trafficking in persons and
13 urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional
14 mechanisms to provide assistance and support to
15 refugees and migrants;

16 (11) support the Lower Mekong Initiative;

17 (12) support newly created initiatives with
18 ASEAN countries, including the Mekong-United
19 States partnership, the United States-ASEAN
20 Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Imple-
21 mentation Project, the United States-ASEAN Inno-
22 vation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health
23 Futures;

24 (13) encourage the President to communicate
25 to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the

1 rule of law and open and transparent government,
2 strengthening civil society, and protecting human
3 rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing
4 politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary
5 killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-
6 dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom
7 of speech and expression;

8 (14) support efforts by organizations in
9 ASEAN that address corruption in the public and
10 private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, en-
11 force bribery criminalization in the private sector,
12 and build beneficial ownership transparency through
13 the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered
14 with the South East Asia Parties Against Corrup-
15 tion (SEA-PAC);

16 (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Lead-
17 ers Initiative as an example of a people-to-people
18 partnership that provides skills, networks, and lead-
19 ership training to a new generation that will create
20 and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and
21 partnerships, and rise to solve the regional and glob-
22 al challenges of the future;

23 (16) support creating initiatives similar to the
24 Young Southeast Asian Leaders for other parts of

1 the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partner-
2 ships with an emphasis on civil society leaders;

3 (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments
4 that have fully upheld and implemented all United
5 Nations Security Council resolutions and inter-
6 national agreements with respect to the Democratic
7 People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic
8 missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN
9 governments to do the same; and

10 (18) allocate appropriate resources across the
11 United States Government to articulate and imple-
12 ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-
13 ports ASEAN centrality and supports ASEAN as a
14 source of well-functioning and problem-solving re-
15 gional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

16 **SEC. 205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED**
17 **STATES-ASEAN COOPERATION ON TECH-**
18 **NOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-**
19 **PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) the United States and ASEAN should com-
22 plete a joint analysis on risks of overreliance on Chi-
23 nese equipment critical to strategic technologies and
24 critical infrastructure;

1 (2) the United States and ASEAN should share
2 information about and collaborate on screening Chi-
3 nese investments in strategic technology and critical
4 infrastructure;

5 (3) the United States and ASEAN should work
6 together on appropriate import restriction regimes
7 regarding Chinese exports of surveillance tech-
8 nologies;

9 (4) the United States should urge ASEAN to
10 adopt its March 2019 proposed sanctions regime
11 targeting cyber attacks;

12 (5) the United States should urge ASEAN to
13 commit to the September 2019 principles signed by
14 28 countries regarding “Advancing Responsible
15 State Behavior in Cyberspace”; a set of commit-
16 ments that support the “rules-based international
17 order; affirm the applicability of international law to
18 state-on-state behavior; adherence to voluntary
19 norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime;
20 and the development and implementation of practical
21 confidence building measures to help reduce the risk
22 of conflict stemming from cyber incidents”; and

23 (6) the United States and ASEAN should ex-
24 plore how Chinese investments in critical technology;

1 including artificial intelligence, will impact Indo-Pa-
 2 cific security over the coming decades.

3 **SEC. 206. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTER-**
 4 **NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.**

5 (a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days
 6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
 7 of State, in coordination with the Director of National In-
 8 telligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
 9 tions and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Sen-
 10 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Perma-
 11 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
 12 Representatives a report on the expanded influence of the
 13 Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
 14 Chinese Communist Party in international organizations.

15 (b) **CONTENTS.**—The report required by subsection
 16 (a) shall include analysis of the following:

17 (1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese
 18 Communist Party in international organizations and
 19 how that influence has expanded over the last 10
 20 years, including—

21 (A) tracking countries’ voting patterns
 22 that align with Chinese government voting pat-
 23 terns;

24 (B) the number of PRC nationals in lead-
 25 ership positions at the D–1 level or higher;

1 (C) changes in PRC voluntary and manda-
2 tory funding by organization;

3 (D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party
4 phrases and initiatives in international organi-
5 zation language and programming;

6 (E) efforts by the PRC to secure legit-
7 imacy for its own foreign policy initiatives, in-
8 cluding the Belt and Road Initiative;

9 (F) the number of Junior Professional Of-
10 ficers that the Government of China has funded
11 by organization;

12 (G) tactics used by the Government of
13 China or the CCP to manipulate secret or oth-
14 erwise non-public voting measures, voting bod-
15 ies, or votes;

16 (H) the extent to which technology compa-
17 nies incorporated in the PRC, or which have
18 PRC or CCP ownership interests, provide
19 equipment and services to international organi-
20 zations; and

21 (I) efforts by China's United Nations Mis-
22 sion to generate criticism of the United States
23 in the United Nations, including any efforts to
24 highlight delayed United States payments or to
25 misrepresent total United States voluntary and

1 assessed financial contributions to the United
2 Nations and its specialized agencies and pro-
3 grams.

4 (2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the ex-
5 panded influence of the PRC and the Chinese Com-
6 munist Party in international organizations, includ-
7 ing an analysis of PRC Government- and Chinese
8 Communist Party strategic documents and rhetoric.

9 (3) The tactics and means employed by the
10 PRC and the Chinese Communist Party to achieve
11 expanded influence in international organizations,
12 including—

13 (A) incentive programs for PRC nationals
14 to join and run for leadership positions in inter-
15 national organizations;

16 (B) coercive economic and other practices
17 against other members in the organization; and

18 (C) economic or other incentives provided
19 to international organizations, including dona-
20 tions of technologies or goods.

21 (4) The successes and failures of PRC and CCP
22 influence efforts in international organizations.

23 (e) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection
24 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
25 clude a classified annex.

1 (d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “inter-
2 national organizations” means the following:

3 (1) The African Development Bank.

4 (2) The Asian Development Bank.

5 (3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.

6 (4) The Bank of International Settlements.

7 (5) The Caribbean Development Bank.

8 (6) The Food and Agriculture Organization.

9 (7) The International Atomic Energy Agency.

10 (8) The International Bank for Reconstruction
11 and Development.

12 (9) The International Bureau of Weights and
13 Measures.

14 (10) The International Chamber of Commerce.

15 (11) The International Civil Aviation Organiza-
16 tion.

17 (12) The International Criminal Police Organi-
18 zation.

19 (13) The International Finance Corporation.

20 (14) The International Fund for Agricultural
21 Development.

22 (15) The International Hydrographic Organiza-
23 tion.

24 (16) The International Labor Organization.

25 (17) The International Maritime Organization.

- 1 (18) The International Monetary Fund.
- 2 (19) The International Olympic Committee.
- 3 (20) The International Organization for Migration.
- 4 tion.
- 5 (21) The International Organization for Standardization.
- 6 ardization.
- 7 (22) The International Renewable Energy Agency.
- 8 Agency.
- 9 (23) The International Telecommunications Union.
- 10 Union.
- 11 (24) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- 12 tion and Development.
- 13 (25) The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
- 14 Chemical Weapons.
- 15 (26) The United Nations.
- 16 (27) The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- 17 and Development.
- 18 (28) The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
- 19 entific, and Cultural Organization.
- 20 (29) The United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
- 21 ment Organization.
- 22 (30) The United Nations Institute for Training and Research.
- 23 and Research.
- 24 (31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
- 25 ganization.

1 (32) The Universal Postal Union.

2 (33) The World Customs Organization.

3 (34) The World Health Organization.

4 (35) The World Intellectual Property Organiza-
5 tion.

6 (36) The World Meteorological Organization.

7 (37) The World Organization for Animal
8 Health.

9 (38) The World Tourism Organization.

10 (39) The World Trade Organization.

11 (40) The World Bank Group.

12 **SEC. 207. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND**
13 **PARTNERS.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
15 nation with the heads of other participating executive
16 branch agencies, shall establish and develop a program to
17 facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United
18 States Government regulatory and technical agencies and
19 their counterpart organizations in allied and partner coun-
20 tries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institu-
21 tions and organizations—

22 (1) to promote best practices in regulatory for-
23 mation and implementation;

1 (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory
2 outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other
3 relevant principles;

4 (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment
5 of regulations and regulatory practices;

6 (4) to build consensus around industry and
7 technical standards in emerging sectors that will
8 drive future global economic growth and commerce;
9 and

10 (5) to promote United States standards regard-
11 ing environmental, labor, and other relevant protec-
12 tions in regulatory formation and implementation, in
13 keeping with the values of free and open societies,
14 including the rule of law.

15 (b) PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIVITIES.—In facilitating
16 expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall
17 prioritize—

18 (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with
19 countries where greater regulatory coherence, har-
20 monization of standards, or communication and dia-
21 logue between technical agencies is achievable and
22 best advances the economic and national security in-
23 terests of the United States;

24 (2) multilateral coordination and coordination
25 where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization

1 of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regu-
 2 latory matters is achievable and best advances the
 3 economic and national security interests of the
 4 United States, including with—

5 (A) the European Union;

6 (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
 7 tion;

8 (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
 9 tions (ASEAN);

10 (D) the Organization for Economic Co-
 11 operation and Development (OECD); and

12 (E) multilateral development banks; and

13 (3) regulatory practices and standards setting
 14 bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerg-
 15 ing technologies.

16 (c) PARTICIPATION BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTI-
 17 TIES.—With regard to the program described in sub-
 18 section (a), the Secretary may facilitate, including through
 19 the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection
 20 (e), the participation of private sector representatives, and
 21 other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant
 22 expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such par-
 23 ticipation advances the goals of such program.

24 (d) DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE SEC-
 25 RETARY.—The Secretary of State is authorized to delegate

1 the responsibilities described in this section to the Under
 2 Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
 3 Environment.

4 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
 6 appropriated \$2,500,000 for each of fiscal years
 7 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

8 (2) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary may obli-
 9 gate amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph
 10 (1) in a manner that—

11 (A) facilitates participation by representa-
 12 tives from technical agencies within the United
 13 States Government and their counterparts; and

14 (B) complies with applicable procedural re-
 15 quirements under the State Department Basic
 16 Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et
 17 seq.) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
 18 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

19 **SEC. 208. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DE-**
 20 **PARTMENT OF STATE.**

21 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
 22 of the United States to lead new technology policy partner-
 23 ships focused on the shared interests of the world's tech-
 24 nology-leading democracies.

1 (b) ~~ESTABLISHMENT.~~—The Secretary of State shall
2 establish an interagency-staffed Technology Partnership
3 Office (referred to in this section as the “Office”), which
4 shall be housed in the Department of State.

5 (c) ~~LEADERSHIP.~~—

6 (1) ~~AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE.~~—The Office shall
7 be headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for Tech-
8 nology, who shall—

9 (A) be appointed by the President, by and
10 with the advice and consent of the Senate;

11 (B) have the rank and status of ambas-
12 sador; and

13 (C) report to the Secretary of State, unless
14 otherwise directed.

15 (2) ~~OFFICE LIAISONS.~~—The Secretary of Com-
16 merce and the Secretary of Treasury shall each ap-
17 point, from within their respective departments at
18 the level of GS-14 or higher, liaisons between the
19 Office and the Department of Commerce or the De-
20 partment of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform
21 the following duties:

22 (A) Collaborate with the Department of
23 State on relevant technology initiatives and
24 partnerships.

1 (B) Provide technical and other relevant
2 expertise to the Office, as appropriate.

3 (d) MEMBERSHIP.—In addition to the liaisons re-
4 ferred to in subsection (c), the Office shall include a rep-
5 resentative or expert detailee from key Federal agencies,
6 as determined by the Ambassador-at-Large for Tech-
7 nology.

8 (e) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office shall in-
9 clude responsibilities such as—

10 (1) creating, overseeing, and carrying out tech-
11 nology partnerships with countries and relevant po-
12 litical and economic unions that are committed to—

13 (A) the rule of law, freedom of speech, and
14 respect for an promotion of human rights;

15 (B) the safe and responsible development
16 and use of new and emerging technologies and
17 the establishment of related norms and stand-
18 ards;

19 (C) a secure internet architecture governed
20 by a multi-stakeholder model instead of central-
21 ized government control;

22 (D) robust international cooperation to
23 promote an open internet and interoperable
24 technological products and services that are

1 necessary to freedom, innovation, transparency,
2 and privacy; and

3 ~~(E)~~ multilateral coordination, including
4 through diplomatic initiatives, information shar-
5 ing, and other activities, to defend the prin-
6 ciples described in subparagraphs (A) through
7 (C) against efforts by state and non-state ac-
8 tors to undermine them;

9 ~~(2)~~ harmonizing technology governance regimes
10 with partners; coordinating on basic and pre-com-
11 petitive research and development initiatives; and
12 collaborating to pursue such opportunities in key
13 technologies, including—

14 ~~(A)~~ artificial intelligence and machine
15 learning;

16 ~~(B)~~ 5G telecommunications and other ad-
17 vanced wireless networking technologies;

18 ~~(C)~~ semiconductor manufacturing;

19 ~~(D)~~ biotechnology;

20 ~~(E)~~ quantum computing;

21 ~~(F)~~ surveillance technologies, including fa-
22 cial recognition technologies and censorship
23 software; and

24 ~~(G)~~ fiber optic cables;

1 (3) coordinating with such countries regarding
2 shared technology strategies, including technology
3 controls and standards, as well as strategies with re-
4 spect to the development and acquisition of key tech-
5 nologies to provide alternatives for those countries
6 utilizing systems supported by authoritarian re-
7 gimes;

8 (4) supporting and expanding adherence to
9 international treaties and frameworks governing the
10 responsible use of new and emerging technologies;

11 (5) coordinating the adoption of shared data
12 privacy, data sharing, and data archiving standards
13 among the United States and partner countries and
14 relevant economic and political unions, including
15 complementary data protection regulations;

16 (6) coordinating with other technology partners
17 on export control policies, including as appropriate
18 through the Wassenaar Arrangement On Export
19 Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
20 Goods and Technologies, done at The Hague Decem-
21 ber 1995, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Aus-
22 tralia Group, and the Missile Technology Control
23 Regime; supply chain security; and investment in or
24 licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-use tech-
25 nologies;

1 (7) coordinating with members of technology
2 partnerships on other policies for the use and control
3 of emerging and foundational technologies through
4 appropriate restrictions, investment screening, and
5 appropriate measures with respect to technology
6 transfers;

7 (8) coordinating policies, in coordination with
8 the Department of Commerce, around the resiliency
9 of supply chains in critical technology areas and ex-
10 plore possible diversification of supply chain compo-
11 nents to countries involved in technology partner-
12 ships with the United States, while also maintaining
13 transparency surrounding subsidies and product ori-
14 gins;

15 (9) sharing information regarding the tech-
16 nology transfer threat posed by authoritarian gov-
17 ernments and the ways in which autocratic regimes
18 are utilizing technology to erode individual freedoms
19 and other foundations of open, democratic societies;

20 (10) administering the establishment of—

21 (A) the common funding mechanism for
22 development and adoption of measurably secure
23 semiconductors and measurably secure semi-
24 conductors supply chains created in and in ac-
25 cordance with the requirements of section 9905

1 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
2 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
3 (~~Public Law 116–283~~); and

4 (B) the multilateral telecommunications se-
5 curity fund created in and in accordance with
6 the requirements of section 9202 of such Act;
7 and

8 (11) collaborating with private companies, trade
9 associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes
10 of paragraphs (1) through (10).

11 (f) SPECIAL HIRING AUTHORITIES.—The Secretary
12 of State may—

13 (1) appoint employees without regard to the
14 provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding
15 appointments in the competitive service; and

16 (2) fix the basic compensation of such employ-
17 ees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III
18 of chapter 53 of such title regarding classification
19 and General Schedule pay rates.

20 (g) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date
21 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
22 the next three years, the Secretary of State shall submit
23 an unclassified report to the appropriate congressional
24 committees, with a classified index, if necessary, about the
25 activities of the Office, including any cooperative initia-

1 tives and partnerships pursued with United States allies
 2 and partners, and the results of those activities, initiatives,
 3 and partnerships.

4 (h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ESTABLISHING INTER-
 5 NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP.—It is the sense
 6 of Congress that the Ambassador-at-Large for Technology
 7 should seek to establish an International Technology Part-
 8 nership for the purposes described in this section with for-
 9 eign countries that have—

10 (1) democratic national government and a
 11 strong commitment to democratic values, including
 12 an adherence to the rule of law, freedom of speech,
 13 and respect for and promotion of human rights;

14 (2) an economy with advanced technology sec-
 15 tors; and

16 (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an ex-
 17 pressed interest in international cooperation and co-
 18 ordination with the United States on important de-
 19 fense and intelligence issues.

20 **SEC. 209. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STAND-**
 21 **ARDS-SETTING BODIES.**

22 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
 23 “Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G
 24 Act of 2021”.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 2 gress that—

3 (1) the United States and its allies and part-
 4 ners should maintain participation and leadership at
 5 international standards-setting bodies for 5th and
 6 future generation mobile telecommunications sys-
 7 tems and infrastructure;

8 (2) the United States should work with its allies
 9 and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop-
 10 ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th
 11 and future generation mobile telecommunications
 12 systems and infrastructure; and

13 (3) the maintenance of a high standard of secu-
 14 rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between
 15 the United States and its allies and partners is a na-
 16 tional security interest of the United States.

17 (c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP
 18 OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-SET-
 19 TING BODIES.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall—

21 (A) establish an interagency working group
 22 to provide assistance and technical expertise to
 23 enhance the representation and leadership of
 24 the United States at international bodies that
 25 set standards for equipment, systems, software,

1 and virtually defined networks that support 5th
2 and future generation mobile telecommuni-
3 cations systems and infrastructure, such as the
4 International Telecommunication Union and the
5 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and

6 (B) work with allies, partners, and the pri-
7 vate sector to increase productive engagement.

8 (2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The
9 interagency working group described in paragraph
10 (1)—

11 (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of
12 State or a designee of the Secretary of State;
13 and

14 (B) shall consist of the head (or designee)
15 of each Federal department or agency the
16 President determines appropriate.

17 (3) BRIEFINGS.—

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
19 days after the date of the enactment of this
20 Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided
21 under subparagraph (B), the interagency work-
22 ing group described in paragraph (1) shall pro-
23 vide a strategy to the appropriate congressional
24 committees that addresses—

1 (i) promotion of United States leader-
2 ship at international standards-setting bod-
3 ies for equipment, systems, software, and
4 virtually defined networks relevant to 5th
5 and future generation mobile telecommuni-
6 cations systems and infrastructure, taking
7 into account the different processes fol-
8 lowed by the various international stand-
9 ard-setting bodies;

10 (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies
11 and partners to share security risk infor-
12 mation and findings pertaining to equip-
13 ment that supports or is used in 5th and
14 future generation mobile telecommuni-
15 cations systems and infrastructure and co-
16 operation on mitigating such risks;

17 (iii) China's presence and activities at
18 international standards-setting bodies rel-
19 evant to 5th and future generation mobile
20 telecommunications systems and infra-
21 structure, including information on the dif-
22 ferences in the scope and scale of China's
23 engagement at such bodies compared to
24 engagement by the United States or its al-
25 lies and partners and the security risks

1 raised by Chinese proposals in such stand-
2 ards-setting bodies; and

3 (iv) engagement with private sector
4 communications and information service
5 providers; equipment developers; academia;
6 Federally funded research and development
7 centers; and other private-sector stake-
8 holders to propose and develop secure
9 standards for equipment, systems, soft-
10 ware, and virtually defined networks that
11 support 5th and future generation mobile
12 telecommunications systems and infra-
13 structure.

14 (B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon re-
15 ceiving a request from the Committee on For-
16 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
17 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
18 tives, or as determined appropriate by the chair
19 of the interagency working group established
20 pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency
21 working group shall provide the requesting com-
22 mittee an updated briefing that covers the mat-
23 ters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of sub-
24 paragraph (A).

1 **SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CENTRALITY OF SANC-**
2 **TIONS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS TO STRA-**
3 **TEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used
7 as part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy,
8 are a powerful tool to advance United States foreign
9 policy and national security interests.

10 (2) Congress has authorized and mandated
11 broad range of sanctions and other restrictions to
12 address malign behavior and incentivize behavior
13 change by individuals and entities in the PRC.

14 (3) The sanctions and other restrictions author-
15 ized and mandated by Congress address a range of
16 malign PRC behavior, including—

17 (A) intellectual property theft;

18 (B) cyber-related economic espionage;

19 (C) repression of ethnic minorities;

20 (D) other human rights abuses;

21 (E) abuses of the international trading sys-
22 tem;

23 (F) illicit assistance to and trade with the
24 Government of North Korea; and

25 (G) drug trafficking, including trafficking
26 in fentanyl and other opioids;

1 (4) The sanctions and other restrictions de-
2 scribed in this section include the following:

3 (A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights
4 Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of
5 Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

6 (B) Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and
7 Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
8 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50
9 U.S.C. 1708).

10 (C) The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21
11 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.).

12 (D) The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Pub-
13 lic Law 116–149; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).

14 (E) Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human
15 Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public
16 Law 116–76; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).

17 (F) Section 6 of the Uyghur Human
18 Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–
19 145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

20 (G) The Export Control Reform Act of
21 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).

22 (H) Export control measures required to
23 be maintained with respect to entities in the
24 telecommunications sector of the People’s Re-
25 public of China, including under section 1260F

1 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
2 Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92).

3 (4) Section 311 of the Countering Amer-
4 ica’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of
5 2018 (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 942).

6 (5) Full implementation of the authorities de-
7 scribed in paragraph (4) is required under the re-
8 spective laws described therein and pursuant to the
9 Take Care Clause of the Constitution (article II, sec-
10 tion 3).

11 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
12 gress that—

13 (1) the executive branch has not fully imple-
14 mented the sanctions and other restrictions de-
15 scribed in subsection (a)(4) despite the statutory
16 and constitutional requirements to do so; and

17 (2) the President’s full implementation and exe-
18 cution of the those authorities is a necessary and es-
19 sential component to the success of the United
20 States in the strategic competition with China.

21 **SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7**
22 **COUNTRIES ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF**
23 **CHINA.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that
25 the President, acting through the Secretary of State,

1 should initiate an agenda with G7 countries on matters
2 relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, including
3 the following:

4 (1) Trade and investment issues and enforce-
5 ment.

6 (2) Building support for international infra-
7 structure standards, including those agreed to at the
8 G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.

9 (3) The erosion of democracy and human
10 rights.

11 (4) The security of 5G telecommunications.

12 (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-
13 tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-
14 nies, and other policies and practices.

15 (6) Predatory international sovereign lending
16 that is inconsistent with OECD and Paris Club prin-
17 ciples.

18 (7) International influence campaigns.

19 (8) Environmental standards.

20 (9) Coordination with like-minded regional part-
21 ners that are not in the G7.

22 **SEC. 212. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART-**
23 **NERSHIP.**

24 It is the policy of the United States—

1 (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the
2 United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

3 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its
4 democracy as key elements for the continued peace
5 and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region; and
6 a vital national security interest of the United
7 States;

8 (3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan
9 under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8)
10 and the “Six Assurances” and in accordance with
11 the United States “One China” policy;

12 (4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its
13 asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities
14 identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;

15 (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense
16 spending in order to fully resource its defense strat-
17 egy;

18 (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-
19 cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-
20 fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop
21 and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including
22 anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense,
23 undersea warfare, advanced command, control, com-
24 munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance;

1 and reconnaissance, and resilient command and con-
2 trol capabilities, into its military forces;

3 (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's
4 meaningful participation in the United Nations, the
5 World Health Assembly, the International Civil
6 Aviation Organization, the International Criminal
7 Police Organization, and other international bodies
8 as appropriate; and

9 (8) to promote meaningful cooperation among
10 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded
11 partners.

12 **SEC. 213. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State and
14 other United States Government agencies shall engage
15 with the democratically elected government of Taiwan on
16 the same basis, and using the same nomenclature and pro-
17 tocol, as the United States Government engages with other
18 foreign governments. Notwithstanding the continued sup-
19 porting role of the American Institute in Taiwan in car-
20 rying out United States foreign policy and protecting
21 United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Gov-
22 ernment shall not place any restrictions on the ability of
23 officials of the Department of State and other United
24 States Government agencies to interact directly and rou-
25 tinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government.

1 (b) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this para-
2 graph shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-
3 matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or
4 altering the United States Government’s position on Tai-
5 wan’s international status.

6 **SEC. 214. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PAN-**
7 **DEMIC.**

8 (a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Con-
9 gress that—

10 (1) it is critical to understand the origins of the
11 COVID-19 pandemic so the United States can bet-
12 ter prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic
13 health threats in the future;

14 (2) given the impact of the COVID-19 pan-
15 demic on all Americans, the American people deserve
16 to know what information the United States Govern-
17 ment possesses about the origins of COVID-19, as
18 appropriate;

19 (3) Congress shares the concerns expressed by
20 the United States Government and 13 other foreign
21 governments that the international team of experts
22 dispatched to the People’s Republic of China by the
23 World Health Organization (WHO) to study the ori-
24 gins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was “significantly

1 delayed and lacked access to complete, original data
2 and samples”;

3 (4) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Di-
4 rector-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom
5 Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative
6 team had encountered “difficulties” in accessing
7 necessary raw data, that “we have not yet found the
8 source of the virus,” and that “all hypotheses re-
9 main on the table”; and

10 (5) it is critical for independent experts to have
11 full access to all pertinent human, animal, and envi-
12 ronmental data, live virus samples, research, and
13 personnel involved in the early stages of the out-
14 break relevant to determining how this pandemic
15 emerged.

16 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days
17 after enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
18 ligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
19 Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary
20 of Energy, and other relevant executive departments, shall
21 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
22 consisting of—

23 (1) an assessment of the most likely source or
24 origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a de-
25 tailed review of all information the United States

1 possesses that it has identified as potentially rel-
2 evant to the source or origin of the SARS-CoV-2
3 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover,
4 the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or other
5 sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on
6 the information the United States Government has
7 to date;

8 (2) an identification of the leading credible
9 theories of the etiology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by
10 the United States Government, the steps the United
11 States has taken to validate those theories, and any
12 variance in assessment or dissent among or between
13 United States intelligence agencies, executive agen-
14 cies, and executive offices of the most likely source
15 or origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and the basis
16 for such variance or dissent;

17 (3) a description of all steps the United States
18 Government has taken to identify and investigate
19 the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a
20 timeline of such efforts;

21 (4) a detailed description of the data to which
22 the United States and the WHO have requested and
23 have access to in order to determine the origin of
24 the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus;

1 (5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooper-
2 ate with, impede, or obstruct any inquiry or inves-
3 tigation to determine the source and transmission of
4 ~~SARS-CoV-2~~ virus, including into a possible lab
5 leak, or to create or spread misinformation or
6 disinformation regarding the source and trans-
7 mission of ~~SARS-CoV-2~~ virus by the PRC or CCP,
8 including by national and local governmental and
9 health entities;

10 (6) a detailed account of information known to
11 the United States Government regarding the WIV
12 and associated facilities, including research activities
13 on coronaviruses and gain-of-function research, any
14 reported illnesses of persons associated with the lab-
15 oratory with symptoms consistent with ~~COVID-19~~
16 and the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of re-
17 search relevant to coronaviruses;

18 (7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC
19 that require disclosure and cooperation in the event
20 of a viral outbreak like ~~SARS-CoV-2~~; and

21 (8) an overview of United States engagement
22 with the PRC with respect to coronaviruses that in-
23 cludes—

24 (A) a detailed accounting of United States
25 engagement with the WIV and similar labs in

1 the PRC specific to coronaviruses, including a
2 detailed accounting United States Government-
3 sponsored research and funding and diplomatic
4 engagements such as “track 1.5” and “track 2”
5 engagements; and

6 (B) an assessment of any additional scruti-
7 tany of United States Government funding to
8 support gain-of-function research in the PRC
9 after the moratorium on such funding was lift-
10 ed in 2017, and whether United States Govern-
11 ment funding was used to support gain-of-func-
12 tion research in China, during the moratorium
13 on gain-of-function research (2014–2017).

14 (e) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
15 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include
16 a classified annex.

17 (d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
18 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
19 tees of Congress” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
21 Senate;

22 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
23 Senate;

24 (3) the Committee on Health, Education,
25 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;

1 (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the
2 Senate;

3 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
4 House of Representatives;

5 (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
6 ligence of the House of Representatives;

7 (7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
8 the House of Representatives; and

9 (8) the Committee on Armed Services of the
10 House of Representatives.

11 **SEC. 215. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND**
12 **ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH PACIFIC IS-**
13 **LAND COUNTRIES.**

14 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The Secretary of State and Sec-
15 retary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Em-
16 ployed Staff in Pacific island countries for the purpose of
17 providing increased diplomatic support and promoting in-
18 creased economic and commercial engagement between the
19 United States and Pacific Island countries.

20 (b) **AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.**—

21 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—Of the amounts authorized
22 to be appropriated to the Department of State and
23 the Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2022,
24 not more than \$10,000,000 ; respectively, shall be
25 available to carry out the purposes of this section.

1 (2) **TERMINATION.**—The availability of funds in
2 paragraph (1) shall expire on December 31, 2026.

3 (c) **REPORT.**—Not later than one year after the date
4 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
5 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall
6 provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a re-
7 port on the activities of the Department of State and De-
8 partment of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in Pacific
9 island countries, which shall include—

10 (1) a detailed description of the additional dip-
11 lomatic, economic, and commercial engagement and
12 activities in the Pacific island countries provided by
13 Locally Employed Staff; and

14 (2) an assessment of the impact of the activities
15 with respect to the diplomatic, economic, and secu-
16 rity interests of the United States.

17 (d) **EXCEPTION FOR AMERICAN SAMOA.**—The Sec-
18 retary of State may, as appropriate, treat the territory of
19 American Samoa as a foreign country for purposes of car-
20 rying out this section.

21 (e) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
22 **FINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
23 tees of Congress” means—

24 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
25 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-

1 tation; the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
2 sources; and the Committee on Appropriations of the
3 Senate; and

4 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs; the
5 Committee on Energy and Commerce; the Com-
6 mittee on Natural Resources; and the Committee on
7 Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

8 **SEC. 216. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PER-**
9 **SONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE**
10 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

11 (a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following find-
12 ings:

13 (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of
14 State allocated \$1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific
15 region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance
16 (FA) resources and \$798,000,000 in the fiscal year
17 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) budget. These
18 amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget
19 and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-
20 USAID budget.

21 (2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and
22 personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5
23 percent of the total, while FA resources averaged
24 only 4 percent of the total.

1 (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a
2 process to realign certain positions at posts to en-
3 sure that its personnel footprint matches the de-
4 mands of great-power competition, including in the
5 Indo-Pacific.

6 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—

7 (1) It shall be the policy of the United States
8 to ensure Department of State funding levels and
9 personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the re-
10 gion’s high degree of importance and significance to
11 United States political, economic, and security inter-
12 ests.

13 (2) It shall be the policy of the United States
14 to increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of
15 personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region re-
16 spective to the Department of State’s total budget.

17 (3) It shall be the policy of the United States
18 to increase the number of Defense attaches in the
19 Indo-Pacific region number of to assure coverage of
20 all appropriate Posts.

21 (c) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the
22 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
23 shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress
24 an action plan with the following elements:

1 (1) Identification of requirements and the per-
2 sonnel budgetary resources needed to meet them, as-
3 suming an unconstrained resource environment.

4 (2) A plan to increase the portion of the De-
5 partment's budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in
6 terms of DE and FA focused on development, eco-
7 nomic, and security assistance.

8 (3) A plan to increase the number of positions
9 at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with
10 responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a
11 description of increases at each post or bureau, a
12 breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of
13 what each new officer will do to advance United
14 States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

15 (4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks
16 that the Department will meet in implementing the
17 action plan.

18 (5) A description of any barriers to imple-
19 menting the action plan.

20 (d) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 90
21 days after the submission of the action plan described in
22 subsection (c), the Secretary shall submit an update and
23 brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the imple-
24 mentation of such action plan, with supporting data and
25 including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.

1 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
2 authorized to be appropriated \$2,000,000,000 in bilateral
3 and regional foreign assistance resources to the Indo-Pa-
4 cific region and \$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement
5 resources to the Indo-Pacific region.

6 (f) SECRETARY OF STATE CERTIFICATION.—Not
7 later than two years after the date of the enactment of
8 this Act, the Secretary of State shall certify whether or
9 not the benchmarks described in the action plan in sub-
10 section (e) have been met. This certification is non-dele-
11 gable.

12 (g) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
13 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
14 tees of Congress” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
16 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

17 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
18 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
19 resentatives.

20 **SEC. 217. ADVANCING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN THE**
21 **UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.**

22 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
24 establish, within the Bureau of International Organi-
25 zation Affairs of the Department of State, a Special

1 Representative for Advancing United States Leader-
2 ship in the United Nations (referred to in this sec-
3 tion as the “Special Representative”). The Special
4 Representative shall serve concurrently as a Deputy
5 Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of International
6 Organization Affairs of the Department of State.
7 The Special Representative shall report directly to
8 the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Inter-
9 national Organization Affairs, in coordination and
10 consultation with the Representative of the United
11 States to the United Nations.

12 (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special Representative
13 shall assume responsibility for—

14 (1) promoting United States leadership and
15 participation in the United Nations system, with a
16 focus on issue areas where authoritarian nations are
17 exercising increased influence in and determining the
18 agenda of the United Nations system;

19 (2) highlighting how investments in the United
20 Nations advance United States interests and enable
21 stronger coalitions to hold authoritarian regimes to
22 account;

23 (3) ensuring United States emphasis on the
24 need for United Nations employees to uphold the

1 principals of impartiality enshrined in the United
2 Nations charter, rules, and regulations;

3 (4) monitoring and developing and imple-
4 menting plans to counter undue influence, especially
5 by authoritarian nations, within the United Nations
6 system;

7 (5) assessing how United States decisions to
8 withdraw from United Nations bodies impacts
9 United States influence at the United Nations and
10 multilateral global initiatives;

11 (6) promoting participation and inclusion of
12 Taiwan in the United Nations system;

13 (7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations
14 jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other
15 qualified nationals to promote for these positions;

16 (8) tracking leadership changes in United Na-
17 tions secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and
18 developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of
19 like-minded states are assembled to ensure leader-
20 ship races are not won by countries that do not
21 share United States interests; and

22 (9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant
23 by the Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity
24 of the United Nations system.

1 (2) COMPANY.—The term “company” means
2 any corporation, company, limited liability company,
3 limited partnership, business trust, business associa-
4 tion, or other similar entity.

5 (3) OTHER SECURITY FORCES.—The term
6 “other security forces”—

7 (A) includes national security forces that
8 conduct maritime security; and

9 (B) does not include self-described militias
10 or paramilitary organizations.

11 **SEC. 222. FINDINGS.**

12 Congress makes the following findings:

13 (1) The People’s Republic of China aims to use
14 its growing military might in concert with other in-
15 struments of its national power to displace the
16 United States in the Indo-Pacific and establish he-
17 gemony over the region.

18 (2) The military balance of power in the Indo-
19 Pacific region is growing increasingly unfavorable to
20 the United States because—

21 (A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and
22 expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project
23 power and create contested areas across the en-
24 tire Indo-Pacific region;

1 (B) PLA modernization has largely fo-
2 cused on areas where it possesses operational
3 advantages and can exploit weaknesses in the
4 United States suite of capabilities; and

5 (C) current United States force structure
6 and presence do not sufficiently counter threats
7 in the Indo-Pacific, as United States allies,
8 bases, and forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific re-
9 gion are concentrated in large bases that are
10 highly vulnerable to the PRC's strike capabili-
11 ties.

12 (3) This shift in the regional military balance
13 and erosion of conventional deterrence in the Indo-
14 Pacific region—

15 (A) presents a substantial and imminent
16 risk to the security of the United States; and

17 (B) left unchecked, could embolden the
18 PRC to take actions, including the use of mili-
19 tary force, to change the status quo before the
20 United States can mount an effective response.

21 (4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish
22 confidence among United States allies and partners
23 in the strength of United States commitments, even
24 to the extent that these nations feel compelled to
25 bandwagon with the PRC to protect their interests.

1 The PRC is closely monitoring the United States re-
2 action to PRC pressure and coercion of United
3 States allies, searching for indicators of United
4 States resolve.

5 (5) Achieving so-called “reunification” of Tai-
6 wan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC
7 to achieve its regional hegemonic ambitions. The
8 PRC has increased the frequency and scope of its
9 exercises and operations targeting Taiwan, such as
10 amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in the Tai-
11 wan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Tai-
12 wan, and flights across the unofficial median line in
13 the Taiwan Strait. The Government of the PRC’s
14 full submission of Hong Kong potentially accelerates
15 the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, and makes the
16 defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.

17 (6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to—

18 (A) defending the people of Taiwan;

19 (B) limiting the PLA’s ability to project
20 power beyond the First Island Chain, including
21 to United States territory, such as Guam and
22 Hawaii;

23 (C) defending the territorial integrity of
24 Japan;

1 (D) preventing the PLA from diverting
2 military planning, resources, and personnel to
3 broader military ambitions; and

4 (E) retaining the United States credibility
5 as a defender of the democratic values and free-
6 market principles embodied by Taiwan's people
7 and government;

8 (7) The PRC capitalized on the world's atten-
9 tion to COVID-19 to advance its military objectives
10 in the South China Sea, intensifying and accel-
11 erating trends already underway. The PRC has sent
12 militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian Exclu-
13 sive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of
14 an administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel
15 Islands under the Chinese local government of
16 Sansha, aimed a fire control radar at a Philippine
17 navy ship, encroached on Indonesia's fishing
18 grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, announced
19 new "research stations" on Fiery Cross Reef and
20 Subi Reef, landed special military aircraft on Fiery
21 Cross Reef to routinize such deployments, and sent
22 a flotilla of over 200 militia vessels to Whitsun Reef,
23 a feature within the exclusive economic zone of the
24 Philippines.

1 (8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State
2 clarified United States policy on the South China
3 Sea and stated that “Beijing’s claims to offshore re-
4 sources across most of the South China Sea are
5 completely unlawful”.

6 (9) These actions in the South China Sea en-
7 able the PLA to exert influence and project power
8 deeper into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As Admi-
9 ral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Com-
10 mand, testified in 2019, “In short, China is now ca-
11 pable of controlling the South China Sea in all sce-
12 narios short of war with the United States.”.

13 (10) The PLA also continues to advance its
14 claims in the East China Sea, including through a
15 high number of surface combatant patrols and fre-
16 quent entry into the territorial waters of the
17 Senkaku Islands, over which the United States rec-
18 ognizes Japan’s administrative control. In April
19 2014, President Barack Obama stated, “Our com-
20 mitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article
21 five [of the U.S.–Japan security treaty] covers all
22 territory under Japan’s administration, including the
23 Senkaku islands.”.

24 (11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Mi-
25 chael R. Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea

1 is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Phil-
2 ippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South
3 China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations
4 under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”

5 (12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining crit-
6 ical capability in every branch and every domain, in-
7 cluding—

8 (A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a
9 great maritime power or “blue-water” navy that
10 can completely control all activity within the
11 First Island Chain and project power beyond it
12 with a fleet of 425 battle force ships by 2030;

13 (B) increasing the size and range of its
14 strike capabilities, including approximately
15 1,900 ground-launched short- and intermediate-
16 range missiles capable of targeting United
17 States allies and partners in the First and Sec-
18 ond Island chains, United States bases in the
19 Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;

20 (C) boosting capabilities for air warfare,
21 including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters
22 and S-400 air defense systems, new J-20 5th
23 generation stealth fighters, advanced H-6
24 bomber variants, a long-range stealth bomber,
25 and Y-20 heavy lift aircraft; and

1 (D) making critical investments in new do-
2 mains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, elec-
3 tronic warfare, and space warfare.

4 (13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization
5 through all means at its disposal, including its Mili-
6 tary-Civil Fusion initiative, which enlists the whole
7 of PRC society in developing and acquiring tech-
8 nology with military applications to pursue techno-
9 logical advantage over the United States in artificial
10 intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed en-
11 ergy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-
12 space weapons, and other emerging capabilities.

13 (14) The United States lead in the development
14 of science and technology relevant to defense is erod-
15 ing in the face of competition from the PRC. United
16 States research and development spending on de-
17 fense capabilities has declined sharply as a share of
18 global research and development. The commercial
19 sector's leading role in innovation presents certain
20 unique challenges to the Department of Defense's
21 reliance on technology for battlefield advantage.

22 (15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic re-
23 search and development expenditures, supported the
24 growth of new cutting-edge industries and tapped

1 into a large workforce to invest in fostering science
2 and engineering talent.

3 (16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense
4 and security capabilities to build its defense tech-
5 nology and industrial base and improve its own mili-
6 tary capabilities, as well as its influence with coun-
7 tries that purchase and become dependent on its
8 military systems.

9 **SEC. 223. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING**
10 **SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PA-**
11 **CIFIC.**

12 It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster
13 United States security partnership in the Indo-Pacific
14 must include—

15 (1) supporting Japan in its development of
16 long-range precision fires, munitions, air and missile
17 defense capacity, interoperability across all domains,
18 maritime security, and intelligence, and surveillance
19 and reconnaissance capabilities;

20 (2) launching a United States-Japan national
21 security innovation fund to solicit and support pri-
22 vate sector cooperation for new technologies that
23 could benefit the United States and Japan's mutual
24 security objectives;

1 (3) promoting a deeper defense relationship be-
2 tween Japan and Australia, including supporting re-
3 ciprocal access agreements and trilateral United
4 States-Japan-Australia intelligence sharing;

5 (4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan's accel-
6 erated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities,
7 which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan
8 from invasion, including long-range precision fires,
9 munitions, anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti-
10 armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced com-
11 mand, control, communications, computers, intel-
12 ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR),
13 and resilient command and control capabilities, and
14 increasing the conduct of relevant and practical
15 training and exercises with Taiwan's defense forces;
16 and

17 (5) prioritizing building the capacity of United
18 States allies and partners to protect defense tech-
19 nology.

20 **SEC. 224. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

21 It shall be the policy of the United States to—

22 (1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United
23 States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for
24 achieving United States political and military objec-
25 tives in the region;

1 (2) exercise freedom of operations in the inter-
2 national waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific
3 maritime domains, which are critical to the pros-
4 perity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific re-
5 gion;

6 (3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the
7 Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber
8 presence, integrated missile defense capabilities,
9 long-range precision fires, undersea warfare capabili-
10 ties, and diversified and resilient basing and rota-
11 tional presence, including support for pre-positioning
12 strategies;

13 (4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and
14 partnerships of the United States to build capacity
15 and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships,
16 modernize communications architecture, address
17 anti-access and area denial challenges, and increase
18 joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;

19 (5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the
20 United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pa-
21 cific region, including longstanding United States
22 policy regarding—

23 (A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Co-
24 operation and Security between the United

1 States and Japan, signed at Washington Janu-
2 ary 19, 1960;

3 (B) Article III of the Mutual Defense
4 Treaty between the United States and the Re-
5 public of Korea, signed at Washington October
6 1, 1953;

7 (C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Trea-
8 ty between the United States and the Republic
9 of the Philippines, signed at Washington Au-
10 gust 30, 1951, including that, as the South
11 China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed at-
12 tack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public ves-
13 sels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual
14 defense obligations under Article IV of our mu-
15 tual defense treaty;

16 (D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zea-
17 land, United States Security Treaty, done at
18 San Francisco September 1, 1951; and

19 (E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
20 Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, to-
21 gether with the Thanat-Rusk Communique of
22 1962; and

23 (6) collaborate with United States treaty allies
24 in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral se-

1 security and defense cooperation with other regional
2 partners;

3 (7) ensure the continuity of operations by the
4 United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific re-
5 gion, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with
6 partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle
7 of freedom of operations in international waters and
8 airspace in accordance with established principles
9 and practices of international law;

10 (8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public
11 Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);

12 (9) sustain the “Six Assurances” provided by
13 the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the
14 foundations for United States-Taiwan relations, and
15 to deepen, to the fullest extent possible, the exten-
16 sive, close, and friendly relations of the United
17 States and Taiwan, including cooperation to support
18 the development of capable, ready, and modern
19 forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan;

20 (10) enhance security partnerships with India,
21 across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the
22 Indo-Pacific;

23 (11) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the
24 PRC against United States and allies’ interests, es-
25 pecially along the First Island Chain and in the

1 Western Pacific, by showing PRC leaders that the
2 United States can and is willing to deny them the
3 ability to achieve their objectives, including by—

4 (A) consistently demonstrating the political
5 will of the United States to deepening existing
6 treaty alliances and growing new partnerships
7 as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched stra-
8 tegic advantage to the PRC's growing military
9 capabilities and reach;

10 (B) maintaining a system of forward-de-
11 ployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the
12 most visible sign of United States resolve and
13 commitment to the region, and as platforms to
14 ensure United States operational readiness and
15 advance interoperability with allies and part-
16 ners;

17 (C) adopting a more dispersed force pos-
18 ture throughout the region, particularly the
19 Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access
20 for United States mobile and relocatable
21 launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and
22 hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific
23 region;

24 (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike
25 networks to United States and allied forces, in-

1 including ground-launched cruise missiles, under-
2 sea and naval capabilities, and integrated air
3 and missile defense in the First Island Chain
4 and the Second Island Chain, in order to deter
5 and prevent PRC coercion and aggression, and
6 to maximize the United States ability to oper-
7 ate;

8 (E) strengthening extended deterrence to
9 ensure that escalation against key United
10 States interests would be costly, risky, and self-
11 defeating; and

12 (F) collaborating with allies and partners
13 to accelerate their roles in more equitably shar-
14 ing the burdens of mutual defense, including
15 through the acquisition and fielding of advanced
16 capabilities and training that will better enable
17 them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and

18 (12) maintain the capacity of the United States
19 to impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial,
20 reputational, and military costs on the PRC for acts
21 of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself
22 and its allies regardless of the point of origin of at-
23 tacks against them.

1 **SEC. 225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO-PA-**
2 **CIFIC AND AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-**
3 **TIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME SE-**
4 **CURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUT-**
5 **REACH ACTIVITIES.**

6 (a) **FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING FUNDING.**—In
7 addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to section
8 ~~23~~ of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (re-
9 lating to foreign military financing assistance), there is
10 authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022
11 through fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific
12 region in accordance with this section—

- 13 (1) \$110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
14 (2) \$125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
15 (3) \$130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
16 (4) \$140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
17 (5) \$150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

18 (b) **SOUTHEAST MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT INI-**
19 **TIATIVE.**—There is authorized to be appropriated
20 \$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026
21 for the Department of State for International Narcotics
22 Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support
23 of the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initia-
24 tive.

25 (c) **DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.**—There is
26 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State,

1 \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026,
2 which shall be used—

3 (1) to conduct, in coordination with the Depart-
4 ment of Defense, outreach activities, including con-
5 ferences and symposia, to familiarize partner coun-
6 tries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, with
7 the United States interpretation of international law
8 relating to freedom of the seas; and

9 (2) to work with allies and partners in the
10 Indo-Pacific region to better align respective inter-
11 pretations of international law relating to freedom of
12 the seas, including on the matters of operations by
13 military ships in exclusive economic zones, innocent
14 passage through territorial seas, and transits
15 through international straits.

16 (d) PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE.—
17 Using amounts appropriate pursuant to subsection (a),
18 the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
19 of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance, for the
20 purpose of increasing maritime security and domain
21 awareness for countries in the Indo-Pacific region—

22 (1) to provide assistance to national military or
23 other security forces of such countries that have
24 maritime security missions among their functional
25 responsibilities;

1 (2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and
2 headquarters level organizations for such forces; and

3 ~~(3) to provide assistance to and training to~~
4 ~~other relevant foreign affairs, maritime, or security-~~
5 ~~related ministries, agencies, departments, or offices~~
6 ~~that manage and oversee maritime activities and pol-~~
7 ~~icy that the Secretary of State may so designate.~~

8 (e) DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance pro-
9 vided by the Secretary of State under this section shall
10 be known as the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initia-
11 tive” (in this section referred to as the “Initiative”).

12 (f) PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.—Assistance provided
13 through the Initiative may be used to accomplish the fol-
14 lowing objectives:

15 (1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of
16 international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region
17 that are critical to ensuring the security and free
18 flow of commerce and achieving United States na-
19 tional security objectives.

20 (2) Improving maritime domain awareness in
21 the Indo-Pacific region.

22 ~~(3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific re-~~
23 ~~gion.~~

24 (4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activi-
25 ties and other forms of maritime trafficking activity

1 in the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organiza-
2 tions that have been determined to be a security
3 threat to the United States.

4 (5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a
5 country or regional organization to respond to
6 emerging threats to maritime security in the Indo-
7 Pacific region.

8 (6) Strengthening United States alliances and
9 partnerships in Southeast Asia and other parts of
10 the Indo-Pacific region.

11 (g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount appropriated
13 pursuant to subsection(a) and section 23 of the
14 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (relating
15 to foreign military financing assistance), there is au-
16 thorized to be appropriated to the Department of
17 State for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initia-
18 tive and other related regional programs exactly—

19 (A) \$70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;

20 (B) \$80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;

21 (C) \$90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;

22 (D) \$100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025;

23 and

24 (E) \$110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

1 (2) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—The “Indo-Pa-
2 cific Maritime Security Initiative” and funds author-
3 ized for the Initiative shall include existing regional
4 programs related to maritime security, including the
5 Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative.

6 (h) **ELIGIBILITY AND PRIORITIES FOR ASSIST-**
7 **ANCE.**—

8 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State shall
9 use the following considerations when selecting
10 which countries in the Indo-Pacific region should re-
11 ceive assistance pursuant to the Initiative:

12 (A) Assistance may be provided to a coun-
13 try in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance the ca-
14 pabilities of that country according to the objec-
15 tives outlined in (f), or of a regional organiza-
16 tion that includes that country, to conduct—

17 (i) maritime intelligence, surveillance,
18 and reconnaissance;

19 (ii) littoral and port security;

20 (iii) Coast Guard operations;

21 (iv) command and control; and

22 (v) management and oversight of mar-
23 itime activities.

24 (B) Priority shall be placed on assistance
25 to enhance the maritime security capabilities of

1 the military or security forces of countries in
2 the Indo-Pacific region that have maritime mis-
3 sions and the government agencies responsible
4 for such forces.

5 ~~(2) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.—~~

6 ~~(A) AUTHORIZED ELEMENTS OF ASSIST-~~
7 ~~ANCE.—~~Assistance provided under paragraph
8 ~~(1)(A)~~ may include the provision of equipment,
9 training, and small-scale military construction.

10 ~~(B) REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF ASSISTANCE~~
11 ~~AND TRAINING.—~~Assistance and training pro-
12 vided under subparagraph ~~(A)~~ shall include ele-
13 ments that promote—

14 (i) the observance of and respect for
15 human rights; and

16 (ii) respect for legitimate civilian au-
17 thority within the country to which the as-
18 sistance is provided.

19 ~~(i) JOINT TASK FORCE.—~~The Department of De-
20 fense shall establish a joint, interagency task force to as-
21 sess, respond to, and coordinate with allies and partners
22 in response to the use of grey zone tactics by state and
23 non-state actors in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, in-
24 cluding—

1 (1) conducting domain awareness operations,
2 intelligence fusion, and multi-sensor correlation to
3 detect, monitor, and hand off suspected grey zone
4 activities;

5 (2) promoting security, cooperation, and capac-
6 ity building; and

7 (3) coordinating country team and partner na-
8 tion initiatives in order to counter the use of grey
9 zone tactics by adversaries.

10 (j) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Secretary of State and
11 the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appro-
12 priate committees of Congress each year a report on the
13 status of the provision of equipment, training, supplies,
14 or other services provided pursuant to the Initiative during
15 the preceding 12 months.

16 (k) NOTICE TO CONGRESS ON ASSISTANCE AND
17 TRAINING.—Not later than 15 days before exercising the
18 authority under subsection (a) with respect to a recipient
19 foreign country, the Secretary of State shall submit a noti-
20 fication in writing to the appropriate committees of Con-
21 gress.

22 **SEC. 226. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT PILOT**
23 **PROGRAM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

24 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
25 authorized to be appropriated \$20,000,000 for each of fis-

1 cal years 2022 and 2023 for the creation of a pilot pro-
2 gram for foreign military financing compacts.

3 (b) ASSISTANCE.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is
5 authorized to create a pilot program, for a duration
6 of two years, with an assessment for any additional
7 or permanent programming, to provide assistance
8 under this section for each country that enters into
9 an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States
10 pursuant to subsection (d) to support policies and
11 programs that advance the progress of the country
12 in achieving lasting security and civilian-military
13 governance through respect for human rights, good
14 governance (including transparency and free and
15 fair elections), and cooperation with United States
16 and international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking,
17 and counter-crime efforts and programs.

18 (2) FORM OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance under
19 this subsection may be provided in the form of
20 grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, or no-in-
21 terest loans to the government of an eligible country
22 described in subsection (c).

23 (c) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—A country shall be a can-
2 didate country for purposes of eligibility for assist-
3 ance for fiscal year 2022 and 2023 if—

4 (A) the country is classified as a lower
5 middle income country in the then most recent
6 edition of the World Development Report for
7 Reconstruction and Development published by
8 the International Bank for Reconstruction and
9 Development and has an income greater than
10 the historical ceiling for International Develop-
11 ment Association eligibility for the fiscal year
12 involved; and

13 (B) the Secretary of State determines that
14 the country is committed to seeking just and
15 democratic governance, including with a dem-
16 onstrated commitment to—

17 (i) the promotion of political plu-
18 ralism, equality, and the rule of law;

19 (ii) respect for human and civil rights;

20 (iii) protection of private property
21 rights;

22 (iv) transparency and accountability
23 of government;

24 (v) anti-corruption; and

1 (vi) the institution of effective civilian
2 control, professionalization, respect for
3 human rights by, and accountability of the
4 armed forces.

5 (2) IDENTIFICATION OF ELIGIBLE COUN-
6 TRIES.—Not later than 90 days prior to the date on
7 which the Secretary of State determines eligible
8 countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the Sec-
9 retary—

10 (A) shall prepare and submit to the appro-
11 priate congressional committees a report that
12 contains a list of all eligible countries identified
13 that have met the requirements under para-
14 graph (1) for the fiscal year; and

15 (B) shall consult with the appropriate con-
16 gressional committees on the extent to which
17 such countries meet the criteria described in
18 paragraph (1).

19 (d) FMF CHALLENGE COMPACT.—

20 (1) COMPACT.—The Secretary of State may
21 provide assistance for an eligible country only if the
22 country enters into an agreement with the United
23 States, to be known as an “FMF Challenge Com-
24 pact” (in this subsection referred to as a “Compact”)
25 that establishes a multi-year plan for achieving

1 shared security objectives in furtherance of the pur-
2 poses of this title.

3 ~~(2) ELEMENTS.~~—The elements of the Compact
4 shall be those listed in subsection ~~(c)(1)(B)~~ for de-
5 termining eligibility, and be designed to significantly
6 advance the performance of those commitments dur-
7 ing the period of the Compact.

8 ~~(3) IN GENERAL.~~—The Compact should take
9 into account the national strategy of the eligible
10 country and shall include—

11 (A) the specific objectives that the country
12 and the United States expect to achieve during
13 the term of the Compact, including both how
14 the foreign military financing under the Com-
15 pact will advance shared security interests and
16 advance partner capacity building efforts as
17 well as to advance national efforts towards just
18 and democratic governance;

19 (B) the responsibilities of the country and
20 the United States in the achievement of such
21 objectives;

22 (C) regular benchmarks to measure, where
23 appropriate, progress toward achieving such ob-
24 jectives; and

1 (D) the strategy of the eligible country to
2 sustain progress made toward achieving such
3 objectives after expiration of the Compact.

4 (e) CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION PRIOR TO COM-
5 PACT NEGOTIATIONS.—Not later than 15 days before
6 commencing negotiations of a Compact with an eligible
7 country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the ap-
8 propriate congressional committees with respect to the
9 proposed Compact negotiation and shall identify the objec-
10 tives and mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of
11 the Compact.

12 (f) ASSESSMENT OF PILOT PROGRAM AND REC-
13 OMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the con-
14 clusion of the pilot program, the Secretary of State shall
15 provide a report to the appropriate congressional commit-
16 tees with respect to the pilot program, including an assess-
17 ment of the success and utility of the pilot program estab-
18 lished under this subsection in meeting United States ob-
19 jectives and a recommendation with respect to whether to
20 continue on a pilot or permanent basis a further foreign
21 military financing compact program.

1 **SEC. 227. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL**
2 **MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE**
3 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

4 There is authorized to be appropriated for each of
5 fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Depart-
6 ment of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise
7 made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II
8 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347
9 et seq.) (relating to international military education and
10 training (IMET) assistance), \$45,000,000 for activities in
11 the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this Act.

12 **SEC. 228. PRIORITIZING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE TRANS-**
13 **FERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that the United States Government should prioritize
16 the review of excess defense article transfers to Indo-Pa-
17 cific partners.

18 (b) FIVE-YEAR PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after
19 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
20 develop a five-year plan to prioritize excess defense article
21 transfers to the Indo-Pacific and provide a report describ-
22 ing such plan to the appropriate congressional committees.

23 (c) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—Section 516(e)(2) of
24 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
25 2321j(e)(2)) is amended by inserting “, Thailand, Indo-

1 nesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia” after “and to the Phil-
2ippines”.

3 (d) **REQUIRED COORDINATION.**—The United States
4 Government shall coordinate and align excess defense arti-
5 cle transfers with capacity building efforts of regional al-
6 lies and partners.

7 **SEC. 229. PRIORITIZING EXCESS NAVAL VESSEL TRANS-**
8 **FERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

9 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The President is authorized to
10 transfer to a government of a country listed pursuant to
11 the amendment made under section 228(e) two **OLIVER**
12 **HAZARD PERRY** class guided missile frigates on a grant
13 basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
14 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

15 (b) **GRANTS NOT COUNTED IN ANNUAL TOTAL OF**
16 **TRANSFERRED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.**—The value
17 of a vessel transferred to another country on a grant basis
18 pursuant to authority provided by this section shall not
19 be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense
20 articles transferred in any fiscal year under section 516
21 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

22 (c) **COSTS OF TRANSFERS.**—Any expense incurred by
23 the United States in connection with a transfer authorized
24 by this section shall be charged to the recipient notwith-

1 standing section 516(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
 2 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).

3 (d) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT IN UNITED
 4 STATES SHIPYARDS.—To the maximum extent prac-
 5 ticable, the President shall require, as a condition of the
 6 transfer of a vessel under this subsection, that the recipi-
 7 ent to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or
 8 refurbishment of the vessel as is needed, before the vessel
 9 joins the naval forces of that recipient, performed at a
 10 shipyard located in the United States.

11 (e) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.—The authority to
 12 transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end
 13 of the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enact-
 14 ment of this Act.

15 **SEC. 230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM**
 16 **OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-**
 17 **WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC**
 18 **AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE**
 19 **SOUTH CHINA SEA.**

20 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

21 (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions
 22 or the use of force to impede freedom of operations
 23 in international airspace by military or civilian air-
 24 craft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the
 25 Indo-Pacific region;

1 (2) urges the Government of China to refrain
2 from implementing the declared East China Sea Air
3 Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in
4 the South China Sea, which is contrary to freedom
5 of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain
6 from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in
7 the Indo-Pacific region;

8 (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's
9 decision is final and legally binding on both parties
10 and that the People's Republic of China's claims to
11 offshore resources across most of the South China
12 Sea are unlawful; and

13 (4) condemns the People's Republic of China
14 for failing to abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's
15 ruling, despite Chinese obligations as a state party
16 to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
17 Sea.

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
19 of the United States to—

20 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
21 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
22 ing longstanding United States policy regarding Ar-
23 ticle V of the United States-Philippines Mutual De-
24 fense Treaty and reaffirm its position that Article V
25 of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty

1 applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Is-
2 lands;

3 ~~(2)~~ oppose claims that impinge on the rights,
4 freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace
5 above it, that belong to all nations, and oppose the
6 militarization of new and reclaimed land features in
7 the South China Sea;

8 ~~(3)~~ continue certain policies with respect to the
9 PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely—

10 ~~(A)~~ that PRC claims in the South China
11 Sea, including to offshore resources across most
12 of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

13 ~~(B)~~ that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a
14 maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in areas
15 that the Tribunal found to be in the Phil-
16 ippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on
17 its continental shelf;

18 ~~(C)~~ to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
19 yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived
20 from islands its claims in the Spratly Islands;
21 and

22 ~~(D)~~ that the PRC has no lawful territorial
23 or maritime claim to James Shoal;

24 ~~(4)~~ urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
25 destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation

1 or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over
2 disputed claims;

3 (5) ensure that disputes are managed without
4 intimidation, coercion, or force;

5 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust
6 claims in accordance with international law;

7 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and
8 maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-
9 torial seas, must be derived from land features and
10 otherwise comport with international law;

11 (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-
12 tions covering disputed areas in the South China
13 Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the
14 region;

15 (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if
16 that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of South-
17 east Asian claimant states and does not serve as a
18 vehicle for the People's Republic of China to advance
19 its unlawful maritime claims;

20 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
21 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
22 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
23 Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs),
24 is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation be-
25 tween the United States Armed Forces and the

1 forces of other countries, including the People's Re-
2 public of China;

3 (11) support the development of regional insti-
4 tutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional
5 Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting
6 Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded
7 ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical coopera-
8 tion in the region and reinforce the role of inter-
9 national law;

10 (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships
11 with other countries in the region for maritime do-
12 main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-
13 forts by the United States Government to explore
14 the development of appropriate multilateral mecha-
15 nisms for a "common operating picture" in the
16 South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries
17 that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing
18 behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

19 (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent
20 any other country from exercising its sovereign
21 rights to the resources of the exclusive economic
22 zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims
23 to those areas in the South China Sea that have no
24 support in international law; and

1 (14) assure the continuity of operations by the
2 United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including,
3 when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and
4 allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of oper-
5 ations in international waters and airspace in ac-
6 cordance with established principles and practices of
7 international law.

8 **SEC. 231. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-**
9 **PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS.**

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that—

12 (1) the Secretary of State should expand and
13 strengthen existing measures under the United
14 States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide
15 capabilities to allies and partners consistent with
16 agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles,
17 missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-
18 ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with
19 United States strategic imperatives;

20 (2) the United States should design for export
21 to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities crit-
22 ical to maintaining a favorable military balance in
23 the region, including long-range precision fires, air
24 and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise mis-
25 siles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional

1 hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and re-
2 connaissance capabilities, and command and control
3 systems;

4 (3) the United States should pursue, to the
5 maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology
6 security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems
7 described in paragraph (2); and

8 (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with
9 the Secretary of Defense, should—

10 (A) urge allies and partners to invest in
11 sufficient quantities of munitions to meet con-
12 tingency requirements and avoid the need for
13 accessing United States stocks in wartime; and

14 (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such
15 munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies'
16 capacity to produce such munitions.

17 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
18 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
19 tees of Congress” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
21 Senate;

22 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the
23 Senate;

24 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
25 House of Representatives; and

1 (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the
2 House of Representatives.

3 ~~(c) REPORT.—~~

4 ~~(1) IN GENERAL.—~~Not later than 90 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
6 of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
7 fense, shall submit a report to the appropriate com-
8 mittees of Congress that describes United States pri-
9 orities for building more capable security partners in
10 the Indo-Pacific region.

11 ~~(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—~~The report
12 required under paragraph ~~(1)~~ shall—

13 ~~(A)~~ provide a priority list of defense and
14 military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and
15 partners must possess for the United States to
16 be able to achieve its military objectives in the
17 Indo-Pacific region;

18 ~~(B)~~ identify, from the list referred to in
19 subparagraph ~~(A)~~, the capabilities that are best
20 provided, or can only be provided, by the
21 United States;

22 ~~(C)~~ identify—

23 ~~(i)~~ actions required to prioritize
24 United States Government resources and

1 personnel to expedite fielding the capabilities identified in subparagraph (B); and

2
3 (ii) steps needed to fully account for
4 and a plan to integrate all means of
5 United States foreign military sales, direct
6 commercial sales, security assistance, and
7 all applicable authorities of the Department of State and the Department of Defense;

8
9
10 (D) assess the requirements for United
11 States security assistance, including International Military Education and Training, in
12 the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means
13 to deliver critical partner capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);

14
15
16 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet
17 the requirements for United States security assistance, and identify resource gaps;

18
19 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
20 requirements for United States security assistance in the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy barriers, and factors related to specific partner countries;

1 (G) identify limitations on the United
 2 States ability to provide such capabilities, in-
 3 cluding those identified under subparagraph
 4 (B), because of existing United States treaty
 5 obligations, United States policies, or other reg-
 6 ulations;

7 (H) recommend improvements to the proc-
 8 ess for developing requirements for partners ca-
 9 pabilities; and

10 (I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
 11 ommendations for infrastructure and posture,
 12 based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

13 (3) FORM.—The report required under this
 14 subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a
 15 classified annex.

16 **SEC. 232. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUS-**
 17 **TRIAL BASE.**

18 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 19 gress that—

20 (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated
 21 approach, which leverages economies of scale with
 22 major allies, is necessary for the United States to re-
 23 tain its lead in defense technology;

24 (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or trans-
 25 fer of defense-related technologies and services to

1 members of the national technology and industrial
2 base (as defined in section 2500 of title 10, United
3 States Code) would advance United States security
4 interests by helping to leverage the defense-related
5 technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies
6 to reduce the dependence on other countries, includ-
7 ing countries that pose challenges to United States
8 interests around the world, for defense-related inno-
9 vation and investment; and

10 (3) it is in the interest of the United States to
11 continue to increase cooperation with Australia,
12 Canada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
13 and Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-re-
14 lated technology and services and leverage the in-
15 vestments of like-minded, major ally nations in order
16 to maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense
17 technology innovation.

18 (b) REPORT.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
20 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
21 of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
22 congressional committees that—

23 (A) describes the Department of State's ef-
24 forts to facilitate access among the national
25 technology and industrial base to defense arti-

1 eles and services subject to the United States
2 Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the
3 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
4 2778(a)(1)); and

5 (B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, for-
6 eign policy, or other challenges or consider-
7 ations that prevent or frustrate these efforts; to
8 include any gaps in the respective export con-
9 trol regimes implemented by United Kingdom
10 of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Aus-
11 tralia, or Canada.

12 (2) FORM.—This report required under para-
13 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a
14 classified annex.

15 **SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RE-**
16 **SPECT TO CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA-**
17 **TIONS OVERSEAS.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
20 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
21 a report to the appropriate congressional committees re-
22 garding United States diplomatic engagement with other
23 nations that host or are considering hosting any military
24 installation of the Government of the People's Republic
25 of China.

1 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
2 quired under subsection (a) shall include—

3 (1) a list of countries that currently host or are
4 considering hosting any military installation of the
5 Government of the People’s Republic of China;

6 (2) a detailed description of United States dip-
7 lomatic and related efforts to countries that are con-
8 sidering hosting a military installation of the Gov-
9 ernment of the People’s Republic of China, and the
10 results of such efforts;

11 (3) an assessment on the adverse impact on
12 United States interests of the Government of the
13 People’s Republic of China successfully establishing
14 a military installation at any of the locations it is
15 currently considering;

16 (4) a description and list of any commercial
17 ports outside of the People’s Republic of China that
18 the United States Government assesses could be
19 used by the Government of the People’s Republic of
20 China for military purposes, and any diplomatic ef-
21 forts with the governments of the countries where
22 such ports are located;

23 (5) the impact of the military installations of
24 the Government of the People’s Republic of China
25 on United States interests; and

1 (6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experi-
2 ence of addressing the PRC's first overseas base in
3 Djibouti.

4 (e) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under
5 subsection (a) shall be classified, but may include a un-
6 classified summary.

7 **SEC. 234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL**
8 **IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS**
9 **SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.**

10 It is the policy of the United States to sustain max-
11 imum economic pressure on the Government of the Demo-
12 cratic People's Republic of Korea (referred to in this sec-
13 tion as the "DPRK") until the regime undertakes com-
14 plete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward
15 denuclearization, including by—

16 (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to
17 implement and enforce existing United Nations
18 sanctions with regard to the DPRK;

19 (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and
20 in accordance with United Nations Security Council
21 resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK
22 citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such
23 workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit
24 source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nu-
25 clear ambitions;

1 (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to
2 pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and
3 from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers,
4 consistent with United Nations Security Council res-
5 olutions;

6 (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities—

7 (A) to cease business activities with United
8 Nations-designated entities and their affiliates
9 in the DPRK; and

10 (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who
11 enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its
12 nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and

13 (5) enforcing United Nations Security Council
14 resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United
15 States sanctions, including those pursuant to the
16 North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
17 of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), the Countering
18 America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Pub-
19 lic Law 115–44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea
20 Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019
21 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 116–92),
22 and relevant United States executive orders.

1 **SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES**
2 **HOSTING CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA-**
3 **TIONS.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initia-
7 tive (BRI) as a development initiative, the People’s
8 Republic of China is also utilizing the BRI to ad-
9 vance its own security interests, including to expand
10 its power projection capabilities and facilitate great-
11 er access for the People’s Liberation Army through
12 overseas military installations; and

13 (2) the expansion of the People’s Liberation
14 Army globally through overseas military installations
15 will undermine the medium- and long-term security
16 of the United States and the security and develop-
17 ment of strategic partners in critical regions around
18 the world, which is at odds with United States goals
19 to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance
20 among partner nations, including through the Mil-
21 lennium Challenge Corporation.

22 (b) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—Except as pro-
23 vided in subsection (c), for fiscal years 2022 through
24 2031, the government of a country that is hosting on its
25 territory a military installation of the Government of the
26 People’s Republic of China or facilitates the expansion of

1 the presence of the People’s Liberation Army for purposes
 2 other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping
 3 operations or for temporary humanitarian, medical, and
 4 disaster relief operations in such country shall not be eligi-
 5 ble for assistance under sections 609 or 616 of the Millen-
 6 nium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).

7 (e) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The President
 8 may, on a case by case basis, waive the limitation in sub-
 9 section (b) if the President submits to the appropriate con-
 10 gressional committees—

11 (1) a written determination that the waiver is
 12 important to the national interests of the United
 13 States; and

14 (2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is
 15 important to those interests.

16 **Subtitle C—Regional Strategies To**
 17 **Counter the People’s Republic**
 18 **of China**

19 **SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
 20 **ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD**
 21 **WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC**
 22 **OF CHINA.**

23 It is the policy of the United States—

24 (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships
 25 Europe and with like-minded countries around the

1 globe to effectively compete with the People's Repub-
2 lie of China; and

3 ~~(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and~~
4 ~~partners—~~

5 (A) to address significant diplomatic, eco-
6 nomic, and military challenges posed by the
7 People's Republic of China;

8 (B) to deter the People's Republic of
9 China from pursuing military aggression;

10 (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of
11 territorial disputes in accordance with inter-
12 national law;

13 (D) to promote private sector-led long-term
14 economic development while countering efforts
15 by the Government of the People's Republic of
16 China to leverage predatory economic practices
17 as a means of political and economic coercion in
18 the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;

19 (E) to promote the values of democracy
20 and human rights, including through efforts to
21 end the repression by the Chinese Communist
22 Party of political dissidents and Uyghurs and
23 other ethnic Muslim minorities, Tibetan Bud-
24 dhists, Christians, and other minorities;

1 (F) to respond to the crackdown by the
2 Chinese Communist Party, in contravention of
3 the commitments made under the Sino-British
4 Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law
5 of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of
6 the people of Hong Kong; and

7 (G) to counter the Chinese Communist
8 Party efforts to spread disinformation in the
9 People's Republic of China and beyond with re-
10 spect to the response of the Chinese Communist
11 Party to COVID-19.

12 **PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

13 **SEC. 245. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED**
14 **STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.**

15 It is the sense of Congress that—

16 (1) the United States and Canada have a
17 unique relationship based on shared geography, ex-
18 tensive personal connections, deep economic ties,
19 mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to
20 uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules
21 based international order established after World
22 War II;

23 (2) the United States and Canada can better
24 address China's economic, political, and security in-
25 fluence through closer cooperation on counter-

1 narcotics, environmental stewardship, transparent
2 practices in public procurement and infrastructure
3 planning, the Arctic, energy and connectivity issues,
4 trade and commercial relations, bilateral legal mat-
5 ters, and support for democracy, good governance,
6 and human rights;

7 (3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the
8 United States and Canada should maintain joint ini-
9 tiatives to address border management, commercial
10 and trade relations, a shared approach with respect
11 to the People's Republic of China, and transnational
12 challenges, including pandemics and climate change;

13 (4) the United States and Canada should en-
14 hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation,
15 influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-
16 ganda efforts;

17 (5) the People's Republic of China's infrastruc-
18 ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-
19 cations technology, extraction of natural resources,
20 and port infrastructure, pose national security risks
21 for the United States and Canada;

22 (6) the United States should share, as appro-
23 priate, intelligence gathered regarding—

24 (A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and

1 (B) the Chinese Government's intentions
2 with respect to 5G expansion;

3 (7) the United States and Canada should con-
4 tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple-
5 ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada
6 Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development
7 Collaboration; and

8 (8) the United States and Canada must
9 prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in
10 the Arctic, including by modernizing the North
11 American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
12 to effectively defend the Northern Hemisphere
13 against the range of threats by peer competitors, in-
14 cluding long range missiles and high-precision weap-
15 ons.

16 **SEC. 246. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERN-**
17 **MENT OF CHINA'S ARBITRARY IMPRISON-**
18 **MENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.**

19 It is the sense of Congress that—

20 (1) the Government of the People's Republic of
21 China's apparent arbitrary detention and abusive
22 treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and
23 Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-
24 ernment of Canada's arrest of Meng Wanzhou is
25 deeply concerning;

1 (2) the Government of Canada has shown inter-
2 national leadership by—

3 (A) upholding the rule of law and com-
4 plying with its international legal obligations,
5 including those pursuant to the Extradition
6 Treaty Between the United States of America
7 and Canada, signed at Washington December
8 3, 1971; and

9 (B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-
10 bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,
11 which has been endorsed by 57 countries and
12 the European Union and reaffirms well-estab-
13 lished prohibitions under international human
14 rights conventions against the arbitrary deten-
15 tion of foreign nationals to be used as leverage
16 in state-to-state relations; and

17 (3) the United States continues to join the Gov-
18 ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-
19 lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for
20 due process for Canadian national Robert
21 Schellenberg.

22 **SEC. 247. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
23 **CANADA.**

24 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the
25 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-

1 mit a strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
3 Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
4 Armed Services of the House of Representatives that de-
5 scribes how the United States will enhance cooperation
6 with the Government of Canada in managing relations
7 with the Government of China.

8 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
9 section (a) shall—

10 (1) identify key policy points of convergence
11 and divergence between the United States and Can-
12 ada in managing relations with the People’s Repub-
13 lic of China in the areas of technology, trade, eco-
14 nomic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains
15 and critical minerals; and illicit narcotics;

16 (2) include the development coordination efforts
17 with Canadian counterparts to enhance the coopera-
18 tion between the United States and Canada with re-
19 spect to—

20 (A) managing economic relations with the
21 People’s Republic of China;

22 (B) democracy and human rights in the
23 People’s Republic of China;

24 (C) technology issues involving the Peo-
25 ple’s Republic of China;

1 (D) defense issues involving the People's
2 Republic of China; and

3 (E) international law enforcement and
4 transnational organized crime issues.

5 (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to
6 work with Canada to counter Chinese projection of
7 an authoritarian governing model around the world;

8 (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
9 cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-
10 nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives
11 to Huawei's 5G technology;

12 (5) detail diplomatic and defense collabora-
13 tion—

14 (A) to advance joint United States-Cana-
15 dian priorities for responsible stewardship in
16 the Arctic Region; and

17 (B) to counter Chinese efforts to project
18 political, economic, and military influence into
19 the Arctic Region; and

20 (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can-
21 ada to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert
22 influence across the multilateral system, including at
23 the World Health Organization.

24 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section
25 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be

1 made available to the public, but may include a classified
2 annex, if necessary.

3 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less fre-
5 quently than every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of
6 State shall consult with the appropriate congressional
7 committees regarding the development and implementa-
8 tion of the strategy required under this section.

9 **SEC. 248. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COM-**
10 **PETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN**
11 **RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN**
12 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
15 in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
16 Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United
17 States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Of-
18 ficer of the United States International Development Fi-
19 nance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for
20 increasing United States economic competitiveness and
21 promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule
22 of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, par-
23 ticularly in the areas of investment, equitable and sustain-
24 able development, commercial relations, anti-corruption
25 activities, and infrastructure projects, to—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
2 Senate;

3 (2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

4 (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the
5 Senate;

6 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
7 Senate;

8 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
9 House of Representatives;

10 (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the
11 House of Representatives;

12 (7) the Committee on Ways and Means of the
13 House of Representatives; and

14 (8) the Committee on Appropriations of the
15 House of Representatives.

16 (b) **ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.**—The strategy required
17 under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-
18 ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—

19 (1) enhance the technical capacity of countries
20 in the region to advance the sustainable development
21 of equitable economies;

22 (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between
23 the countries of the Americas;

1 (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and
2 competitive environment for United States busi-
3 nesses in the region;

4 (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
5 view long term financial sustainability and security
6 implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-
7 tors or services, including transportation, commu-
8 nications, natural resources, and energy;

9 (5) establish competitive and transparent infra-
10 structure project selection and procurement proc-
11 esses that promote transparency, open competition,
12 financial sustainability, adherence to robust global
13 standards, and the employment of the local work-
14 force;

15 (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust
16 democratic governance, fair competition, combat cor-
17 ruption, and end impunity;

18 (7) identify and mitigate obstacles to private
19 sector-led economic growth in Latin America and
20 the Caribbean; and

21 (8) maintain transparent and affordable access
22 to the internet and digital infrastructure in the
23 Western Hemisphere.

24 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1
25 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annu-

1 ally thereafter, the Secretary of State, after consultation
 2 with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Com-
 3 merce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade
 4 Representative, and the leadership of the United States
 5 International Development Finance Corporation, shall
 6 brief the congressional committees listed in subsection (a)
 7 regarding the implementation of this part, including exam-
 8 ples of successes and challenges.

9 **SEC. 249. ENGAGEMENT IN REGIONAL AND INTER-**
 10 **NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN LATIN AMER-**
 11 **ICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

12 (a) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
 13 **FINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
 14 tees of Congress” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
 16 Senate;

17 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
 18 Senate;

19 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
 20 Senate;

21 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
 22 House of Representatives;

23 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
 24 ligence of the House of Representatives; and

1 (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the
2 House of Representatives.

3 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
6 of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of
7 State for Intelligence and Research, and in coordina-
8 tion with the Director of National Intelligence and
9 the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall
10 submit a report to the appropriate committees of
11 Congress that assesses the nature, intent, and im-
12 pact to United States strategic interests of Chinese
13 diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the deci-
14 sions, procedures, and programs of multilateral or-
15 ganizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, in-
16 cluding the World Bank, International Monetary
17 Fund, Organization of American States, and the
18 Inter-American Development Bank.

19 (2) FORM.—The report required under para-
20 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form
21 and shall include classified annexes.

1 **SEC. 250. ADDRESSING CHINA'S SOVEREIGN LENDING**
2 **PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CAR-**
3 **IBBEAN.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) since 2005, the Government of China has
7 expanded sovereign lending to governments in Latin
8 America and the Caribbean with loans that are re-
9 paid or collateralized with natural resources or com-
10 modities;

11 (2) several countries in Latin American and the
12 Caribbean that have received a significant amount of
13 sovereign lending from the Government of China
14 face challenges in repaying such loans;

15 (3) the Government of China's predatory eco-
16 nomic practices and sovereign lending practices in
17 Latin America and the Caribbean negatively influ-
18 ence United States national interests in the Western
19 Hemisphere;

20 (4) the Inter-American Development Bank, the
21 premier multilateral development bank dedicated to
22 the Western Hemisphere, should play a significant
23 role supporting the countries of Latin America and
24 the Caribbean in achieving sustainable and service-
25 able debt structures; and

1 (5) a tenth general capital increase for the
2 Inter-American Development Bank would strengthen
3 the Bank's ability to help the countries of Latin
4 America and the Caribbean achieve sustainable and
5 serviceable debt structures.

6 (b) ~~SUPPORT FOR A GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE.—~~
7 The President shall take steps to support a tenth general
8 capital increase for the Inter-American Development
9 Bank, including advancing diplomatic engagement to build
10 support among member countries of the Bank for a tenth
11 general capital increase for the Bank

12 (c) ~~TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.—~~The Inter-Amer-
13 ican Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is
14 amended by adding at the end the following:

15 “**SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.**

16 “(a) ~~VOTE AUTHORIZED.—~~The United States Gov-
17 ernor of the Bank is authorized to vote in favor of a reso-
18 lution to increase the capital stock of the Bank by
19 \$80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 years:

20 “(b) ~~SUBSCRIPTION AUTHORIZED.—~~

21 “(1) ~~IN GENERAL.—~~The United States Gov-
22 ernor of the Bank may subscribe on behalf of the
23 United States to 1,990,714 additional shares of the
24 capital stock of the Bank.

1 “(2) LIMITATION.—Any subscription by the
 2 United States to the capital stock of the Bank shall
 3 be effective only to such extent and in such amounts
 4 as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts.

5 “(e) LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORIZATION OF APPRO-
 6 PRIATIONS.—

7 “(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to pay for the in-
 8 crease in the United States subscription to the Bank
 9 under subsection (b), there is authorized to be ap-
 10 propriated \$24,014,857,191 for payment by the Sec-
 11 retary of the Treasury.

12 “(2) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amount
 13 authorized to be appropriated under paragraph
 14 (1)—

15 “(A) \$600,371,430 shall be for paid in
 16 shares of the Bank; and

17 “(B) \$23,414,485,761 shall be for callable
 18 shares of the Bank.”.

19 “(d) ADDRESSING CHINA’S SOVEREIGN LENDING IN
 20 THE AMERICAS.—The Secretary of the Treasury and the
 21 United States Executive Director to the Inter-American
 22 Development Bank shall use the voice, vote, and influence
 23 of the United States—

24 (1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help
 25 countries restructure debt resulting from sovereign

1 lending by the Government of China in order to
2 achieve sustainable and serviceable debt structures;
3 and

4 (2) to establish appropriate safeguards and
5 transparency and conditionality measures to protect
6 debt-vulnerable member countries of the Inter-Amer-
7 ican Development Bank that borrow from the Bank
8 for the purposes of restructuring Chinese bilateral
9 debt held by such countries and preventing such
10 countries from incurring subsequent Chinese bilat-
11 eral debt.

12 (c) BRIEFINGS.—

13 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
15 every 90 days thereafter, the President shall provide
16 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
17 ate and the Committee on Financial Services of the
18 House of Representatives a briefing detailing efforts
19 to carry out subsection (b) and (d) and the amend-
20 ment made by subsection (c).

21 (2) PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE
22 AND SERVICEABLE DEBT STRUCTURES.—Not later
23 than 180 days after the successful completion of a
24 tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American
25 Development Bank, and every 180 days thereafter

1 for a period of 3 years, the President shall provide
 2 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
 3 ate and the Committee on Financial Services of the
 4 House of Representatives a briefing on efforts by the
 5 Bank to support countries in Latin American and
 6 the Caribbean in their efforts to achieve sustainable
 7 and serviceable debt structures.

8 **SEC. 251. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND**
 9 **THE CARIBBEAN.**

10 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—There is authorized to be appro-
 11 priated to the Department of State \$12,000,000 for the
 12 International Military Education and Training Program
 13 for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal
 14 years 2021 through 2026.

15 (b) **MODERNIZATION.**—The Secretary of State shall
 16 take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs re-
 17 ceiving funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such
 18 programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent
 19 choice for international military education and training for
 20 Latin American and Caribbean partners.

21 (c) **REQUIRED ELEMENTS.**—The programs referred
 22 to in subsection (a) shall—

23 (1) provide training and capacity-building op-
 24 portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-
 25 rity services;

1 (2) provide practical skills and frameworks
2 for—

3 (A) improving the functioning and organi-
4 zation of security services in Latin America and
5 the Caribbean;

6 (B) creating a better understanding of the
7 United States and its values; and

8 (C) using technology for maximum effi-
9 ciency and organization; and

10 (3) promote and ensure that security services in
11 Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian
12 authority and operate in compliance with inter-
13 national norms, standards, and rules of engagement,
14 including a respect for human rights.

15 (d) LIMITATION.—Security assistance under this sec-
16 tion is subject to limitations as enshrined in the require-
17 ments of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of
18 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

19 **SEC. 252. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN**
20 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING**
21 **ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE**
22 **RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-**
23 **NOLOGIES.**

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that—

1 (1) the Government of China is exporting its
2 model for internal security and state control of soci-
3 ety through advanced technology and artificial intel-
4 ligence; and

5 (2) the inclusion of communication networks
6 and communications supply chains with equipment
7 and services from companies with close ties to or
8 susceptible to pressure from governments or security
9 services without reliable legal checks on govern-
10 mental powers can lead to breaches of citizens' pri-
11 vate information, increased censorship, violations of
12 human rights, and harassment of political oppo-
13 nents.

14 (b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of
15 State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-
16 ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and
17 the Caribbean to—

18 (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil
19 liberties posed by technologies and services described
20 in subsection (a); and

21 (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate
22 such risks.

23 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Ex-
24 ecutive Officer of the United States Agency for Global
25 Media, working through the Open Technology Fund, and

1 the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of De-
2 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom
3 and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand
4 and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology
5 and services to journalists in Latin America and the Car-
6ibbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely access
7 or share digital news and information.

8 (d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of
9 State, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
10 State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the
11 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
12 national Development, shall work through nongovern-
13 mental organizations to—

14 (1) support and promote programs that support
15 internet freedom and the free flow of information
16 online in Latin America and the Caribbean;

17 (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-
18 able access to internet in Latin America and the
19 Caribbean;

20 (3) provide integrated support to civil society
21 for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy,
22 and applied research programs in Latin America
23 and the Caribbean;

24 (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in
25 Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative

1 techniques necessary to ensure public accountability
2 and prevent government overreach in the digital
3 sphere;

4 (5) assist independent media outlets and jour-
5 nalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build
6 their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth
7 news reports covering governance and human rights
8 topics;

9 (6) provide training for journalists and civil so-
10 ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to
11 improve transparency and accountability in govern-
12 ment and the private sector;

13 (7) provide training on investigative reporting
14 of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business
15 and commercial practices related to China, including
16 the role of the Government of China in such prac-
17 tices;

18 (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to
19 strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities
20 described in paragraph (7); and

21 (9) identify local resources to support the pre-
22 ponderance of activities that would be carried out
23 under this subsection.

24 (c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not more than 180
25 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every

1 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, the Adminis-
 2 trator of the United States Agency for International De-
 3 velopment, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United
 4 States Agency for Global Media shall provide a briefing
 5 regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), (d), and
 6 (e) to—

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
 8 Senate;

9 (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the
 10 Senate;

11 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
 12 House of Representatives; and

13 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
 14 House of Representatives.

15 **PART II—TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE**

16 **SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC**
 17 **ALLIANCE.**

18 It is the sense of Congress that—

19 (1) the United States, the European Union,
 20 and countries of Europe are close partners, sharing
 21 values grounded in democracy, human rights, trans-
 22 parency, and the rules-based international order es-
 23 tablished after World War II;

24 (2) without a common approach by the United
 25 States, European Union, and countries of Europe on

1 connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and sup-
2 port for democracy and human rights, the People's
3 Republic of China will continue to increase its eco-
4 nomic, political and security leverage in Europe;

5 (3) the People's Republic of China's deployment
6 of assistance to European countries following the
7 COVID-19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach
8 to aid, but it also highlighted Europe's deep eco-
9 nomic ties to China;

10 (4) as European states seek to recover from the
11 economic toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United
12 States must stand in partnership with Europe to
13 support our collective economic recovery and rein-
14 force our collective national security and defend
15 these shared values;

16 (5) the United States, European Union, and
17 other European countries should coordinate on joint
18 strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away
19 from the People's Republic of China, especially in
20 the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;

21 (6) the United States, European Union, United
22 Kingdom, and the countries of Europe should lever-
23 age their respective economic innovation capabilities
24 to support the global economic recovery from the
25 COVID-19 recession and draw a contrast with the

1 centralized economy of the People's Republic of
2 China;

3 (7) the United States and European Union
4 should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade
5 disputes, including negotiating a United States-Eu-
6 ropean Union trade agreement that benefits workers
7 and the broader economy in both the United States
8 and European Union;

9 (8) the United States, European Union, and
10 Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address
11 economic challenges posed by the People's Republic
12 of China;

13 (9) the United States, European Union, and
14 countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to
15 counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations,
16 and propaganda efforts;

17 (10) the United States and European nations
18 share serious concerns with the repressions being
19 supported and executed by the Government of
20 China, and should continue implementing measures
21 to address the Government of China's specific
22 abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang; and
23 should build joint mechanisms and programs to pre-
24 vent the export of China's authoritarian governance
25 model to countries around the world;

1 (11) the United States and European nations
2 should remain united in their shared values against
3 attempts by the Government of China at the United
4 Nations and other multilateral organizations to pro-
5 mote efforts that erode the Universal Declaration of
6 Human Rights, like the “community of a shared fu-
7 ture for mankind” and “democratization of inter-
8 national relations”;

9 (12) the People’s Republic of China’s infra-
10 structure investments around the world, particularly
11 in 5G telecommunications technology and port infra-
12 structure, could threaten democracy across Europe
13 and the national security of key countries;

14 (13) as appropriate, the United States should
15 share intelligence with European allies and partners
16 on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of
17 the Government of China with respect to 5G expan-
18 sion in Europe;

19 (14) the European Union’s Investment Screen-
20 ing Regulation, which came into force in October
21 2020, is a welcome development, and member states
22 should closely scrutinize Chinese investments in their
23 countries through their own national investment
24 screening measures;

1 (15) the President should actively engage the
2 European Union on the implementation of the Ex-
3 port Control Reform Act regulations and work to
4 align the law’s regulations with European Union pri-
5 orities;

6 (16) the President should strongly advocate for
7 the listing of more items and technologies to restrict
8 dual use exports controlled at the National Security
9 and above level to the People’s Republic of China
10 under the Wassenaar Arrangement;

11 (17) the United States should explore the value
12 of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating
13 Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
14 (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate the ex-
15 port of United States and European Union sensitive
16 technologies to the People’s Republic of China; and

17 (18) the United States should work with coun-
18 terparts in Europe to—

19 (A) evaluate United States and European
20 overreliance on Chinese goods, including in the
21 medical and pharmaceutical sectors; and de-
22 velop joint strategies to diversify supply chains;

23 (B) counter Chinese efforts to use
24 COVID-19-related assistance as a coercive tool
25 to pressure developing countries by offering rel-

1 evant United States and European expertise
2 and assistance; and

3 (C) leverage the United States and Euro-
4 pean private sectors to advance the post-
5 COVID-19 economic recovery.

6 **SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-**
7 **OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-**
8 **PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

9 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief
11 the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee
12 on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on
13 Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of
14 the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the
15 United States will enhance cooperation with the European
16 Union, NATO, and European partner countries on man-
17 aging relations with the People's Republic of China.

18 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The briefing required by subsection
19 (a) shall do the following:

20 (1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed De-
21 partment of State official that leads United States
22 efforts to cooperate with the European Union,
23 NATO, and European partner countries to advance
24 a shared approach with respect to the People's Re-
25 public of China.

1 (2) Identify key policy points of convergence
2 and divergence between the United States and Euro-
3 pean partners with respect to the People's Republic
4 of China in the areas of technology, trade, and eco-
5 nomic practices.

6 (3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests
7 with European counterparts on—

8 (A) economic challenges with the People's
9 Republic of China;

10 (B) democracy and human rights chal-
11 lenges with respect to the People's Republic of
12 China;

13 (C) technology issues with respect to the
14 People's Republic of China;

15 (D) defense issues with respect to the Peo-
16 ple's Republic of China; and

17 (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to
18 respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
19 established by the Government of the People's
20 Republic of China.

21 (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms
22 among key regional and functional bureaus within
23 the Department of State and Department of Defense
24 tasked with engaging with European partners on the
25 People's Republic of China.

1 (5) Detail diplomatic efforts made up to the
2 date on which the date of the briefing and future
3 plans to work with European partners to counter
4 Chinese advancement of an authoritarian governing
5 model around the world.

6 (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the
7 date on which the strategy is submitted and future
8 plans to support European efforts to identify cost-
9 effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G technology.

10 (7) Detail how United States public diplomacy
11 tools, including the Global Engagement Center of
12 the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with
13 counterpart entities within the European Union to
14 counter Chinese propaganda.

15 (8) Describe the staffing and budget resources
16 the Department of State dedicates to engagement
17 between the United States and the European Union
18 on the People's Republic of China and provide an
19 assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the
20 strategy.

21 (9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with Euro-
22 pean partners to track and counter Chinese attempts
23 to exert influence across multilateral fora, including
24 at the World Health Organization.

1 (c) FORM.—The briefing required by section (a) shall
2 be classified.

3 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
5 thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the
6 appropriate congressional committees regarding the devel-
7 opment and implementation of the strategy.

8 **SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON**
9 **PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with
11 transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among
12 the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada,
13 and the European Development Finance Institutions
14 (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on
15 shared objectives to foster private sector-led development
16 and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed fi-
17 nancing in emerging markets, particularly as related to
18 the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
19 (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—

20 (1) the European Union Strategy on Con-
21 necting Europe and Asia;

22 (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas
23 Initiative Fund;

24 (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United
25 States, Japan, and Australia; and

1 Science, and Transportation; the Committee on En-
2 ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on
3 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
4 mittee on Finance, and the Committee on Appro-
5 priations of the Senate; and

6 (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
7 ligence; the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
8 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy
9 and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Serv-
10 ices, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
11 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
12 resentatives.

13 (b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Di-
16 rector of National Intelligence shall, in coordination
17 with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
18 fense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
19 Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such
20 other heads of Federal agencies as the Director con-
21 siders appropriate, submit to the appropriate com-
22 mittees of Congress a report and brief the appro-
23 priate committees of Congress on cooperation be-
24 tween China and Iran and between China and Rus-
25 sia.

1 (2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under
2 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

3 (A) An identification of major areas of dip-
4 lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan-
5 cial, economic, military, and space coopera-
6 tion—

7 (i) between China and Iran; and

8 (ii) between China and Russia.

9 (B) An assessment of the effect of the
10 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pan-
11 demic on such cooperation.

12 (3) FORM.—The report submitted under para-
13 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form;
14 but may include a classified annex.

15 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES
16 AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Di-
17 rector of National Intelligence and the heads of other ap-
18 propriate Federal departments and agencies should share
19 the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b)
20 with important allies and partners of the United States,
21 as appropriate.

22 **PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

23 **SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL**
24 **ASIA.**

25 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
2 section (a) shall include the following elements:

3 (1) A detailed description of the security and
4 economic challenges that the People’s Republic of
5 China poses to the countries of South and Central
6 Asia, including border disputes with South and Cen-
7 tral Asian countries that border China; Chinese in-
8 vestments in land and sea ports; transportation in-
9 frastructure; and energy projects across the region.

10 (2) A detailed description of United States ef-
11 forts to provide alternatives to Chinese investment in
12 infrastructure and other sectors in South and Cen-
13 tral Asia:

14 (3) A detailed description of bilateral and re-
15 gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia
16 on strategies to build resilience against Chinese ef-
17 forts to interfere in their political systems and
18 economies:

19 (4) A detailed description of United States dip-
20 lomatic efforts to work with the Government of Af-
21 ghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by
22 Chinese investment in the Afghan mineral sector:

23 (5) A detailed description of United States dip-
24 lomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan
25 with respect to matters relevant to the People’s Re-

1 public of China, including investments by the Peo-
2 ple's Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt
3 and Road Initiative.

4 (6) In close consultation with the Government
5 of India, identification of areas where the United
6 States Government can provide diplomatic and other
7 support as appropriate for India's efforts to address
8 economic and security challenges posed by the Peo-
9 ple's Republic of China in the region.

10 (7) A description of the coordination mecha-
11 nisms among key regional and functional bureaus
12 within the Department of State and Department of
13 Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of
14 South and Central Asia on issues relating to the
15 People's Republic of China.

16 (8) A description of the efforts being made by
17 Federal departments agencies, including the Depart-
18 ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-
19 national Development, the Department of Com-
20 merce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of
21 the United States Trade Representative, to help the
22 nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and
23 commerce links that will help those nations diversify
24 their trade away from China.

1 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a)
 2 shall be submitted in unclassified form that can be made
 3 available to the public, but may include a classified annex
 4 as necessary.

5 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after
 6 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than
 7 annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult
 8 with the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
 9 mittee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee
 10 of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations
 11 of the House of Representatives regarding the develop-
 12 ment and implementation of the strategy required under
 13 subsection (a).

14 **PART IV—AFRICA**

15 **SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SE-** 16 **CURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUB-** 17 **LIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.**

18 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
 19 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
 20 tees of Congress” means—

21 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
 22 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
 23 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

24 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
 25 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent

1 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
2 Representatives.

3 (b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than
4 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
5 Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director
6 of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate com-
7 mittees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and
8 impact of Chinese political, economic, and security sector
9 activity in Africa, and its impact on United States stra-
10 tegic interests, including—

11 (1) the amount and impact of direct invest-
12 ment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans
13 deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;

14 (2) the involvement of Chinese state-owned en-
15 terprises in Africa;

16 (3) the amount of African debt held by the Peo-
17 ple's Republic of China;

18 (4) the involvement of Chinese private security,
19 technology and media companies in Africa;

20 (5) the scale and impact of Chinese arms sales
21 to African countries;

22 (6) the methods, tools, and tactics used to fa-
23 cilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in
24 counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex-

1 tractive resources and wildlife products, from Africa
2 to China;

3 (7) the methods and techniques that China uses
4 to exert undue influence on African governments
5 and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, and to influ-
6 ence African multilateral organizations; and

7 (8) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and
8 educational activities undertaken by the PRC and
9 CCP to seek to expand influence in Africa.

10 **SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE**
11 **UNITED STATES IN AFRICA.**

12 (a) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
13 **FINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
14 tees of Congress” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
16 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
17 Finance of the Senate; and

18 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
19 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
20 Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

21 (b) **STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.**—Not later than 180
22 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
23 retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary
24 of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney
25 General, the United States Trade Representative, the Ad-

1 administrator of the United States Agency for International
2 Development, and the leadership of the United States
3 International Development Finance Corporation, submit
4 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting
5 forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States
6 economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in
7 the investment climate in Africa, including through sup-
8 port for democratic institutions, the rule of law, including
9 property rights, and for improved transparency, anti-cor-
10 ruption and governance.

11 (c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to
12 subsection (a) shall include—

13 (1) a description and assessment of barriers to
14 United States investment in Africa for United States
15 businesses, including a clear identification of the dif-
16 ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized
17 businesses, and an assessment of whether existing
18 programs effectively address such barriers;

19 (2) a description and assessment of barriers to
20 African diaspora investment in Africa, and rec-
21 ommendations to overcome such barriers;

22 (3) an identification of the economic sectors in
23 the United States that have a comparative advan-
24 tage in Africa markets;

1 (4) a determination of priority African coun-
2 tries for promoting two-way trade and investment
3 and an assessment of additional foreign assistance
4 needs, including democracy and governance and rule
5 of law support, to promote a conducive operating en-
6 vironment in priority countries;

7 (5) an identification of opportunities for stra-
8 tegic cooperation with European allies on trade and
9 investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue
10 on trade, security, development, and environmental
11 issues of mutual interest; and

12 (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Af-
13 rica Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and
14 investment, strategic engagement, and security in
15 Africa

16 (d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
17 HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller Gen-
18 eral of the United States shall—

19 (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign
20 Commercial Service Officers and Department of
21 State Economic Officers at United States embassies
22 in sub-Saharan Africa; and

23 (2) develop an assessment of whether human
24 resource capacity in such embassies is adequate to
25 meet the goals of the various trade and economic

1 programs and initiatives in Africa, including the Af-
2 rican Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper Af-
3 rica.

4 **SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT**
5 **TO AFRICA.**

6 (a) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
7 **FINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
8 tees of Congress” means—

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
10 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
11 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
13 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
14 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
15 Representatives.

16 (b) **INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER**
17 **CHINESE CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.**—

18 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall establish
19 an interagency Working Group, which shall include
20 representatives of the Department of State, the De-
21 partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of
22 National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the
23 United States Government as the President con-
24 siders appropriate, on means to counter Chinese
25 cyber aggression with respect to Africa.

1 (2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established
2 pursuant to this subsection shall develop a set of
3 recommendations for—

4 (A) bolstering the capacity of governments
5 in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data
6 networks and critical infrastructure where ap-
7 plicable;

8 (B) providing alternatives to Huawei;

9 (C) an action plan for United States em-
10 bassies in Africa to offer to provide assistance
11 to host-country governments with protecting
12 their vital digital networks and infrastructure
13 from Chinese espionage, including an assess-
14 ment of staffing resources needed to implement
15 the action plan in embassies in Africa;

16 (D) utilizing interagency resources to
17 counter Chinese disinformation and propaganda
18 in traditional and digital media targeted to Af-
19 rican audiences; and

20 (E) helping civil society in Africa counter
21 digital authoritarianism and identifying tools
22 and assistance to enhance and promote digital
23 democracy.

1 **SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EM-**
2 **BASSIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED**
3 **ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

4 The Secretary of State may station on a permanent
5 basis Department of State personnel at such United
6 States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as the Secretary
7 considers appropriate focused on the activities, policies
8 and investments of the People's Republic of China in Afri-
9 ca.

10 **SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA-**
11 **TIVE.**

12 (a) **FINDING.**—Congress finds that youth in Africa
13 can have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic
14 growth, improve public sector transparency and govern-
15 ance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of
16 focus for United States outreach on the continent.

17 (b) **POLICY.**—It is the policy of the United States,
18 in cooperation and collaboration with private sector com-
19 panies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organiza-
20 tions, and national and regional public sector entities, to
21 commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and
22 leadership skills of African youth with the objective of en-
23 hancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and
24 private sectors in order to help them spur growth and
25 prosperity, strengthen democratic governance, and en-

1 hance peace and security in their respective countries of
2 origin and across Africa.

3 (c) **YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.**—

4 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—There is hereby established
5 the Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried
6 out by the Secretary of State.

7 (2) **FELLOWSHIPS.**—The Secretary is author-
8 ized to support the participation in the Initiative es-
9 tablished under this paragraph, in the United
10 States, of fellows from Africa each year for such
11 education and training in leadership and profes-
12 sional development through the Department of State
13 as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The
14 Secretary shall establish and publish criteria for eli-
15 gibility for participation as such a fellow, and for se-
16 lection of fellows among eligible applicants for a fel-
17 lowship.

18 (3) **RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.**—Under the Ini-
19 tiative, United States citizens may engage in such
20 reciprocal exchanges in connection with and collabo-
21 ration on projects with fellows under paragraph (1)
22 as the Secretary considers appropriate.

23 (4) **REGIONAL CENTERS AND NETWORKS.**—The
24 Administrator of the United States Agency for

1 International Development shall establish each of
2 the following:

3 (A) Not fewer than four regional centers in
4 Africa to provide in-person and online training
5 throughout the year in business and entrepre-
6 neurship, civic leadership, and public manage-
7 ment.

8 (B) An online network that provides infor-
9 mation and online courses on, and connections
10 with leaders in, the private and public sectors
11 in Africa.

12 (d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that the Secretary of State should increase the num-
14 ber of fellows from Africa in the Young African Leaders
15 Initiative above the number that participated in the Initia-
16 tive in fiscal year 2020 :

17 **SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.**

18 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
19 ment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency
20 for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congres-
21 sional committees a report on the resources and timeline
22 needed to establish within the Agency an organization
23 whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and
24 institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and
25 relevant news and information to the people of Africa, es-

1 pecially in countries where a free press is banned by the
2 government or not fully established; about the region, the
3 world; and the United States through uncensored news,
4 responsible discussion, and open debate.

5 **PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

6 **SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN,**
7 **AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND**
8 **NORTH AFRICA.**

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) the economic influence of the People's Re-
12 public of China through its oil and gas imports from
13 the Middle East, infrastructure investments, tech-
14 nology transfer, and arms sales provide influence
15 and leverage that runs counter to United States in-
16 terests in the region;

17 (2) the People's Republic of China seeks to
18 erode United States influence in the Middle East
19 and North Africa through the sale of Chinese arms,
20 associated weapons technology, and joint weapons
21 research and development initiatives;

22 (3) the People's Republic of China seeks to es-
23 tablish military or dual use facilities in geographi-
24 cally strategic locations in the Middle East and
25 North Africa to further the Chinese Communist Par-

1 ty's Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of
2 United States national security interests; and

3 (4) the export of certain communications infra-
4 structure from the People's Republic of China de-
5 grades the security of partner networks; exposes in-
6 tellectual property to theft; threatens the ability of
7 the United States to conduct security cooperation
8 with compromised regional partners; and furthers
9 China's authoritarian surveillance model.

10 (b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
13 of State, in consultation with the Administrator of
14 the United States Agency for International Develop-
15 ment and the heads of other appropriate Federal
16 agencies, shall jointly develop and submit to the ap-
17 propriate congressional committees a strategy for
18 countering and limiting Chinese influence in, and ac-
19 cess to, the Middle East and North Africa.

20 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under
21 paragraph (1) shall include—

22 (A) an assessment of China's intent with
23 regards to increased cooperation with Middle
24 East and North African countries and how

1 these activities fit into their broader global stra-
2 tegic objectives;

3 (B) an assessment of how governments
4 across the region are responding to Chinese ef-
5 forts to increase Chinese military presence in
6 their countries;

7 (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation
8 through foreign military sales, financing, and
9 efforts to build partner capacity and increase
10 interoperability with the United States;

11 (D) an assessment of Chinese joint re-
12 search and development with the Middle East,
13 North Africa, impacts on United States' na-
14 tional security interests, and recommended
15 steps to mitigate Chinese influence;

16 (E) an assessment of arms sales and weap-
17 ons technology transfers from the People's Re-
18 public of China to the Middle East and North
19 Africa, impacts on United States' national secu-
20 rity interests, and recommended steps to miti-
21 gate Chinese influence;

22 (F) an assessment of Chinese military
23 sales to the region including lethal and non le-
24 thal unmanned aerial systems;

1 (G) an assessment of People's Republic of
2 China military basing and dual-use facility ini-
3 tiatives across the Middle East and North Afri-
4 ca; impacts on United States' national security
5 interests; and recommended steps to mitigate
6 Chinese influence;

7 (H) efforts to improve regional security co-
8 operation with United States allies and partners
9 with a focus on—

10 (i) maritime security in the Arabian
11 Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi-
12 terranean;

13 (ii) integrated air and missile defense;

14 (iii) cyber security;

15 (iv) border security; and

16 (v) critical infrastructure security; to
17 include energy security;

18 (I) increased support for government-to-
19 government engagement on critical infrastruc-
20 ture development projects including ports and
21 water infrastructure;

22 (J) efforts to encourage United States pri-
23 vate sector and public-private partnerships in
24 healthcare technology and foreign direct invest-
25 ment in non-energy sectors;

1 ~~(K)~~ efforts to expand youth engagement
2 and professional education exchanges with key
3 partner countries;

4 ~~(L)~~ specific steps to counter increased Chi-
5 nese investment in telecommunications infra-
6 structure and diplomatic efforts to stress the
7 political, economic, and social benefits of a free
8 and open internet;

9 ~~(M)~~ efforts to promote United States pri-
10 vate sector engagement in and public-private
11 partnerships on renewable energy development;

12 ~~(N)~~ the expansion of public-private part-
13 nership efforts on water, desalination, and irri-
14 gation projects; and

15 ~~(O)~~ efforts to warn United States partners
16 in the Middle East and North Africa of the
17 risks associated with Chinese telecommuni-
18 cations infrastructure and provide alternative
19 “clean paths” to Chinese technology.

20 **SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND**
21 **NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.**

22 ~~(a)~~ **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following find-
23 ings:

24 ~~(1)~~ The United States and the international
25 community have long-term interests in the stability,

1 security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle
2 East and North Africa.

3 ~~(2) In addition to and apart from military and~~
4 ~~security efforts, the United States should harness a~~
5 ~~whole of government approach, including bilateral~~
6 ~~and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort,~~
7 ~~and public diplomacy to compete with and counter~~
8 ~~Chinese Communist Party influence.~~

9 ~~(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of~~
10 ~~United States engagement, transparent governance~~
11 ~~structures, and active civil society engagement help~~
12 ~~counter predatory foreign investment and influence~~
13 ~~efforts.~~

14 ~~(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the~~
15 ~~United States that the United States and the international~~
16 ~~community should, continue diplomatic and economic ef-~~
17 ~~forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that~~
18 ~~support reform efforts to—~~

19 ~~(1) promote greater economic opportunity;~~

20 ~~(2) foster private sector development;~~

21 ~~(3) strengthen civil society; and~~

22 ~~(4) promote transparent and democratic gov-~~
23 ~~ernance and the rule of law.~~

PART VI—ARCTIC REGION**2 SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.****3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.—**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—

6 (A) creates new national and regional secu-
7 rity challenges due to increased military activity
8 in the Arctic;

9 (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerg-
10 ing as a major theater of conflict in ongoing
11 strategic competition;

12 (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit-
13 toral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol
14 the increased vessel traffic in this remote re-
15 gion, which is a result of diminished annual lev-
16 els of sea ice;

17 (D) impacts public safety due to increased
18 human activity in the Arctic region where
19 search and rescue capacity remains very lim-
20 ited; and

21 (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's
22 fragile and pristine environment and the unique
23 and highly sensitive species found in the Arc-
24 tic's marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

25 (2) the United States should reduce the con-
26 sequences outlined in paragraph (1) by—

1 (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety
2 and dynamic set of security and safety risks un-
3 folding in the Arctic;

4 (B) developing policies and making prep-
5 arations to mitigate and respond to threats and
6 risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to
7 work with allies and partners in the Arctic re-
8 gion to deter potential aggressive activities and
9 build Arctic competencies;

10 (C) adequately funding the National Earth
11 System Prediction Capability to substantively
12 improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on
13 the time scales necessary to ensure regional se-
14 curity and trans-Arctic shipping;

15 (D) investing in resources, including a sig-
16 nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure
17 that the United States has adequate capacity to
18 prevent and respond to security threats in the
19 Arctic region;

20 (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with
21 all nations in the Arctic region for—

22 (i) maintaining peace and stability in
23 the Arctic region; and

1 (ii) fostering cooperation on steward-
 2 ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-
 3 gion; and

4 (F) examining the possibility of recon-
 5 vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum.

6 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
 7 United States—

8 (1) to recognize only the nations enumerated in
 9 subsection (c)(1) as Arctic nations, and to reject all
 10 other claims to this status; and

11 (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a
 12 serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the
 13 interests of United States allies and partners.

14 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

15 (1) ARCTIC NATIONS.—The term “Arctic na-
 16 tions” means the 8 nations with territory or exclu-
 17 sive economic zones that extend north of the
 18 ~~66.56083~~ parallel latitude north of the equator,
 19 namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,
 20 Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden,
 21 and Iceland.

22 (2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term “Arctic Re-
 23 gion” means the geographic region north of the
 24 ~~66.56083~~ parallel latitude north of the equator.

1 (d) DESIGNATION.—The Assistant Secretary of State
2 for Oceans and International Environmental and Sci-
3 entific Affairs (OES) shall designate a deputy assistant
4 secretary serving within the Bureau of Oceans and Inter-
5 national Environmental and Scientific Affairs as “Deputy
6 Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs”, who shall be re-
7 sponsible for OES affairs in the Arctic Region.

8 (e) DUTIES.—The Deputy Assistant Secretary for
9 Arctic Affairs shall—

10 (1) facilitate the development and coordination
11 of United States foreign policy in the Arctic Region
12 relating to—

13 (A) strengthening institutions for coopera-
14 tion among the Arctic nations;

15 (B) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-
16 search on local, regional, and global environ-
17 mental issues;

18 (C) protecting the Arctic environment and
19 conserving its biological resources;

20 (D) promoting responsible natural resource
21 management and economic development; and

22 (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in
23 decisions that affect them.

24 (2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives with re-
25 spect to the activities described in paragraph (1);

1 and, as appropriate, represent the United States
2 within multilateral fora that address international
3 cooperation and foreign policy matters in the Arctic
4 Region;

5 (3) help inform, in coordination with the Bu-
6 reau of Economic and Business Affairs,
7 transnational commerce and commercial maritime
8 transit in the Arctic Region;

9 (4) coordinate the integration of scientific data
10 on the current and projected effects of emerging en-
11 vironmental changes on the Arctic Region and en-
12 sure that such data is applied to the development of
13 security strategies for the Arctic Region;

14 (5) make available the methods and approaches
15 on the integration of climate, data, and environ-
16 mental science to regional security planning pro-
17 grams in the Department of State to better ensure
18 that broader decision-making processes may more
19 adequately account for the effects of climate change;

20 (6) assist with the development of, and facili-
21 tate the implementation of, an Arctic Region Secu-
22 rity Policy in accordance with subsection (f);

23 (7) use the voice, vote, and influence of the
24 United States to encourage other countries and
25 international multilateral organizations to support

1 the principles of the Arctic Region Security Policy
2 implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and

3 (8) perform such other duties and exercise such
4 powers as the Assistant Secretary of State for
5 Oceans and International Environmental and Sci-
6 entific Affairs shall prescribe.

7 (f) RANK AND STATUS.—The Secretary of State may
8 change the title of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Ar-
9 tic Affairs designated under subsection (e) to Special Rep-
10 resentative or Special Envoy with the rank of Ambassador
11 if—

12 (1) the President nominates the person so des-
13 ignated to that rank and status; and

14 (2) the Senate confirms such person to such
15 rank and status.

16 (g) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—The Bu-
17 reau of European and Eurasian Affairs shall be the lead
18 bureau for developing and implementing the United
19 States' Arctic Region Security Policy, in coordination with
20 the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
21 and Scientific Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Af-
22 fairs, embassies, other regional bureaus, and relevant of-
23 fices to advance United States national security interests,
24 including through conflict prevention efforts, security as-
25 sistance, humanitarian disaster response and prevention;

1 and economic and other relevant assistance programs. The
2 Arctic Region Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget
3 for, and implement plans, policies, and actions—

4 (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the
5 United States in Arctic nations, including through
6 enhancements to diplomatic missions and facilities,
7 participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-
8 lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United
9 States initiatives and assistance programs across
10 agencies to protect the national security of the
11 United States and its allies and partners;

12 (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic
13 nations to the effects of environmental change and
14 increased civilian and military activity from Arctic
15 nations and other nations that may result from in-
16 creased accessibility of the Arctic Region;

17 (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic
18 Region and Arctic nations that—

19 (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic
20 environment; and

21 (B) are strategically significant to the
22 United States;

23 (4) to coordinate the integration of environ-
24 mental change and national security risk and vulner-

1 ability assessments into the decision making process
2 on foreign assistance awards to Arctic nations;

3 (5) to advance principles of good governance by
4 encouraging and cooperating with Arctic nations on
5 collaborative approaches—

6 (A) to responsibly manage natural re-
7 sources in the Arctic Region;

8 (B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
9 time safety in the Arctic Region;

10 (C) to prevent the escalation of security
11 tensions by mitigating against the militarization
12 of the Arctic Region;

13 (D) to develop mutually agreed upon mul-
14 tilateral policies among Arctic nations on the
15 management of maritime transit routes through
16 the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the
17 transit policies for access to and transit in the
18 Arctic Region by non-Arctic nations; and

19 (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic
20 Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability
21 and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
22 mane and responsible fashion; and

23 (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
24 vivability, and resiliency of United States interests
25 and nondefense assets in the Arctic Region.

PART VII—OCEANIA**SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-
GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.**

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic national security and economic priority of the United States Government;

(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open Indo-Pacific region;

(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the entire region;

(4) to work with the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic development;

(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in existing regional organizations and international structures to promote the national security

1 and economic goals of the United States and coun-
2 tries of the Oceania region;

3 (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United
4 States strategy that will enhance youth engagement
5 and advance long-term growth and development
6 throughout the region, especially as it relates to pro-
7 tecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-
8 hoods and strengthening the resilience of the coun-
9 tries of the Oceania region against current and fu-
10 ture threats resulting from extreme weather and se-
11 vere changes in the environment;

12 (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign
13 influence and corruption aimed at undermining the
14 political, environmental, social, and economic sta-
15 bility of the people and governments of the countries
16 of Oceania;

17 (8) to improve the local capacity of the coun-
18 tries of Oceania to address public health challenges
19 and improve global health security;

20 (9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar-
21 ket-based private sector investments that adhere to
22 best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain-
23 ability, and environmental and social safeguards as
24 an alternative to state-directed investments by au-
25 thoritarian governments;

1 (10) to ensure the people and communities of
2 Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and de-
3 grading munitions hazards and other debris that
4 threaten health and livelihoods; and

5 (11) to work cooperatively with all governments
6 in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re-
7 mains of members of the United States Armed
8 Forces that are missing in action from previous con-
9 flicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

10 **SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.**

11 (a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than
12 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
13 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
14 sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening
15 United States engagement with the countries of Oceania,
16 including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with
17 Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared
18 concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security
19 and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

20 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by
21 subsection (a) shall include the following:

22 (1) A description of United States regional
23 goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and in-
24 creasing engagement with the countries of Oceania.

1 (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of
2 United States regional goals and concerns that are
3 shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in-
4 cluding a review of issues related to anticorruption,
5 maritime and other security issues, environmental
6 protection, fisheries management, economic growth
7 and development, and disaster resilience and pre-
8 paredness.

9 (3) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
10 tives by the governments of the United States, Aus-
11 tralia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of those
12 shared regional goals and concerns, including with
13 respect to the issues described in paragraph (1).

14 (4) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
15 tives by regional organizations and other related
16 intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing
17 the issues described in paragraph (1).

18 (5) A plan for aligning United States programs
19 and resources in pursuit of those shared regional
20 goals and concerns, as appropriate.

21 (6) Recommendations for additional United
22 States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources
23 necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.

24 (7) Any other elements the Secretary considers
25 appropriate.

1 **TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR**
2 **VALUES**

3 **SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
4 **MOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG.**

5 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is
6 authorized to be appropriated \$10,000,000 for fiscal year
7 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
8 Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy
9 in Hong Kong.

10 (b) **ADMINISTRATION.**—The Secretary of State shall
11 designate an office with the Department of State to ad-
12 minister and coordinate the provision of such funds de-
13 scribed in subsection (a) within the Department of State
14 and across the United States Government.

15 **SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO**
16 **FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR**
17 **AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

18 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
19 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
20 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

21 (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) as sub-
22 paragraph (F); and

23 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the fol-
24 lowing:

1 “(E) Serious human rights abuses in con-
2 nection with forced labor.”.

3 (b) **EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.**—The amend-
4 ment made by subsection (a)—

5 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
6 this Act; and

7 (2) applies with respect to the first report re-
8 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human
9 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date
10 of enactment.

11 **SEC. 303. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
12 **SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION,**
13 **FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY**
14 **CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE**
15 **XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

16 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
17 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
18 22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as amended by section 302, is fur-
19 ther amended—

20 (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) as sub-
21 paragraph (G); and

22 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the fol-
23 lowing:

1 “(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion,
2 forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive
3 implantation policies and practices.”.

4 (b) **EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.**—The amend-
5 ment made by subsection (a)—

6 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
7 this Act; and

8 (2) applies with respect to the first report re-
9 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human
10 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date
11 of enactment.

12 **TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR** 13 **ECONOMIC STATECRAFT**

14 **SEC. 401. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING** 15 **THE PRC’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY.**

16 (a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following find-
17 ings:

18 (1) The People’s Republic of China, at the di-
19 rection of the Chinese Communist Party, is advanc-
20 ing an ecosystem of anticompetitive economic and
21 industrial policies that—

22 (A) distort global markets;

23 (B) limit innovation;

1 (C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the
2 expense of the United States and other foreign
3 firms; and

4 (D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice con-
5 sumer choice.

6 (2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and
7 industrial policies pursued by the PRC, the mass
8 subsidization of Chinese firms, intellectual property
9 theft, and forced technology transfer are among the
10 most damaging to the global economy.

11 (3) Through regulatory interventions and direct
12 financial subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of ad-
13 vancing national political and economic objectives,
14 directs, coerces, and influences in anti-competitive
15 ways the commercial activities of firms that are di-
16 rected, financed, influenced, or otherwise controlled
17 by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and
18 ostensibly independent and private Chinese compa-
19 nies, such as technology firms in strategic sectors.

20 (4) The PRC Government, at the national and
21 subnational levels, grants special privileges or status
22 to certain PRC firms in key sectors designated as
23 strategic, such as telecommunications, oil, power,
24 aviation, banking, and semiconductors. Enterprises
25 receive special state preferences in the form of favor-

1 able loans, tax exemptions, and preferential land ac-
2 cess from the CCP.

3 (5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as de-
4 scribed in paragraphs (3) and (4)—

5 (A) enables these companies to sell goods
6 below market prices, allowing them to outbid
7 and crowd out market-based competitors and
8 thereby pursue global dominance of key sectors;

9 (B) distorts the global market economy by
10 undermining longstanding and generally accept-
11 ed market-based principles of fair competition,
12 leading to barriers to entry and forced exit from
13 the market for foreign or private firms, not only
14 in the PRC, but in markets around the world;

15 (C) creates government-sponsored or sup-
16 ported de facto monopolies, cartels, and other
17 anti-market arrangements in key sectors, lim-
18 iting or removing opportunities for other firms;
19 and

20 (D) leads to, as a result of the issues de-
21 scribed in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines
22 in profits and revenue needed by foreign and
23 private firms for research and development.

24 (6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chi-
25 nese actors to steal critical technologies and trade

1 secrets from private and foreign competitors oper-
2 ating in the PRC and around the world, particularly
3 in areas that the CCP has identified as critical to
4 advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by
5 the CCP, also continues to implement anti-competi-
6 tive regulations, policies, and practices that coerce
7 the handover of technology and other propriety or
8 sensitive data from foreign enterprises to domestic
9 firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.

10 (7) Companies in the United States and in for-
11 eign countries compete with state-subsidized PRC
12 companies that enjoy the protection and power of
13 the state in third-country markets around the world.
14 The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined
15 with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC
16 market itself, severely hamper the ability of United
17 States and foreign firms to compete, innovate, and
18 pursue the provision of best value to customers. The
19 result is an unbalanced playing field. Such an
20 unsustainable course, if not checked, will over time
21 lead to depressed competition around the world, re-
22 duced opportunity, and harm to both producers and
23 consumers.

24 (8) As stated in the United States Trade Rep-
25 resentative's investigation of the PRC's trade prac-

1 tices under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
2 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 2018, “When
3 U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on their
4 investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the
5 growth necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this
6 sense, China’s technology transfer regime directly
7 burdens the innovation ecosystem that is an engine
8 of economic growth in the United States and simi-
9 larly-situated economies.”.

10 (9) In addition to forced technology described
11 in this subsection, the United States Trade Rep-
12 resentative’s investigation of the PRC under section
13 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also
14 identified requirements that foreign firms license
15 products at less than market value, government-di-
16 rected and government-subsidized acquisition of sen-
17 sitive technology for strategic purposes, and cyber
18 theft as other key PRC technology and industrial
19 policies that are unreasonable and discriminatory.
20 These policies place at risk United States intellectual
21 property rights, innovation and technological devel-
22 opment, and jobs in dozens of industries.

23 (10) Other elements of the PRC’s ecosystem of
24 industrial policies that harm innovation and distort
25 global markets include—

1 (A) advancement of policies that encourage
2 local production over imports;

3 (B) continuation of policies that favor
4 unique technical standards in use by Chinese
5 firms rather than globally accepted standards,
6 which often force foreign firms to alter their
7 products and manufacturing chains to compete;

8 (C) requirements that foreign companies
9 disclose proprietary information to qualify for
10 the adoption of their standards for use in the
11 PRC domestic market; and

12 (D) maintenance of closed procurement
13 processes, which limit participation by foreign
14 firms, including by setting terms that require
15 such firms to use domestic suppliers, transfer
16 know-how to firms in the PRC, and disclose
17 proprietary information.

18 (11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and
19 associated industry-specific efforts under this initia-
20 tive, such as the Digital Silk Road, are key vectors
21 to advance the PRC's mercantilist policies and prac-
22 tices globally. The resulting challenges do not only
23 affect United States firms. As the European Cham-
24 ber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report,
25 the combination of concessional lending to Chinese

1 state-owned enterprises, nontransparent procure-
2 ment and bidding processes, closed digital standards,
3 and other factors severely limit European and other
4 participation in BRI and make “competition [with
5 Chinese companies] in third-country markets ex-
6 tremely challenging”. This underscores a key objec-
7 tive of BRI, which is to ensure the reliance of infra-
8 structure, digital technologies, and other important
9 goods on PRC supply chains and technical stand-
10 ards.

11 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
12 gress that—

13 (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket
14 economy like the PRC’s economy, which has cap-
15 tured such a large share of global economic ex-
16 change, are in many ways unprecedented and re-
17 quire sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term
18 focus and engagement;

19 (2) in order to truly address the most detri-
20 mental aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist eco-
21 nomic strategy, the United States must adopt poli-
22 cies that—

23 (A) expose the full scope and scale of intel-
24 lectual property theft and mass subsidization of
25 Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the

1 United States, foreign markets, and the global
2 economy;

3 (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs
4 and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;

5 (C) provide options for affected United
6 States persons to address and respond to un-
7 reasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed in-
8 dustrial policies; and

9 (D) strengthen the protection of critical
10 technology and sensitive data, while still fos-
11 tering an environment that provides incentives
12 for innovation and competition;

13 (3) the United States must work with its allies
14 and partners through the Organization for Economic
15 Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World
16 Trade Organization, and other venues and fora—

17 (A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac-
18 cepted principles of fair competition and market
19 behavior and address the PRC's anticompetitive
20 economic and industrial policies that undermine
21 decades of global growth and innovation;

22 (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted
23 the same treatment as that of a free-market
24 economy until it ceases the implementation of
25 laws, regulations, policies, and practices that

1 provide unfair advantage on PRC firms in fur-
2 therance of national objectives and impose un-
3 reasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens
4 on market-based international commerce; and

5 (C) to align policies with respect to curbing
6 state-directed subsidization of the private sec-
7 tor, such as advocating for global rules related
8 to transparency and adherence to notification
9 requirements, including through the efforts cur-
10 rently being advanced by the United States,
11 Japan, and the European Union; and

12 (4) the United States and its allies and part-
13 ners must collaborate to provide incentives to their
14 respective companies to cooperate in areas such as—

15 (A) advocating for protection of intellectual
16 property rights in markets around the world;

17 (B) fostering open technical standards;
18 and

19 (C) increasing joint investments in over-
20 seas markets.

21 **SEC. 402. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
23 date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently
24 than annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordi-
25 nation with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States

1 Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intel-
2 ligence, shall create a list (referred to in this section as
3 the “intellectual property violators list”), which identifies
4 all state-owned enterprises that have benefitted from—

5 (1) a significant act or series of acts of intellec-
6 tual property theft that subjected a United States
7 economic sector or particular company incorporated
8 in the United States to harm; or

9 (2) an act or government policy of involuntary
10 or coerced technology transfer of intellectual prop-
11 erty ultimately owned by a company incorporated in
12 the United States.

13 (b) RULES FOR IDENTIFICATION.—To determine
14 whether there is a credible basis for determining that a
15 company should be included on the intellectual property
16 violators list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
17 the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Rep-
18 resentative, and the Director of National Intelligence,
19 shall consider—

20 (1) any finding by a United States court that
21 the company has violated relevant United States
22 laws intended to protect intellectual property rights;
23 or

1 (2) substantial and credible information re-
2 ceived from any entity described in subsection (e) or
3 other interested persons.

4 (e) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the
5 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
6 Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and
7 the Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as nec-
8 essary and appropriate, with—

9 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde-
10 pendent agencies;

11 (2) the private sector; and

12 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex-
13 pertise.

14 (d) REPORT.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
16 publish, in the Federal Register, an annual report
17 that—

18 (A) lists the companies engaged in the ac-
19 tivities described in subsection (a)(1); and

20 (B) describes the circumstances sur-
21 rounding actions described in subsection (a)(2),
22 including any role of the Government of the
23 PRC; and

24 (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the
25 economic advantage derived by the companies

1 engaged in the activities described in subsection
2 (a)(1).

3 ~~(2) FORM.—~~The report published under para-
4 graph ~~(1)~~ shall be unclassified, but may include a
5 classified annex.

6 ~~(c) DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.—~~The Direc-
7 tor of National Intelligence may authorize the declassifica-
8 tion of information, as appropriate, to inform the contents
9 of the report published pursuant to subsection ~~(d)~~.

10 ~~(f) REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT BUSINESS-CON-~~
11 ~~FIDENTIAL INFORMATION.—~~

12 ~~(1) IN GENERAL.—~~The Secretary of State and
13 the heads of all other Federal agencies involved in
14 the production of the intellectual property violators
15 list shall protect from disclosure any proprietary in-
16 formation submitted by a private sector participant
17 and marked as business-confidential information,
18 unless the party submitting the confidential business
19 information—

20 ~~(A)~~ had notice, at the time of submission,
21 that such information would be released by the
22 Secretary; or

23 ~~(B)~~ subsequently consents to the release of
24 such information.

1 ~~(2) NONCONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF REPORT.—~~

2 If confidential business information is provided by a
3 private sector participant, a nonconfidential version
4 of the report under subsection (d) shall be published
5 in the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes,
6 if necessary, the confidential business information.

7 ~~(3) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—~~Propri-
8 etary information submitted by a private party
9 under this section—

10 (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets
11 and commercial or financial information (as de-
12 fined under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United
13 States Code); and

14 (B) shall be exempt from disclosure with-
15 out the express approval of the private party.

16 **SEC. 403. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF**
17 **CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST.**

18 (a) ~~REPORT.—~~Not later than one year after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
20 Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States
21 Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce,
22 shall publish an unclassified report in the Federal Register
23 that identifies—

24 (1) subsidies provided by the Government of the
25 PRC to enterprises in the PRC; and

1 (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enter-
2 prises in the PRC over foreign market participants.

3 (b) ~~SUBSIDIES AND DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT~~

4 ~~DESCRIBED.~~—In compiling the report under subsection
5 (a), the Secretary of State shall consider—

6 (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or pro-
7 moted by the Government of the PRC that—

8 (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in
9 the PRC at the expense of foreign market par-
10 ticipants;

11 (B) shield centrally administered, state-
12 owned enterprises from competition; or

13 (C) otherwise suppress market-based com-
14 petition;

15 (2) financial subsidies, including favorable lend-
16 ing terms, from or promoted by the Government of
17 the PRC or centrally administered, state-owned en-
18 terprises that materially benefit PRC enterprises
19 over foreign market participants in contravention of
20 generally accepted market principles; and

21 (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of
22 subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Sub-
23 sidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in
24 section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agree-
25 ments Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).”.

1 (e) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State, in co-
2 ordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United
3 States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and ap-
4 propriate, consult with—

5 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde-
6 pendent agencies;

7 (2) the private sector; and

8 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex-
9 pertise.

10 **SEC. 404. COUNTERING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
12 nation with the Attorney General, shall offer to provide
13 technical assistance to establish legislative and regulatory
14 frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public offi-
15 cials consistent with the principles of the OECD Conven-
16 tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
17 International Business Transactions to the governments
18 of countries—

19 (1) that are partners of the United States;

20 (2) that have demonstrated a will to combat
21 foreign corrupt practices responsibly; and

22 (3) for which technical assistance will have the
23 greatest opportunity to achieve measureable results.

24 (b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90
25 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary

1 of State shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activi-
2 ties described in subsections (a) to the appropriate con-
3 gressional committees.

4 (c) COORDINATION.—In formulating the strategy de-
5 scribed in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall co-
6 ordinate with the Attorney General.

7 (d) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not
8 later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
9 Act, and every 180 days thereafter for five years, the Sec-
10 retary of State shall provide a briefing regarding the ac-
11 tivities described in subsection (a) and the strategy sub-
12 mitted under subsection (b) to the appropriate congres-
13 sional committees.

14 **SEC. 405. DEBT RELIEF FOR COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR AS-**
15 **SISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DE-**
16 **VELOPMENT ASSOCIATION.**

17 (a) POLICY STATEMENT.—It is the policy of the
18 United States to coordinate with the international commu-
19 nity to provide debt relief for debt that is held by countries
20 eligible for assistance from the International Development
21 Association that request forbearance to respond to the
22 COVID-19 pandemic.

23 (b) DEBT RELIEF.—The Secretary of the Treasury,
24 in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall engage
25 with international financial institutions and other bilateral

1 official creditors to advance policy discussions on restruc-
2 turing, rescheduling, or canceling the sovereign debt of
3 countries eligible for assistance from the International De-
4 velopment Association, as necessary, to respond to the
5 COVID-19 pandemic.

6 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 45
7 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every
8 90 days thereafter until the end of the COVID-19 pan-
9 demic, as determined by the World Health Organization,
10 or until two years after the date of the enactment of this
11 Act, whichever is earlier, the Secretary of the Treasury,
12 in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit
13 to the committees specified in subsection (d) a report that
14 describes—

15 (1) actions that have been taken to advance
16 debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from
17 the International Development Association that re-
18 quest forbearance to respond to the COVID-19 pan-
19 demic in coordination with international financial in-
20 stitutions, the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20
21 (G20), Paris Club members, and the Institute of
22 International Finance;

23 (2) mechanisms that have been utilized and
24 mechanisms that are under consideration to provide
25 the debt relief described in paragraph (1);

1 ~~(3)~~ any United States policy concerns regarding
2 debt relief to specific countries;

3 ~~(4)~~ the balance and status of repayments on all
4 loans from the People's Republic of China to coun-
5 tries eligible for assistance from the International
6 Development Association, including—

7 ~~(A)~~ loans provided as part of the Belt and
8 Road Initiative of the People's Republic of
9 China;

10 ~~(B)~~ loans made by the Export-Import
11 Bank of China;

12 ~~(C)~~ loans made by the China Development
13 Bank; and

14 ~~(D)~~ loans made by the Asian Infrastruc-
15 ture Investment Bank; and

16 ~~(5)~~ the transparency measures established or
17 proposed to ensure that funds saved through the
18 debt relief described in paragraph ~~(1)~~ will be used
19 for activities—

20 ~~(A)~~ that respond to the health, economic,
21 and social consequences of the COVID-19 pan-
22 demic; and

23 ~~(B)~~ that are consistent with the interests
24 and values of the United States.

1 (d) COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—The committees spec-
2 ified in this subsection are—

3 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
4 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
5 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
6 and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
8 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
9 Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

10 **SEC. 406. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE**
11 **GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG**
12 **KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES**
13 **LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.**

14 Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act
15 of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding
16 at the end the following:

17 **“SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH**
18 **THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS**
19 **HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED**
20 **STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.**

21 **“(a) IN GENERAL.—**Not later than 180 days after
22 the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary
23 of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
24 committees a report on the manner and extent to which
25 the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong

1 to circumvent the laws and protections of the United
2 States.

3 “(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection
4 (a) shall include the following:

5 “(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Com-
6 merce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
7 Director of National Intelligence—

8 “(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
9 ment of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent
10 United States export controls; and

11 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
12 which the Government of China used Hong
13 Kong to circumvent such controls during the re-
14 porting period.

15 “(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the
16 Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce—

17 “(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
18 ment of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent
19 duties on merchandise exported to the United
20 States from the People’s Republic of China; and

21 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
22 which the Government of China used Hong
23 Kong to circumvent such duties during the re-
24 porting period.

1 “(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the
2 Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
3 the Director of National Intelligence—

4 “(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
5 ment of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent
6 sanctions imposed by the United States or pur-
7 suant to multilateral regimes; and

8 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
9 which the Government of China used Hong
10 Kong to circumvent such sanctions during the
11 reporting period.

12 “(4) In consultation with the Secretary of
13 Homeland Security and the Director of National In-
14 telligence, an assessment of how the Government of
15 China uses formal or informal means to extradite or
16 coercively move individuals, including United States
17 persons, from Hong Kong to the People’s Republic
18 of China.

19 “(5) In consultation with the Secretary of De-
20 fense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the
21 Director of Homeland Security—

22 “(A) an assessment of how the intelligence,
23 security, and law enforcement agencies of the
24 Government of China, including the Ministry of
25 State Security, the Ministry of Public Security,

1 and the People's Armed Police, use the Hong
2 Kong Security Bureau and other security agen-
3 cies in Hong Kong to conduct espionage on for-
4 eign nationals, including United States persons,
5 conduct influence operations, or violate civil lib-
6 erties guaranteed under the laws of Hong
7 Kong; and

8 “(B) a list of all significant incidents of
9 such espionage, influence operations, or viola-
10 tions of civil liberties during the reporting pe-
11 riod.

12 “(c) FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.—

13 “(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection
14 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
15 include a classified index.

16 “(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion
17 of the report required by subsection (a) shall be
18 posted on a publicly available internet website of the
19 Department of State.

20 “(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

21 “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
22 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-
23 mittees’ means—

24 “(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
25 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and

1 Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and
 2 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
 3 Senate; and

4 “(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
 5 the Committee on Financial Services, the Per-
 6 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
 7 the Committee on Ways and Means of the
 8 House of Representatives.

9 “(2) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term ‘foreign
 10 national’ means a person that is neither—

11 “(A) an individual who is a citizen or na-
 12 tional of the People’s Republic of China; or

13 “(B) an entity organized under the laws of
 14 the People’s Republic of China or of a jurisdic-
 15 tion within the People’s Republic of China.

16 “(3) REPORTING PERIOD.—The term ‘reporting
 17 period’ means the 5-year period preceding submis-
 18 sion of the report required by subsection (a).

19 “(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
 20 ‘United States person’ means—

21 “(A) a United States citizen or an alien
 22 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
 23 the United States; or

24 “(B) an entity organized under the laws of
 25 the United States or of any jurisdiction within

1 the United States, including a foreign branch of
2 such an entity.”.

3 **SEC. 407. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE**
4 **COMPANIES IN UNITED STATES CAPITAL**
5 **MARKETS.**

6 (a) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**—In
7 this section, the term “appropriate committees of Con-
8 gress” means—

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
10 Senate;

11 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
12 Senate;

13 (3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
14 Urban Affairs of the Senate;

15 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
16 House of Representatives;

17 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
18 ligence of the House of Representatives; and

19 (6) the Committee on Financial Services of the
20 House of Representatives.

21 (b) **REPORT.**—

22 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
24 nually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Sec-
25 retary of State, in consultation with the Director of

1 National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treas-
2 ury, shall submit an unclassified report to the appro-
3 priate committees of Congress that describes the
4 risks posed to the United States by the presence in
5 United States capital markets of companies incor-
6 porated in the PRC.

7 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
8 required under paragraph (1) shall—

9 (A) identify companies incorporated in the
10 PRC that—

11 (i) are listed or traded on one or sev-
12 eral stock exchanges within the United
13 States, including over-the-counter market
14 and “A Shares” added to indexes and ex-
15 change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
16 changes in the PRC; and

17 (ii) based on the factors for consider-
18 ation described in paragraph (3), have
19 knowingly and materially contributed to—

20 (I) activities that undermine
21 United States national security;

22 (II) serious abuses of internation-
23 ally recognized human rights; or

1 (III) a substantially increased fi-
2 nancial risk exposure for United
3 States-based investors;

4 (B) describe the activities of the companies
5 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and
6 their implications for the United States; and

7 (C) develop policy recommendations for the
8 United States Government, State governments,
9 United States financial institutions, United
10 States equity and debt exchanges, and other
11 relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed
12 by the presence in United States capital mar-
13 kets of the companies identified pursuant to
14 subparagraph (A).

15 (3) FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION.—In com-
16 pleting the report under paragraph (1), the Presi-
17 dent shall consider whether a company identified
18 pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)—

19 (A) has materially contributed to the devel-
20 opment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated
21 procurement by the PLA, of lethal military
22 equipment or component parts of such equip-
23 ment;

1 (B) has contributed to the construction
2 and militarization of features in the South
3 China Sea;

4 (C) has been sanctioned by the United
5 States or has been determined to have con-
6 ducted business with sanctioned entities;

7 (D) has engaged in an act or a series of
8 acts of intellectual property theft;

9 (E) has engaged in corporate or economic
10 espionage;

11 (F) has contributed to the proliferation of
12 nuclear or missile technology in violation of
13 United Nations Security Council resolutions or
14 United States sanctions;

15 (G) has contributed to the repression of re-
16 ligious and ethnic minorities within the PRC,
17 including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
18 gion or Tibet Autonomous Region;

19 (H) has contributed to the development of
20 technologies that enable censorship directed or
21 directly supported by the Government of the
22 PRC;

23 (I) has failed to comply fully with Federal
24 securities laws (including required audits by the
25 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board)

1 and “material risk” disclosure requirements of
2 the Securities and Exchange Commission; or

3 (J) has contributed to other activities or
4 behavior determined to be relevant by the Presi-
5 dent.

6 (c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
7 section (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form; but
8 may include a classified annex.

9 (d) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the
10 report under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to
11 the public online through relevant United States Govern-
12 ment websites.

13 **TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC** 14 **SECURITY**

15 **SEC. 501. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS** 16 **CONTROL.**

17 Congress makes the following findings:

18 (1) The United States and the PRC have a
19 shared interest in strategic security through enforce-
20 able arms control and non-proliferation agreements.

21 (2) The United States has long pursued and
22 continues to seek effective, verifiable, and enforce-
23 able arms control and non-proliferation agreements
24 that support United States and allied security by—

1 (A) controlling the spread of nuclear mate-
2 rials and technology;

3 (B) placing limits on the production, stock-
4 piling, and deployment of nuclear weapons;

5 (C) decreasing misperception and mis-
6 calculation; and

7 (D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms
8 competition.

9 (3) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intel-
10 ligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley
11 stated, “China is likely to at least double the size of
12 its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing
13 the most rapid expansion and diversification of its
14 nuclear arsenal in China’s history.”. The PLA is
15 building a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile
16 ground-based launchers and new capabilities for nu-
17 clear-armed bombers and submarine-launched bal-
18 listic missiles.

19 (4) In June 2020, the Department of State
20 raised concerns in its annual “Adherence to and
21 Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation,
22 and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”
23 report to Congress that the PRC is not complying
24 with the “zero-yield” nuclear testing ban and ac-

1 caused the PRC of “blocking the flow of data from
2 the monitoring stations” in China.

3 (5) The Department of Defense 2020 Report on
4 Military and Security Developments Involving the
5 People’s Republic of China states that China “in-
6 tends to increase peacetime readiness of its nuclear
7 forces by moving to a launch on warning posture
8 with an expanded silo-based force”.

9 (6) The Department of Defense report also
10 states that, over the next decade, China’s nuclear
11 stockpile—currently estimated in the low 200s—is
12 projected to least double in size as China expands
13 and modernizes its nuclear force.

14 (7) The PRC is conducting research on its first
15 potential early warning radar, with technical co-
16 operation from Russia. This radar could indicate
17 that the PRC is moving to a launch-on warning pos-
18 ture.

19 (8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capa-
20 ble space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities
21 against United States early warning systems and
22 critical infrastructure in a crisis scenario. This poses
23 great risk to strategic security, as it could lead to
24 inadvertent escalation.

1 (9) The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a
2 part of a massive modernization of the PLA which,
3 combined with the PLA's aggressive actions, has in-
4 creasingly destabilized the Indo-Pacific region.

5 (10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which
6 was elevated in 2015 to become a separate branch
7 within the PLA, has formed 11 new missile brigades
8 since May 2017, some of which are capable of both
9 conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United
10 States, which separates its conventional strike and
11 nuclear capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only
12 co-locate conventional and nuclear forces, including
13 dual-use missiles like the DF-26, but to task the
14 same unit with both nuclear and conventional mis-
15 sions. Such intermingling could lead to inadvertent
16 escalation in a crisis. The United States Defense In-
17 telligence Agency determined in March 2020 that
18 the PLA tested more ballistic missiles than the rest
19 of the world combined in 2019.

20 (11) A January 2021 report from the Institute
21 for Defense Analysis found that many United States
22 and international observers viewed China's no first-
23 use policy with skepticism, especially in the wake of
24 the expansion and modernization of its nuclear capa-
25 bilities.

1 (12) The long-planned United States nuclear
2 modernization program will not increase the United
3 States nuclear weapons stockpile, predates China's
4 conventional military and nuclear expansion, and is
5 not an arms race against China.

6 (13) The United States extended nuclear deter-
7 rence—

8 (A) provides critical strategic security
9 around the world;

10 (B) is an essential element of United
11 States military alliances; and

12 (C) serves a vital non-proliferation func-
13 tion.

14 (14) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-
15 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash-
16 ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, the PRC
17 is obligated under Article Six of the treaty to pursue
18 arms control negotiations in good faith.

19 (15) The United States has, on numerous occa-
20 sions, called on the PRC to participate in strategic
21 arms control negotiations, but the PRC has thus far
22 declined.

23 (16) The Governments of Poland, Slovenia,
24 Denmark, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the
25 Netherlands, Romania, Austria, and Albania, as well

1 as the Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlan-
2 tic Treaty Organization, have all encouraged the
3 PRC to join arms control discussions.

4 **SEC. 502. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA-**
5 **LOGUE.**

6 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
7 United States—

8 (1) to pursue, in coordination with United
9 States allies, arms control negotiations and sus-
10 tained and regular engagement with the PRC—

11 (A) to enhance understanding of each oth-
12 er's respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca-
13 pabilities;

14 (B) to improve transparency; and

15 (C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula-
16 tion and misperception;

17 (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Gov-
18 ernment of China on relevant bilateral issues that
19 lays the groundwork for bringing the People's Re-
20 public of China into an arms control framework, in-
21 cluding—

22 (A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms
23 control leading to the convening of bilateral
24 strategic security talks;

25 (B) negotiating norms for outer space;

1 (C) developing pre-launch notification re-
2 regimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation;
3 and

4 (D) expanding lines of communication be-
5 tween both governments for the purposes of re-
6 ducing the risks of conventional war and in-
7 creasing transparency;

8 (3) to pursue relevant capabilities in coordina-
9 tion with our allies and partners to ensure the secu-
10 rity of United States and allied interests in the face
11 of the PRC's military modernization and expansion;
12 including—

13 (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic
14 missiles;

15 (B) integrated air and missile defense;

16 (C) hypersonic missiles;

17 (D) intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
18 naissance;

19 (E) space-based capabilities;

20 (F) cyber capabilities; and

21 (G) command, control, and communica-
22 tions;

23 (4) to maintain sufficient force structure, pos-
24 ture, and capabilities to provide extended nuclear de-
25 terrence to United States allies and partners;

1 (5) to maintain appropriate missile defense ca-
2 pabilities to protect threats to the United States
3 homeland and our forces across the theater from
4 rogue intercontinental ballistic missiles from the
5 Indo-Pacific region; and

6 (6) to ensure that the United States declaratory
7 policy reflects the requirements of extended deter-
8 rence, to both assure allies and to preserve its non-
9 proliferation benefits.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that—

12 (1) in the midst of growing competition between
13 the United States and the PRC, it is in the interest
14 of both nations to cooperate in reducing risks of con-
15 ventional and nuclear escalation;

16 (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other
17 PLA attack on United States early warning sat-
18 ellites, other portions of the nuclear command and
19 control enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a
20 high risk to inadvertent but rapid escalation;

21 (3) the United States and its allies should pro-
22 mote international norms on military operations in
23 space, the employment of cyber capabilities, and the
24 military use of artificial intelligence, as an element

1 of risk reduction regarding nuclear command and
2 control; and

3 (4) United States allies and partners should
4 share the burden of promoting and protecting such
5 norms by voting against the PRC's proposals re-
6 garding the weaponization of space, highlighting un-
7 safe behavior by the PRC that violates international
8 norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity oper-
9 ations, and promoting responsible behavior in space
10 and all other domains.

11 **SEC. 503. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO EN-**
12 **GAGE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON**
13 **NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE**
14 **ISSUES.**

15 (a) ~~REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-~~
16 ~~CHINA ARMS CONTROL.~~—Not later than 180 days after
17 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
18 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
19 the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate
20 committees of Congress a report, and if necessary a sepa-
21 rate classified annex, that examines the approaches and
22 strategic effects of engaging the Government of China on
23 arms control and risk reduction, including—

24 (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Gov-
25 ernments of the United States and the People's Re-

1 public of China, including on ballistic, hypersonic
2 glide, and cruise missiles; conventional forces; nu-
3 clear, space, and cyberspace issues; as well as other
4 new strategic domains; which could reduce the likeli-
5 hood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to
6 occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the
7 Indo-Pacific;

8 (2) how the United States Government can
9 incentivize the Government of China to engage in a
10 constructive arms control dialogue;

11 (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of
12 the People's Republic of China that the United
13 States Government is most concerned about and how
14 limiting these capabilities may benefit United States
15 and allied security interests;

16 (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control
17 nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military
18 escalation between the United States and the Peo-
19 ple's Republic of China; and

20 (5) opportunities and methods to encourage
21 transparency from the People's Republic of China.

22 (b) REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE
23 RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
24 CHINA.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the
25 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consulta-

1 tion with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
2 Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
3 Congress a report that describes—

4 (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that
5 includes both the People’s Republic of China and the
6 Russian Federation;

7 (2) if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not
8 arise, what alternative plans the Department of
9 State envisages for ensuring the security of the
10 United States and its allies security from Russian
11 and Chinese nuclear weapons;

12 (3) effects on the credibility of United States
13 extended deterrence assurances to allies and part-
14 ners if the United States is faced with two nuclear-
15 armed peer competitors and any likely corresponding
16 implications for regional security architectures;

17 (4) efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of
18 China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilat-
19 eral or multilateral basis; and

20 (5) the interest level of the Government of
21 China in joining arms control talks, whether on a bi-
22 lateral or multilateral basis.

23 (e) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
24 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
25 tees of Congress” means—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
 2 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
 3 on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;
 4 and

5 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
 6 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
 7 on Energy and Commerce of the House of Rep-
 8 resentatives.

9 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

10 (a) *SHORT TITLE.*—*This Act may be cited as the*
 11 *“Strategic Competition Act of 2021”.*

12 (b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—*The table of contents for*
 13 *this Act is as follows:*

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

Sec. 3. Definitions.

Sec. 4. Statement of policy.

Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.

Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

Subtitle A—Science and Technology

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.

Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment standards.

Sec. 113. United States support for infrastructure.

Sec. 114. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.

Sec. 115. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.

Sec. 116. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign energy development.

Subtitle C—Digital Technology and Connectivity

Sec. 121. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.

- Sec. 122. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.*
Sec. 123. Strategy for digital investment by United States International Development Finance Corporation.

Subtitle D—Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence

- Sec. 131. Short title.*
Sec. 132. Authorization of appropriations for countering Chinese Influence Fund.
Sec. 133. Findings on Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations.
Sec. 134. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program.
Sec. 135. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
Sec. 136. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 137. Global engagement center.
Sec. 138. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of certain foreign gifts to and contracts with institutions of higher education.
Sec. 139. Post-employment restrictions on Senate-confirmed officials at the Department of State.
Sec. 140. Sense of Congress on prioritizing nomination of qualified ambassadors to ensure proper diplomatic positioning to counter Chinese influence.
Sec. 141. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

- Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.*
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 206. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States–ASEAN cooperation on technology issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 207. Report on Chinese influence in international organizations.
Sec. 208. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
Sec. 209. Technology partnership office at the Department of State.
Sec. 210. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on centrality of sanctions and other restrictions to strategic competition with China.
Sec. 212. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
Sec. 213. Enhancing the United States–Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 214. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
Sec. 215. Treatment of Taiwan government.
Sec. 216. Taiwan symbols of sovereignty.
Sec. 217. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic.
Sec. 218. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement with Pacific island countries.
Sec. 219. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 219A. Advancing United States leadership in the United Nations System.
Sec. 219B. Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
Sec. 219C. Statement of policy on need for reciprocity in the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

- Sec. 219D. Opposition to provision of assistance to People's Republic of China by Asian Development Bank.*
- Sec. 219E. Opposition to provision of assistance to People's Republic of China by International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.*
- Sec. 219F. United States policy on Chinese and Russian government efforts to undermine the United Nations Security Council action on human rights.*
- Sec. 219G. Deterring PRC use of force against Taiwan.*
- Sec. 219H. Strategy to respond to sharp power operations targeting Taiwan.*
- Sec. 219I. Study and report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking.*
- Sec. 219J. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.*
- Sec. 219K. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018.*

Subtitle B—International Security Matters

- Sec. 221. Definitions.*
- Sec. 222. Findings.*
- Sec. 223. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.*
- Sec. 224. Statement of policy.*
- Sec. 225. Foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific and authorization of appropriations for Southeast Asia maritime security programs and diplomatic outreach activities.*
- Sec. 226. Foreign military financing compact pilot program in the Indo-Pacific.*
- Sec. 227. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific.*
- Sec. 228. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for the Indo-Pacific.*
- Sec. 229. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the Indo-Pacific.*
- Sec. 230. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea.*
- Sec. 231. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners.*
- Sec. 232. Report on national technology and industrial base.*
- Sec. 233. Report on diplomatic outreach with respect to Chinese military installations overseas.*
- Sec. 234. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea.*
- Sec. 235. Limitation on assistance to countries hosting Chinese military installations.*

Subtitle C—Regional Strategies to Counter the People's Republic of China

- Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the world with respect to the People's Republic of China.*

PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE

- Sec. 245. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.*
- Sec. 246. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China's arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian citizens.*
- Sec. 247. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.*
- Sec. 248. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean.*

Sec. 249. Engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sec. 250. Addressing China's sovereign lending practices in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sec. 251. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sec. 252. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies.

PART II—TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on the Transatlantic alliance.

Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to the People's Republic of China.

Sec. 257. Enhancing Transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance.

Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and between China and Russia.

Sec. 259. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the belt and road initiative.

PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.

Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.

PART IV—AFRICA

Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People's Republic of China in Africa.

Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa.

Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.

Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa focused on the People's Republic of China.

Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.

Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks.

PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.

Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.

PART VI—ARCTIC REGION

Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.

PART VII—OCEANIA

Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.

Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.

Sec. 293. Review of USAID programming in Oceania.

Sec. 294. Oceania Security Dialogue.

Sec. 295. Report on countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in Oceania.

Sec. 296. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships.

TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

- Sec. 301. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong Kong.*
- Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions relating to forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.*
- Sec. 303. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.*
- Sec. 304. Report on corrupt activities of senior officials of Government of the People's Republic of China.*
- Sec. 305. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that commit human rights abuses.*
- Sec. 306. Policy with respect to Tibet.*
- Sec. 307. United States policy and international engagement on the succession or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.*
- Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.*
- Sec. 309. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great Firewall circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong.*
- Sec. 310. Enhancing transparency on international agreements and qualifying non-binding instruments.*
- Sec. 311. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights in the People's Republic of China.*
- Sec. 312. Diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games.*
- Sec. 313. Repeal of sunset applicable to authority under Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.*

TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

- Sec. 401. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial policy.*
- Sec. 402. Intellectual property violators list.*
- Sec. 403. Government of the People's Republic of China subsidies list.*
- Sec. 404. Countering foreign corrupt practices.*
- Sec. 405. Debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from the International Development Association.*
- Sec. 406. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United States laws and protections.*
- Sec. 407. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies in United States capital markets.*
- Sec. 408. Economic defense response teams.*

TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

- Sec. 501. Findings on strategic security and arms control.*
- Sec. 502. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.*
- Sec. 503. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's Republic of China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues.*
- Sec. 504. Countering China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to the Middle-East.*

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 *Congress makes the following findings:*

3 *(1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is*
4 *leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili-*
5 *tary, technological, and ideological power to become a*
6 *strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United*
7 *States. The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC*
8 *in these domains are contrary to the interests and*
9 *values of the United States, its partners, and much*
10 *of the rest of the world.*

11 *(2) The current policies being pursued by the*
12 *PRC—*

13 *(A) threaten the future character of the*
14 *international order and are shaping the rules,*
15 *norms, and institutions that govern relations*
16 *among states;*

17 *(B) will put at risk the ability of the*
18 *United States to secure its national interests;*
19 *and*

20 *(C) will put at risk the future peace, pros-*
21 *perity, and freedom of the international commu-*
22 *nity in the coming decades.*

23 *(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with*
24 *the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked*
25 *to advance the PRC's economic and social develop-*
26 *ment to ensure that the PRC participated in, and*

1 *benefitted from, the free and open international order.*
2 *The United States pursued these goals and contrib-*
3 *uted to the welfare of the Chinese people by—*

4 *(A) increasing the PRC's trade relations*
5 *and access to global capital markets;*

6 *(B) promoting the PRC's accession to the*
7 *World Trade Organization;*

8 *(C) providing development finance and*
9 *technical assistance;*

10 *(D) promoting research collaboration;*

11 *(E) educating the PRC's top students;*

12 *(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge*
13 *technologies and scientific knowledge; and*

14 *(G) providing intelligence and military as-*
15 *sistance.*

16 *(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to*
17 *pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an*
18 *increasingly authoritarian governance model at home*
19 *through increased restrictions on personal freedoms,*
20 *and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These*
21 *policies frequently and deliberately undermine United*
22 *States interests and are contrary to core United*
23 *States values and the values of other nations, both in*
24 *the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this stra-*
25 *tegic decision of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),*

1 *the United States has been compelled to reexamine*
2 *and revise its strategy towards the PRC.*

3 *(5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the*
4 *President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, has elevated the*
5 *“Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” as cen-*
6 *tral to the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC.*
7 *His program demands—*

8 *(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;*

9 *(B) concentration of military power;*

10 *(C) a strong role for the CCP in the state*
11 *and the economy;*

12 *(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking*
13 *control over broadly asserted territorial claims;*
14 *and*

15 *(E) the denial of any values and individual*
16 *rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.*

17 *(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of govern-*
18 *ance, “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, as su-*
19 *perior to, and at odds with, the constitutional models*
20 *of the United States and other democracies. This ap-*
21 *proach to governance is lauded by the CCP as essen-*
22 *tial to securing the PRC’s status as a global leader,*
23 *and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013*
24 *speech, President Xi said, “We firmly believe that as*
25 *socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further*

1 . . . it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our
2 socialist system will be increasingly apparent . . .
3 [and] our country's road of development will have in-
4 creasingly greater influence on the world.”.

5 (7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish re-
6 gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use
7 that dominant position to propel the PRC to become
8 the “leading world power,” shaping an international
9 order that is conducive to the CCP's interests. Achiev-
10 ing these objectives require turning the PRC into a
11 wealthy nation under strict CCP rule and using a
12 strong military and advanced technological capability
13 to pursue the PRC's objectives, regardless of other
14 countries' interests.

15 (8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter-
16 national order, which is built upon the rule of law
17 and free and open ideals and principles, by con-
18 ducting global information and influence operations,
19 seeking to redefine international laws and norms to
20 align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the le-
21 gitimacy of internationally recognized human rights,
22 and seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of
23 multinational organizations for the benefit of the
24 PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the expense
25 of the interests of the United States and the inter-

1 *national community. In December 2018, President Xi*
2 *suggested that the CCP views its “historic mission” as*
3 *not only to govern China, but also to profoundly in-*
4 *fluence global governance to benefit the CCP.*

5 *(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to*
6 *follow its model of “socialism with Chinese character-*
7 *istics”. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017,*
8 *President Xi said that the PRC could serve as a*
9 *model of development for other countries by utilizing*
10 *“Chinese wisdom” and a “Chinese approach to solv-*
11 *ing problems”.*

12 *(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model*
13 *and attempting to weaken other models of governance*
14 *by—*

15 *(A) undermining democratic institutions;*

16 *(B) subverting financial institutions;*

17 *(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the*
18 *policies of the PRC; and*

19 *(D) using disinformation to disguise the na-*
20 *ture of the actions described in subparagraphs*
21 *(A) through (C).*

22 *(11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming the*
23 *global leader in science and technology. In May 2018,*
24 *President Xi said that for the PRC to reach “pros-*
25 *perity and rejuvenation”, it needs to “endeavor to be*

1 *a major world center for science and innovation”. The*
2 *PRC has invested the equivalent of billions of dollars*
3 *into education, research and development, and estab-*
4 *lished joint scientific research centers and science uni-*
5 *versities.*

6 (12) *The PRC’s drive to become a “manufac-*
7 *turing and technological superpower” and to promote*
8 *“innovation with Chinese characteristics” is coming*
9 *at the expense of human rights and longstanding*
10 *international rules and norms with respect to eco-*
11 *nomie competition, and presents a challenge to*
12 *United States national security and the security of*
13 *allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the*
14 *PRC advances its illiberal political and social poli-*
15 *cies through mass surveillance, social credit systems,*
16 *and a significant role of the state in internet govern-*
17 *ance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct*
18 *and indirect government control over its citizens’ ev-*
19 *eryday lives. Its national strategy of “Military-Civil*
20 *Fusion” mandates that civil and commercial re-*
21 *search, which increasingly drives global innovation, is*
22 *leveraged to develop new military capabilities.*

23 (13) *The PRC and the CCP are committing*
24 *crimes against humanity and are engaged in an on-*
25 *going genocide, in violation of the Convention on the*

1 *Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,*
2 *done at Paris December 9, 1948, against the predomi-*
3 *nantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and reli-*
4 *gious minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Au-*
5 *tonomous Region, including through campaigns of*
6 *imprisonment, torture, rape, and coercive birth pre-*
7 *vention policies.*

8 *(14) The PRC is using legal and illegal means*
9 *to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing*
10 *and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-di-*
11 *rected industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to*
12 *ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP*
13 *engages in and encourages actions that actively un-*
14 *dermine a free and open international market, such*
15 *as intellectual property theft, forced technology trans-*
16 *fers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and manda-*
17 *tory CCP access to proprietary data as part of busi-*
18 *ness and commercial agreements between Chinese and*
19 *foreign companies.*

20 *(15) The policies referred to in paragraph (14)*
21 *are designed to freeze United States and other foreign*
22 *firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competi-*
23 *tion in other important markets. The heavy subsidiza-*
24 *tion of Chinese companies includes potential violation*
25 *of its World Trade Organization commitments. In*

1 *May 2018, President Xi said that the PRC aims to*
2 *keep the “initiatives of innovation and development*
3 *security . . . in [China’s] own hands”.*

4 *(16) The PRC is advancing its global objectives*
5 *through a variety of avenues, including its signature*
6 *initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which*
7 *is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and includes*
8 *the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The*
9 *PRC describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly*
10 *beneficial plan for all countries. However, it eventu-*
11 *ally seeks to advance an economic system with the*
12 *PRC at its center, making it the most concrete geo-*
13 *graphical representation of the PRC’s global ambi-*
14 *tions. BRI increases the economic influence of state-*
15 *owned Chinese firms in global markets, enhances the*
16 *PRC’s political leverage with government leaders*
17 *around the world, and provides greater access to stra-*
18 *tegic nodes such as ports and railways. Through BRI,*
19 *the PRC seeks political deference through economic*
20 *dependence.*

21 *(17) The PRC is executing a plan to establish re-*
22 *gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace*
23 *the United States from the region. As a Pacific*
24 *power, the United States has built and supported en-*
25 *during alliances and economic partnerships that se-*

1 *cure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of*
2 *law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-*
3 *Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and mili-*
4 *tary coercion in the region to secure its own interests.*

5 (18) *The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep*
6 *the United States military from operating in the*
7 *Western Pacific and to erode United States security*
8 *guarantees.*

9 (19) *The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive*
10 *control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air*
11 *space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually*
12 *exercising greater influence beyond the region. This*
13 *includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy*
14 *exploration, transport, and the exercise of security op-*
15 *erations in areas permitted under international law.*

16 (20) *The PRC seeks so-called “reunification”*
17 *with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately*
18 *be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called “re-*
19 *unification” is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal*
20 *inherently coercive. In January 2019, President Xi*
21 *stated that the PRC “make[s] no promise to renounce*
22 *the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking all*
23 *necessary means”. Taiwan’s embodiment of demo-*
24 *cratic values and economic liberalism challenges*
25 *President Xi’s goal of achieving national rejuvena-*

1 *tion. The PRC plans to exploit Taiwan’s dominant*
2 *strategic position in the First Island Chain and to*
3 *project power into the Second Island Chain and be-*
4 *yond.*

5 *(21) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe-*
6 *cuted an illegal island-building campaign that threat-*
7 *ens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of com-*
8 *merce, damages the environment, bolsters PLA power*
9 *projection capabilities, and coerces and intimidates*
10 *other regional claimants in an effort to advance its*
11 *unlawful claims and control the waters around neigh-*
12 *boring countries. Despite President Xi’s September*
13 *2015 speech, in which he said the PRC did not intend*
14 *to militarize the South China Sea, during the 2017*
15 *19th Party Congress, President Xi announced that*
16 *“construction on islands and reefs in the South China*
17 *Sea have seen steady progress”.*

18 *(22) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA*
19 *to attain a level of capacity and capability superior*
20 *to the United States in terms of equipment and con-*
21 *duct of modern military operations by shifting its*
22 *military doctrine from having a force “adequate [for]*
23 *China’s defensive needs” to having a force “commen-*
24 *surate with China’s international status”. Ultimately,*
25 *this transformation could enable China to impose its*

1 *will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of*
2 *military force. In 2017, President Xi established the*
3 *following developmental benchmarks for the advance-*
4 *ment of the PLA:*

5 (A) *A mechanized force with increased*
6 *informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.*

7 (B) *The complete modernization of China's*
8 *national defense by 2035.*

9 (C) *The full transformation of the PLA into*
10 *a world-class force by 2050.*

11 (23) *The PRC's strategy and supporting policies*
12 *described in this section undermine United States in-*
13 *terests, such as—*

14 (A) *upholding a free and open international*
15 *order;*

16 (B) *maintaining the integrity of inter-*
17 *national institutions with liberal norms and val-*
18 *ues;*

19 (C) *preserving a favorable balance of power*
20 *in the Indo-Pacific;*

21 (D) *ensuring the defense of its allies;*

22 (E) *preserving open sea and air lanes;*

23 (F) *fostering the free flow of commerce*
24 *through open and transparent markets; and*

1 (G) promoting individual freedom and
2 human rights.

3 (24) The global COVID–19 pandemic has inten-
4 sified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s be-
5 havior and therefore increased the need for United
6 States global leadership and a competitive posture.
7 The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the
8 COVID–19 pandemic by—

9 (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong
10 Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-called
11 “national security law” on Hong Kong;

12 (B) aggressively imposing its will in the
13 East and South China Seas;

14 (C) contributing to increased tensions with
15 India; and

16 (D) engaging in a widespread and govern-
17 ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob-
18 scure the PRC government’s efforts to cover up
19 the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion
20 about the origination of the outbreak, and dis-
21 credit the United States, its allies, and global
22 health efforts.

23 (25) The CCP’s disinformation campaign re-
24 ferred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included—

1 (A) concerted efforts, in the early days of
2 the pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope
3 of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well
4 as cases of person-to-person transmission;

5 (B) claims that the virus originated in
6 United States biological defense research at Fort
7 Detrick, Maryland;

8 (C) Chinese state media reports insinuating
9 a possible link between the virus and other
10 United States biological facilities; and

11 (D) efforts to block access to qualified inter-
12 national infectious disease experts who might
13 contradict the CCP's narrative.

14 (26) In response to the PRC's strategy and poli-
15 cies, the United States must adopt a policy of stra-
16 tegic competition with the PRC to protect and pro-
17 mote our vital interests and values.

18 (27) The United States' policy of strategic com-
19 petition with respect to the PRC is part of a broader
20 strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world
21 which centers around cooperation with United States
22 allies and partners to advance shared values and in-
23 terests and to preserve and enhance a free, open,
24 democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse
25 region.

1 (28) *The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018*
2 *(Public Law 115–409) contributed to a comprehensive*
3 *framework for promoting United State security inter-*
4 *ests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pa-*
5 *cific region, investing \$7,500,000,000 over 5 years—*

6 (A) *to support greater security and defense*
7 *cooperation between the United States and allies*
8 *and partners in the Indo-Pacific region;*

9 (B) *to advance democracy and the protec-*
10 *tion and promotion of human rights in the Indo-*
11 *Pacific region;*

12 (C) *to enhance cybersecurity cooperation be-*
13 *tween the United States and partners in the*
14 *Indo-Pacific;*

15 (D) *to deepen people-to-people engagement*
16 *through programs such as the Young Southeast*
17 *Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth*
18 *Volunteers program; and*

19 (E) *to enhance energy cooperation and en-*
20 *ergy security in the Indo-Pacific region.*

21 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

22 *In this Act:*

23 (1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
24 *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
25 *tees” means—*

1 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
2 *the Senate; and*

3 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
4 *House of Representatives.*

5 (2) *CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese*
6 *Communist Party.*

7 (3) *INDO-PACIFIC REGION.—The terms “Indo-Pa-*
8 *cific” and “Indo-Pacific region” mean the 37 coun-*
9 *tries and the surrounding waterways that are under*
10 *the area of responsibility of the U.S. Indo-Pacific*
11 *Command. These countries are: Australia, Ban-*
12 *gladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China,*
13 *Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malay-*
14 *sia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mon-*
15 *golia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea,*
16 *Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of*
17 *Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri*
18 *Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga,*
19 *Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.*

20 (4) *PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The*
21 *terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean*
22 *the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.*

23 (5) *PRC; CHINA.—The terms “PRC” and*
24 *“China” mean the People’s Republic of China.*

1 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

2 (a) *OBJECTIVES.*—*It is the policy of the United States,*
3 *in pursuing strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue*
4 *the following objectives:*

5 (1) *The United States global leadership role is*
6 *sustained and its political system and major founda-*
7 *tions of national power are postured for long-term po-*
8 *litical, economic, technological, and military competi-*
9 *tion with the PRC.*

10 (2) *The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific re-*
11 *mains favorable to the United States and its allies.*
12 *The United States and its allies maintain unfettered*
13 *access to the region, including through freedom of*
14 *navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent*
15 *with international law and practice, and the PRC*
16 *neither dominates the region nor coerces its neighbors.*

17 (3) *The allies and partners of the United*
18 *States—*

19 (A) *maintain confidence in United States*
20 *leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-*
21 *cific region;*

22 (B) *can withstand and combat subversion*
23 *and undue influence by the PRC; and*

24 (C) *align themselves with the United States*
25 *in setting global rules, norms, and standards*
26 *that benefit the international community.*

1 (4) *The combined weight of the United States*
2 *and its allies and partners is strong enough to dem-*
3 *onstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to*
4 *dominate other states outweigh the potential benefits.*

5 (5) *The United States leads the free and open*
6 *international order, which is comprised of resilient*
7 *states and institutions that uphold and defend prin-*
8 *ciples, such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual*
9 *freedom, and human rights. The international order*
10 *is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization*
11 *by illiberal and authoritarian actors.*

12 (6) *The key rules, norms, and standards of inter-*
13 *national engagement in the 21st century are main-*
14 *tained, including—*

15 (A) *the protection of human rights, commer-*
16 *cial engagement and investment, and technology;*
17 *and*

18 (B) *that such rules, norms, and standards*
19 *are in alignment with the values and interests of*
20 *the United States, its allies and partners, and*
21 *the free world.*

22 (7) *Assures that the CCP does not—*

23 (A) *subvert open and democratic societies;*

24 (B) *distort global markets;*

1 (C) manipulate the international trade sys-
2 tem;

3 (D) coerce other nations via economic and
4 military means; or

5 (E) use its technological advantages to un-
6 dermine individual freedoms or other states' na-
7 tional security interests.

8 (8) The United States deters military confronta-
9 tion with the PRC and both nations work to reduce
10 the risk of conflict.

11 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in
12 pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

13 (1) to strengthen the United States domestic
14 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic
15 growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
16 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that
17 improve the ability of the United States to pursue its
18 vital economic, foreign policy, and national security
19 interests;

20 (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition
21 with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic,
22 development, military, informational, and techno-
23 logical realms that maximizes the United States'
24 strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of harm-

1 *ing United States interests and the values of United*
2 *States allies and partners;*

3 *(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international*
4 *system characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of*
5 *law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and*
6 *a shared commitment to security and peaceful resolu-*
7 *tion of disputes, human rights, and good and trans-*
8 *parent governance;*

9 *(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-*
10 *ances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific*
11 *and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multi-*
12 *lateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared in-*
13 *terests and values and bolster partner countries' con-*
14 *fidence that the United States is and will remain a*
15 *strong, committed, and constant partner;*

16 *(5) to encourage and collaborate with United*
17 *States allies and partners in boosting their own capa-*
18 *bilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect*
19 *shared interests and values, free from coercion and ex-*
20 *ternal pressure;*

21 *(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and*
22 *healthy competition in United States-China economic*
23 *relations by—*

24 *(A) advancing policies that harden the*
25 *United States economy against unfair and ille-*

1 *gal commercial or trading practices and the co-*
2 *ercion of United States businesses; and*

3 *(B) tightening United States laws and regu-*
4 *lations as necessary to prevent the PRC's at-*
5 *tempts to harm United States economic competi-*
6 *tiveness;*

7 *(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led*
8 *growth in emerging markets around the world, in-*
9 *cluding through the use of United States Government*
10 *tools that—*

11 *(A) support greater private sector invest-*
12 *ment and advance capacity-building initiatives*
13 *that are grounded in the rule of law;*

14 *(B) promote open markets;*

15 *(C) establish clear policy and regulatory*
16 *frameworks;*

17 *(D) improve the management of key eco-*
18 *nomie sectors;*

19 *(E) combat corruption; and*

20 *(F) foster and support greater collaboration*
21 *with and among partner countries and the*
22 *United States private sector to develop secure*
23 *and sustainable infrastructure;*

1 (8) *to lead in the advancement of international*
2 *rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade*
3 *and open and integrated markets;*

4 (9) *to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in*
5 *support of United States companies and businesses in*
6 *partner countries that seek fair competition;*

7 (10) *to ensure that the United States leads in the*
8 *innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such*
9 *as next-generation telecommunications, artificial in-*
10 *telligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and*
11 *biotechnology, by—*

12 (A) *providing necessary investment and*
13 *concrete incentives for the private sector to accel-*
14 *erate development of such technologies;*

15 (B) *modernizing export controls and invest-*
16 *ment screening regimes and associated policies*
17 *and regulations;*

18 (C) *enhancing United States leadership in*
19 *technical standards-setting bodies and avenues*
20 *for developing norms regarding the use of emerg-*
21 *ing critical technologies;*

22 (D) *reducing United States barriers and in-*
23 *creasing incentives for collaboration with allies*
24 *and partners on the research and co-development*
25 *of critical technologies;*

1 (E) collaborating with allies and partners
2 to protect critical technologies by—

3 (i) crafting multilateral export control
4 measures;

5 (ii) building capacity for defense tech-
6 nology security;

7 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in sup-
8 ply chains; and

9 (iv) ensuring diversification; and

10 (F) designing major defense capabilities for
11 export to allies and partners;

12 (11) to enable the people of the United States, in-
13 cluding the private sector, civil society, universities
14 and other academic institutions, State and local legis-
15 lators, and other relevant actors to identify and re-
16 main vigilant to the risks posed by undue influence
17 of the CCP in the United States;

18 (12) to implement measures to mitigate the risks
19 referred to in paragraph (11), while still preserving
20 opportunities for economic engagement, academic re-
21 search, and cooperation in other areas where the
22 United States and the PRC share interests;

23 (13) to collaborate with advanced democracies
24 and other willing partners to promote ideals and
25 principles that—

1 (A) *advance a free and open international*
2 *order;*

3 (B) *strengthen democratic institutions;*

4 (C) *protect and promote human rights; and*

5 (D) *uphold a free press and fact-based re-*
6 *porting;*

7 (14) *to develop comprehensive and holistic strate-*
8 *gies and policies to counter PRC disinformation cam-*
9 *paings;*

10 (15) *to demonstrate effective leadership at the*
11 *United Nations, its associated agencies, and other*
12 *multilateral organizations and defend the integrity of*
13 *these organizations against co-optation by illiberal*
14 *and authoritarian nations;*

15 (16) *to prioritize the defense of fundamental free-*
16 *doms and human rights in the United States relation-*
17 *ship with the PRC;*

18 (17) *to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-*
19 *tilateral organizations, leveraging their significant*
20 *and growing capabilities to build a network of like-*
21 *minded states that sustains and strengthens a free*
22 *and open order and addresses regional and global*
23 *challenges to hold the Government of the PRC ac-*
24 *countable for—*

25 (A) *violations and abuses of human rights;*

1 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and

2 (C) undermining and abrogating treaties,

3 other international agreements, and other inter-

4 national norms related to human rights;

5 (18) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, re-

6 pression, coercion, and other malign behavior to at-

7 tain unfair economic advantages and to pressure

8 other nations to defer to its political and strategic ob-

9 jectives;

10 (19) to maintain United States access to the

11 Western Pacific, including by—

12 (A) increasing United States forward-de-

13 ployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region;

14 (B) modernizing the United States military

15 through investments in existing and new plat-

16 forms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater

17 force structure and enabling capabilities, joint

18 operational concepts, and a diverse, operation-

19 ally resilient and politically sustainable posture;

20 and

21 (C) operating and conducting exercises with

22 allies and partners—

23 (i) to mitigate the PLA's ability to

24 project power and establish contested zones

25 within the First and Second Island Chains;

1 (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA
2 to coerce its neighbors;

3 (iii) to maintain open sea and air
4 lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait,
5 the East China Sea, and the South China
6 Sea; and

7 (iv) to project power from the United
8 States and its allies and partners to dem-
9 onstrate the ability to conduct contested lo-
10 gistics;

11 (20) to deter the PRC from—

12 (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including
13 by developing more combat-credible forces that
14 are integrated with allies and partners in con-
15 tact, blunt, and surge layers and able to defeat
16 any PRC theory of victory in the First or Sec-
17 ond Island Chains of the Western Pacific and be-
18 yond, as called for in the 2018 National Defense
19 Strategy;

20 (B) using grey-zone tactics below the level of
21 armed conflict; or

22 (C) initiating armed conflict;

23 (21) to strengthen United States-PRC military-
24 to-military communication and improve de-escalation
25 procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the

1 *risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level*
2 *visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and*
3 *military officials and other measures, in alignment*
4 *with United States interests; and*

5 *(22) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align,*
6 *including through bilateral or multilateral means and*
7 *at the United Nations, as appropriate.*

8 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

9 *It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the pol-*
10 *icy described in section 4(b) requires the following actions:*

11 *(1) Strategic competition with the PRC will re-*
12 *quire the United States—*

13 *(A) to marshal sustained political will to*
14 *protect its vital interests, promote its values, and*
15 *advance its economic and national security ob-*
16 *jectives for decades to come; and*

17 *(B) to achieve this sustained political will,*
18 *persuade the American people and United States*
19 *allies and partners of—*

20 *(i) the challenges posed by the PRC;*

21 *and*

22 *(ii) the need for long-term competition*
23 *to defend shared interests and values.*

24 *(2) The United States must coordinate closely*
25 *with allies and partners to compete effectively with*

1 *the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners*
2 *to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing*
3 *and checking the aggressive and assertive behavior of*
4 *the PRC.*

5 *(3) The President of the United States must lead*
6 *and direct the entire executive branch to treat the*
7 *People’s Republic of China as the greatest geopolitical*
8 *and geoeconomic challenge for United States foreign*
9 *policy, increasing the prioritization of strategic com-*
10 *petition with the PRC and broader United States in-*
11 *terests in the Indo-Pacific region in the conduct of*
12 *foreign policy and assuring the allocation of appro-*
13 *priate resources adequate to the challenge.*

14 *(4) The head of every Federal department and*
15 *agency should designate a senior official at the level*
16 *of Under Secretary or above to coordinate the depart-*
17 *ment’s or agency’s policies with respect to strategic*
18 *competition with the PRC.*

19 *(5) The ability of the United States to execute a*
20 *strategy of strategic competition with the PRC will be*
21 *undermined if our attention is repeatedly diverted to*
22 *challenges that are not vital to United States eco-*
23 *nomics and national security interests.*

24 *(6) In the coming decades, the United States*
25 *must prevent the PRC from—*

1 (A) *establishing regional hegemony in the*
2 *Indo-Pacific; and*

3 (B) *using that position to advance its asser-*
4 *tive political, economic, and foreign policy goals*
5 *around the world.*

6 (7) *The United States must ensure that the Fed-*
7 *eral budget is properly aligned with the strategic im-*
8 *perative to compete with the PRC by—*

9 (A) *ensuring sufficient levels of funding to*
10 *resource all instruments of United States na-*
11 *tional power; and*

12 (B) *coherently prioritizing how such funds*
13 *are used.*

14 (8) *Sustained prioritization of the challenge*
15 *posed by the PRC requires—*

16 (A) *bipartisan cooperation within Congress;*
17 *and*

18 (B) *frequent, sustained, and meaningful col-*
19 *laboration and consultation between the executive*
20 *branch and Congress.*

21 (9) *The United States must ensure close integra-*
22 *tion among economic and foreign policymakers, the*
23 *private sector, civil society, universities and academic*
24 *institutions, and other relevant actors in free and*

1 *open societies affected by the challenges posed by the*
2 *PRC to enable such actors—*

3 *(A) to collaborate to advance common inter-*
4 *ests; and*

5 *(B) to identify appropriate policies—*

6 *(i) to strengthen the United States and*
7 *its allies;*

8 *(ii) to promote a compelling vision of*
9 *a free and open order; and*

10 *(iii) to push back against detrimental*
11 *policies pursued by the CCP.*

12 *(10) The United States must ensure that all Fed-*
13 *eral departments and agencies are organized to reflect*
14 *the fact that strategic competition with the PRC is*
15 *the United States' greatest geopolitical and*
16 *goeconomic challenge, including through the assigned*
17 *missions and location of United States Government*
18 *personnel, by—*

19 *(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-*
20 *Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in*
21 *Washington DC, with priorities directly relevant*
22 *to advancing competition with the People's Re-*
23 *public of China;*

24 *(B) placing greater numbers of foreign serv-*
25 *ice officers, international development profes-*

1 *sionals, members of the foreign commercial serv-*
2 *ice, intelligence professionals, and other United*
3 *States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific*
4 *region; and*

5 *(C) ensuring that this workforce, both civil-*
6 *ian and military, has the training in language,*
7 *technical skills, and other competencies required*
8 *to advance a successful competitive strategy with*
9 *the PRC.*

10 *(11) The United States must place renewed em-*
11 *phasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments*
12 *of national power, including diplomacy, information,*
13 *technology, economics, foreign assistance and develop-*
14 *ment finance, commerce, intelligence, and law en-*
15 *forcement, which are crucial for addressing the unique*
16 *economic, political, and ideological challenges posed*
17 *by the PRC.*

18 *(12) The United States must sustain resourcing*
19 *for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be*
20 *aligned with the overarching political and diplomatic*
21 *objectives articulated in the Asia Reassurance Initia-*
22 *tive Act (Public Law 115–409), and must prioritize*
23 *the military investments necessary to achieve United*
24 *States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, includ-*
25 *ing—*

1 (A) *promoting regional security in the*
2 *Indo-Pacific;*

3 (B) *reassuring allies and partners while*
4 *protecting them from coercion; and*

5 (C) *deterring conflict with the PRC.*

6 (13) *Competition with the PRC requires the*
7 *United States' skillful adaptation to the information*
8 *environment of the 21st century. United States public*
9 *diplomacy and messaging efforts must effectively—*

10 (A) *promote the value of partnership with*
11 *the United States;*

12 (B) *highlight the risks and costs of*
13 *enmeshment with the PRC; and*

14 (C) *counter CCP propaganda and*
15 *disinformation.*

16 **SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

17 (a) *APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON*
18 *ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.—Nothing in*
19 *this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede,*
20 *or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United*
21 *States Government under section 620M of the Foreign As-*
22 *sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of*
23 *title 10, United States Code.*

1 **(b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY**
2 *FORCE.*—*Nothing in this Act may be construed as author-*
3 *izing the use of military force.*

4 **TITLE I—INVESTING IN A**
5 **COMPETITIVE FUTURE**
6 **Subtitle A—Science and Technology**

7 **SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-**
8 **PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-**
9 **SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.**

10 **(a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.**—*The*
11 *Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of*
12 *Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate*
13 *the contracting by the Department of State for the profes-*
14 *sional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee*
15 *for service basis, to assist interested United States persons*
16 *and business entities with supply chain management issues*
17 *related to the PRC, including—*

18 **(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating**
19 *certain production facilities to locations outside the*
20 **PRC;**

21 **(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-**
22 *forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of*
23 **the PRC;**

1 (3) *navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-*
2 *lenges in the course of the activities described in para-*
3 *graphs (1) and (2); and*

4 (4) *identifying alternative markets for produc-*
5 *tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including*
6 *through providing market intelligence, facilitating*
7 *contact with reliable local partners as appropriate,*
8 *and other services.*

9 (b) *CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons*
10 *hired to perform the services described in subsection (a)*
11 *shall—*

12 (1) *be under the authority of the United States*
13 *Chief of Mission in the country in which they are*
14 *hired, in accordance with existing United States laws;*

15 (2) *coordinate with Department of State and De-*
16 *partment of Commerce officers; and*

17 (3) *coordinate with United States missions and*
18 *relevant local partners in other countries as needed to*
19 *carry out the services described in subsection (a).*

20 (c) *PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-*
21 *DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in sub-*
22 *section (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, small-*
23 *, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the matters*
24 *described in subsection (a).*

1 (d) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There is*
2 *authorized to be appropriated \$15,000,000 for each of fiscal*
3 *years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying out*
4 *this section.*

5 (e) *PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY FOR-*
6 *EIGN ADVERSARIES.*—*None of the funds appropriated pur-*
7 *suant to this section may be provided to an entity—*

8 (1) *under the foreign ownership, control, or in-*
9 *fluence of the Government of the People’s Republic of*
10 *China or the Chinese Communist Party, or other for-*
11 *ign adversary;*

12 (2) *determined to have beneficial ownership from*
13 *foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direc-*
14 *tion, or influence of foreign adversaries; and*

15 (3) *that has any contract in effect at the time of*
16 *the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract with-*
17 *in the previous one year that is no longer in effect,*
18 *with—*

19 (A) *the Government of the People’s Republic*
20 *of China;*

21 (B) *the Chinese Communist Party;*

22 (C) *the Chinese military;*

23 (D) *an entity majority-owned, majority-*
24 *controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern-*

1 *ment of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP,*
 2 *or the Chinese military; or*

3 *(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an*
 4 *entity described in subparagraph (D).*

5 *(f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms “foreign ownership, con-*
 6 *trol, or influence” and “FOCI” have the meanings given*
 7 *those terms in the National Industrial Security Program*
 8 *Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor docu-*
 9 *ment.*

10 ***Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure***
 11 ***and Energy Development***

12 ***SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-***
 13 ***FINED.***

14 *In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of*
 15 *Congress” means—*

16 *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the*
 17 *Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and*

18 *(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the*
 19 *Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-*
 20 *resentatives.*

21 ***SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL-***
 22 ***ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND-***
 23 ***ARDS.***

24 *(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
 25 *that the United States should initiate collaboration among*

1 *governments, the private sector, and civil society to encour-*
2 *age the adoption of the standards for quality global infra-*
3 *structure development advanced by the G20 at Osaka in*
4 *2018, including with respect to the following issues:*

5 (1) *Respect for the sovereignty of countries in*
6 *which infrastructure investments are made.*

7 (2) *Anti-corruption.*

8 (3) *Rule of law.*

9 (4) *Human rights and labor rights.*

10 (5) *Fiscal and debt sustainability.*

11 (6) *Social and governance safeguards.*

12 (7) *Transparency.*

13 (8) *Environmental and energy standards.*

14 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
15 *that the United States should launch a series of fora around*
16 *the world showcasing the commitment of the United States*
17 *and partners of the United States to high-quality develop-*
18 *ment cooperation, including with respect to the issues de-*
19 *scribed in subsection (a).*

20 **SEC. 113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE.**

21 (a) *FINDINGS.—The Global Infrastructure Coordi-*
22 *nating Committee (GICC) was established to coordinate the*
23 *efforts of the Department of State, the Department of Com-*
24 *merce, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of*
25 *Energy, the Department of Transportation, the United*

1 *States Agency for International Development, the United*
2 *States Trade and Development Agency, the Development Fi-*
3 *nance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United*
4 *States, and other agencies to catalyze private sector invest-*
5 *ments around the world and to coordinate the deployment*
6 *of United States Government technical assistance and devel-*
7 *opment finance tools, including project preparation services*
8 *and commercial advocacy.*

9 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
10 *that—*

11 (1) *the world’s infrastructure needs, including in*
12 *the transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast*
13 *and growing;*

14 (2) *total or partial ownership or acquisition of,*
15 *or a significant financial stake or physical presence*
16 *in, certain types of infrastructure, including ports,*
17 *energy grids, 5G telecommunications networks, and*
18 *undersea cables, can provide an advantage to coun-*
19 *tries that do not share the interests and values of the*
20 *United States and its allies and partners, and could*
21 *therefore be deleterious to the interests and values of*
22 *the United States and its allies and partners;*

23 (3) *the United States must continue to prioritize*
24 *support for infrastructure projects that are physically*

1 *secure, financially viable, economically sustainable,*
2 *and socially responsible;*

3 (4) *achieving the objective outlined in paragraph*
4 (3) *requires the coordination of all United States*
5 *Government economic tools across the interagency, so*
6 *that such tools are deployed in a way to maximize*
7 *United States interests and that of its allies and part-*
8 *ners;*

9 (5) *the GICC represents an important and con-*
10 *crete step towards better communication and coordi-*
11 *nation across the United States Government of eco-*
12 *nomical tools relevant to supporting infrastructure that*
13 *is physically secure, financially viable, economically*
14 *sustainable, and socially responsible, and should be*
15 *continued; and*

16 (6) *the executive branch and Congress should*
17 *have consistent consultations on United States sup-*
18 *port for strategic infrastructure projects, including*
19 *how Congress can support such initiatives in the fu-*
20 *ture.*

21 (c) *REPORTING REQUIREMENT.*—*Not later than 180*
22 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-*
23 *annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in*
24 *coordination with other Federal agencies that participate*
25 *in the GICC, and, as appropriate, the Director of National*

1 *Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of*
2 *Congress a report that identifies—*

3 (1) *current, pending, and future infrastructure*
4 *projects, particularly in the transport, energy, and*
5 *digital sectors, that the United States is supporting or*
6 *will support through financing, foreign assistance,*
7 *technical assistance, or other means;*

8 (2) *a detailed explanation of the United States*
9 *and partner country interests served by the United*
10 *States providing support to such projects; and*

11 (3) *a detailed description of any support pro-*
12 *vided by other United States allies and partners to*
13 *such projects.*

14 (d) *FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-*
15 *section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may*
16 *include a classified annex.*

17 **SEC. 114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSIST-**
18 **ANCE NETWORK.**

19 (a) *AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State is authorized*
20 *to establish an initiative, to be known as the “Infrastructure*
21 *Transaction and Assistance Network”, under which the Sec-*
22 *retary of State, in consultation with other relevant Federal*
23 *agencies, including those represented on the Global Infra-*
24 *structure Coordinating Committee, may carry out various*
25 *programs to advance the development of sustainable, trans-*

1 *parent, and high-quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific*
2 *region by—*

3 (1) *strengthening capacity-building programs to*
4 *improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and*
5 *procurement environments, and project preparation*
6 *capacity of countries that are partners of the United*
7 *States in such development;*

8 (2) *providing transaction advisory services and*
9 *project preparation assistance to support sustainable*
10 *infrastructure; and*

11 (3) *coordinating the provision of United States*
12 *assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-*
13 *cluding infrastructure that utilizes United States-*
14 *manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing in-*
15 *vestment led by the private sector.*

16 (b) *TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the*
17 *“Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” de-*
18 *scribed under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is au-*
19 *thorized to provide support, including through the Trans-*
20 *action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost*
21 *the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and*
22 *assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential*
23 *infrastructure projects, including through providing serv-*
24 *ices such as—*

25 (1) *legal services;*

- 1 (2) *project preparation and feasibility studies;*
- 2 (3) *debt sustainability analyses;*
- 3 (4) *bid or proposal evaluation; and*
- 4 (5) *other services relevant to advancing the devel-*
5 *opment of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality*
6 *infrastructure.*

7 (c) *STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.*——

8 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—As part of the “Infrastructure
9 *Transaction and Assistance Network*” described under
10 *subsection (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to*
11 *provide support, including through the Strategic In-*
12 *frastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project*
13 *preparation, pipeline development, and other infra-*
14 *structure project support.*

15 (2) *JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.*—Funds
16 *authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund*
17 *should be used in coordination with the Department*
18 *of Defense, the International Development Finance*
19 *Corporation, like-minded donor partners, and multi-*
20 *lateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint infra-*
21 *structure projects in the Indo-Pacific region.*

22 (3) *STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.*—
23 *Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure*
24 *Fund should be used to support strategic infrastruc-*
25 *ture projects that are in the national security interest*

1 *tions, or direct state support to state-owned enter-*
2 *prises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;*

3 *(2) pursue strategic support and investment op-*
4 *portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sec-*
5 *tor reforms, to expand the development and deploy-*
6 *ment of advanced energy technologies in developing*
7 *countries;*

8 *(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and*
9 *other financial products on terms that advance do-*
10 *mestic economic and local employment opportunities,*
11 *utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage pri-*
12 *vate sector growth, and, when appropriate United*
13 *States equity and sovereign lending products as alter-*
14 *natives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chi-*
15 *nese financial institutions;*

16 *(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-*
17 *national financial and multilateral institutions to le-*
18 *verage investment in advanced energy technologies in*
19 *developing countries; and*

20 *(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the*
21 *cooperative development of advanced energy tech-*
22 *nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-*
23 *ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the ef-*
24 *fects of energy engagement by the PRC through preda-*

1 *tory lending or other actions that negatively impact*
2 *other countries.*

3 *(c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.—*

4 *Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of*
5 *this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary*
6 *of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall*
7 *submit to the appropriate congressional committees a*
8 *United States Government strategy to increase United*
9 *States exports of advanced energy technologies to—*

10 *(1) improve energy security in allied and devel-*
11 *oping countries;*

12 *(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and trans-*
13 *parent energy markets;*

14 *(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy*
15 *trading relationships; and*

16 *(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.*

17 **SEC. 116. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S**

18 **INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVEL-**

19 **OPMENT.**

20 *(a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the*
21 *date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter*
22 *for five years, the Administrator of the United States Agen-*
23 *cy for International Development, in consultation with the*
24 *Secretary of State through the Assistant Secretary for En-*

1 *ergy Resources, shall submit to the appropriate congres-*
2 *sional committees a report that—*

3 (1) *identifies priority countries for deepening*
4 *United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-*
5 *cordance with the economic and national security in-*
6 *terests of the United States and where deeper energy*
7 *partnerships are most achievable;*

8 (2) *describes the involvement of the PRC govern-*
9 *ment and companies incorporated in the PRC in the*
10 *development, operation, financing, or ownership of*
11 *energy generation facilities, transmission infrastruc-*
12 *ture, or energy resources in the countries identified in*
13 *paragraph (1);*

14 (3) *evaluates strategic or security concerns and*
15 *implications for United States national interests and*
16 *the interests of the countries identified in paragraph*
17 *(1), with respect to the PRC's involvement and influ-*
18 *ence in developing country energy production or*
19 *transmission; and*

20 (4) *outlines current and planned efforts by the*
21 *United States to partner with the countries identified*
22 *in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support*
23 *shared interests between the United States and such*
24 *countries.*

1 (b) *PUBLICATION.*—*The assessment required in sub-*
 2 *section (a) shall be published on the United States Agency*
 3 *for International Development’s website.*

4 ***Subtitle C—Digital Technology and***
 5 ***Connectivity***

6 ***SEC. 121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY***
 7 ***ISSUES.***

8 (a) *LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SET-*
 9 *TING.*—*It is the sense of Congress that the United States*
 10 *must lead in international bodies that set the governance*
 11 *norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies*
 12 *in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a*
 13 *free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.*

14 (b) *COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.*—*It is*
 15 *the sense of Congress that the United States, along with al-*
 16 *lies and partners, should lead an international effort that*
 17 *utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its dis-*
 18 *posal to combat the expanding use of information and com-*
 19 *munications technology products and services to surveil, re-*
 20 *press, and manipulate populations (also known as “digital*
 21 *authoritarianism”).*

22 (c) *NEGOTIATIONS FOR DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS*
 23 *OR ARRANGEMENTS.*—*It is the sense of Congress that the*
 24 *United States Trade Representative should negotiate bilat-*
 25 *eral and plurilateral agreements or arrangements relating*

1 to digital goods with the European Union, Japan, Taiwan,
2 the member countries of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing
3 alliance, and other nations, as appropriate.

4 (d) *FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL*
5 *AGE.*—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
6 should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-
7 mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish
8 information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained
9 as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral
10 mechanism for communication.

11 (e) *EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOP-*
12 *MENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OR*
13 *HUMAN RIGHTS.*—It is the sense of Congress that the
14 United States should lead a global effort to develop and
15 adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical
16 technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies can-
17 not be abused by malign actors, whether they are govern-
18 ments or other entities, and that they do not threaten demo-
19 cratic governance or human rights.

20 (f) *FORMATION OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY TRADE AL-*
21 *LIANCE.*—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
22 should examine opportunities for diplomatic negotiations
23 regarding the formation of mutually beneficial alliances re-
24 lating to digitally-enabled technologies and services.

1 **SEC. 122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY**
2 **PARTNERSHIP.**

3 (a) *DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY*
4 *PARTNERSHIP.*—*The Secretary of State is authorized to es-*
5 *tablish a program, to be known as the “Digital Connectivity*
6 *and Cybersecurity Partnership” to help foreign countries—*

7 (1) *expand and increase secure Internet access*
8 *and digital infrastructure in emerging markets;*

9 (2) *protect technological assets, including data;*

10 (3) *adopt policies and regulatory positions that*
11 *foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and*
12 *secure internet, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder*
13 *models of internet governance, and pro-competitive*
14 *and secure information and communications tech-*
15 *nology (ICT) policies and regulations;*

16 (4) *promote exports of United States ICT goods*
17 *and services and increase United States company*
18 *market share in target markets;*

19 (5) *promote the diversification of ICT goods and*
20 *supply chain services to be less reliant on PRC im-*
21 *ports; and*

22 (6) *build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-*
23 *operability, and promote best practices for a national*
24 *approach to cybersecurity.*

25 (b) *IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.*—*Not later than 180 days*
26 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary*

1 *of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-*
2 *gress an implementation plan for the coming year to ad-*
3 *vance the goals identified in subsection (a).*

4 *(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the action plan re-*
5 *quired by subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall consult*
6 *with—*

7 *(1) the appropriate congressional committees;*

8 *(2) leaders of the United States industry;*

9 *(3) other relevant technology experts, including*
10 *the Open Technology Fund;*

11 *(4) representatives from relevant United States*
12 *Government agencies; and*

13 *(5) representatives from like-minded allies and*
14 *partners.*

15 *(d) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later*
16 *than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,*
17 *and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State*
18 *shall provide the appropriate congressional committees a*
19 *briefing on the implementation of the plan required by sub-*
20 *section (b).*

21 *(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
22 *authorized to be appropriated \$100,000,000 for each of fis-*
23 *cal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.*

1 **SEC. 123. STRATEGY FOR DIGITAL INVESTMENT BY UNITED**
2 **STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FI-**
3 **NANCE CORPORATION.**

4 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than one year after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the United States Inter-
6 national Development Finance Corporation, in consulta-
7 tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency
8 for International Development, shall submit to the appro-
9 priate congressional committees a strategy for support of
10 private sector digital investment that—

11 (1) *includes support for information-connectivity*
12 *projects, including projects relating to telecommuni-*
13 *cations equipment, mobile payments, smart cities,*
14 *and undersea cables;*

15 (2) *in providing such support, prioritizes private*
16 *sector projects—*

17 (A) *of strategic value to the United States;*

18 (B) *of mutual strategic value to the United*
19 *States and allies and partners of the United*
20 *States; and*

21 (C) *that will advance broader development*
22 *priorities of the United States; and*

23 (3) *helps to bridge the digital gap in less devel-*
24 *oped countries and among women and minority com-*
25 *munities within those countries;*

1 (4) *facilitates coordination, where appropriate,*
 2 *with multilateral development banks and development*
 3 *finance institutions of other countries with respect to*
 4 *projects described in paragraph (1), including*
 5 *through the provision of co-financing and co-guaran-*
 6 *tees; and*

7 (5) *identifies the human and financial resources*
 8 *available to dedicate to such projects and assesses any*
 9 *constraints to implementing such projects.*

10 **(b) LIMITATION.—**

11 (1) **IN GENERAL.—***The Corporation may not*
 12 *provide support for projects in which entities de-*
 13 *scribed in paragraph (2) participate.*

14 (2) **ENTITIES DESCRIBED.—***An entity described*
 15 *in this subparagraph is an entity based in, or owned*
 16 *or controlled by the government of, a country, includ-*
 17 *ing the People’s Republic of China, that does not pro-*
 18 *tect internet freedom of expression and privacy.*

19 ***Subtitle D—Countering Chinese***
 20 ***Communist Party Malign Influence***

21 **SECTION 131. SHORT TITLE.**

22 *This subtitle may be cited as the “Countering Chinese*
 23 *Communist Party Malign Influence Act”.*

1 **SEC. 132. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUN-**
2 **TERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.**

3 (a) *COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.*—There
4 is authorized to be appropriated \$300,000,000 for each of
5 fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering Chinese
6 Influence Fund to counter the malign influence of the Chi-
7 nese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated
8 pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain
9 available until expended and shall be in addition to
10 amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to counter
11 such influence.

12 (b) *CONSULTATION REQUIRED.*—The obligation of
13 funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter
14 the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party glob-
15 ally shall be subject to prior consultation with, and con-
16 sistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
17 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification proce-
18 dures of—

19 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations and the*
20 *Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and*

21 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the*
22 *Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-*
23 *resentatives.*

24 (c) *POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND AP-*
25 *PROVAL.*—

1 (1) *COORDINATOR.*—*The Secretary of State shall*
2 *designate an existing senior official of the Department*
3 *at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide*
4 *policy guidance, coordination, and approval for the*
5 *obligation of funds authorized pursuant to subsection*
6 *(a).*

7 (2) *DUTIES.*—*The senior official designated pur-*
8 *suant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—*

9 (A) *on an annual basis, the identification of*
10 *specific strategic priorities for using the funds*
11 *authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a),*
12 *such as geographic areas of focus or functional*
13 *categories of programming that funds are to be*
14 *concentrated within, consistent with the national*
15 *interests of the United States and the purposes*
16 *of this Act;*

17 (B) *the coordination and approval of all*
18 *programming conducted using the funds author-*
19 *ized to be appropriated by subsection (a), based*
20 *on a determination that such programming di-*
21 *rectly counters the malign influence of the Chi-*
22 *nese Communist Party, including specific activi-*
23 *ties or policies advanced by the Chinese Com-*
24 *munist Party, pursuant to the strategic objec-*
25 *tives of the United States, as established in the*

1 *2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 Na-*
2 *tional Defense Strategy, and other relevant na-*
3 *tional and regional strategies as appropriate;*

4 (C) *ensuring that all programming ap-*
5 *proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such*
6 *acts by the Chinese Communist Party described*
7 *in subsection (d) and adheres to the requirements*
8 *outlined in subsection (e); and*

9 (D) *conducting oversight, monitoring, and*
10 *evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-*
11 *ming conducted using the funds authorized to be*
12 *appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure that it*
13 *advances United States interests and degrades*
14 *the ability of the Chinese Communist Party, to*
15 *advance activities that align with subsection (d)*
16 *of this section.*

17 (3) *INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior*
18 *official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall,*
19 *in coordinating and approving programming pursu-*
20 *ant to paragraph (2), seek to—*

21 (A) *conduct appropriate interagency con-*
22 *sultation; and*

23 (B) *ensure, to the maximum extent prac-*
24 *ticable, that all approved programming functions*
25 *in concert with other Federal activities to*

1 *counter the malign influence and activities of the*
2 *Chinese Communist Party.*

3 (4) *ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.*—*The Adminis-*
4 *trator of the United States Agency for International*
5 *Development shall designate a senior official at the*
6 *rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist*
7 *and consult with the senior official designated pursu-*
8 *ant to paragraph (1).*

9 (d) *MALIGN INFLUENCE.*—*In this section, the term*
10 *“malign influence” with respect to the Chinese Communist*
11 *Party should be construed to include acts conducted by the*
12 *Chinese Communist Party or entities acting on its behalf*
13 *that—*

14 (1) *undermine a free and open international*
15 *order;*

16 (2) *advance an alternative, repressive inter-*
17 *national order that bolsters the Chinese Communist*
18 *Party’s hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by*
19 *coercion and dependency;*

20 (3) *undermine the national security or sov-*
21 *ereignty of the United States or other countries; or*

22 (4) *undermine the economic security of the*
23 *United States or other countries, including by pro-*
24 *moting corruption.*

1 (e) *COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.*—*In this sec-*
2 *tion, countering malign influence through the use of funds*
3 *authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall in-*
4 *clude efforts to—*

5 (1) *promote transparency and accountability,*
6 *and reduce corruption, including in governance struc-*
7 *tures targeted by the malign influence of the Chinese*
8 *Communist Party;*

9 (2) *support civil society and independent media*
10 *to raise awareness of and increase transparency re-*
11 *garding the negative impact of activities related to*
12 *the Belt and Road Initiative and associated initia-*
13 *tives;*

14 (3) *counter transnational criminal networks that*
15 *benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the*
16 *Chinese Communist Party;*

17 (4) *encourage economic development structures*
18 *that help protect against predatory lending schemes,*
19 *including support for market-based alternatives in*
20 *key economic sectors, such as digital economy, energy,*
21 *and infrastructure;*

22 (5) *counter activities that provide undue influ-*
23 *ence to the security forces of the People’s Republic of*
24 *China;*

1 (6) *expose misinformation and disinformation of*
2 *the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda, includ-*
3 *ing through programs carried out by the Global En-*
4 *gagement Center; and*

5 (7) *counter efforts by the Chinese Communist*
6 *Party to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology*
7 *and governance models.*

8 **SEC. 133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE**
9 **AND MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.**

10 (a) *FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

11 (1) *In the report to Congress required under sec-*
12 *tion 1261(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense*
13 *Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law*
14 *115–232), the President laid out a broad range of ma-*
15 *lign activities conducted by the Government of the*
16 *People’s Republic of China and its agents and enti-*
17 *ties, including—*

18 (A) *propaganda and disinformation, in*
19 *which “Beijing communicates its narrative*
20 *through state-run television, print, radio, and*
21 *online organizations whose presence is prolifer-*
22 *ating in the United States and around the*
23 *world”;*

24 (B) *malign political influence operations,*
25 *particularly “front organizations and agents*

1 *which target businesses, universities, think tanks,*
2 *scholars, journalists, and local state and Federal*
3 *officials in the United States and around the*
4 *world, attempting to influence discourse”;* and

5 (C) *malign financial influence operations,*
6 *characterized as the “misappropriation of tech-*
7 *nology and intellectual property, failure to ap-*
8 *propriately disclose relationships with foreign*
9 *government sponsored entities, breaches of con-*
10 *tract and confidentiality, and manipulation of*
11 *processes for fair and merit-based allocation of*
12 *Federal research and development funding”.*

13 (2) *Chinese information warfare and malign in-*
14 *fluence operations are ongoing. In January 2019,*
15 *then-Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats,*
16 *stated, “China will continue to use legal, political,*
17 *and economic levers—such as the lure of Chinese mar-*
18 *kets—to shape the information environment. It is also*
19 *capable of using cyber attacks against systems in the*
20 *United States to censor or suppress viewpoints it*
21 *deems politically sensitive.”.*

22 (3) *In February 2020, then-Director of the Fed-*
23 *eral Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testi-*
24 *fied to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House*
25 *of Representatives that the People’s Republic of China*

1 has “very active [malign] foreign influence efforts in
2 this country,” with the goal of “trying to shift our
3 policy and our public opinion to be more pro-China
4 on a variety of issues”.

5 (4) *The PRC’s information warfare and malign*
6 *influence operations continue to adopt new tactics*
7 *and evolve in sophistication. In May 2020, then-Spe-*
8 *cial Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engage-*
9 *ment Center (GEC), Lea Gabrielle, stated that there*
10 *was a convergence of Russian and Chinese narratives*
11 *surrounding COVID–19 and that the GEC had “un-*
12 *covered a new network of inauthentic Twitter ac-*
13 *counts” that it assessed was “created with the intent*
14 *to amplify Chinese propaganda and disinformation”.*
15 *In June 2020, Google reported that Chinese hackers*
16 *attempted to access email accounts of the campaign*
17 *staff of a presidential candidate.*

18 (5) *Chinese information warfare and malign in-*
19 *fluence operations are a threat to the national secu-*
20 *rity, democracy, and economic systems of the United*
21 *States and its allies and partners. In October 2018,*
22 *Vice President Michael R. Pence warned that “Bei-*
23 *jing is employing a whole-of-government approach,*
24 *using political, economic, and military tools, as well*

1 *as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit*
2 *its interests in the United States.”.*

3 (6) *In February 2018, then-Director of the Fed-*
4 *eral Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testi-*
5 *fied to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the*
6 *Senate that the People’s Republic of China is taking*
7 *advantage of and exploiting the open research and de-*
8 *velopment environments of United States institutions*
9 *of higher education to utilize “professors, scientists*
10 *and students” as “nontraditional collectors” of infor-*
11 *mation.*

12 (b) *PRESIDENTIAL DUTIES.—The President shall—*

13 (1) *protect our democratic institutions and proc-*
14 *esses from malign influence from the People’s Repub-*
15 *lic of China and other foreign adversaries; and*

16 (2) *consistent with the policy specified in para-*
17 *graph (1), direct the heads of the appropriate Federal*
18 *departments and agencies to implement Acts of Con-*
19 *gress to counter and deter PRC and other foreign in-*
20 *formation warfare and malign influence operations*
21 *without delay, including—*

22 (A) *section 1043 of the John S. McCain Na-*
23 *tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year*
24 *2019 (Public Law 115–232), which authorizes a*
25 *coordinator position within the National Secu-*

1 *rity Council for countering malign foreign influ-*
2 *ence operations and campaigns;*

3 *(B) section 228 of the National Defense Au-*
4 *thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public*
5 *Law 116–92), which authorizes additional re-*
6 *search of foreign malign influence operations on*
7 *social media platforms;*

8 *(C) section 847 of such Act, which requires*
9 *the Secretary of Defense to modify contracting*
10 *regulations regarding vetting for foreign owner-*
11 *ship, control and influence in order to mitigate*
12 *risks from malign foreign influence;*

13 *(D) section 1239 of such Act, which requires*
14 *an update of the comprehensive strategy to*
15 *counter the threat of malign influence to include*
16 *the People’s Republic of China;*

17 *(E) section 5323 of such Act, which author-*
18 *izes the Director of National Intelligence to fa-*
19 *cilitate the establishment of Social Media Data*
20 *and Threat Analysis Center to detect and study*
21 *information warfare and malign influence oper-*
22 *ations across social media platforms; and*

23 *(F) section 119C of the National Security*
24 *Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes*
25 *the establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence*

1 *Response Center inside the Office of the Director*
2 *of National Intelligence.*

3 **SEC. 134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE**
4 **FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.**

5 *There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year*
6 *period beginning on October 1, 2021, \$105,500,000, to pro-*
7 *mote education, training, research, and foreign language*
8 *skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance*
9 *with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural*
10 *Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).*

11 **SEC. 135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN**
12 **RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION.**

13 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

14 *(1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pandemic,*
15 *crimes and discrimination against Asians and those*
16 *of Asian descent have risen dramatically worldwide.*
17 *In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-General An-*
18 *tonio Guterres said “the pandemic continues to un-*
19 *leash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating*
20 *and scare-mongering” and urged governments to “act*
21 *now to strengthen the immunity of our societies*
22 *against the virus of hate”.*

23 *(2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI)*
24 *workers make up a large portion of the essential*
25 *workers on the frontlines of the COVID–19 pandemic,*

1 *making up 8.5 percent of all essential healthcare*
2 *workers in the United States. AAPI workers also*
3 *make up a large share—between 6 percent and 12*
4 *percent based on sector—of the biomedical field.*

5 *(3) The United States Census notes that Ameri-*
6 *cans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 per-*
7 *cent of the United States population in 2019, and*
8 *that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial*
9 *group in the United States, projected to represent 14*
10 *percent of the United States population by 2065.*

11 *(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
12 *that—*

13 *(1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian*
14 *descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian senti-*
15 *ment and racism in the United States and around the*
16 *world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and toler-*
17 *ant world;*

18 *(2) the United States is a diverse nation with a*
19 *proud tradition of immigration, and the strength and*
20 *vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the di-*
21 *verse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens,*
22 *including Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders;*

23 *(3) the United States Government should encour-*
24 *age other foreign governments to use the official and*
25 *scientific names for the COVID–19 pandemic, as rec-*

1 *ommended by the World Health Organization and the*
2 *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and*

3 *(4) the United States Government and other gov-*
4 *ernments around the world must actively oppose rac-*
5 *ism and intolerance, and use all available and appro-*
6 *priate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian racism*
7 *and discrimination.*

8 **SEC. 136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN-**
9 **TERING DISINFORMATION.**

10 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

11 *(1) The PRC is increasing its spending on pub-*
12 *lic diplomacy including influence campaigns, adver-*
13 *tising, and investments into state-sponsored media*
14 *publications outside of the PRC. These include, for ex-*
15 *ample, more than \$10,000,000,000 in foreign direct*
16 *investment in communications infrastructure, plat-*
17 *forms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists*
18 *to the PRC for training programs.*

19 *(2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the*
20 *United Front Work Department (UFWD), and*
21 *UFWD's many affiliates and proxies, has obtained*
22 *unfettered access to radio, television, and digital dis-*
23 *semination platforms in numerous languages targeted*
24 *at citizens in other regions where the PRC has an in-*
25 *terest in promoting public sentiment in support of the*

1 *Chinese Communist Party and expanding the reach of*
2 *its misleading narratives and propaganda.*

3 (3) *Even in Western democracies, the PRC*
4 *spends extensively on influence operations, such as a*
5 *\$500,000,000 advertising campaign to attract cable*
6 *viewers in Australia and a more than \$20,000,000*
7 *campaign to influence United States public opinion*
8 *via the China Daily newspaper supplement.*

9 (4) *Radio Free Asia (referred to in this sub-*
10 *section as “RFA”), a private nonprofit multimedia*
11 *news corporation, which broadcasts in 9 East Asian*
12 *languages including Mandarin, Uyghur, Cantonese,*
13 *and Tibetan, has succeeded in its mission to reach*
14 *audiences in China and in the Central Asia region*
15 *despite the Chinese Government’s—*

16 (A) *efforts to practice “media sovereignty,”*
17 *which restricts access to the free press within*
18 *China; and*

19 (B) *campaign to spread disinformation to*
20 *countries abroad.*

21 (5) *In 2019, RFA’s Uyghur Service alerted the*
22 *world to the human rights abuses of Uyghur and*
23 *other ethnic minorities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur*
24 *Autonomous Region.*

1 (6) *Gulchehra Hoja, a Uyghur journalist for*
2 *RFA, received the International Women’s Media*
3 *Foundation’s Courage in Journalism Award and a*
4 *2019 Magnitsky Human Rights Award for her cov-*
5 *erage of Xinjiang, while the Chinese Government de-*
6 *tained and harassed Ms. Hoja’s China-based family*
7 *and the families of 7 other RFA journalists in retal-*
8 *iation for their role in exposing abuses.*

9 (7) *In 2019 and 2020, RFA provided widely dis-*
10 *seminated print and digital coverage of the decline in*
11 *freedom in Hong Kong and the student-led protests of*
12 *the extradition law.*

13 (8) *In March 2020, RFA exposed efforts by the*
14 *Chinese Government to underreport the number of fa-*
15 *talities from the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan*
16 *Province, China.*

17 (b) *THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR GLOBAL*
18 *MEDIA.—The United States Agency for Global Media*
19 *(USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal entities*
20 *shall undertake the following actions to support inde-*
21 *pendent journalism, counter disinformation, and combat*
22 *surveillance in countries where the Chinese Communist*
23 *Party and other malign actors are promoting*
24 *disinformation, propaganda, and manipulated media mar-*
25 *kets:*

1 (1) *Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand domes-*
2 *tic coverage and digital programming for all RFA*
3 *China services and other affiliate language broad-*
4 *casting services.*

5 (2) *USAGM shall increase funding for RFA's*
6 *Mandarin, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Cantonese language*
7 *services.*

8 (3) *Voice of America shall establish a real-time*
9 *disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for*
10 *Russian language propaganda and misinformation.*

11 (4) *USAGM shall expand existing training and*
12 *partnership programs that promote journalistic*
13 *standards, investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and*
14 *digital analytics to help expose and counter false CCP*
15 *narratives.*

16 (5) *The Open Technology Fund shall continue*
17 *and expand its work to support tools and technology*
18 *to circumvent censorship and surveillance by the*
19 *CCP, both inside the PRC as well as abroad where the*
20 *PRC has exported censorship technology, and increase*
21 *secure peer-to-peer connectivity and privacy tools.*

22 (6) *Voice of America shall continue and review*
23 *opportunities to expand its mission of providing*
24 *timely, accurate, and reliable news, programming,*

1 *and content about the United States, including news,*
2 *culture, and values.*

3 *(7) The networks and grantees of the United*
4 *States Agency for Global Media shall continue their*
5 *mission of providing credible and timely news cov-*
6 *erage inclusive of the People’s Republic of China’s ac-*
7 *tivities in Xinjiang, including China’s ongoing geno-*
8 *cide and crimes against humanity with respect to*
9 *Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, including*
10 *through strategic amplification of Radio Free Asia’s*
11 *coverage, in its news programming in majority-Mus-*
12 *lim countries.*

13 *(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
14 *authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022*
15 *through 2026 for the United States Agency for Global*
16 *Media, \$100,000,000 for ongoing and new programs to sup-*
17 *port local media, build independent media, combat Chinese*
18 *disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in tech-*
19 *nology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate*
20 *these programs, of which—*

21 *(1) not less than \$70,000,000 shall be directed to*
22 *a grant to Radio Free Asia language services;*

23 *(2) not less than \$20,000,000 shall be used to*
24 *serve populations in China through Mandarin, Can-*
25 *tonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language services; and*

1 (3) *not less than \$5,500,000 shall be used for dig-*
2 *ital media services—*

3 (A) *to counter propaganda of non-Chinese*
4 *populations in foreign countries; and*

5 (B) *to counter propaganda of Chinese popu-*
6 *lations in China through “Global Mandarin”*
7 *programming.*

8 (d) *REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—*

9 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
10 *the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually*
11 *thereafter for 5 years, the Chief Executive Office of the*
12 *United States Agency for Global Media, in consulta-*
13 *tion with the President of the Open Technology Fund,*
14 *shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional*
15 *committees that outlines—*

16 (A) *the amount of funding appropriated*
17 *pursuant to subsection (c) that was provided to*
18 *the Open Technology Fund for purposes of cir-*
19 *cumventing Chinese Communist Party censor-*
20 *ship of the internet within the borders of the Peo-*
21 *ple’s Republic of China;*

22 (B) *the progress that has been made in de-*
23 *veloping the technology referred to in subpara-*
24 *graph (A), including an assessment of whether*
25 *the funding provided was sufficient to achieve*

1 *meaningful penetration of People's Republic of*
2 *China's censors; and*

3 *(C) the impact of Open Technology Fund*
4 *tools on piercing Chinese Communist Party*
5 *internet censorship efforts, including the metrics*
6 *used to measure that impact and the trajectory*
7 *of that impact over the previous 5 years.*

8 *(2) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required*
9 *under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassi-*
10 *fied form, but may include a classified annex.*

11 *(e) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of*
12 *State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for*
13 *Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordination*
14 *with the Administrator of the United States Agency for*
15 *International Development, shall support and train jour-*
16 *nalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure pub-*
17 *lic accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative,*
18 *the PRC's surveillance and digital export of technology, and*
19 *other influence operations abroad direct or directly sup-*
20 *ported by the Communist Party or the Chinese government.*

21 *(f) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau of*
22 *Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to*
23 *support internet freedom programs.*

24 *(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
25 *authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State,*

1 *for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, \$170,000,000*
2 *for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom,*
3 *training, and protection of journalists.*

4 **SEC. 137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.**

5 (a) *FINDING.*—*Congress established the Global Engage-*
6 *ment Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts” of the*
7 *Federal Government to “recognize, understand, expose, and*
8 *counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and*
9 *disinformation globally”.*

10 (b) *EXTENSION.*—*Section 1287(j) of the National De-*
11 *fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C.*
12 *2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that is 8 years*
13 *after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting*
14 *“December 31, 2027”.*

15 (c) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
16 *that the Global Engagement Center should expand its co-*
17 *ordinating capacity through the exchange of liaison officers*
18 *with Federal departments and agencies that manage aspects*
19 *of identifying and countering foreign disinformation, in-*
20 *cluding the National Counterterrorism Center at the Office*
21 *of the Director of National Intelligence and from combatant*
22 *commands.*

23 (d) *HIRING AUTHORITY.*—*Notwithstanding any other*
24 *provision of law, the Secretary of State, during the five year*
25 *period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act*

1 *and solely to carry out functions of the Global Engagement*
2 *Center, may—*

3 *(1) appoint employees without regard to the pro-*
4 *visions of title 5, United States Code, regarding ap-*
5 *pointments in the competitive service; and*

6 *(2) fix the basic compensation of such employees*
7 *without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of*
8 *chapter 53 of such title regarding classification and*
9 *General Schedule pay rates.*

10 *(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
11 *authorized to be appropriated \$150,000,000 for fiscal year*
12 *2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign*
13 *state and non-state sponsored propaganda and*
14 *disinformation.*

15 **SEC. 138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVEST-**
16 **MENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN**
17 **FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH IN-**
18 **STITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.**

19 *(a) AMENDMENTS TO DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF*
20 *1950.—*

21 *(1) DEFINITION OF COVERED TRANSACTION.—*
22 *Subsection (a)(4) of section 721 of the Defense Pro-*
23 *duction Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565) is amended—*

24 *(A) in subparagraph (A)—*

1 *(i) in clause (i), by striking “; and”*
2 *and inserting a semicolon;*

3 *(ii) in clause (ii), by striking the pe-*
4 *riod at the end and inserting “; and”; and*

5 *(iii) by adding at the end the fol-*
6 *lowing:*

7 *“(iii) any transaction described in*
8 *subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending*
9 *after the date of the enactment of the China*
10 *Strategic Competition Act of 2021.”;*

11 *(B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the*
12 *end the following:*

13 *“(vi) Any gift to an institution of*
14 *higher education from a foreign person, or*
15 *the entry into a contract by such an institu-*
16 *tion with a foreign person, if—*

17 *“(I)(aa) the value of the gift or*
18 *contract equals or exceeds \$1,000,000;*

19 *or*

20 *“(bb) the institution receives, di-*
21 *rectly or indirectly, more than one gift*
22 *from or enters into more than one con-*
23 *tract, directly or indirectly, with the*
24 *same foreign person for the same pur-*
25 *pose the aggregate value of which, dur-*

1 *ing the period of 2 consecutive cal-*
 2 *endar years, equals or exceeds*
 3 *\$1,000,000; and*

4 *“(II) the gift or contract—*

5 *“(aa) relates to research, de-*
 6 *velopment, or production of crit-*
 7 *ical technologies and provides the*
 8 *foreign person potential access to*
 9 *any material nonpublic technical*
 10 *information (as defined in sub-*
 11 *paragraph (D)(ii)) in the posses-*
 12 *sion of the institution; or*

13 *“(bb) is a restricted or condi-*
 14 *tional gift or contract (as defined*
 15 *in section 117(h) of the Higher*
 16 *Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.*
 17 *1011f(h))) that establishes con-*
 18 *trol.”; and*

19 *(C) by adding at the end the following:*

20 *“(G) FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS*
 21 *WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—*

22 *For purposes of subparagraph (B)(vi):*

23 *“(i) CONTRACT.—The term ‘contract’*
 24 *means any agreement for the acquisition by*
 25 *purchase, lease, or barter of property or*

1 *services by a foreign person, for the direct*
2 *benefit or use of either of the parties.*

3 “(ii) *GIFT.*—*The term ‘gift’ means any*
4 *gift of money or property.*

5 “(iii) *INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDU-*
6 *CATION.*—*The term ‘institution of higher*
7 *education’ means any institution, public or*
8 *private, or, if a multicampus institution,*
9 *any single campus of such institution, in*
10 *any State—*

11 “(I) *that is legally authorized*
12 *within such State to provide a pro-*
13 *gram of education beyond secondary*
14 *school;*

15 “(II) *that provides a program for*
16 *which the institution awards a bach-*
17 *elor’s degree (or provides not less than*
18 *a 2-year program which is acceptable*
19 *for full credit toward such a degree) or*
20 *a more advanced degree;*

21 “(III) *that is accredited by a na-*
22 *tionally recognized accrediting agency*
23 *or association; and*

24 “(IV) *to which the Federal Gov-*
25 *ernment extends Federal financial as-*

1 *sistance (directly or indirectly through*
2 *another entity or person), or that re-*
3 *ceives support from the extension of*
4 *Federal financial assistance to any of*
5 *the institution’s subunits.”.*

6 (2) *MANDATORY DECLARATIONS.*—*Subsection*
7 *(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by*
8 *adding at the end the following: “Such regulations*
9 *shall require a declaration under this subclause with*
10 *respect to a covered transaction described in sub-*
11 *section (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).”.*

12 (3) *FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.*—*Subsection*
13 *(f) of such section is amended—*

14 (A) *in paragraph (10), by striking “; and”*
15 *and inserting a semicolon;*

16 (B) *by redesignating paragraph (11) as*
17 *paragraph (12); and*

18 (C) *by inserting after paragraph (10) the*
19 *following:*

20 *“(11) as appropriate, and particularly with re-*
21 *spect to covered transactions described in subsection*
22 *(a)(4)(B)(vi), the importance of academic freedom at*
23 *institutions of higher education in the United States;*
24 *and”.*

1 (4) *MEMBERSHIP OF CFIUS.*—Subsection (k) of
2 such section is amended—

3 (A) in paragraph (2)—

4 (i) by redesignating subparagraphs
5 (H), (I), and (J) as subparagraphs (I), (J),
6 and (K), respectively; and

7 (ii) by inserting after subparagraph
8 (G) the following:

9 “(H) In the case of a covered transaction
10 involving an institution of higher education (as
11 defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary of
12 Education.”; and

13 (B) by adding at the end the following:

14 “(8) *INCLUSION OF OTHER AGENCIES ON COM-*
15 *MITTEE.*—In considering including on the Committee
16 under paragraph (2)(K) the heads of other executive
17 departments, agencies, or offices, the President shall
18 give due consideration to the heads of relevant re-
19 search and science agencies, departments, and offices,
20 including the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
21 ices, the Director of the National Institutes of Health,
22 and the Director of the National Science Founda-
23 tion.”.

1 (5) *CONTENTS OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING TO*
2 *CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.*—*Subsection (m)(3) of such*
3 *section is amended—*

4 (A) *in subparagraph (B), by striking “;*
5 *and” and inserting a semicolon;*

6 (B) *in subparagraph (C), by striking the*
7 *period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and*

8 (C) *by adding at the end the following:*

9 “(D) *an evaluation of whether there are for-*
10 *foreign malign influence or espionage activities di-*
11 *rected or directly assisted by foreign governments*
12 *against institutions of higher education (as de-*
13 *fined in subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed at obtain-*
14 *ing research and development methods or secrets*
15 *related to critical technologies; and*

16 “(E) *an evaluation of, and recommendation*
17 *for any changes to, reviews conducted under this*
18 *section that relate to institutions of higher edu-*
19 *cation, based on an analysis of disclosure reports*
20 *submitted to the chairperson under section*
21 *117(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20*
22 *U.S.C. 1011f(a)).”.*

23 (b) *INCLUSION OF CFIUS IN REPORTING ON FOREIGN*
24 *GIFTS UNDER HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965.*—*Section*

1 *117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f)*
2 *is amended—*

3 *(1) in subsection (a), by inserting after “the Sec-*
4 *retary” the following: “and the Secretary of the*
5 *Treasury (in the capacity of the Secretary as the*
6 *chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Investment*
7 *in the United States under section 721(k)(3) of the*
8 *Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.*
9 *4565(k)(3))”;* and

10 *(2) in subsection (d)—*

11 *(A) in paragraph (1)—*

12 *(i) by striking “with the Secretary”*
13 *and inserting “with the Secretary and the*
14 *Secretary of the Treasury”;* and

15 *(ii) by striking “to the Secretary” and*
16 *inserting “to each such Secretary”;* and

17 *(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “with the*
18 *Secretary” and inserting “with the Secretary*
19 *and the Secretary of the Treasury”.*

20 *(c) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend-*
21 *ments made by subsection (a) shall—*

22 *(1) take effect on the date of the enactment of*
23 *this Act, subject to the requirements of subsections (d)*
24 *and (e); and*

1 (2) *apply with respect to any covered trans-*
2 *action the review or investigation of which is initi-*
3 *ated under section 721 of the Defense Production Act*
4 *of 1950 on or after the date that is 30 days after the*
5 *publication in the Federal Register of the notice re-*
6 *quired under subsection (e)(2).*

7 (d) *REGULATIONS.—*

8 (1) *IN GENERAL.—The Committee on Foreign*
9 *Investment in the United States (in this section re-*
10 *ferred to as the “Committee”), which shall include the*
11 *Secretary of Education for purposes of this subsection,*
12 *shall prescribe regulations as necessary and appro-*
13 *priate to implement the amendments made by sub-*
14 *section (a).*

15 (2) *ELEMENTS.—The regulations prescribed*
16 *under paragraph (1) shall include—*

17 (A) *regulations accounting for the burden*
18 *on institutions of higher education likely to re-*
19 *sult from compliance with the amendments made*
20 *by subsection (a), including structuring penalties*
21 *and filing fees to reduce such burdens, shortening*
22 *timelines for reviews and investigations, allow-*
23 *ing for simplified and streamlined declaration*
24 *and notice requirements, and implementing any*

1 *procedures necessary to protect academic free-*
2 *dom; and*

3 *(B) guidance with respect to—*

4 *(i) which gifts and contracts described*
5 *in described in clause (vi)(II)(aa) of sub-*
6 *section (a)(4)(B) of section 721 of the De-*
7 *fense Production Act of 1950, as added by*
8 *subsection (a)(1), would be subject to filing*
9 *mandatory declarations under subsection*
10 *(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV) of that section; and*

11 *(ii) the meaning of “control”, as de-*
12 *finied in subsection (a) of that section, as*
13 *that term applies to covered transactions*
14 *described in clause (vi) of paragraph (4)(B)*
15 *of that section, as added by subsection*
16 *(a)(1).*

17 *(3) ISSUANCE OF FINAL RULE.—The Committee*
18 *shall issue a final rule to carry out the amendments*
19 *made by subsection (a) after assessing the findings of*
20 *the pilot program required by subsection (e).*

21 *(e) PILOT PROGRAM.—*

22 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that is*
23 *30 days after the publication in the Federal Register*
24 *of the matter required by paragraph (2) and ending*
25 *on the date that is 570 days thereafter, the Committee*

1 *shall conduct a pilot program to assess methods for*
2 *implementing the review of covered transactions de-*
3 *scribed in clause (vi) of section 721(a)(4)(B) of the*
4 *Defense Production Act of 1950, as added by sub-*
5 *section (a)(1).*

6 (2) *PROPOSED DETERMINATION.—Not later than*
7 *270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,*
8 *the Committee shall, in consultation with the Sec-*
9 *retary of Education, publish in the Federal Reg-*
10 *ister—*

11 (A) *a proposed determination of the scope of*
12 *and procedures for the pilot program required by*
13 *paragraph (1);*

14 (B) *an assessment of the burden on institu-*
15 *tions of higher education likely to result from*
16 *compliance with the pilot program;*

17 (C) *recommendations for addressing any*
18 *such burdens, including shortening timelines for*
19 *reviews and investigations, structuring penalties*
20 *and filing fees, and simplifying and stream-*
21 *lining declaration and notice requirements to re-*
22 *duce such burdens; and*

23 (D) *any procedures necessary to ensure that*
24 *the pilot program does not infringe upon aca-*
25 *demie freedom.*

1 (3) *REPORT ON FINDINGS.*—Upon conclusion of
2 the pilot program required by paragraph (1), the
3 Committee shall submit to Congress a report on the
4 findings of that pilot program that includes—

5 (A) a summary of the reviews conducted by
6 the Committee under the pilot program and the
7 outcome of such reviews;

8 (B) an assessment of any additional re-
9 sources required by the Committee to carry out
10 this section or the amendments made by sub-
11 section (a);

12 (C) findings regarding the additional bur-
13 den on institutions of higher education likely to
14 result from compliance with the amendments
15 made by subsection (a) and any additional rec-
16 ommended steps to reduce those burdens; and

17 (D) any recommendations for Congress to
18 consider regarding the scope or procedures de-
19 scribed in this section or the amendments made
20 by subsection (a).

21 **SEC. 139. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SENATE-**
22 **CONFIRMED OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT**
23 **OF STATE.**

24 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress
25 that—

1 (1) *Congress and the executive branch have rec-*
2 *ognized the importance of preventing and mitigating*
3 *the potential for conflicts of interest following govern-*
4 *ment service, including with respect to senior United*
5 *States officials working on behalf of foreign govern-*
6 *ments; and*

7 (2) *Congress and the executive branch should*
8 *jointly evaluate the status and scope of post-employ-*
9 *ment restrictions.*

10 (b) *RESTRICTIONS.—Section 841 of the State Depart-*
11 *ment Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is*
12 *amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:*

13 “(i) *EXTENDED POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS*
14 *FOR CERTAIN SENATE-CONFIRMED OFFICIALS.—*

15 “(1) *SECRETARY OF STATE AND DEPUTY SEC-*
16 *RETARY OF STATE.—With respect to a person serving*
17 *as the Secretary of State or Deputy Secretary of*
18 *State, the restrictions described in section 207(f)(1) of*
19 *title 18, United States Code, shall apply to rep-*
20 *resenting, aiding, or advising a foreign governmental*
21 *entity before an officer or employee of the executive*
22 *branch of the United States at any time after the ter-*
23 *mination of that person’s service as Secretary or Dep-*
24 *uty Secretary.*

1 “(2) *UNDER SECRETARIES, ASSISTANT SECRE-*
2 *TARIES, AND AMBASSADORS.*—*With respect to a per-*
3 *son serving as an Under Secretary, Assistant Sec-*
4 *retary, or Ambassador at the Department of State or*
5 *the United States Permanent Representative to the*
6 *United Nations, the restrictions described in section*
7 *207(f)(1) of title 18, United States Code, shall apply*
8 *to representing, aiding, or advising a foreign govern-*
9 *mental entity before an officer or employee of the ex-*
10 *ecutive branch of the United States for 3 years after*
11 *the termination of that person’s service in a position*
12 *described in this paragraph, or the duration of the*
13 *term or terms of the President who appointed that*
14 *person to their position, whichever is longer.*

15 “(3) *PENALTIES AND INJUNCTIONS.*—*Any viola-*
16 *tions of the restrictions in paragraphs (1) or (2) shall*
17 *be subject to the penalties and injunctions provided*
18 *for under section 216 of title 18, United States Code.*

19 “(4) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this subsection:*

20 ““(A) *The term ‘foreign governmental enti-*
21 *ty’ includes any person employed by—*

22 “(i) *any department, agency, or other*
23 *entity of a foreign government at the na-*
24 *tional, regional, or local level;*

1 “(ii) any governing party or coalition
2 of a foreign government at the national, re-
3 gional, or local level; or

4 “(iii) any entity majority-owned or
5 majority-controlled by a foreign government
6 at the national, regional, or local level.

7 “(B) The term ‘representation’ does not in-
8 clude representation by an attorney, who is duly
9 licensed and authorized to provide legal advice
10 in a United States jurisdiction, of a person or
11 entity in a legal capacity or for the purposes of
12 rendering legal advice.

13 “(5) *EFFECTIVE DATE.*—The restrictions in this
14 subsection shall apply only to persons who are ap-
15 pointed by the President to the positions referenced in
16 this subsection on or after 120 days after the date of
17 the enactment of the Strategic Competition Act of
18 2021.

19 “(6) *NOTICE OF RESTRICTIONS.*—Any person
20 subject to the restrictions of this subsection shall be
21 provided notice of these restrictions by the Depart-
22 ment of State upon appointment by the President,
23 and subsequently upon termination of service with the
24 Department of State.”.

1 **SEC. 140. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITIZING NOMINA-**
 2 **TION OF QUALIFIED AMBASSADORS TO EN-**
 3 **SURE PROPER DIPLOMATIC POSITIONING TO**
 4 **COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE.**

5 *It is the sense of Congress that it is critically impor-*
 6 *tant for the President to nominate qualified ambassadors*
 7 *as quickly as possible, especially for countries in Central*
 8 *and South America, to ensure that the United States is dip-*
 9 *lomatically positioned to counter Chinese influence efforts*
 10 *in foreign countries.*

11 **SEC. 141. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION**
 12 **GROUP.**

13 *(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

14 *(1) QUALIFIED RESEARCH ENTITY.—The term*
 15 *“qualified research entity” means an entity that—*

16 *(A) is a nonpartisan research organization*
 17 *or a federally funded research and development*
 18 *center;*

19 *(B) has appropriate expertise and analyt-*
 20 *ical capability to write the report required under*
 21 *subsection (c); and*

22 *(C) is free from any financial, commercial,*
 23 *or other entanglements, which could undermine*
 24 *the independence of such report or create a con-*
 25 *flict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of*
 26 *interest, with—*

1 (i) *the Government of the People’s Re-*
2 *public of China;*

3 (ii) *the Chinese Communist Party;*

4 (iii) *any company incorporated in the*
5 *People’s Republic of China or a subsidiary*
6 *of such company; or*

7 (iv) *any company or entity incor-*
8 *porated outside of the People’s Republic of*
9 *China that is believed to have a substantial*
10 *financial or commercial interest in the Peo-*
11 *ple’s Republic of China.*

12 (2) *UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United*
13 *States person” means—*

14 (A) *a United States citizen or an alien law-*
15 *fully admitted for permanent residence to the*
16 *United States; or*

17 (B) *an entity organized under the laws of*
18 *the United States or any jurisdiction within the*
19 *United States, including a foreign branch of*
20 *such an entity.*

21 (b) *CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION*
22 *GROUP.—*

23 (1) *IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish*
24 *an interagency task force, which shall be known as the*

1 *“China Censorship Monitor and Action Group”* (re-
2 ferred to in this subsection as the *“Task Force”*).

3 (2) *MEMBERSHIP.—The President shall—*

4 (A) *appoint the chair of the Task Force*
5 *from among the staff of the National Security*
6 *Council;*

7 (B) *appoint the vice chair of the Task Force*
8 *from among the staff of the National Economic*
9 *Council; and*

10 (C) *direct the head of each of the following*
11 *executive branch agencies to appoint personnel to*
12 *participate in the Task Force:*

13 (i) *The Department of State.*

14 (ii) *The Department of Commerce.*

15 (iii) *The Department of the Treasury.*

16 (iv) *The Department of Justice.*

17 (v) *The Office of the United States*
18 *Trade Representative.*

19 (vi) *The Office of the Director of Na-*
20 *tional Intelligence, and other appropriate*
21 *elements of the intelligence community (as*
22 *defined in section 3 of the National Secu-*
23 *rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).*

24 (vii) *The Federal Communications*
25 *Commission.*

1 (viii) *The United States Agency for*
2 *Global Media.*

3 (ix) *Other agencies designated by the*
4 *President.*

5 (3) *RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Task Force shall—*

6 (A) *oversee the development and execution of*
7 *an integrated Federal Government strategy to*
8 *monitor and address the impacts of efforts di-*
9 *rected, or directly supported, by the Government*
10 *of the People’s Republic of China to censor or in-*
11 *timidate, in the United States or in any of its*
12 *possessions or territories, any United States per-*
13 *son, including United States companies that*
14 *conduct business in the People’s Republic of*
15 *China, which are exercising their right to free-*
16 *dom of speech; and*

17 (B) *submit the strategy developed pursuant*
18 *to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congres-*
19 *sional committees not later than 120 days after*
20 *the date of the enactment of this Act.*

21 (4) *MEETINGS.—The Task Force shall meet not*
22 *less frequently than twice per year.*

23 (5) *CONSULTATIONS.—The Task Force should*
24 *regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appro-*
25 *priate, with—*

1 (A) *Federal agencies that are not rep-*
2 *resented on the Task Force;*

3 (B) *independent agencies of the United*
4 *States Government that are not represented on*
5 *the Task Force;*

6 (C) *relevant stakeholders in the private sec-*
7 *tor and the media; and*

8 (D) *relevant stakeholders among United*
9 *States allies and partners facing similar chal-*
10 *lenges related to censorship or intimidation by*
11 *the Government of the People's Republic of*
12 *China.*

13 (6) *REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—*

14 (A) *ANNUAL REPORT.—The Task Force*
15 *shall submit an annual report to the appropriate*
16 *congressional committees that describes, with re-*
17 *spect to the reporting period—*

18 (i) *the strategic objectives and policies*
19 *pursued by the Task Force to address the*
20 *challenges of censorship and intimidation of*
21 *United States persons while in the United*
22 *States or any of its possessions or terri-*
23 *tories, which is directed or directly sup-*
24 *ported by the Government of the People's*
25 *Republic of China;*

1 (ii) the activities conducted by the
2 Task Force in support of the strategic objec-
3 tives and policies referred to in clause (i);
4 and

5 (iii) the results of the activities referred
6 to in clause (ii) and the impact of such ac-
7 tivities on the national interests of the
8 United States.

9 (B) *FORM OF REPORT.*—Each report sub-
10 mitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be
11 unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

12 (C) *CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.*—Not later
13 than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
14 this Act, and annually thereafter, the Task Force
15 shall provide briefings to the appropriate con-
16 gressional committees regarding the activities of
17 the Task Force to execute the strategy developed
18 pursuant to paragraph (3)(A).

19 (c) *REPORT ON CENSORSHIP AND INTIMIDATION OF*
20 *UNITED STATES PERSONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE*
21 *PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.*—

22 (1) *REPORT.*—

23 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 90 days
24 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
25 Secretary of State shall select and seek to enter

1 into an agreement with a qualified research enti-
2 ty that is independent of the Department of
3 State to write a report on censorship and in-
4 timidation in the United States and its posses-
5 sions and territories of United States persons,
6 including United States companies that conduct
7 business in the People’s Republic of China, which
8 is directed or directly supported by the Govern-
9 ment of the People’s Republic of China.

10 (B) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—The re-
11 port required under subparagraph (A) shall—

12 (i) assess major trends, patterns, and
13 methods of the Government of the People’s
14 Republic of China’s efforts to direct or di-
15 rectly support censorship and intimidation
16 of United States persons, including United
17 States companies that conduct business in
18 the People’s Republic of China, which are
19 exercising their right to freedom of speech;

20 (ii) assess, including through the use of
21 illustrative examples, as appropriate, the
22 impact on and consequences for United
23 States persons, including United States
24 companies that conduct business in the Peo-
25 ple’s Republic of China, that criticize—

1 (I) *the Chinese Communist Party;*

2 (II) *the Government of the Peo-*
3 *ple's Republic of China;*

4 (III) *the authoritarian model of*
5 *government of the People's Republic of*
6 *China; or*

7 (IV) *a particular policy advanced*
8 *by the Chinese Communist Party or*
9 *the Government of the People's Repub-*
10 *lic of China;*

11 (iii) *identify the implications for the*
12 *United States of the matters described in*
13 *clauses (i) and (ii);*

14 (iv) *assess the methods and evaluate*
15 *the efficacy of the efforts by the Government*
16 *of the People's Republic of China to limit*
17 *freedom of expression in the private sector,*
18 *including media, social media, film, edu-*
19 *cation, travel, financial services, sports and*
20 *entertainment, technology, telecommuni-*
21 *cation, and internet infrastructure interests;*

22 (v) *include policy recommendations for*
23 *the United States Government, including*
24 *recommendations regarding collaboration*
25 *with United States allies and partners, to*

1 *address censorship and intimidation by the*
2 *Government of the People’s Republic of*
3 *China; and*

4 *(vi) include policy recommendations*
5 *for United States persons, including United*
6 *States companies that conduct business in*
7 *China, to address censorship and intimidati-*
8 *on by the Government of the People’s Re-*
9 *public of China.*

10 *(C) APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES AL-*
11 *LIES AND PARTNERS.—To the extent practicable,*
12 *the report required under subparagraph (A)*
13 *should identify implications and policy rec-*
14 *ommendations that are relevant to United States*
15 *allies and partners facing censorship and intimi-*
16 *dation directed or directly supported by the Gov-*
17 *ernment of the People’s Republic of China.*

18 *(2) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—*

19 *(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year*
20 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, the*
21 *Secretary of State shall submit the report writ-*
22 *ten by the qualified research entity selected pur-*
23 *suant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appropriate*
24 *congressional committees.*

1 (B) *PUBLICATION.*—*The report referred to*
 2 *in subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to*
 3 *the public online through relevant United States*
 4 *Government websites.*

5 (3) *FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT.*—*The Sec-*
 6 *retary of State and other Federal agencies selected by*
 7 *the President shall provide the qualified research enti-*
 8 *ty selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) with timely*
 9 *access to appropriate information, data, resources,*
 10 *and analyses necessary for such entity to write the re-*
 11 *port described in paragraph (1)(A) in a thorough and*
 12 *independent manner.*

13 (d) *SUNSET.*—*This section shall terminate on the date*
 14 *that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.*

15 **TITLE II—INVESTING IN**
 16 **ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS**
 17 **Subtitle A—Strategic and**
 18 **Diplomatic Matters**

19 **SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
 20 **FINED.**

21 *In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of*
 22 *Congress” means—*

23 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations and the*
 24 *Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and*

1 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the*
2 *Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-*
3 *resentatives.*

4 **SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR**

5 **ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

6 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
7 *that—*

8 (1) *the United States treaty alliances in the*
9 *Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to*
10 *the United States and are among the Nation’s most*
11 *precious assets, enabling the United States to advance*
12 *its vital national interests, defend its territory, ex-*
13 *pend its economy through international trade and*
14 *commerce, establish enduring cooperation among like-*
15 *minded countries, prevent the domination of the Indo-*
16 *Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes*
17 *by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential ag-*
18 *gressors;*

19 (2) *the Governments of the United States, Japan,*
20 *the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and*
21 *Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and*
22 *open order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling*
23 *challenges with unity of purpose, and have collabo-*
24 *rated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in*
25 *areas such as defense and security, economic pros-*

1 *perity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental*
2 *freedoms;*

3 *(3) the United States greatly values other part-*
4 *nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with*
5 *India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand,*
6 *and Vietnam as well as regional architecture such as*
7 *the Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*
8 *(ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Commu-*
9 *nity (APEC), which are essential to further shared*
10 *interests;*

11 *(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific*
12 *demand consistent United States and allied commit-*
13 *ment to strengthening and advancing our alliances so*
14 *that they are postured to meet these challenges, and*
15 *will require sustained political will, concrete partner-*
16 *ships, economic, commercial, and technological co-*
17 *operation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-*
18 *level and extensive consultations on matters of mutual*
19 *interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the acqui-*
20 *sition of key capabilities important to allied defenses,*
21 *and unified mutual support in the face of political,*
22 *economic, or military coercion;*

23 *(5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-*
24 *tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-*

1 *versaries and weaken collective ability to advance*
2 *shared interests;*

3 *(6) the United States must work with allies to*
4 *prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific*
5 *region;*

6 *(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the*
7 *Expert Group of the International Military Council*
8 *on Climate and Security (IMCCS), titled “Climate*
9 *and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific” noted, the*
10 *Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions most vulner-*
11 *able to climate impacts and as former Deputy Under*
12 *Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environ-*
13 *ment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS,*
14 *noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the*
15 *Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian re-*
16 *sponse costs and impacting security throughout the*
17 *region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food*
18 *insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more*
19 *frequent;*

20 *(8) the United State should continue to engage*
21 *on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners*
22 *of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as*
23 *laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Pub-*
24 *lic Law 115–409), in the areas of—*

25 *(A) forecasting environmental challenges;*

1 (B) assisting with transnational coopera-
2 tion on sustainable uses of forest and water re-
3 sources with the goal of preserving biodiversity
4 and access to safe drinking water;

5 (C) fisheries and marine resource conserva-
6 tion; and

7 (D) meeting environmental challenges and
8 developing resilience; and

9 (9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with
10 the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the
11 United States Agency for International Development,
12 should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific cli-
13 mate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on
14 internal and external actions needed—

15 (A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk
16 reduction, and resilience to weather-related im-
17 pacts on strategic interests of the United States
18 and partners and allies of the United States in
19 the region; and

20 (B) to address humanitarian and food secu-
21 rity impacts of weather-related changes in the re-
22 gion.

23 (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—It shall be the policy of
24 the United States—

1 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security
2 cooperation between and among the United States,
3 Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Phil-
4 ippines, and Thailand, including through diplomatic
5 engagement, regional development, energy security
6 and development, scientific and health partnerships,
7 educational and cultural exchanges, missile defense,
8 intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other diplo-
9 matic and defense-related initiatives;

10 (2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral trea-
11 ty obligations, including—

12 (A) defending Japan, including all areas
13 under the administration of Japan, under article
14 V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Secu-
15 rity Between the United States of America and
16 Japan;

17 (B) defending the Republic of Korea under
18 article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between
19 the United States and the Republic of Korea;

20 (C) defending the Philippines under article
21 IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
22 United States and the Republic of the Phil-
23 ippines;

1 (D) defending Thailand under the 1954 Ma-
2 nila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique of
3 1962; and

4 (E) defending Australia under article IV of
5 the Australia, New Zealand, United States Secu-
6 rity Treaty;

7 (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States'
8 bilateral and regional partnerships, including with
9 India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;

10 (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of
11 Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to
12 promote human rights bilaterally and through re-
13 gional and multilateral fora and pacts; and

14 (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
15 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-
16 ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
17 Indonesia, and India.

18 **SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH**

19 **THE QUAD.**

20 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

21 (1) the United States should reaffirm our com-
22 mitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Aus-
23 tralia, India, Japan, and the United States (the
24 “Quad”) to enhance and implement a shared vision
25 to meet shared regional challenges and to promote a

1 *free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pa-*
2 *cific that is characterized by democracy, rule of law,*
3 *and market-driven economic growth, and is free from*
4 *undue influence and coercion;*

5 *(2) the United States should seek to expand sus-*
6 *tained dialogue and cooperation through the Quad*
7 *with a range of partners to support the rule of law,*
8 *freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolu-*
9 *tion of disputes, democratic values, and territorial in-*
10 *tegrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and*
11 *strengthen democratic resilience;*

12 *(3) the United States should seek to expand ave-*
13 *nues of cooperation with the Quad, including more*
14 *regular military-to-military dialogues, joint exercises,*
15 *and coordinated policies related to shared interests*
16 *such as protecting cyberspace and advancing mari-*
17 *time security;*

18 *(4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad*
19 *leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the*
20 *economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including*
21 *expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine pro-*
22 *duction and equitable access, and to address shared*
23 *challenges, including in cyberspace, critical tech-*
24 *nologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure in-*
25 *vestment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster*

1 relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances
2 the important cooperation among Quad nations that
3 is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;

4 (5) building upon their partnership to help fi-
5 nance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines by
6 the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region, the
7 United States International Development Finance
8 Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation
9 Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Co-
10 operation, including through partnerships other mul-
11 tilateral development banks, should also venture to fi-
12 nance development and infrastructure projects in the
13 Indo-Pacific region that are sustainable and offer a
14 viable alternative to the investments of the People’s
15 Republic of China in that region under the Belt and
16 Road Initiative;

17 (6) in consultation with other Quad countries,
18 the President should establish clear deliverables for the
19 3 new Quad Working Groups established on March
20 12, 2021, which are—

21 (A) the Quad Vaccine Experts Working
22 Group;

23 (B) the Quad Climate Working Group; and

24 (C) the Quad Critical and Emerging Tech-
25 nology Working Group; and

1 *agreement described in subsection (a), there shall be*
2 *established a United States Group, which shall rep-*
3 *resent the United States at the Quad Intra-Par-*
4 *liamentary Working Group.*

5 (2) *MEMBERSHIP.—*

6 (A) *IN GENERAL.—The United States*
7 *Group shall be comprised of not more than 24*
8 *Members of Congress.*

9 (B) *APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of*
10 *Congress appointed to the United States Group*
11 *under subparagraph (A)—*

12 (i) *half shall be appointed by the*
13 *Speaker of the House of Representatives*
14 *from among Members of the House, not less*
15 *than 4 of whom shall be members of the*
16 *Committee on Foreign Affairs; and*

17 (ii) *half shall be appointed by the*
18 *President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based*
19 *on recommendations of the majority leader*
20 *and minority leader of the Senate, from*
21 *among Members of the Senate, not less than*
22 *4 of whom shall be members of the Com-*
23 *mittee on Foreign Relations (unless the ma-*
24 *jority leader and minority leader determine*
25 *otherwise).*

1 (3) *MEETINGS.*—

2 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*The United States*
3 *Group shall seek to meet not less frequently than*
4 *annually with representatives and appropriate*
5 *staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, and*
6 *India, and any other country invited by mutual*
7 *agreement of the Quad countries.*

8 (B) *LIMITATION.*—*A meeting described in*
9 *subparagraph (A) may be held—*

10 (i) *in the United States;*

11 (ii) *in another Quad country during*
12 *periods when Congress is not in session; or*

13 (iii) *virtually.*

14 (4) *CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.*—

15 (A) *HOUSE DELEGATION.*—*The Speaker of*
16 *the House of Representatives shall designate the*
17 *chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation*
18 *of the United States Group from the House from*
19 *among members of the Committee on Foreign Af-*
20 *airs.*

21 (B) *SENATE DELEGATION.*—*The President*
22 *Pro Tempore of the Senate shall designate the*
23 *chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation*
24 *of the United States Group from the Senate from*

1 *among members of the Committee on Foreign*
2 *Relations.*

3 (5) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—*

4 (A) *IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be*
5 *appropriated \$1,000,000 for each fiscal year*
6 *2022 through 2025 for the United States Group.*

7 (B) *DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—*

8 (i) *IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year*
9 *for which an appropriation is made for the*
10 *United States Group, half of the amount*
11 *appropriated shall be available to the dele-*
12 *gation from the House of Representatives*
13 *and half of the amount shall be available to*
14 *the delegation from the Senate.*

15 (ii) *METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The*
16 *amounts available to the delegations of the*
17 *House of Representatives and the Senate*
18 *under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouch-*
19 *ers to be approved by the chairperson of the*
20 *delegation from the House of Representa-*
21 *tives and the chairperson of the delegation*
22 *from the Senate, respectively.*

23 (6) *PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States*
24 *Group may accept gifts or donations of services or*
25 *property, subject to the review and approval, as ap-*

1 *appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of*
2 *Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the*
3 *Senate.*

4 (7) *CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The*
5 *certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from*
6 *the House of Representatives or the delegation of the*
7 *Senate of the United States Group shall be final and*
8 *conclusive upon the accounting officers in the audit-*
9 *ing of the accounts of the United States Group.*

10 (8) *ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States Group*
11 *shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of*
12 *the House of Representatives and the Committee on*
13 *Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fis-*
14 *cal year for which an appropriation is made for the*
15 *United States Group, which shall include a descrip-*
16 *tion of its expenditures under such appropriation.*

17 **SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
18 **ASEAN.**

19 *It is the policy of the United States to—*

20 (1) *stand with the nations of the Association of*
21 *Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to*
22 *COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in build-*
23 *ing capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics*
24 *and other public health challenges;*

1 (2) support high-level United States participa-
2 tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year;

3 (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-
4 ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi-
5 nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and sup-
6 port the ASEAN Economic Community's (AEC)
7 goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable
8 long-term economic growth and cooperation with the
9 United States that focuses on innovation and capac-
10 ity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster
11 management, food security, human rights, and trade
12 facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's poorest coun-
13 tries;

14 (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster
15 greater integration and unity within the ASEAN
16 community, as well as to foster greater integration
17 and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and
18 security partners, including Japan, the Republic of
19 Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and
20 India;

21 (5) recognize the value of strategic economic ini-
22 tiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect, which
23 demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC
24 and builds upon economic relationships in the region;

1 (6) *support ASEAN nations in addressing mari-*
2 *time and territorial disputes in a constructive man-*
3 *ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-*
4 *matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and*
5 *international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with*
6 *international law, including through the adoption of*
7 *a code of conduct in the South China Sea that rep-*
8 *resents the interests of all parties and promotes peace*
9 *and stability in the region;*

10 (7) *urge all parties involved in the maritime and*
11 *territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-*
12 *ing the Government of the People's Republic of*
13 *China—*

14 (A) *to cease any current activities, and*
15 *avoid undertaking any actions in the future,*
16 *that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-*
17 *late disputes through the use of coercion, intimi-*
18 *dation, or military force;*

19 (B) *to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals,*
20 *and other features, and refrain from new efforts*
21 *to militarize, including the construction of new*
22 *garrisons and facilities and the relocation of ad-*
23 *ditional military personnel, material, or equip-*
24 *ment;*

1 (C) to oppose actions by any country that
2 prevent other countries from exercising their sov-
3 ereign rights to the resources in their exclusive
4 economic zones and continental shelves by enforce-
5 ing claims to those areas in the South China Sea
6 that lack support in international law; and

7 (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
8 ministrative and military districts in contested
9 areas in the South China Sea;

10 (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
11 tions that cause permanent physical damage to the
12 marine environment and support the efforts of the
13 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
14 and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
15 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the re-
16 gion;

17 (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
18 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Per-
19 manent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of
20 the Republic of the Philippines in the case against the
21 People's Republic of China's excessive maritime
22 claims;

23 (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United
24 States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt
25 human smuggling and trafficking in persons and

1 *urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mech-*
2 *anisms to provide assistance and support to refugees*
3 *and migrants;*

4 *(11) support the Mekong-United States Partner-*
5 *ship;*

6 *(12) support newly created initiatives with*
7 *ASEAN countries, including the United States-*
8 *ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy*
9 *Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN*
10 *Innovation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN*
11 *Health Futures;*

12 *(13) encourage the President to communicate to*
13 *ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule*
14 *of law and open and transparent government,*
15 *strengthening civil society, and protecting human*
16 *rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing*
17 *politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary*
18 *killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-*
19 *dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of*
20 *speech and expression;*

21 *(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN*
22 *that address corruption in the public and private sec-*
23 *tors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery*
24 *criminalization in the private sector, and build bene-*
25 *ficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN-*

1 *USAID PROSPECT* project partnered with the South
2 *East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);*

3 (15) *support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders*
4 *Initiative as an example of a people-to-people part-*
5 *nership that provides skills, networks, and leadership*
6 *training to a new generation that will create and fill*
7 *jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships,*
8 *and rise to address the regional and global challenges*
9 *of the future;*

10 (16) *support the creation of initiatives similar to*
11 *the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for*
12 *other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-peo-*
13 *ple partnerships with an emphasis on civil society*
14 *leaders;*

15 (17) *acknowledge those ASEAN governments that*
16 *have fully upheld and implemented all United Na-*
17 *tions Security Council resolutions and international*
18 *agreements with respect to the Democratic People's*
19 *Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile pro-*
20 *grams and encourage all other ASEAN governments*
21 *to do the same; and*

22 (18) *allocate appropriate resources across the*
23 *United States Government to articulate and imple-*
24 *ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-*
25 *ports ASEAN centrality and supports ASEAN as a*

1 source of well-functioning and problem-solving re-
2 gional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

3 **SEC. 206. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED**
4 **STATES–ASEAN COOPERATION ON TECH-**
5 **NOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-**
6 **PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

7 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

8 (1) *the United States and ASEAN should com-*
9 *plete a joint analysis on risks of overreliance on Chi-*
10 *nese equipment critical to strategic technologies and*
11 *critical infrastructure;*

12 (2) *the United States and ASEAN should share*
13 *information about and collaborate on screening Chi-*
14 *nese investments in strategic technology sectors and*
15 *critical infrastructure;*

16 (3) *the United States and ASEAN should work*
17 *together on appropriate import restriction regimes re-*
18 *garding Chinese exports of surveillance technologies;*

19 (4) *the United States should urge ASEAN to*
20 *adopt its March 2019 proposed sanctions regime tar-*
21 *geting cyber attacks;*

22 (5) *the United States should urge ASEAN to*
23 *commit to the September 2019 principles signed by*
24 *28 countries regarding “Advancing Responsible State*
25 *Behavior in Cyberspace”, a set of commitments that*

1 support the “rules-based international order, affirm
2 the applicability of international law to state-on-state
3 behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible
4 state behavior in peacetime, and the development and
5 implementation of practical confidence building
6 measures to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming
7 from cyber incidents”; and

8 (6) the United States and ASEAN should explore
9 how Chinese investments in critical technology, in-
10 cluding artificial intelligence, will impact Indo-Pa-
11 cific security over the coming decades.

12 **SEC. 207. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTER-**
13 **NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.**

14 (a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days
15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
16 of State, in coordination with the Director of National In-
17 telligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
18 tions and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
19 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent
20 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Represent-
21 atives a report on the expanded influence of the Government
22 of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Com-
23 munist Party in international organizations.

24 (b) **CONTENTS.**—The report required by subsection (a)
25 shall include analysis of the following:

1 (1) *The influence of the PRC and Chinese Com-*
2 *munist Party in international organizations and how*
3 *that influence has expanded over the last 10 years, in-*
4 *cluding—*

5 (A) *tracking countries' voting patterns that*
6 *align with Chinese government voting patterns;*

7 (B) *the number of PRC nationals in leader-*
8 *ship positions at the D–1 level or higher;*

9 (C) *changes in PRC voluntary and manda-*
10 *tory funding by organization;*

11 (D) *adoption of Chinese Communist Party*
12 *phrases and initiatives in international organi-*
13 *zation language and programming;*

14 (E) *efforts by the PRC to secure legitimacy*
15 *for its own foreign policy initiatives, including*
16 *the Belt and Road Initiative;*

17 (F) *the number of Junior Professional Offi-*
18 *cers that the Government of the People's Republic*
19 *of China has funded by organization;*

20 (G) *tactics used by the Government of the*
21 *People's Republic of China or the CCP to ma-*
22 *nipulate secret or otherwise non-public voting*
23 *measures, voting bodies, or votes;*

24 (H) *the extent to which technology compa-*
25 *nies incorporated in the PRC, or which have*

1 *PRC or CCP ownership interests, provide equip-*
2 *ment and services to international organizations;*
3 *and*

4 *(I) efforts by the PRC's United Nations*
5 *Mission to generate criticism of the United*
6 *States in the United Nations, including any ef-*
7 *forts to highlight delayed United States pay-*
8 *ments or to misrepresent total United States vol-*
9 *untary and assessed financial contributions to*
10 *the United Nations and its specialized agencies*
11 *and programs.*

12 *(2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the ex-*
13 *panded influence of the PRC government and the Chi-*
14 *nese Communist Party in international organiza-*
15 *tions, including an analysis of PRC Government and*
16 *Chinese Communist Party strategic documents and*
17 *rhetoric.*

18 *(3) The tactics and means employed by the PRC*
19 *government and the Chinese Communist Party to*
20 *achieve expanded influence in international organiza-*
21 *tions, including—*

22 *(A) incentive programs for PRC nationals*
23 *to join and run for leadership positions in inter-*
24 *national organizations;*

1 (B) coercive economic and other practices
2 against other members in the organization; and

3 (C) economic or other incentives provided to
4 international organizations, including donations
5 of technologies or goods.

6 (4) The successes and failures of the PRC govern-
7 ment and Chinese Communist Party influence efforts
8 in international organizations, especially those re-
9 lated to human rights, “internet sovereignty”, the de-
10 velopment of norms on artificial intelligence, labor,
11 international standards setting, and freedom of navi-
12 gation.

13 (c) *FORM.*—The report submitted under subsection (a)
14 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
15 a classified annex.

16 (d) *DEFINITION.*—In this section, the term “inter-
17 national organizations” includes the following:

18 (1) *The African Development Bank.*

19 (2) *The Asian Development Bank.*

20 (3) *The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.*

21 (4) *The Bank of International Settlements.*

22 (5) *The Caribbean Development Bank.*

23 (6) *The Food and Agriculture Organization.*

24 (7) *The International Atomic Energy Agency.*

1 (8) *The International Bank for Reconstruction*
2 *and Development.*

3 (9) *The International Bureau of Weights and*
4 *Measures.*

5 (10) *The International Chamber of Commerce.*

6 (11) *The International Civil Aviation Organiza-*
7 *tion.*

8 (12) *The International Criminal Police Organi-*
9 *zation.*

10 (13) *The International Finance Corporation.*

11 (14) *The International Fund for Agricultural*
12 *Development.*

13 (15) *The International Hydrographic Organiza-*
14 *tion.*

15 (16) *The International Labor Organization.*

16 (17) *The International Maritime Organization.*

17 (18) *The International Monetary Fund.*

18 (19) *The International Olympic Committee.*

19 (20) *The International Organization for Migra-*
20 *tion.*

21 (21) *The International Organization for Stand-*
22 *ardization.*

23 (22) *The International Renewable Energy Agen-*
24 *cy.*

1 (23) *The International Telecommunications*
2 *Union.*

3 (24) *The Organization for Economic Cooperation*
4 *and Development.*

5 (25) *The Organization for the Prohibition of*
6 *Chemical Weapons.*

7 (26) *The United Nations.*

8 (27) *The United Nations Conference on Trade*
9 *and Development.*

10 (28) *The United Nations Educational, Scientific,*
11 *and Cultural Organization.*

12 (29) *The United Nations Industrial Development*
13 *Organization.*

14 (30) *The United Nations Institute for Training*
15 *and Research.*

16 (31) *The United Nations Truce Supervision Or-*
17 *ganization.*

18 (32) *The Universal Postal Union.*

19 (33) *The World Customs Organization.*

20 (34) *The World Health Organization.*

21 (35) *The World Intellectual Property Organiza-*
22 *tion.*

23 (36) *The World Meteorological Organization.*

24 (37) *The World Organization for Animal Health.*

25 (38) *The World Tourism Organization.*

1 (39) *The World Trade Organization.*

2 (40) *The World Bank Group.*

3 **SEC. 208. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND**
4 **PARTNERS.**

5 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, in coordi-*
6 *nation with the heads of other participating executive*
7 *branch agencies, shall establish and develop a program to*
8 *facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United*
9 *States Government regulatory and technical agencies and*
10 *their counterpart organizations in allied and partner coun-*
11 *tries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institu-*
12 *tions and organizations—*

13 (1) *to promote best practices in regulatory for-*
14 *mation and implementation;*

15 (2) *to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory*
16 *outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other rel-*
17 *evant principles;*

18 (3) *to seek better harmonization and alignment*
19 *of regulations and regulatory practices;*

20 (4) *to build consensus around industry and tech-*
21 *nical standards in emerging sectors that will drive fu-*
22 *ture global economic growth and commerce; and*

23 (5) *to promote United States standards regard-*
24 *ing environmental, labor, and other relevant protec-*
25 *tions in regulatory formation and implementation, in*

1 *keeping with the values of free and open societies, in-*
2 *cluding the rule of law.*

3 **(b) PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIVITIES.**—*In facilitating*
4 *expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall*
5 *prioritize—*

6 *(1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with*
7 *countries where greater regulatory coherence, harmo-*
8 *nization of standards, or communication and dia-*
9 *logue between technical agencies is achievable and best*
10 *advances the economic and national security interests*
11 *of the United States;*

12 *(2) multilateral coordination and collaboration*
13 *where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of*
14 *standards, or dialogue on other relevant regulatory*
15 *matters is achievable and best advances the economic*
16 *and national security interests of the United States,*
17 *including with—*

18 *(A) the European Union;*

19 *(B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;*

20 *(C) the Association of Southeast Asian Na-*
21 *tions (ASEAN);*

22 *(D) the Organization for Economic Co-*
23 *operation and Development (OECD); and*

24 *(E) multilateral development banks; and*

1 (3) *regulatory practices and standards-setting*
2 *bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerging*
3 *technologies.*

4 (c) *PARTICIPATION BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTI-*
5 *TIES.—With regard to the program described in subsection*
6 *(a), the Secretary of State may facilitate, including through*
7 *the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (e),*
8 *the participation of private sector representatives, and other*
9 *relevant organizations and individuals with relevant exper-*
10 *tise, as appropriate and to the extent that such participa-*
11 *tion advances the goals of such program.*

12 (d) *DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE SEC-*
13 *RETARY.—The Secretary of State is authorized to delegate*
14 *the responsibilities described in this section to the Under*
15 *Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the*
16 *Environment.*

17 (e) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—*

18 (1) *IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be ap-*
19 *propriated \$2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2022*
20 *through 2026 to carry out this section.*

21 (2) *USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary may make*
22 *available amounts appropriated pursuant to para-*
23 *graph (1) in a manner that—*

1 (A) facilitates participation by representa-
2 tives from technical agencies within the United
3 States Government and their counterparts; and

4 (B) complies with applicable procedural re-
5 quirements under the State Department Basic
6 Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.)
7 and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
8 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

9 **SEC. 209. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DE-**
10 **PARTMENT OF STATE.**

11 (a) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—It shall be the policy of
12 the United States to lead new technology policy partner-
13 ships focused on the shared interests of the world’s tech-
14 nology-leading democracies.

15 (b) *ESTABLISHMENT.*—The Secretary of State shall es-
16 tablish an interagency-staffed Technology Partnership Of-
17 fice (referred to in this section as the “Office”), which shall
18 be housed in the Department of State.

19 (c) *LEADERSHIP.*—

20 (1) *AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE.*—The Office shall be
21 headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for Technology,
22 who shall—

23 (A) be appointed by the President, by and
24 with the advice and consent of the Senate;

1 (B) *have the rank and status of ambas-*
2 *sador; and*

3 (C) *report to the Secretary of State, unless*
4 *otherwise directed.*

5 (2) *OFFICE LIAISONS.—The Secretary of Com-*
6 *merce and the Secretary of the Treasury shall each*
7 *appoint, from within their respective departments at*
8 *the level of GS–14 or higher, liaisons between the Of-*
9 *fice and the Department of Commerce or the Depart-*
10 *ment of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform the*
11 *following duties:*

12 (A) *Collaborate with the Department of*
13 *State on relevant technology initiatives and*
14 *partnerships.*

15 (B) *Provide technical and other relevant ex-*
16 *pertise to the Office, as appropriate.*

17 (d) *MEMBERSHIP.—In addition to the liaisons referred*
18 *to in subsection (c), the Office shall include a representative*
19 *or expert detailee from key Federal agencies, as determined*
20 *by the Ambassador-at-Large for Technology.*

21 (e) *PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office shall in-*
22 *clude responsibilities such as—*

23 (1) *creating, overseeing, and carrying out tech-*
24 *nology partnerships with countries and relevant polit-*
25 *ical and economic unions that are committed to—*

1 (A) *the rule of law, freedom of speech, and*
2 *respect for human rights;*

3 (B) *the safe and responsible development*
4 *and use of new and emerging technologies and*
5 *the establishment of related norms and stand-*
6 *ards;*

7 (C) *a secure internet architecture governed*
8 *by a multi-stakeholder model instead of central-*
9 *ized government control;*

10 (D) *robust international cooperation to pro-*
11 *mote an open internet and interoperable techno-*
12 *logical products and services that are necessary*
13 *to freedom, innovation, transparency, and pri-*
14 *vacv; and*

15 (E) *multilateral coordination, including*
16 *through diplomatic initiatives, information shar-*
17 *ing, and other activities, to defend the principles*
18 *described in subparagraphs (A) through (D)*
19 *against efforts by state and non-state actors to*
20 *undermine them;*

21 (2) *harmonizing technology governance regimes*
22 *with partners, coordinating on basic and pre-competi-*
23 *tive research and development initiatives, and collabo-*
24 *rating to pursue such opportunities in key tech-*
25 *nologies, including—*

1 (A) *artificial intelligence and machine*
2 *learning;*

3 (B) *5G telecommunications and other ad-*
4 *vanced wireless networking technologies;*

5 (C) *semiconductor manufacturing;*

6 (D) *biotechnology;*

7 (E) *quantum computing;*

8 (F) *surveillance technologies, including fa-*
9 *cial recognition technologies and censorship soft-*
10 *ware; and*

11 (G) *fiber optic cables;*

12 (3) *coordinating with such countries regarding*
13 *shared technology strategies, including technology con-*
14 *trols and standards, as well as strategies with respect*
15 *to the development and acquisition of key technologies*
16 *to provide alternatives for those countries utilizing*
17 *systems supported by authoritarian regimes;*

18 (4) *supporting and expanding adherence to*
19 *international treaties and frameworks governing the*
20 *responsible use of new and emerging technologies;*

21 (5) *coordinating the adoption of shared data pri-*
22 *vacv, data sharing, and data archiving standards*
23 *among the United States and partner countries and*
24 *relevant economic and political unions, including*
25 *complementary data protection regulations;*

1 (6) *coordinating with other technology partners*
2 *on export control policies, including as appropriate*
3 *through the Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Con-*
4 *trols for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and*
5 *Technologies, done at The Hague December 1995, the*
6 *Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and*
7 *the Missile Technology Control Regime; supply chain*
8 *security; and investment in or licensing of critical in-*
9 *frastructure and dual-use technologies;*

10 (7) *coordinating with members of technology*
11 *partnerships on other policies regarding the use and*
12 *control of emerging and foundational technologies*
13 *through appropriate restrictions, investment screen-*
14 *ing, and appropriate measures with respect to tech-*
15 *nology transfers;*

16 (8) *coordinating policies, in coordination with*
17 *the Department of Commerce, around the resiliency of*
18 *supply chains in critical technology areas, including*
19 *possible diversification of supply chain components to*
20 *countries involved in technology partnerships with the*
21 *United States, while also maintaining transparency*
22 *surrounding subsidies and product origins;*

23 (9) *sharing information regarding the technology*
24 *transfer threat posed by authoritarian governments*
25 *and the ways in which autocratic regimes are uti-*

1 *lizing technology to erode individual freedoms and*
2 *other foundations of open, democratic societies;*

3 *(10) administering the establishment of—*

4 *(A) the common funding mechanism for de-*
5 *velopment and adoption of measurably secure*
6 *semiconductors and measurably secure semi-*
7 *conductors supply chains created in and in ac-*
8 *cordance with the requirements of section 9905 of*
9 *the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National De-*
10 *fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021*
11 *(Public Law 116–283); and*

12 *(B) the multilateral telecommunications se-*
13 *curity fund created in and in accordance with*
14 *the requirements of section 9202 of such Act; and*

15 *(11) collaborating with private companies, trade*
16 *associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes*
17 *of paragraphs (1) through (10).*

18 *(f) SPECIAL HIRING AUTHORITIES.—The Secretary of*
19 *State may—*

20 *(1) appoint employees without regard to the pro-*
21 *visions of title 5, United States Code, regarding ap-*
22 *pointments in the competitive service; and*

23 *(2) fix the basic compensation of such employees*
24 *without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of*

1 *chapter 53 of such title regarding classification and*
2 *General Schedule pay rates.*

3 *(g) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date*
4 *of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for*
5 *the next 3 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination*
6 *with the Director for National Intelligence, shall submit an*
7 *unclassified report to the appropriate congressional com-*
8 *mittees, with a classified index, if necessary, regarding—*

9 *(1) the activities of the Office, including any co-*
10 *operative initiatives and partnerships pursued with*
11 *United States allies and partners, and the results of*
12 *those activities, initiatives, and partnerships; and*

13 *(2) the activities of the Government of the Peo-*
14 *ples' Republic of China, the Chinese Communist*
15 *Party, and the Russian Federation in key technology*
16 *sectors and the threats they pose to the United States,*
17 *including—*

18 *(A) artificial intelligence and machine*
19 *learning;*

20 *(B) 5G telecommunications and other ad-*
21 *vanced wireless networking technologies;*

22 *(C) semiconductor manufacturing;*

23 *(D) biotechnology;*

24 *(E) quantum computing;*

1 (F) surveillance technologies, including fa-
2 cial recognition technologies and censorship soft-
3 ware; and

4 (G) fiber optic cables.

5 (h) *SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ESTABLISHING INTER-*
6 *NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP.*—It is the sense of
7 Congress that the Ambassador-at-Large for Technology
8 should seek to establish an International Technology Part-
9 nership for the purposes described in this section with for-
10 eign countries that have—

11 (1) a democratic national government and a
12 strong commitment to democratic values, including
13 an adherence to the rule of law, freedom of speech,
14 and respect for and promotion of human rights;

15 (2) an economy with advanced technology sec-
16 tors; and

17 (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an ex-
18 pressed interest in international cooperation and co-
19 ordination with the United States on important de-
20 fense and intelligence issues.

21 **SEC. 210. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STAND-**
22 **ARDS-SETTING BODIES.**

23 (a) *SHORT TITLE.*—This section may be cited as the
24 “Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G
25 Act of 2021”.

1 **(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—*It is the sense of Congress*
2 *that—*

3 **(1) the United States and its allies and partners**
4 *should maintain participation and leadership at*
5 *international standards-setting bodies for 5th and fu-*
6 *ture generation mobile telecommunications systems*
7 *and infrastructure;*

8 **(2) the United States should work with its allies**
9 *and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop-*
10 *ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th*
11 *and future generation mobile telecommunications sys-*
12 *tems and infrastructure; and*

13 **(3) the maintenance of a high standard of secu-**
14 *rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between*
15 *the United States and its allies and partners is a na-*
16 *tional security interest of the United States.*

17 **(c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP**
18 **OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-SET-**
19 **TING BODIES.**—

20 **(1) IN GENERAL.**—*The President shall—*

21 **(A) establish an interagency working group**
22 *to provide assistance and technical expertise to*
23 *enhance the representation and leadership of the*
24 *United States at international bodies that set*
25 *standards for equipment, systems, software, and*

1 *virtually defined networks that support 5th and*
2 *future generation mobile telecommunications sys-*
3 *tems and infrastructure, such as the Inter-*
4 *national Telecommunication Union and the 3rd*
5 *Generation Partnership Project; and*

6 *(B) work with allies, partners, and the pri-*
7 *vate sector to increase productive engagement.*

8 (2) *INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The inter-*
9 *agency working group described in paragraph (1)—*

10 *(A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of*
11 *State or a designee of the Secretary of State; and*

12 *(B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of*
13 *each Federal department or agency the President*
14 *determines appropriate.*

15 (3) *BRIEFINGS.—*

16 *(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days*
17 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, and*
18 *subsequently thereafter as provided under sub-*
19 *paragraph (B), the interagency working group*
20 *described in paragraph (1) shall provide a strat-*
21 *egy to the appropriate congressional committees*
22 *that addresses—*

23 *(i) promotion of United States leader-*
24 *ship at international standards-setting bod-*
25 *ies for equipment, systems, software, and*

1 *virtually defined networks relevant to 5th*
2 *and future generation mobile telecommuni-*
3 *cations systems and infrastructure, taking*
4 *into account the different processes followed*
5 *by the various international standard-set-*
6 *ting bodies;*

7 *(ii) diplomatic engagement with allies*
8 *and partners to share security risk informa-*
9 *tion and findings pertaining to equipment*
10 *that supports or is used in 5th and future*
11 *generation mobile telecommunications sys-*
12 *tems and infrastructure and cooperation on*
13 *mitigating such risks;*

14 *(iii) China's presence and activities at*
15 *international standards-setting bodies rel-*
16 *evant to 5th and future generation mobile*
17 *telecommunications systems and infrastruc-*
18 *ture, including information on the dif-*
19 *ferences in the scope and scale of China's*
20 *engagement at such bodies compared to en-*
21 *gagement by the United States or its allies*
22 *and partners and the security risks raised*
23 *by Chinese proposals in such standards-set-*
24 *ting bodies; and*

1 (iv) engagement with private sector
2 communications and information service
3 providers, equipment developers, academia,
4 Federally funded research and development
5 centers, and other private-sector stakeholders
6 to propose and develop secure standards for
7 equipment, systems, software, and virtually
8 defined networks that support 5th and fu-
9 ture generation mobile telecommunications
10 systems and infrastructure.

11 (B) *SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.*—Upon re-
12 ceiving a request from the appropriate congres-
13 sional committees, or as determined appropriate
14 by the chair of the interagency working group es-
15 tablished pursuant to paragraph (1), the inter-
16 agency working group shall provide such com-
17 mittees an updated briefing that covers the mat-
18 ters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of sub-
19 paragraph (A).

20 **SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CENTRALITY OF SANC-**
21 **TIONS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS TO STRA-**
22 **TEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA.**

23 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress makes the following findings:

24 (1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used
25 as part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy,

1 *are a powerful tool to advance United States foreign*
2 *policy and national security interests.*

3 *(2) Congress has authorized and mandated a*
4 *broad range of sanctions and other restrictions to ad-*
5 *dress malign behavior and incentivize behavior*
6 *change by individuals and entities in the PRC.*

7 *(3) The sanctions and other restrictions author-*
8 *ized and mandated by Congress address a range of*
9 *malign PRC behavior, including—*

10 *(A) intellectual property theft;*

11 *(B) cyber-related economic espionage;*

12 *(C) repression of ethnic minorities;*

13 *(D) other human rights abuses;*

14 *(E) abuses of the international trading sys-*
15 *tem;*

16 *(F) illicit assistance to and trade with the*
17 *Government of the Democratic People’s Republic*
18 *of Korea; and*

19 *(G) drug trafficking, including trafficking*
20 *in fentanyl and other opioids;*

21 *(4) The sanctions and other restrictions described*
22 *in this section include the following:*

23 *(A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights*
24 *Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of*
25 *Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).*

1 (B) *Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and*
2 *Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense*
3 *Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50*
4 *U.S.C. 1708).*

5 (C) *The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C.*
6 *2301 et seq.).*

7 (D) *The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public*
8 *Law 116–149; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).*

9 (E) *Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human*
10 *Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law*
11 *116–76; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).*

12 (F) *Section 6 of the Uyghur Human Rights*
13 *Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22*
14 *U.S.C. 6901 note).*

15 (G) *The Export Control Reform Act of 2018*
16 *(50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).*

17 (H) *Export control measures required to be*
18 *maintained with respect to entities in the tele-*
19 *communications sector of the People’s Republic*
20 *of China, including under section 1260I of the*
21 *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal*
22 *Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92).*

23 (I) *Section 311 of the Countering America’s*
24 *Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2018*
25 *(Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 942).*

1 *(J) The prohibition on the export of covered*
2 *munitions and crime control items to the Hong*
3 *Kong Police Force under the Act entitled “An*
4 *Act to prohibit the commercial export of covered*
5 *munitions and crime control items to the Hong*
6 *Kong Police Force”, approved November 27,*
7 *2019 (Public Law 116–77; 133 Stat. 1173), as*
8 *amended by section 1252 of the William M.*
9 *(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authoriza-*
10 *tion Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–*
11 *283).*

12 *(5) Full implementation of the authorities de-*
13 *scribed in paragraph (4) is required under the respec-*
14 *tive laws described therein and pursuant to the Take*
15 *Care Clause of the Constitution (article II, section 3).*

16 ***(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress***
17 *that—*

18 *(1) the executive branch has not fully imple-*
19 *mented the sanctions and other restrictions described*
20 *in subsection (a)(4) despite the statutory and con-*
21 *stitutional requirements to do so; and*

22 *(2) the President’s full implementation and exe-*
23 *cution of the those authorities is a necessary and es-*
24 *sential component to the success of the United States*
25 *in the strategic competition with China.*

1 **SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7**
2 **AND G20 COUNTRIES.**

3 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*It is the sense of Congress that the*
4 *President, acting through the Secretary of State, should ini-*
5 *tiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on matters rel-*
6 *evant to economic and democratic freedoms, including the*
7 *following:*

8 (1) *Trade and investment issues and enforce-*
9 *ment.*

10 (2) *Building support for international infra-*
11 *structure standards, including those agreed to at the*
12 *G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.*

13 (3) *The erosion of democracy and human rights.*

14 (4) *The security of 5G telecommunications.*

15 (5) *Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-*
16 *tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-*
17 *nies, and other policies and practices.*

18 (6) *Predatory international sovereign lending*
19 *that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic*
20 *Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Paris*
21 *Club principles.*

22 (7) *International influence campaigns.*

23 (8) *Environmental standards.*

24 (9) *Coordination with like-minded regional part-*
25 *ners that are not in the G7 and G20.*

1 **SEC. 213. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART-**
2 **nership.**

3 (a) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
4 *United States—*

5 (1) *to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the*
6 *United States Indo-Pacific strategy;*

7 (2) *to advance the security of Taiwan and its de-*
8 *mocracy as key elements for the continued peace and*
9 *stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and a*
10 *vital national security interest of the United States;*

11 (3) *to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan*
12 *under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8)*
13 *and the “Six Assurances”;*

14 (4) *to support Taiwan’s implementation of its*
15 *asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities*
16 *identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;*

17 (5) *to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spend-*
18 *ing in order to fully resource its defense strategy;*

19 (6) *to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-*
20 *cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-*
21 *fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop*
22 *and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including*
23 *anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, un-*
24 *dersea warfare, advanced command, control, commu-*
25 *nications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and*

1 *reconnaissance, and resilient command and control*
2 *capabilities, into its military forces;*

3 *(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's*
4 *meaningful participation in the United Nations, the*
5 *World Health Assembly, the International Civil Avia-*
6 *tion Organization, the International Criminal Police*
7 *Organization, and other international bodies as ap-*
8 *propriate;*

9 *(8) to advocate for information sharing with*
10 *Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on*
11 *Cancer;*

12 *(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among*
13 *the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded*
14 *partners;*

15 *(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-*
16 *tially through new agreements or resumption of talks*
17 *related to a possible Trade and Investment Frame-*
18 *work Agreement;*

19 *(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-*
20 *ance of a bilateral free trade agreement;*

21 *(12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-*
22 *logical cooperation, including improving supply*
23 *chain security;*

24 *(13) to support United States educational and*
25 *exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-*

1 *moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-*
2 *tory, and politics in Taiwan; and*

3 *(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-*
4 *tween the United States and Taiwan.*

5 *(b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND*
6 *EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.—*

7 *(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-*
8 *TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The*
9 *Secretary of State should consider establishing an*
10 *independent nonprofit that—*

11 *(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between*
12 *the future leaders of Taiwan and the United*
13 *States; and*

14 *(B) works with State and local school dis-*
15 *tricts and educational institutions to send high*
16 *school and university students to Taiwan to*
17 *study the Chinese language, culture, history, pol-*
18 *itics, and other relevant subjects.*

19 *(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts*
20 *and educational institutions, including public univer-*
21 *sities, are encouraged to partner with the Taipei Eco-*
22 *nomic and Cultural Representative Office in the*
23 *United States to establish programs to promote an in-*
24 *crease in educational and cultural exchanges.*

1 **SEC. 214. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.**

2 (a) *SHORT TITLE.*—*This section may be cited as the*
3 *“Taiwan Fellowship Act”.*

4 (b) *FINDINGS.*—*Congress finds the following:*

5 (1) *The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–*
6 *8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States pol-*
7 *icy “to preserve and promote extensive, close, and*
8 *friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations be-*
9 *tween the people of the United States and the people*
10 *on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China main-*
11 *land and all other peoples of the Western Pacific*
12 *area”.*

13 (2) *Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initia-*
14 *tive Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the United*
15 *States has grown its strategic partnership with Tai-*
16 *wan’s vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 people.*

17 (3) *Despite a concerted campaign by the People’s*
18 *Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplo-*
19 *matic partners and from international organizations,*
20 *including the World Health Organization, Taiwan*
21 *has emerged as a global leader in the coronavirus*
22 *global pandemic response, including by donating*
23 *more than 2,000,000 surgical masks and other med-*
24 *ical equipment to the United States.*

25 (4) *The creation of a United States fellowship*
26 *program with Taiwan would support—*

1 (A) a key priority of expanding people-to-
2 people exchanges, which was outlined in Presi-
3 dent Donald J. Trump’s 2017 National Security
4 Strategy;

5 (B) President Joseph R. Biden’s commit-
6 ment to Taiwan, “a leading democracy and a
7 critical economic and security partner,” as ex-
8 pressed in his March 2021 Interim National Se-
9 curity Strategic Guidance; and

10 (C) April 2021 guidance from the Depart-
11 ment of State based on a review required under
12 the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B of
13 title III of division FF of Public Law 116–260)
14 to “encourage U.S. government engagement with
15 Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial re-
16 lationship”.

17 (c) *PURPOSES.*—The purposes of this section are—

18 (1) to further strengthen the United States-Tai-
19 wan strategic partnership and broaden understanding
20 of the Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning
21 officials of agencies of the United States Government
22 to Taiwan for intensive study in Mandarin and
23 placement as Fellows with the governing authorities
24 on Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;

1 (2) *to provide for eligible United States per-*
2 *sonnel to learn or strengthen Mandarin Chinese lan-*
3 *guage skills and to expand their understanding of the*
4 *political economy of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific re-*
5 *gion; and*

6 (3) *to better position the United States to ad-*
7 *vance its economic, security, and human rights inter-*
8 *ests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.*

9 (d) *DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

10 (1) *AGENCY HEAD.—The term “agency head”*
11 *means in the case of the executive branch of United*
12 *States Government, or a legislative branch agency de-*
13 *scribed in paragraph (2), the head of the respective*
14 *agency.*

15 (2) *AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-*
16 *MENT.—The term “agency of the United States Gov-*
17 *ernment” includes the Government Accountability Of-*
18 *fice, Congressional Budget Office, or the Congressional*
19 *Research Service of the legislative branch as well as*
20 *any agency of the executive branch.*

21 (3) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—*
22 *The term “appropriate committees of Congress”*
23 *means—*

24 (A) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
25 *Senate;*

1 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
2 *the Senate;*

3 (C) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
4 *House of Representatives; and*

5 (D) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
6 *House of Representatives.*

7 (4) *DETAILEE.—The term “detailee”—*

8 (A) *means an employee of a branch of the*
9 *United States Government on loan to the Amer-*
10 *ican Institute in Taiwan, without a change of*
11 *position from the agency at which he or she is*
12 *employed; and*

13 (B) *a legislative branch employee from the*
14 *Government Accountability Office, Congressional*
15 *Budget Office, or the Congressional Research*
16 *Service.*

17 (5) *IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term “imple-*
18 *menting partner” means any United States organiza-*
19 *tion described in 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue*
20 *Code of 1986 that—*

21 (A) *performs logistical, administrative, and*
22 *other functions, as determined by the Depart-*
23 *ment of State and the American Institute of Tai-*
24 *wan in support of the Taiwan Fellowship Pro-*
25 *gram; and*

1 (B) enters into a cooperative agreement
2 with the American Institute in Taiwan to ad-
3 minister the Taiwan Fellowship Program.

4 (e) *ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PRO-*
5 *GRAM.—*

6 (1) *ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State*
7 *shall establish the “Taiwan Fellowship Program” (re-*
8 *ferred to in this subsection as the “Program”)* to pro-
9 *vide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to 2*
10 *years for eligible United States citizens. The Depart-*
11 *ment of State, in consultation with the American In-*
12 *stitute in Taiwan and the implementing partner,*
13 *may modify the name of the Program.*

14 (2) *COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT.—*

15 (A) *IN GENERAL.—The American Institute*
16 *in Taiwan should use amounts appropriated*
17 *pursuant to subsection (h)(1) to enter into an*
18 *annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with*
19 *an appropriate implementing partner.*

20 (B) *FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department of*
21 *State, in consultation with the American Insti-*
22 *tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the imple-*
23 *menting partner, should award to eligible United*
24 *States citizens, subject to available funding—*

1 (i) approximately 5 fellowships during
2 the first 2 years of the Program; and

3 (ii) approximately 10 fellowships dur-
4 ing each of the remaining years of the Pro-
5 gram.

6 (3) *INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLEMENTING*
7 *PARTNER.*—Not later than 30 days after the date of
8 the enactment of this Act, the American Institute in
9 Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of
10 State, should—

11 (A) begin negotiations with the Taipei Eco-
12 nomic and Cultural Representative Office, or
13 with another appropriate entity, for the purpose
14 of entering into an agreement to facilitate the
15 placement of fellows in an agency of the gov-
16 erning authorities on Taiwan; and

17 (B) begin the process of selecting an imple-
18 menting partner, which—

19 (i) shall agree to meet all of the legal
20 requirements required to operate in Tai-
21 wan; and

22 (ii) shall be composed of staff who dem-
23 onstrate significant experience managing
24 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific re-
25 gion.

1 (4) *CURRICULUM.*—

2 (A) *FIRST YEAR.*—*During the first year of*
3 *each fellowship under this subsection, each fellow*
4 *should study—*

5 (i) *the Mandarin Chinese language;*

6 (ii) *the people, history, and political*
7 *climate on Taiwan; and*

8 (iii) *the issues affecting the relation-*
9 *ship between the United States and the*
10 *Indo-Pacific region.*

11 (B) *SECOND YEAR.*—*During the second year*
12 *of each fellowship under this subsection, each fel-*
13 *low, subject to the approval of the Department of*
14 *State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and*
15 *the implementing partner, and in accordance*
16 *with the purposes of this section, should work*
17 *in—*

18 (i) *a parliamentary office, ministry, or*
19 *other agency of the governing authorities on*
20 *Taiwan; or*

21 (ii) *an organization outside of the gov-*
22 *erning authorities on Taiwan, whose inter-*
23 *ests are associated with the interests of the*
24 *fellow and the agency of the United States*

1 *Government from which the fellow had been*
2 *employed.*

3 (5) *FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.*—*Not-*
4 *withstanding any requirement under this subsection,*
5 *the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Amer-*
6 *ican Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the*
7 *implementing partner, may award fellowships that*
8 *have a duration of less than two years, and may alter*
9 *the curriculum requirements under paragraph (4) for*
10 *such purposes.*

11 (6) *SUNSET.*—*The fellowship program under this*
12 *subsection shall terminate 7 years after the date of the*
13 *enactment of this Act.*

14 (f) *PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.*—

15 (1) *ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.*—*A United*
16 *States citizen is eligible for a fellowship under sub-*
17 *section (e) if he or she—*

18 (A) *is an employee of the United States*
19 *Government;*

20 (B) *has received at least one exemplary per-*
21 *formance review in his or her current United*
22 *States Government role within at least the last*
23 *three years prior to beginning the fellowship;*

24 (C) *has at least 2 years of experience in any*
25 *branch of the United States Government;*

1 (D) has a demonstrated professional or edu-
2 cational background in the relationship between
3 the United States and countries in the Indo-Pa-
4 cific region; and

5 (E) has demonstrated his or her commit-
6 ment to further service in the United States Gov-
7 ernment.

8 (2) *RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.*—Each re-
9 cipient of a fellowship under subsection (e) shall
10 agree, as a condition of such fellowship—

11 (A) to maintain satisfactory progress in
12 language training and appropriate behavior in
13 Taiwan, as determined by the Department of
14 State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as
15 appropriate, its implementing partner;

16 (B) to refrain from engaging in any intel-
17 ligence or intelligence-related activity on behalf
18 of the United States Government; and

19 (C) to continue Federal Government em-
20 ployment for a period of not less than 4 years
21 after the conclusion of the fellowship or for not
22 less than 2 years for a fellowship that is 1 year
23 or shorter.

24 (3) *RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING PART-*
25 *NER.*—

1 (A) *SELECTION OF FELLOWS.*—*The imple-*
2 *menting partner, in close coordination with the*
3 *Department of State and the American Institute*
4 *in Taiwan, shall—*

5 (i) *make efforts to recruit fellowship*
6 *candidates who reflect the diversity of the*
7 *United States;*

8 (ii) *select fellows for the Taiwan Fel-*
9 *lowship Program based solely on merit,*
10 *with appropriate supervision from the De-*
11 *partment of State and the American Insti-*
12 *tute in Taiwan; and*

13 (iii) *prioritize the selection of can-*
14 *didates willing to serve a fellowship lasting*
15 *1 year or longer.*

16 (B) *FIRST YEAR.*—*The implementing part-*
17 *ner should provide each fellow in the first year*
18 *(or shorter duration, as jointly determined by the*
19 *Department of State and the American Institute*
20 *in Taiwan for those who are not serving a 2-*
21 *year fellowship) with—*

22 (i) *intensive Mandarin Chinese lan-*
23 *guage training; and*

1 (ii) courses in the political economy of
2 Taiwan, China, and the broader Indo-Pa-
3 cific.

4 (C) *WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAINING.*—The
5 Department of State, in coordination with the
6 American Institute in Taiwan and, as appro-
7 priate, the implementing partner, may waive
8 any of the training required under subparagraph
9 (B) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin lan-
10 guage skills, knowledge of the topic described in
11 subparagraph (B)(ii), or for other related rea-
12 sons approved by the Department of State and
13 the American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the
14 training requirements are waived for a fellow
15 serving a 2-year fellowship, the training portion
16 of his or her fellowship may be shortened to the
17 extent appropriate.

18 (D) *OFFICE; STAFFING.*—The implementing
19 partner, in consultation with the Department of
20 State and the American Institute in Taiwan,
21 may maintain an office and at least 1 full-time
22 staff member in Taiwan—

23 (i) to liaise with the American Insti-
24 tute in Taiwan and the governing authori-
25 ties on Taiwan; and

1 (ii) to serve as the primary in-country
2 point of contact for the recipients of fellow-
3 ships under this section and their depend-
4 ents.

5 (E) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The implementing
6 partner may perform other functions in associa-
7 tion in support of the Taiwan Fellowship Pro-
8 gram, including logistical and administrative
9 functions, as prescribed by the Department of
10 State and the American Institute in Taiwan.

11 (4) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

12 (A) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails to
13 comply with the requirements under this sub-
14 section shall reimburse the American Institute in
15 Taiwan for—

16 (i) the Federal funds expended for the
17 fellow's participation in the fellowship, as
18 set forth in subparagraphs (B) and (C); and

19 (ii) interest accrued on such funds
20 (calculated at the prevailing rate).

21 (B) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow
22 who violates subparagraph (A) or (B) of para-
23 graph (2) shall reimburse the American Institute
24 in Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of—

1 (i) all of the Federal funds expended
2 for the fellow's participation in the fellow-
3 ship; and

4 (ii) interest on the amount specified in
5 clause (i), which shall be calculated at the
6 prevailing rate.

7 (C) *PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.*—Any fel-
8 low who violates paragraph (2)(C) shall reim-
9 burse the American Institute in Taiwan in an
10 amount equal to the difference between—

11 (i) the amount specified in subpara-
12 graph (B); and

13 (ii) the product of—

14 (I) the amount the fellow received
15 in compensation during the final year
16 of the fellowship, including the value of
17 any allowances and benefits received
18 by the fellow; multiplied by

19 (II) the percentage of the period
20 specified in paragraph (2)(C) during
21 which the fellow did not remain em-
22 ployed by the Federal Government.

23 (5) *ANNUAL REPORT.*—Not later than 90 days
24 after the selection of the first class of fellows under
25 this section, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the

1 *Department of State shall offer to brief the appro-*
2 *priate committees of Congress regarding the following*
3 *issues:*

4 *(A) An assessment of the performance of the*
5 *implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes*
6 *of this section.*

7 *(B) The names and sponsoring agencies of*
8 *the fellows selected by the implementing partner*
9 *and the extent to which such fellows represent the*
10 *diversity of the United States.*

11 *(C) The names of the parliamentary offices,*
12 *ministries, other agencies of the governing au-*
13 *thorities on Taiwan, and nongovernmental insti-*
14 *tutions to which each fellow was assigned during*
15 *the second year of the fellowship.*

16 *(D) Any recommendations, as appropriate,*
17 *to improve the implementation of the Taiwan*
18 *Fellowship Program, including added flexibilities*
19 *in the administration of the program.*

20 *(E) An assessment of the Taiwan Fellow-*
21 *ship Program's value upon the relationship be-*
22 *tween the United States and Taiwan or the*
23 *United States and Asian countries.*

24 *(6) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—*

1 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*The financial records of*
2 *any implementing partner shall be audited an-*
3 *nually in accordance with generally accepted au-*
4 *ditting standards by independent certified public*
5 *accountants or independent licensed public ac-*
6 *countants who are certified or licensed by a regu-*
7 *latory authority of a State or another political*
8 *subdivision of the United States.*

9 (B) *LOCATION.*—*Each audit under sub-*
10 *paragraph (A) shall be conducted at the place or*
11 *places where the financial records of the imple-*
12 *menting partner are normally kept.*

13 (C) *ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.*—*The imple-*
14 *menting partner shall make available to the ac-*
15 *countants conducting an audit under subpara-*
16 *graph (A)—*

17 (i) *all books, financial records, files,*
18 *other papers, things, and property belonging*
19 *to, or in use by, the implementing partner*
20 *that are necessary to facilitate the audit;*
21 *and*

22 (ii) *full facilities for verifying trans-*
23 *actions with the balances or securities held*
24 *by depositories, fiscal agents, and*
25 *custodians.*

1 (D) *REPORT.*—

2 (i) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 6
3 months after the end of each fiscal year, the
4 implementing partner shall provide a re-
5 port of the audit conducted for such fiscal
6 year under subparagraph (A) to the Depart-
7 ment of State and the American Institute in
8 Taiwan.

9 (ii) *CONTENTS.*—Each audit report
10 shall—

11 (I) set forth the scope of the audit;

12 (II) include such statements,
13 along with the auditor's opinion of
14 those statements, as may be necessary
15 to present fairly the implementing
16 partner's assets and liabilities, surplus
17 or deficit, with reasonable detail;

18 (III) include a statement of the
19 implementing partner's income and ex-
20 penses during the year; and

21 (IV) include a schedule of—

22 (aa) all contracts and cooper-
23 ative agreements requiring pay-
24 ments greater than \$5,000; and

1 *(bb) any payments of com-*
2 *ensation, salaries, or fees at a*
3 *rate greater than \$5,000 per year.*

4 *(iii) COPIES.—Each audit report shall*
5 *be produced in sufficient copies for distribu-*
6 *tion to the public.*

7 *(g) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERNMENT*
8 *SERVICE.—*

9 *(1) IN GENERAL.—*

10 *(A) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the ap-*
11 *proval of the Secretary of State, an agency head*
12 *may detail, for a period of not more than 2*
13 *years, an employee of the agency of the United*
14 *States Government who has been awarded a fel-*
15 *lowship under this section, to the American In-*
16 *stitute in Taiwan for the purpose of assignment*
17 *to the governing authorities on Taiwan or an or-*
18 *ganization described in subsection (e)(4)(B)(ii).*

19 *(B) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall enter*
20 *into a written agreement with the Federal Gov-*
21 *ernment before receiving a fellowship, in which*
22 *the fellow shall agree—*

23 *(i) to continue in the service of the*
24 *sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship*
25 *for a period of at least 4 years (or at least*

1 2 years if the fellowship duration is 1 year
2 or shorter) unless the detailee is involun-
3 tarily separated from the service of such
4 agency; and

5 (ii) to pay to the American Institute
6 in Taiwan any additional expenses in-
7 curred by the Federal Government in con-
8 nection with the fellowship if the detailee
9 voluntarily separates from service with the
10 sponsoring agency before the end of the pe-
11 riod for which the detailee has agreed to
12 continue in the service of such agency.

13 (C) *EXCEPTION.*—The payment agreed to
14 under subparagraph (B)(ii) may not be required
15 of a detailee who leaves the service of the spon-
16 soring agency to enter into the service of another
17 agency of the United States Government unless
18 the head of the sponsoring agency notifies the
19 detailee before the effective date of entry into the
20 service of the other agency that payment will be
21 required under this subsection.

22 (2) *STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.*—A
23 detailee—

24 (A) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving
25 allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and

1 *other benefits, to be an employee of the spon-*
2 *soring agency;*

3 *(B) is entitled to pay, allowances, and bene-*
4 *fits from funds available to such agency, which*
5 *is deemed to comply with section 5536 of title 5,*
6 *United States Code; and*

7 *(C) may be assigned to a position with an*
8 *entity described in section (f)(4)(B)(i) if accept-*
9 *ance of such position does not involve—*

10 *(i) the taking of an oath of allegiance*
11 *to another government; or*

12 *(ii) the acceptance of compensation or*
13 *other benefits from any foreign government*
14 *by such detailee.*

15 (3) *RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING AGEN-*
16 *CY.—*

17 *(A) IN GENERAL.—The Federal agency from*
18 *which a detailee is detailed should provide the*
19 *fellow allowances and benefits that are consistent*
20 *with Department of State Standardized Regula-*
21 *tions or other applicable rules and regulations,*
22 *including—*

23 *(i) a living quarters allowance to cover*
24 *the cost of housing in Taiwan;*

1 (ii) a cost of living allowance to cover
2 any possible higher costs of living in Tai-
3 wan;

4 (iii) a temporary quarters subsistence
5 allowance for up to 7 days if the fellow is
6 unable to find housing immediately upon
7 arriving in Taiwan;

8 (iv) an education allowance to assist
9 parents in providing the fellow's minor chil-
10 dren with educational services ordinarily
11 provided without charge by public schools
12 in the United States;

13 (v) moving expenses to transport per-
14 sonal belongings of the fellow and his or her
15 family in their move to Taiwan, which is
16 comparable to the allowance given for
17 American Institute in Taiwan employees
18 assigned to Taiwan; and

19 (vi) an economy-class airline ticket to
20 and from Taiwan for each fellow and the
21 fellow's immediate family.

22 (B) *MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.*—The
23 American Institute in Taiwan and its imple-
24 menting partner, with the approval of the De-
25 partment of State, may modify the benefits set

1 *forth in subparagraph (A) if such modification*
2 *is warranted by fiscal circumstances.*

3 (4) *NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.*—*The American*
4 *Institute in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and*
5 *any governing authorities on Taiwan or nongovern-*
6 *mental entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is de-*
7 *tailed during the second year of the fellowship may*
8 *not be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or any*
9 *other benefit normally provided to the detailee.*

10 (5) *REIMBURSEMENT.*—*Fellows may be detailed*
11 *under paragraph (1)(A) without reimbursement to the*
12 *United States by the American Institute in Taiwan.*

13 (6) *ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.*—*Detailees may*
14 *be paid by the American Institute in Taiwan for the*
15 *allowances and benefits listed in paragraph (3).*

16 (h) *FUNDING.*—

17 (1) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—
18 *There are authorized to be appropriated to the Amer-*
19 *ican Institute in Taiwan—*

20 (A) *for fiscal year 2022, \$2,900,000, of*
21 *which—*

22 (i) *\$500,000 shall be used to launch the*
23 *Taiwan Fellowship Program through a*
24 *competitive cooperative agreement with an*
25 *appropriate implementing partner;*

1 (ii) \$2,300,000 shall be used to fund a
2 cooperative agreement with the appropriate
3 implementing partner; and

4 (iii) \$100,000 shall be used for man-
5 agement expenses of the American Institute
6 in Taiwan related to the management of the
7 Taiwan Fellowship Program; and

8 (B) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc-
9 ceeding fiscal year, \$2,400,000, of which—

10 (i) \$2,300,000 shall be used to fund a
11 cooperative agreement with an appropriate
12 implementing partner; and

13 (ii) \$100,000 shall be used for manage-
14 ment expenses of the American Institute in
15 Taiwan related to the management of the
16 Taiwan Fellowship Program.

17 (2) *PRIVATE SOURCES.*—The implementing part-
18 ner selected to implement the Taiwan Fellowship Pro-
19 gram may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or dona-
20 tions of services or property in carrying out such pro-
21 gram, subject to the review and approval of the Amer-
22 ican Institute in Taiwan.

23 (i) *STUDY AND REPORT.*—Not later than one year
24 prior to the sunset of the fellowship program under sub-
25 section (e), the Comptroller General of the United States

1 *shall conduct a study and submit to the Committee on For-*
2 *ign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign*
3 *Affairs of the House a report that includes—*

4

5 *(A) an analysis of the United States Gov-*
6 *ernment participants in this program, including*
7 *the number of applicants and the number of fel-*
8 *lowships undertaken, the place of employment,*
9 *and as assessment of the costs and benefits for*
10 *participants and for the United States Govern-*
11 *ment of such fellowships;*

12 *(B) an analysis of the financial impact of*
13 *the fellowship on United States Government of-*
14 *fices which have provided Fellows to participate*
15 *in the program; and*

16 *(C) recommendations, if any, on how to im-*
17 *prove the fellowship program.*

18 **SEC. 215. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.**

19 *(a) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State and other*
20 *United States Government departments and agencies shall*
21 *engage with the democratically elected government of Tai-*
22 *wan as the legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan*
23 *and end the outdated practice of referring to the government*
24 *in Taiwan as the “Taiwan authorities”. Notwithstanding*
25 *the continued supporting role of the American Institute in*

1 *Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and*
2 *protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United*
3 *States Government shall not place any restrictions on the*
4 *ability of officials of the Department of State and other*
5 *United States Government departments and agencies to*
6 *interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the*
7 *Taiwan government.*

8 (b) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.*—*Nothing in this para-*
9 *graph shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-*
10 *matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or al-*
11 *tering the United States Government’s position on Tai-*
12 *wan’s international status.*

13 **SEC. 216. TAIWAN SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY.**

14 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 90 days after the*
15 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State*
16 *shall rescind any contact guideline, internal restriction, sec-*
17 *tion of the Foreign Affairs Manual or Foreign Affairs*
18 *Handbook, related guidance, or related policies that, explic-*
19 *itly or implicitly, including through restrictions or limita-*
20 *tions on activities of United States personnel, limits the*
21 *ability of members of the armed forces of the Republic of*
22 *China (Taiwan) and government representatives from the*
23 *Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office*
24 *(TECRO) to display for official purposes symbols of Repub-*
25 *lic of China sovereignty, including—*

1 (1) *the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan);*
2 *and*

3 (2) *the corresponding emblems or insignia of*
4 *military units.*

5 (b) *OFFICIAL PURPOSES DEFINED.—In this section,*
6 *the term “official purposes” means—*

7 (1) *the wearing of official uniforms;*

8 (2) *conducting government-hosted ceremonies or*
9 *functions; and*

10 (3) *appearances on Department of State social*
11 *media accounts promoting engagements with Taiwan.*

12 (c) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section*
13 *shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic re-*
14 *lations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering*
15 *the United States Government’s position on Taiwan’s inter-*
16 *national status.*

17 **SEC. 217. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PAN-**
18 **DEMIC.**

19 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
20 *that—*

21 (1) *it is critical to understand the origins of the*
22 *COVID-19 pandemic so the United States can better*
23 *prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health*
24 *threats in the future;*

1 (2) *given the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic*
2 *on all Americans, the American people deserve to*
3 *know what information the United States Govern-*
4 *ment possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as ap-*
5 *propriate;*

6 (3) *Congress shares the concerns expressed by the*
7 *United States Government and 13 other foreign gov-*
8 *ernments that the international team of experts dis-*
9 *patched to the People’s Republic of China by the*
10 *World Health Organization (WHO) to study the ori-*
11 *gins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was “significantly de-*
12 *layed and lacked access to complete, original data*
13 *and samples”;*

14 (4) *the March 30, 2021, statement by the Direc-*
15 *tor-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom*
16 *Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative*
17 *team had encountered “difficulties” in accessing nec-*
18 *essary raw data, that “we have not yet found the*
19 *source of the virus,” and that “all hypotheses remain*
20 *on the table”;* and

21 (5) *it is critical for independent experts to have*
22 *full access to all pertinent human, animal, and envi-*
23 *ronmental data, live virus samples, research, and per-*
24 *sonnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak rel-*
25 *evant to determining how this pandemic emerged.*

1 (b) *REPORT REQUIRED.*—Not later than 180 days
2 after enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
3 ligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Sec-
4 retary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of En-
5 ergy, and other relevant executive departments, shall submit
6 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report con-
7 sisting of—

8 (1) *an assessment of the most likely source or or-*
9 *igin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a detailed*
10 *review of all information the United States possesses*
11 *that it has identified as potentially relevant to the*
12 *source or origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including*
13 *zoonotic transmission and spillover, the Wuhan Insti-*
14 *tute of Virology (WIV), or other sources of origin,*
15 *transmission, or spillover, based on the information*
16 *the United States Government has to date;*

17 (2) *an identification of the leading credible theo-*
18 *ries of the etiology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by the*
19 *United States Government, the steps the United*
20 *States has taken to validate those theories, and any*
21 *variance in assessment or dissent among or between*
22 *United States intelligence agencies, executive agencies,*
23 *and executive offices of the most likely source or ori-*
24 *gin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and the basis for such*
25 *variance or dissent;*

1 (3) a description of all steps the United States
2 Government has taken to identify and investigate the
3 source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a
4 timeline of such efforts;

5 (4) a detailed description of the data to which
6 the United States and the WHO have requested and
7 have access to in order to determine the origin of the
8 source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus;

9 (5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooperate
10 with, impede, or obstruct any inquiry or investiga-
11 tion to determine the source and transmission of
12 SARS-CoV-2 virus, including into a possible lab
13 leak, or to create or spread misinformation or
14 disinformation regarding the source and transmission
15 of SARS-CoV-2 virus by the PRC or CCP, including
16 by national and local governmental and health enti-
17 ties;

18 (6) a detailed account of information known to
19 the United States Government regarding the WIV and
20 associated facilities, including research activities on
21 coronaviruses and gain-of-function research, any re-
22 ported illnesses of persons associated with the labora-
23 tory with symptoms consistent with COVID-19 and
24 the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of research rel-
25 evant to coronaviruses;

1 (7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC
2 that require disclosure and cooperation in the event of
3 a viral outbreak like SARS-CoV-2; and

4 (8) an overview of United States engagement
5 with the PRC with respect to coronaviruses that in-
6 cludes—

7 (A) a detailed accounting of United States
8 engagement with the WIV and similar labs in
9 the PRC specific to coronaviruses, including a
10 detailed accounting of United States Govern-
11 ment-sponsored research and funding and diplo-
12 matic engagements such as “track 1.5” and
13 “track 2” engagements; and

14 (B) an assessment of any additional scru-
15 tiny of United States Government funding to
16 support gain-of-function research in the PRC
17 after the moratorium on such funding was lifted
18 in 2017, and whether United States Government
19 funding was used to support gain-of-function re-
20 search in the PRC, during the moratorium on
21 gain-of-function research (2014–2017).

22 (c) *FORM.*—The report required by subsection (b) shall
23 be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classi-
24 fied annex.

1 (d) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
2 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
3 *of Congress” means—*

4 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
5 *Senate;*

6 (2) *the Select Committee on Intelligence of the*
7 *Senate;*

8 (3) *the Committee on Health, Education, Labor,*
9 *and Pensions of the Senate;*

10 (4) *the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-*
11 *sources of the Senate;*

12 (5) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
13 *House of Representatives;*

14 (6) *the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-*
15 *ligence of the House of Representatives; and*

16 (8) *the Committee on Energy and Commerce of*
17 *the House of Representatives.*

18 **SEC. 218. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND**
19 **ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH PACIFIC IS-**
20 **LAND COUNTRIES.**

21 (a) *AUTHORITY.*—*The Secretary of State and Sec-*
22 *retary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Em-*
23 *ployed Staff in Pacific island countries for the purpose of*
24 *providing increased diplomatic support and promoting in-*

1 *creased economic and commercial engagement between the*
2 *United States and Pacific Island countries.*

3 *(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—*

4 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to*
5 *be appropriated or otherwise made available to the*
6 *Department of State and the Department of Com-*
7 *merce for fiscal year 2022, not more than*
8 *\$10,000,000, respectively, shall be available to carry*
9 *out the purposes of this section.*

10 *(2) TERMINATION.—The availability of funds in*
11 *paragraph (1) shall expire on October 1, 2026.*

12 *(c) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date*
13 *of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for*
14 *5 years, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Com-*
15 *merce shall provide to the appropriate committees of Con-*
16 *gress a report on the activities of the Department of State*
17 *and Department of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in*
18 *Pacific island countries, which shall include—*

19 *(1) a detailed description of the additional diplo-*
20 *matic, economic, and commercial engagement and ac-*
21 *tivities in the Pacific island countries provided by*
22 *Locally Employed Staff; and*

23 *(2) an assessment of the impact of the activities*
24 *with respect to the diplomatic, economic, and security*
25 *interests of the United States.*

1 (d) *EXCEPTION FOR AMERICAN SAMOA.*—*The Sec-*
 2 *retary of State may, as appropriate, treat the territory of*
 3 *American Samoa as a foreign country for purposes of car-*
 4 *rying out this section.*

5 (e) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
 6 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
 7 *of Congress” means—*

8 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
 9 *Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-*
 10 *tation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-*
 11 *sources, and the Committee on Appropriations of the*
 12 *Senate; and*

13 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
 14 *mittee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on*
 15 *Natural Resources, and the Committee on Appropria-*
 16 *tions of the House of Representatives.*

17 **SEC. 219. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL**
 18 **AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PA-**
 19 **CIFIC.**

20 (a) *FINDINGS.*—*Congress makes the following findings:*

21 (1) *In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State*
 22 *allocated \$1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in*
 23 *bilateral and regional foreign assistance (FA) re-*
 24 *sources, including as authorized by section 201(b) of*
 25 *the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public*

1 *Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and \$798,000,000 in*
2 *the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE)*
3 *budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the*
4 *DE budget and only 4 percent of the total Depart-*
5 *ment of State-USAID budget.*

6 (2) *Over the last 5 years the DE budget and per-*
7 *sonnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 per-*
8 *cent of the total, while FA resources averaged only 4*
9 *percent of the total.*

10 (3) *In 2020, the Department of State began a*
11 *process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure*
12 *that its personnel footprint matches the demands of*
13 *great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pa-*
14 *cific.*

15 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
16 *that—*

17 (1) *the size of the United States diplomatic corps*
18 *must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging*
19 *challenges of the 21st century, including those posed*
20 *by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere;*

21 (2) *the increase must be designed to meet the ob-*
22 *jectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on*
23 *strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of*
24 *states that adhere to and uphold the rules-based inter-*
25 *national order; and*

1 (3) *the increase must be implemented with a*
2 *focus on increased numbers of economic, political, and*
3 *public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative*
4 *increase of at least 200 foreign service officer general-*
5 *ists, to—*

6 (A) *advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade*
7 *and open investment environments for United*
8 *States companies, and engaged in increased com-*
9 *mercial diplomacy in key markets;*

10 (B) *better articulate and explain United*
11 *States policies, strengthen civil society and*
12 *democratic principles, enhance reporting on Chi-*
13 *nese the PRC's global activities, promote people-*
14 *to-people exchanges, and advance United States*
15 *influence; and*

16 (C) *increase capacity at small- and me-*
17 *dium-sized embassies and consulates in the Indo-*
18 *Pacific and other regions around the world, as*
19 *necessary.*

20 (c) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—*

21 (1) *It shall be the policy of the United States to*
22 *ensure Department of State funding levels and per-*
23 *sonnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's*
24 *high degree of importance and significance to United*
25 *States political, economic, and security interests.*

1 (2) *It shall be the policy of the United States to*
2 *increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of per-*
3 *sonnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective*
4 *to the Department of State's total budget.*

5 (3) *It shall be the policy of the United States to*
6 *increase the number of resident Defense attachés in*
7 *the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in locations*
8 *where the People's Republic of China has a resident*
9 *military attaché but the United States does not, to as-*
10 *sure coverage of all appropriate posts.*

11 (d) *ACTION PLAN.*—*Not later than 180 days after the*
12 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State*
13 *shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress an*
14 *action plan with the following elements:*

15 (1) *Identification of requirements to advance*
16 *United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific*
17 *and the personnel and budgetary resources needed to*
18 *meet them, assuming an unconstrained resource envi-*
19 *ronment.*

20 (2) *A plan to increase the portion of the Depart-*
21 *ment's budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms*
22 *of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and*
23 *security assistance.*

24 (3) *A plan to increase the number of positions*
25 *at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with*

1 *responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a*
2 *description of increases at each post or bureau, a*
3 *breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of*
4 *how such increases in personnel will advance United*
5 *States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.*

6 *(4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks*
7 *that the Department will meet in implementing the*
8 *action plan.*

9 *(5) A description of any barriers to imple-*
10 *menting the action plan.*

11 *(e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 90*
12 *days after the submission of the action plan described in*
13 *subsection (c), the Secretary shall submit an update and*
14 *brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the imple-*
15 *mentation of such action plan, with supporting data and*
16 *including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.*

17 *(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
18 *authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022,*
19 *\$2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assistance*
20 *resources to carry out the purposes of part 1 and chapter*
21 *4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.*
22 *2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and*
23 *\$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the*
24 *Indo-Pacific region.*

1 (g) *INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU-*
2 *ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.—*
3 *Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (f)*
4 *include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to*
5 *section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of*
6 *2018 (Public Law 115–409).*

7 (h) *SECRETARY OF STATE CERTIFICATION.—Not later*
8 *than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act,*
9 *the Secretary of State shall certify, to the appropriate com-*
10 *mittees of Congress, whether or not the benchmarks de-*
11 *scribed in the action plan in subsection (c) have been met.*
12 *This certification is non-delegable.*

13 **SEC. 219A. ADVANCING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN**
14 **THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.**

15 (a) *ESTABLISHMENT.—*

16 (1) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall*
17 *establish, within the Bureau of International Organi-*
18 *zation Affairs of the Department of State, a Special*
19 *Representative for Advancing United States Leader-*
20 *ship in the United Nations (referred to in this section*
21 *as the “Special Representative”). The Special Rep-*
22 *resentative shall serve concurrently as a Deputy As-*
23 *istant Secretary in the Bureau of International Or-*
24 *ganization Affairs of the Department of State. The*
25 *Special Representative shall report directly to the As-*

1 *stant Secretary for the Bureau of International Or-*
2 *ganization Affairs, in coordination and consultation*
3 *with the Representative of the United States to the*
4 *United Nations.*

5 *(b) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special Representative*
6 *shall assume responsibility for—*

7 *(1) promoting United States leadership and par-*
8 *ticipation in the United Nations system, with a focus*
9 *on issue areas where authoritarian nations are exer-*
10 *cising increased influence in and determining the*
11 *agenda of the United Nations system;*

12 *(2) highlighting how investments in the United*
13 *Nations advance United States interests and enable*
14 *stronger coalitions to hold authoritarian regimes to*
15 *account;*

16 *(3) ensuring United States emphasis on the need*
17 *for United Nations employees to uphold the principals*
18 *of impartiality enshrined in the United Nations char-*
19 *ter, rules, and regulations;*

20 *(4) monitoring and developing and imple-*
21 *menting plans to counter undue influence, especially*
22 *by authoritarian nations, within the United Nations*
23 *system;*

24 *(5) assessing how United States decisions to*
25 *withdraw from United Nations bodies impacts United*

1 *States influence at the United Nations and multilat-*
2 *eral global initiatives;*

3 *(6) promoting the participation and inclusion of*
4 *Taiwan in the United Nations system;*

5 *(7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations*
6 *jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other*
7 *qualified nationals to promote for these positions;*

8 *(8) tracking leadership changes in United Na-*
9 *tions secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and*
10 *developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-*
11 *minded states are assembled to ensure leadership*
12 *racers are not won by countries that do not share*
13 *United States interests;*

14 *(9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant*
15 *by the Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity of*
16 *the United Nations system;*

17 *(10) eliminating current barriers to the employ-*
18 *ment of United States nationals in the United Na-*
19 *tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and*

20 *(11) increasing the number of qualified United*
21 *States candidates for leadership and oversight posi-*
22 *tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-*
23 *grams, agencies, and at other international organiza-*
24 *tions.*

1 (c) *SUPPORT.*—*The Secretary of State shall make any*
2 *necessary adjustments to the current structure of the Bureau*
3 *of International Organization Affairs, including the respec-*
4 *tive roles and responsibilities of offices in that Bureau, to*
5 *ensure appropriate support for the mission and work of the*
6 *Special Representative.*

7 (d) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There is*
8 *authorized to be appropriated \$5,000,000 for fiscal years*
9 *2022 through 2026 to carry out the responsibilities under*
10 *subsection (b).*

11 **SEC. 219B. ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.**

12 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
13 *that—*

14 (1) *the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of*
15 *the world’s most dynamic democracies, economic op-*
16 *portunities, as well as many challenges to United*
17 *States interests and values as a result of the growth*
18 *in authoritarian governance in the region and by*
19 *broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the*
20 *changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to*
21 *human rights principles and obligations;*

22 (2) *the People’s Republic of China poses a par-*
23 *ticular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally*
24 *recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic*
25 *and trade practices, disregards international laws*

1 *and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign*
2 *influence operations, and enables global digital*
3 *authoritarianism;*

4 *(3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018*
5 *(referred to in this section as “ARIA”) enhances the*
6 *United States’ commitment in the Indo-Pacific region*
7 *by—*

8 *(A) expanding its defense cooperation with*
9 *its allies and partners;*

10 *(B) investing in democracy and the protec-*
11 *tion of human rights;*

12 *(C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives;*
13 *and*

14 *(D) supporting people-to-people engagement*
15 *and other shared priorities; and*

16 *(4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific*
17 *Strategy Report concludes that ARIA “enshrines a*
18 *generational whole-of-government policy framework*
19 *that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and*
20 *open Indo-Pacific region”.*

21 *(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—The Asia*
22 *Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409)*
23 *is amended—*

24 *(1) in section 201(b), by striking*
25 *“\$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019*

1 *through 2023” and inserting “\$2,000,000,000 for each*
2 *of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026”;*

3 *(2) in section 215(b), by striking “2023” and in-*
4 *serting “2026”;*

5 *(3) in section 306(a)—*

6 *(A) in paragraph (1), by striking “5 years”*
7 *and inserting “8 years”; and*

8 *(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “2023”*
9 *and inserting “2026”;*

10 *(4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking “2023” and*
11 *inserting “2026”;*

12 *(5) in section 410—*

13 *(A) in subsection (c), by striking “2023”*
14 *and inserting “2026”; and*

15 *(B) in subsection (d), in the matter pre-*
16 *ceding paragraph (1), by striking “2023” and*
17 *inserting “2026”; and*

18 *(6) in section 411, by striking “2023” and in-*
19 *serting “2026”.*

20 **SEC. 219C. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON NEED FOR RECI-**
21 **PROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN**
22 **THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE’S RE-**
23 **PUBLIC OF CHINA.**

24 *(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
25 *United States—*

1 (1) *to clearly differentiate, in official statements,*
2 *media communications, and messaging, between the*
3 *people of China and the Communist Party of China;*

4 (2) *that any negotiations toward a trade agree-*
5 *ment with the People’s Republic of China should be*
6 *concluded in a manner that addresses unfair trading*
7 *practices by the People’s Republic of China;*

8 (3) *that such an agreement should, to the extent*
9 *possible—*

10 (A) *ensure that the People’s Republic of*
11 *China commits to structural changes in its trade*
12 *and economic policies;*

13 (B) *hold the People’s Republic of China ac-*
14 *countable to those commitments; and*

15 (C) *promote access to reciprocal direct in-*
16 *vestment; and*

17 (4) *to seek and develop a relationship with the*
18 *People’s Republic of China that is founded on the*
19 *principles of basic reciprocity across sectors, includ-*
20 *ing economic, diplomatic, educational, and commu-*
21 *nications sectors.*

22 (b) *REPORT REQUIRED.—*

23 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
24 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
25 *State, in consultation with other relevant Federal de-*

1 *partments and agencies, shall submit to the appro-*
2 *prate congressional committees a report on the man-*
3 *ner in which the Government of the People's Republic*
4 *of China creates barriers to the work of United States*
5 *diplomats and other officials, journalists, and busi-*
6 *nesses, and nongovernmental organizations based in*
7 *the United States, in the People's Republic of China.*

8 (2) *ELEMENTS.*—*The report required by para-*
9 *graph (1) shall include the following:*

10 (A) *A summary of obstacles that United*
11 *States diplomats and other officials, journalists,*
12 *and businesses encounter in carrying out their*
13 *work in the People's Republic of China.*

14 (B) *A summary of the obstacles Chinese*
15 *diplomats and other officials, journalists, and*
16 *businesses encounter while working in the United*
17 *States.*

18 (C) *A description of the efforts that officials*
19 *of the United States have made to rectify any*
20 *differences in the treatment of diplomats and*
21 *other officials, journalists, and businesses by the*
22 *United States and by the People's Republic of*
23 *China, and the results of those efforts.*

24 (D) *An assessment of the adherence of the*
25 *Government of the People's Republic of China, in*

1 *its treatment of United States citizens, to the re-*
2 *quirements of—*

3 *(i) the Convention on Consular Rela-*
4 *tions, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and*
5 *entered into force March 19, 1967 (21*
6 *U.S.T. 77); and*

7 *(ii) the Consular Convention, signed at*
8 *Washington September 17, 1980, and en-*
9 *tered into force February 19, 1982, between*
10 *the United States and the People’s Republic*
11 *of China.*

12 *(E) An assessment of any impacts of the*
13 *People’s Republic of China’s internet restrictions*
14 *on reciprocity between the United States and the*
15 *People’s Republic of China.*

16 *(F) A summary of other notable areas where*
17 *the Government of the People’s Republic of*
18 *China or entities affiliated with that Govern-*
19 *ment are able to conduct activities or invest-*
20 *ments in the United States but that are denied*
21 *to United States entities in the People’s Republic*
22 *of China.*

23 *(G) Recommendations on efforts that the*
24 *Government of the United States could undertake*
25 *to improve reciprocity in the relationship be-*

1 *tween the United States and the People’s Repub-*
 2 *lic of China.*

3 (3) *FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.—*

4 (A) *FORM.—The report required by para-*
 5 *graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified*
 6 *form, but may include a classified index.*

7 (B) *AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified por-*
 8 *tion of the report required by paragraph (1)*
 9 *shall be posted on a publicly available internet*
 10 *website of the Department of State.*

11 (4) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES*
 12 *DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate*
 13 *congressional committees” means the Committee on*
 14 *Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on*
 15 *Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.*

16 (c) *RECIPROCITY DEFINED.—In this section, the term*
 17 *“reciprocity” means the mutual and equitable exchange of*
 18 *privileges between governments, countries, businesses, or in-*
 19 *dividuals.*

20 **SEC. 219D. OPPOSITION TO PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO**
 21 **PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY ASIAN DE-**
 22 **VELOPMENT BANK.**

23 (a) *FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

24 (1) *Through the Asian Development Bank, coun-*
 25 *tries are eligible to borrow from the Bank until they*

1 *can manage long-term development and access to cap-*
2 *ital markets without financial resources from the*
3 *Bank.*

4 (2) *The Bank uses the gross national income per*
5 *capita benchmark used by the International Bank for*
6 *Reconstruction and Development to trigger the grad-*
7 *uation process. For fiscal year 2021, the graduation*
8 *discussion income is a gross national income per cap-*
9 *ita exceeding \$7,065.*

10 (3) *The People’s Republic of China exceeded the*
11 *graduation discussion income threshold in 2016.*

12 (4) *Since 2016, the Asian Development Bank has*
13 *continued to approve loans and technical assistance*
14 *to the People’s Republic of China totaling*
15 *\$7,600,000,000. The Bank has also approved non-sov-*
16 *ereign commitments in the People’s Republic of China*
17 *totaling \$1,800,000,000 since 2016.*

18 (5) *The World Bank calculates the People’s Re-*
19 *public of China’s most recent year (2019) gross na-*
20 *tional income per capita as \$10,390.*

21 (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
22 *United States to oppose any additional lending from the*
23 *Asian Development Bank to the People’s Republic of China*
24 *as a result of the People’s Republic of China’s successful*

1 *graduation from the eligibility requirements for assistance*
 2 *from the Bank.*

3 (c) *OPPOSITION TO LENDING TO PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC*
 4 *OF CHINA.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct*
 5 *the United States Executive Director of the Asian Develop-*
 6 *ment Bank to use the voice, vote, and influence of the*
 7 *United States to oppose any loan or extension of financial*
 8 *or technical assistance by the Asian Development Bank to*
 9 *the People’s Republic of China.*

10 **SEC. 219E. OPPOSITION TO PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO**
 11 **PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY INTER-**
 12 **NATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND**
 13 **DEVELOPMENT.**

14 (a) *FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

15 (1) *The People’s Republic of China is the world’s*
 16 *second largest economy and a major global lender.*

17 (2) *In February 2021, the People’s Republic of*
 18 *China’s foreign exchange reserves totaled more than*
 19 *\$3,200,000,000,000.*

20 (3) *The World Bank classifies the People’s Re-*
 21 *public of China as having an upper-middle-income*
 22 *economy.*

23 (4) *On February 25, 2021, President Xi Jinping*
 24 *announced “complete victory” over extreme poverty in*
 25 *the People’s Republic of China.*

1 (5) *The Government of China utilizes state re-*
2 *sources to create and promote the Asian Infrastruc-*
3 *ture Investment Bank, the New Development Bank,*
4 *and the Belt and Road Initiative.*

5 (6) *The People's Republic of China is the world's*
6 *largest official creditor.*

7 (7) *Through the International Bank for Recon-*
8 *struction and Development, countries are eligible to*
9 *borrow from the Bank until they can manage long-*
10 *term development and access to capital markets with-*
11 *out financial resources from the Bank.*

12 (8) *The World Bank reviews the graduation of a*
13 *country from eligibility to borrow from the Inter-*
14 *national Bank for Reconstruction and Development*
15 *once the country reaches the graduation discussion in-*
16 *come, which is equivalent to the gross national in-*
17 *come. For fiscal year 2021, the graduation discussion*
18 *income is a gross national income per capita exceed-*
19 *ing \$7,065.*

20 (9) *The People's Republic of China exceeded the*
21 *graduation discussion income threshold in 2016.*

22 (10) *Since 2016, the International Bank for Re-*
23 *construction and Development has approved projects*
24 *totaling \$8,930,000,000 to the People's Republic of*
25 *China.*

1 (11) *The World Bank calculates the People’s Re-*
2 *public of China’s most recent year (2019) gross na-*
3 *tional income per capita as \$10,390.*

4 (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
5 *United States to oppose any additional lending from the*
6 *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to*
7 *the People’s Republic of China as a result of the People’s*
8 *Republic of China’s successful graduation from the eligi-*
9 *bility requirements for assistance from the Bank.*

10 (c) *OPPOSITION TO LENDING TO PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC*
11 *OF CHINA.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct*
12 *the United States Executive Director of the International*
13 *Bank for Reconstruction and Development to use the voice,*
14 *vote, and influence of the United States—*

15 (1) *to oppose any loan or extension of financial*
16 *or technical assistance by the International Bank for*
17 *Reconstruction and Development to the People’s Re-*
18 *public of China; and*

19 (2) *to end lending and assistance to countries*
20 *that exceed the graduation discussion income of the*
21 *Bank.*

22 (d) *REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than one year*
23 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually*
24 *thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the*
25 *Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Com-*

1 *mittee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign*
2 *Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that in-*
3 *cludes—*

4 (1) *an assessment of the status of borrowing by*
5 *the People’s Republic of China from the World Bank;*

6 (2) *a list of countries that have exceeded the*
7 *graduation discussion income at the International*
8 *Bank for Reconstruction and Development;*

9 (3) *a list of countries that have graduated from*
10 *eligibility for assistance from the Bank; and*

11 (4) *a description of the efforts taken by the*
12 *United States to graduate countries from such eligi-*
13 *bility once they exceed the graduation discussion in-*
14 *come.*

15 **SEC. 219F. UNITED STATES POLICY ON CHINESE AND RUS-**
16 **SIAN GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE**
17 **THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL**
18 **ACTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.**

19 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—*

20 (1) *notes with growing concern that the People’s*
21 *Republic of China and Russia have, at the United*
22 *Nations, aligned with one another in blocking Secu-*
23 *rity Council action on Syria, Myanmar, Zimbabwe,*
24 *Venezuela, and other countries credibly accused of*
25 *committing human rights abuses;*

1 (2) *recognizes that it is not only the use of the*
2 *veto on the United Nations Security Council, but also*
3 *the threat of the use of a veto, that can prevent the*
4 *Security Council from taking actions aimed at pro-*
5 *tecting human rights;*

6 (3) *condemns efforts by China and Russia to un-*
7 *dermine United Nations Security Council actions*
8 *aimed at censuring governments credibly accused of*
9 *committing or permitting the commission of human*
10 *rights violations; and*

11 (4) *denounces the tactical alignment between the*
12 *People's Republic of China and Russia within the*
13 *United Nations Security Council to challenge the pro-*
14 *tection of human rights and the guarantee of humani-*
15 *tarian access.*

16 (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of*
17 *the United States to—*

18 (1) *reaffirm its commitment to maintain inter-*
19 *national peace and security, develop friendly relations*
20 *among nations, and cooperate in solving inter-*
21 *national problems and promoting respect for human*
22 *rights;*

23 (2) *highlight efforts by the People's Republic of*
24 *China and Russia to undermine international peace*

1 *and security, protect human rights, and guarantee*
2 *humanitarian access to those in need;*

3 *(3) increase the role and presence of the United*
4 *States at the United Nations and its constituent bod-*
5 *ies to advance United States interests, including by*
6 *counteracting malign Chinese and Russian influence;*
7 *and*

8 *(4) urge allies and like-minded partners to work*
9 *together with the United States to overcome Chinese*
10 *and Russian efforts to weaken the United Nations Se-*
11 *curity Council by preventing it from carrying out its*
12 *core mandate.*

13 **SEC. 219G. DETERRING PRC USE OF FORCE AGAINST TAI-**
14 **WAN.**

15 *(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
16 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
17 *of Congress” means—*

18 *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
19 *Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-*
20 *mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and*

21 *(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
22 *mittee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select*
23 *Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-*
24 *tives.*

1 (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—*It shall be the policy of*
2 *the United States—*

3 (1) *to strenuously oppose any action by the Peo-*
4 *ple’s Republic of China to use force to change the sta-*
5 *tus quo on Taiwan; and*

6 (2) *that, in order to deter the use of force by the*
7 *People’s Republic of China to change the status quo*
8 *on Taiwan, the United States should coordinate with*
9 *allies and partners to identify and develop significant*
10 *economic, diplomatic, and other measures to deter*
11 *and impose costs on any such action by the People’s*
12 *Republic of China, and to bolster deterrence by ar-*
13 *ticulating such policies publicly, as appropriate and*
14 *in alignment with United States interests.*

15 (c) *WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT REVIEW.*—*Not later than*
16 *14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the*
17 *President shall convene the heads of all relevant Federal de-*
18 *partments and agencies to conduct a whole-of-government*
19 *review of all available economic, diplomatic, and other*
20 *measures to deter the use of force by the People’s Republic*
21 *of China to change the status quo of Taiwan.*

22 (d) *BRIEFING REQUIRED.*—*Not later than 90 days*
23 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90*
24 *days thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, the Sec-*
25 *retary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec-*

1 *power operations and the united front campaign supported*
2 *by the Government of the People's Republic of China and*
3 *the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward per-*
4 *sons or entities in Taiwan.*

5 (b) *ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-*
6 *section (a) shall include the following elements:*

7 (1) *Development of a response to PRC propa-*
8 *ganda and disinformation campaigns and cyber-in-*
9 *trusions targeting Taiwan, including—*

10 (A) *assistance in building the capacity of*
11 *the Taiwan government and private-sector enti-*
12 *ties to document and expose propaganda and*
13 *disinformation supported by the Government of*
14 *the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Com-*
15 *munist Party, or affiliated entities;*

16 (B) *assistance to enhance the Taiwan gov-*
17 *ernment's ability to develop a whole-of-govern-*
18 *ment strategy to respond to sharp power oper-*
19 *ations, including election interference; and*

20 (C) *media training for Taiwan officials and*
21 *other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation*
22 *campaigns.*

23 (2) *Development of a response to political influ-*
24 *ence operations that includes an assessment of the ex-*
25 *tent of influence exerted by the Government of the*

1 *People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Com-*
2 *munist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, fi-*
3 *nancial institutions, media organizations, and other*
4 *entities.*

5 *(3) Support for exchanges and other technical as-*
6 *sistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s abil-*
7 *ity to respond to sharp power operations.*

8 *(4) Establishment of a coordinated partnership,*
9 *through the Global Cooperation and Training Frame-*
10 *work, with like-minded governments to share data*
11 *and best practices with the Government of Taiwan on*
12 *ways to address sharp power operations supported by*
13 *the Government of the People’s Republic of China and*
14 *the Chinese Communist Party.*

15 **SEC. 219I. STUDY AND REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO**
16 **ADDRESS CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING.**

17 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:*

18 *(1) In January 2020, the DEA named China as*
19 *the primary source of United States-bound illicit*
20 *fentanyl and synthetic opioids.*

21 *(2) While in 2019 China instituted domestic con-*
22 *trols on the production and exportation of fentanyl,*
23 *some of its variants, and two precursors known as*
24 *NPP and 4-ANPP, China has not yet expanded its*
25 *class scheduling to include many fentanyl precursors*

1 *such as 4-AP, which continue to be trafficked to sec-*
2 *ond countries in which they are used in the final pro-*
3 *duction of United States-bound fentanyl and other*
4 *synthetic opioids.*

5 *(3) The DEA currently maintains a presence in*
6 *Beijing but continues to seek Chinese approval to*
7 *open offices in the major shipping hubs of Guangzhou*
8 *and Shanghai.*

9 *(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

10 *(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—*
11 *The term “appropriate committees of Congress”*
12 *means—*

13 *(A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the*
14 *Senate;*

15 *(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
16 *the Senate;*

17 *(C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the*
18 *House of Representative; and*

19 *(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
20 *House of Representatives.*

21 *(2) CHINA.—The term “China” means the Peo-*
22 *ple’s Republic of China.*

23 *(3) DEA.—The term “DEA” means the Drug*
24 *Enforcement Administration.*

1 (4) *PRECURSORS.*—*The term “precursors” means*
2 *chemicals used in the illicit production of fentanyl*
3 *and related synthetic opioid variants.*

4 (c) *CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND*
5 *SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.*—*Not later than 180*
6 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-*
7 *retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the*
8 *appropriate committees of Congress a written report—*

9 (1) *detailing a description of United States Gov-*
10 *ernment efforts to gain a commitment from the Chi-*
11 *nese Government to submit unregulated fentanyl pre-*
12 *cursor such as 4-AP to controls; and*

13 (2) *a plan for future steps the United States*
14 *Government will take to urge China to combat illicit*
15 *fentanyl production and trafficking originating in*
16 *China.*

17 (d) *ESTABLISHMENT OF DEA OFFICES IN CHINA.*—
18 *Not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, the*
19 *Secretary of State and Attorney General shall provide to*
20 *the appropriate committees of Congress a classified briefing*
21 *on—*

22 (1) *outreach and negotiations undertaken by the*
23 *United States Government with the Chinese Govern-*
24 *ment aimed at securing its approval for the establish-*

1 *ment of DEA offices in Shanghai and Guangzhou*
 2 *China; and*

3 *(2) additional efforts to establish new partner-*
 4 *ships with provincial-level authorities to counter the*
 5 *illicit trafficking of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and*
 6 *their precursors.*

7 *(e) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under*
 8 *subsection (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.*

9 **SEC. 219J. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AF-**
 10 **RICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB-**
 11 **BEAN.**

12 *(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—*

13 *(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish*
 14 *a comprehensive United States strategy for public*
 15 *and private investment, trade, and development in*
 16 *Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.*

17 *(2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required*
 18 *by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing exports of*
 19 *United States goods and services to Africa and Latin*
 20 *America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real*
 21 *dollar value by the date that is 10 years after the date*
 22 *of the enactment of this Act.*

23 *(3) CONSULTATIONS.—In developing the strategy*
 24 *required by paragraph (1), the President shall consult*
 25 *with—*

1 (A) Congress;

2 (B) each agency that is a member of the
3 Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee;

4 (C) the relevant multilateral development
5 banks, in coordination with the Secretary of the
6 Treasury and the respective United States Exec-
7utive Directors of such banks;

8 (D) each agency that participates in the
9 Trade Policy Staff Committee established;

10 (E) the President's Export Council;

11 (F) each of the development agencies;

12 (G) any other Federal agencies with respon-
13sibility for export promotion or financing and
14development; and

15 (H) the private sector, including businesses,
16nongovernmental organizations, and African and
17Latin American and Caribbean diaspora groups.

18 (4) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—

19 (A) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days
20after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
21President shall submit to Congress the strategy
22required by subsection (a).

23 (B) PROGRESS REPORT.—Not later than 3
24years after the date of the enactment of this Act,
25the President shall submit to Congress a report

1 *on the implementation of the strategy required*
2 *by paragraph (1).*

3 **(b) SPECIAL AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE**
4 **CARIBBEAN EXPORT STRATEGY COORDINATORS.**—*The*
5 *President shall designate an individual to serve as Special*
6 *Africa Export Strategy Coordinator and an individual to*
7 *serve as Special Latin America and the Caribbean Export*
8 *Strategy Coordinator—*

9 *(1) to oversee the development and implementa-*
10 *tion of the strategy required by subsection (a); and*

11 *(2) to coordinate developing and implementing*
12 *the strategy with—*

13 *(A) the Trade Promotion Coordinating*
14 *Committee;*

15 *(B) the Assistant United States Trade Rep-*
16 *resentative for African Affairs or the Assistant*
17 *United States Trade Representative for the West-*
18 *ern Hemisphere, as appropriate;*

19 *(C) the Assistant Secretary of State for Af-*
20 *rican Affairs or the Assistant Secretary of State*
21 *for Western Hemisphere Affairs, as appropriate;*

22 *(D) the Export-Import Bank of the United*
23 *States;*

24 *(E) the United States International Devel-*
25 *opment Finance Corporation; and*

1 (F) *the development agencies.*

2 (c) *TRADE MISSIONS TO AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA*
3 *AND THE CARIBBEAN.*—*It is the sense of Congress that, not*
4 *later than one year after the date of the enactment of this*
5 *Act, the Secretary of Commerce and other high-level officials*
6 *of the United States Government with responsibility for ex-*
7 *port promotion, financing, and development should conduct*
8 *a joint trade missions to Africa and to Latin America and*
9 *the Caribbean.*

10 (d) *TRAINING.*—*The President shall develop a plan—*

11 (1) *to standardize the training received by*
12 *United States and Foreign Commercial Service offi-*
13 *cers, economic officers of the Department of State,*
14 *and economic officers of the United States Agency for*
15 *International Development with respect to the pro-*
16 *grams and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of*
17 *the United States, the United States International*
18 *Development Finance Corporation, the Small Busi-*
19 *ness Administration, and the United States Trade*
20 *and Development Agency; and*

21 (2) *to ensure that, not later than one year after*
22 *the date of the enactment of this Act—*

23 (A) *all United States and Foreign Commer-*
24 *cial Service officers that are stationed overseas*

1 *receive the training described in paragraph (1);*
2 *and*

3 *(B) in the case of a country to which no*
4 *United States and Foreign Commercial Service*
5 *officer is assigned, any economic officer of the*
6 *Department of State stationed in that country*
7 *receives that training.*

8 *(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

9 *(1) DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES.—The term “devel-*
10 *opment agencies” means the United States Depart-*
11 *ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-*
12 *national Development, the Millennium Challenge Cor-*
13 *poration, the United States International Develop-*
14 *ment Finance Corporation, the United States Trade*
15 *and Development Agency, the United States Depart-*
16 *ment of Agriculture, and relevant multilateral devel-*
17 *opment banks.*

18 *(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS.—The*
19 *term “multilateral development banks” has the mean-*
20 *ing given that term in section 1701(c)(4) of the Inter-*
21 *national Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C.*
22 *262r(c)(4)) and includes the African Development*
23 *Foundation.*

24 *(3) TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE.—The*
25 *term “Trade Policy Staff Committee” means the*

1 *Trade Policy Staff Committee established pursuant to*
 2 *section 2002.2 of title 15, Code of Federal Regula-*
 3 *tions.*

4 (4) *TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COM-*
 5 *MITTEE.—The term “Trade Promotion Coordinating*
 6 *Committee” means the Trade Promotion Coordi-*
 7 *nating Committee established under section 2312 of*
 8 *the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C.*
 9 *4727).*

10 (5) *UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL*
 11 *SERVICE.—The term “United States and Foreign*
 12 *Commercial Service” means the United States and*
 13 *Foreign Commercial Service established by section*
 14 *2301 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15*
 15 *U.S.C. 4721).*

16 **SEC. 219K. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVEST-**
 17 **MENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF**
 18 **INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT**
 19 **ACT OF 2018.**

20 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
 21 *that support provided under section 1421(c)(1) of the Better*
 22 *Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of*
 23 *2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1)) should be considered to be a*
 24 *Federal credit program that is subject to the Federal Credit*

1 *Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of*
 2 *applying the requirements of such Act to such support.*

3 (b) *MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.*—Section 1433
 4 *of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Develop-*
 5 *ment Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking*
 6 *“\$60,000,000,000” and inserting “\$100,000,000,000”.*

7 ***Subtitle B—International Security***
 8 ***Matters***

9 ***SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.***

10 *In this subtitle:*

11 (1) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.*—

12 *The term “appropriate committees of Congress”*
 13 *means—*

14 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
 15 *Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-*
 16 *mittee on Appropriations of the Senate; and*

17 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the*
 18 *Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-*
 19 *mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-*
 20 *resentatives.*

21 (2) *COMPANY.*—*The term “company” means any*
 22 *corporation, company, limited liability company,*
 23 *limited partnership, business trust, business associa-*
 24 *tion, or other similar entity.*

1 (3) *OTHER SECURITY FORCES.*—The term “other
2 *security forces*”—

3 (A) *includes national security forces that*
4 *conduct maritime security; and*

5 (B) *does not include self-described militias*
6 *or paramilitary organizations.*

7 **SEC. 222. FINDINGS.**

8 *Congress makes the following findings:*

9 (1) *The People’s Republic of China aims to use*
10 *its growing military might in concert with other in-*
11 *struments of its national power to displace the United*
12 *States in the Indo-Pacific and establish hegemony*
13 *over the region.*

14 (2) *The military balance of power in the Indo-*
15 *Pacific region is growing increasingly unfavorable to*
16 *the United States because—*

17 (A) *the PRC is rapidly modernizing and*
18 *expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project*
19 *power and create contested areas across the en-*
20 *tire Indo-Pacific region;*

21 (B) *PLA modernization has largely focused*
22 *on areas where it possesses operational advan-*
23 *tages and can exploit weaknesses in the United*
24 *States suite of capabilities; and*

1 (C) current United States force structure
2 and presence do not sufficiently counter threats
3 in the Indo-Pacific, as United States allies,
4 bases, and forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific re-
5 gion are concentrated in large bases that are
6 highly vulnerable to the PRC's strike capabili-
7 ties.

8 (3) This shift in the regional military balance
9 and erosion of conventional and strategic deterrence
10 in the Indo-Pacific region—

11 (A) presents a substantial and imminent
12 risk to the security of the United States; and

13 (B) left unchecked, could—

14 (i) embolden the PRC to take actions,
15 including the use of military force, to
16 change the status quo before the United
17 States can mount an effective response; and

18 (ii) alter the nuclear balance in the
19 Indo-Pacific.

20 (4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish
21 confidence among United States allies and partners
22 in the strength of United States commitments, even to
23 the extent that these nations feel compelled to band-
24 wagon with the PRC to protect their interests. The
25 PRC is closely monitoring the United States reaction

1 to PRC pressure and coercion of United States allies,
2 searching for indicators of United States resolve.

3 (5) Achieving so-called “reunification” of Tai-
4 wan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC to
5 achieve its regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC
6 has increased the frequency and scope of its exercises
7 and operations targeting Taiwan, such as amphibious
8 assault and live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait,
9 PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan, and
10 flights across the unofficial median line in the Tai-
11 wan Strait. The Government of the PRC’s full sub-
12 mission of Hong Kong potentially accelerates the
13 timeline of a Taiwan scenario, and makes the defense
14 of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.

15 (6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to—

16 (A) defending the people of Taiwan;

17 (B) limiting the PLA’s ability to project
18 power beyond the First Island Chain, including
19 to United States territory, such as Guam and
20 Hawaii;

21 (C) defending the territorial integrity of
22 Japan;

23 (D) preventing the PLA from diverting
24 military planning, resources, and personnel to
25 broader military ambitions; and

1 *(E) retaining the United States credibility*
2 *as a defender of the democratic values and free-*
3 *market principles embodied by Taiwan’s people*
4 *and government;*

5 *(7) The PRC capitalized on the world’s attention*
6 *to COVID–19 to advance its military objectives in the*
7 *South China Sea, intensifying and accelerating*
8 *trends already underway. The PRC has sent milita-*
9 *rized survey vessels into the Malaysian Exclusive Eco-*
10 *nom ic Zone, announced the establishment of an ad-*
11 *ministrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Is-*
12 *lands under the Chinese local government of Sansha,*
13 *aimed a fire control radar at a Philippine navy ship,*
14 *encroached on Indonesia’s fishing grounds, sunk a Vi-*
15 *etnamese fishing boat, announced new “research sta-*
16 *tions” on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef, landed spe-*
17 *cial military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef to routinize*
18 *such deployments, and sent a flotilla of over 200 mili-*
19 *tia vessels to Whitsun Reef, a feature within the ex-*
20 *clusive economic zone of the Philippines.*

21 *(8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State*
22 *clarified United States policy on the South China Sea*
23 *and stated that “Beijing’s claims to offshore resources*
24 *across most of the South China Sea are completely*
25 *unlawful”.*

1 (9) *These actions in the South China Sea enable*
2 *the PLA to exert influence and project power deeper*
3 *into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil*
4 *Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, tes-*
5 *tified in 2019, “In short, China is now capable of*
6 *controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short*
7 *of war with the United States.”.*

8 (10) *The PLA also continues to advance its*
9 *claims in the East China Sea, including through a*
10 *high number of surface combatant patrols and fre-*
11 *quent entry into the territorial waters of the Senkaku*
12 *Islands, over which the United States recognizes Ja-*
13 *pan’s administrative control. In April 2014, Presi-*
14 *dent Barack Obama stated, “Our commitment to Ja-*
15 *pan’s security is absolute and article five of the U.S.-*
16 *Japan security treaty covers all territory under Ja-*
17 *pan’s administration, including the Senkaku is-*
18 *lands.”.*

19 (11) *On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Mi-*
20 *chael R. Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea is*
21 *part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine*
22 *forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China*
23 *Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Ar-*
24 *ticle 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”.*

1 (12) *The PLA also continues to advance its in-*
2 *fluence over the Korean Peninsula, including through*
3 *a series of joint air exercises with the Russian Fed-*
4 *eration in the Republic of Korea's Air Defense Identi-*
5 *fication Zone.*

6 (13) *The PLA is modernizing and gaining crit-*
7 *ical capability in every branch and every domain, in-*
8 *cluding—*

9 (A) *positioning the PLA Navy to become a*
10 *great maritime power or “blue-water” navy that*
11 *can completely control all activity within the*
12 *First Island Chain and project power beyond it*
13 *with a fleet of 425 battle force ships by 2030;*

14 (B) *increasing the size and range of its*
15 *strike capabilities, including approximately*
16 *1,900 ground-launched short- and intermediate-*
17 *range missiles capable of targeting United States*
18 *allies and partners in the First and Second Is-*
19 *land chains, United States bases in the Indo-Pa-*
20 *cific, and United States forces at sea;*

21 (C) *boosting capabilities for air warfare, in-*
22 *cluding with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters and*
23 *S-400 air defense systems, new J-20 5th genera-*
24 *tion stealth fighters, advanced H-6 bomber*

1 *variants, a long-range stealth bomber, and Y-20*
2 *heavy lift aircraft;*

3 *(D) making critical investments in new do-*
4 *mains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, elec-*
5 *tronic warfare, and space warfare; and*

6 *(E) increasing the size of its nuclear stock-*
7 *pile and delivery systems.*

8 *(14) The PRC is pursuing this modernization*
9 *through all means at its disposal, including its Mili-*
10 *tary-Civil Fusion initiative, which enlists the whole*
11 *of PRC society in developing and acquiring tech-*
12 *nology with military applications to pursue techno-*
13 *logical advantage over the United States in artificial*
14 *intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed energy*
15 *weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space*
16 *weapons, and other emerging capabilities.*

17 *(15) The United States lead in the development*
18 *of science and technology relevant to defense is erod-*
19 *ing in the face of competition from the PRC. United*
20 *States research and development spending on defense*
21 *capabilities has declined sharply as a share of global*
22 *research and development. The commercial sector's*
23 *leading role in innovation presents certain unique*
24 *challenges to the Department of Defense's reliance on*
25 *technology for battlefield advantage.*

1 (16) *The PRC has vastly increased domestic re-*
2 *search and development expenditures, supported the*
3 *growth of new cutting-edge industries and tapped into*
4 *a large workforce to invest in fostering science and*
5 *engineering talent.*

6 (17) *The PRC is increasing exports of defense*
7 *and security capabilities to build its defense tech-*
8 *nology and industrial base and improve its own mili-*
9 *tary capabilities, as well as its influence with coun-*
10 *tries that purchase and become dependent on its mili-*
11 *tary systems.*

12 **SEC. 223. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING**
13 **SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PA-**
14 **CIFIC.**

15 *It is the sense of Congress that steps to bolster United*
16 *States security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific must in-*
17 *clude—*

18 (1) *supporting Japan in its development of long-*
19 *range precision fires, munitions, air and missile de-*
20 *fense capacity, interoperability across all domains,*
21 *maritime security, and intelligence, and surveillance*
22 *and reconnaissance capabilities;*

23 (2) *launching a United States-Japan national*
24 *security innovation fund to solicit and support pri-*
25 *vate sector cooperation for new technologies that could*

1 *benefit the United States and Japan’s mutual secu-*
2 *rity objectives;*

3 *(3) promoting a deeper defense relationship be-*
4 *tween Japan and Australia, including supporting re-*
5 *ciprocal access agreements and trilateral United*
6 *States-Japan-Australia intelligence sharing;*

7 *(4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan’s accel-*
8 *erated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities,*
9 *which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan*
10 *from invasion, including long-range precision fires,*
11 *munitions, anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti-*
12 *armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced com-*
13 *mand, control, communications, computers, intel-*
14 *ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (CAISR), and*
15 *resilient command and control capabilities, and in-*
16 *creasing the conduct of relevant and practical train-*
17 *ing and exercises with Taiwan’s defense forces; and*

18 *(5) prioritizing building the capacity of United*
19 *States allies and partners to protect defense tech-*
20 *nology.*

21 **SEC. 224. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

22 *It shall be the policy of the United States to—*

23 *(1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United*
24 *States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for*

1 *achieving United States political and military objec-*
2 *tives in the region;*

3 (2) *exercise freedom of operations in the inter-*
4 *national waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific*
5 *maritime domains, which are critical to the pros-*
6 *perity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific re-*
7 *gion;*

8 (3) *maintain forward-deployed forces in the*
9 *Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber*
10 *presence, integrated missile defense capabilities, long-*
11 *range precision fires, undersea warfare capabilities,*
12 *and diversified and resilient basing and rotational*
13 *presence, including support for pre-positioning strate-*
14 *gies;*

15 (4) *strengthen and deepen the alliances and*
16 *partnerships of the United States to build capacity*
17 *and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships,*
18 *modernize communications architecture, address anti-*
19 *access and area denial challenges, and increase joint*
20 *exercises and security cooperation efforts;*

21 (5) *reaffirm the commitment and support of the*
22 *United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pa-*
23 *cific region, including longstanding United States*
24 *policy regarding—*

1 (A) *Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Co-*
2 *operation and Security between the United*
3 *States and Japan, signed at Washington Janu-*
4 *ary 19, 1960;*

5 (B) *Article III of the Mutual Defense Trea-*
6 *ty between the United States and the Republic of*
7 *Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953;*

8 (C) *Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty*
9 *between the United States and the Republic of*
10 *the Philippines, signed at Washington August*
11 *30, 1951, including that, as the South China Sea*
12 *is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Phil-*
13 *ippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the*
14 *South China Sea will trigger mutual defense ob-*
15 *ligations under Article IV of our mutual defense*
16 *treaty;*

17 (D) *Article IV of the Australia, New Zea-*
18 *land, United States Security Treaty, done at*
19 *San Francisco September 1, 1951; and*

20 (E) *the Southeast Asia Collective Defense*
21 *Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, to-*
22 *gether with the Thanat-Rusk Communique of*
23 *1962;*

24 (6) *collaborate with United States treaty allies*
25 *in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral secu-*

1 *urity and defense cooperation with other regional part-*
2 *ners;*

3 *(7) ensure the continuity of operations by the*
4 *United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific re-*
5 *gion, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with*
6 *partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle*
7 *of freedom of operations in international waters and*
8 *airspace in accordance with established principles*
9 *and practices of international law;*

10 *(8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public*
11 *Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the “Six As-*
12 *surances” provided by the United States to Taiwan*
13 *in July 1982 as the foundations for United States-*
14 *Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent*
15 *possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations of*
16 *the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation*
17 *to support the development of capable, ready, and*
18 *modern forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan;*

19 *(9) enhance security partnerships with India,*
20 *across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the*
21 *Indo-Pacific;*

22 *(10) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the*
23 *PRC against United States and allies’ interests, espe-*
24 *cially along the First Island Chain and in the West-*
25 *ern Pacific, by showing PRC leaders that the United*

1 *States can and is willing to deny them the ability to*
2 *achieve their objectives, including by—*

3 *(A) consistently demonstrating the political*
4 *will of the United States to deepening existing*
5 *treaty alliances and growing new partnerships*
6 *as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched stra-*
7 *tegic advantage to the PRC's growing military*
8 *capabilities and reach;*

9 *(B) maintaining a system of forward-de-*
10 *ployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the*
11 *most visible sign of United States resolve and*
12 *commitment to the region, and as platforms to*
13 *ensure United States operational readiness and*
14 *advance interoperability with allies and part-*
15 *ners;*

16 *(C) adopting a more dispersed force posture*
17 *throughout the region, particularly the Western*
18 *Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for*
19 *United States mobile and relocatable launchers*
20 *for long-range cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic*
21 *weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific region;*

22 *(D) fielding long-range, precision-strike net-*
23 *works to United States and allied forces, includ-*
24 *ing ground-launched cruise missiles, undersea*
25 *and naval capabilities, and integrated air and*

1 *missile defense in the First Island Chain and the*
2 *Second Island Chain, in order to deter and pre-*
3 *vent PRC coercion and aggression, and to maxi-*
4 *mize the United States ability to operate;*

5 *(E) strengthening extended deterrence to en-*
6 *sure that escalation against key United States*
7 *interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeat-*
8 *ing; and*

9 *(F) collaborating with allies and partners*
10 *to accelerate their roles in more equitably shar-*
11 *ing the burdens of mutual defense, including*
12 *through the acquisition and fielding of advanced*
13 *capabilities and training that will better enable*
14 *them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and*

15 *(11) maintain the capacity of the United States*
16 *to impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial,*
17 *reputational, and military costs on the PRC for acts*
18 *of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself*
19 *and its allies regardless of the point of origin of at-*
20 *tacks against them.*

1 **SEC. 225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO-PA-**
2 **CIFIC AND AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-**
3 **TIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME SE-**
4 **CURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUT-**
5 **REACH ACTIVITIES.**

6 (a) *FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING FUNDING.*—In ad-
7 dition to any amount appropriated pursuant to section 23
8 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (relating
9 to foreign military financing assistance), there is author-
10 ized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through
11 fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in
12 accordance with this section—

- 13 (1) \$110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
14 (2) \$125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
15 (3) \$130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
16 (4) \$140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
17 (5) \$150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

18 (b) *SOUTHEAST MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT INI-*
19 *TIATIVE.*—There is authorized to be appropriated
20 \$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for
21 the Department of State for International Narcotics Control
22 and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support of the
23 Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.

24 (c) *DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.*—There is au-
25 thORIZED to be appropriated to the Department of State

1 \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026,
2 which shall be used—

3 (1) to conduct, in coordination with the Depart-
4 ment of Defense, outreach activities, including con-
5 ferences and symposia, to familiarize partner coun-
6 tries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, with the
7 United States' interpretation of international law re-
8 lating to freedom of the seas; and

9 (2) to work with allies and partners in the Indo-
10 Pacific region to better align respective interpreta-
11 tions of international law relating to freedom of the
12 seas, including on the matters of operations by mili-
13 tary ships in exclusive economic zones, innocent pas-
14 sage through territorial seas, and transits through
15 international straits.

16 (d) PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE.—Using
17 amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a), the Sec-
18 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
19 fense, is authorized to provide assistance, for the purpose
20 of increasing maritime security and domain awareness for
21 countries in the Indo-Pacific region—

22 (1) to provide assistance to national military or
23 other security forces of such countries that have mari-
24 time security missions among their functional respon-
25 sibilities;

1 (2) *to provide training to ministry, agency, and*
2 *headquarters level organizations for such forces; and*

3 (3) *to provide assistance and training to other*
4 *relevant foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related*
5 *ministries, agencies, departments, or offices that man-*
6 *age and oversee maritime activities and policy that*
7 *the Secretary of State may so designate.*

8 (e) *DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANCE.*—*Assistance pro-*
9 *vided by the Secretary of State under subsection (g) shall*
10 *be known as the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initia-*
11 *tive” (in this section referred to as the “Initiative”).*

12 (f) *PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.*—*Assistance provided*
13 *through the Initiative may be used to accomplish the fol-*
14 *lowing objectives:*

15 (1) *Retaining unhindered access to and use of*
16 *international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region*
17 *that are critical to ensuring the security and free flow*
18 *of commerce and to achieving United States national*
19 *security objectives.*

20 (2) *Improving maritime domain awareness in*
21 *the Indo-Pacific region.*

22 (3) *Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific region.*

23 (4) *Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking ac-*
24 *tivities and other forms of maritime trafficking activ-*
25 *ity in the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organiza-*

1 *tions that have been determined to be a security*
2 *threat to the United States.*

3 (5) *Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a*
4 *country or regional organization to respond to emerg-*
5 *ing threats to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific*
6 *region.*

7 (6) *Strengthening United States alliances and*
8 *partnerships in Southeast Asia and other parts of the*
9 *Indo-Pacific region.*

10 (g) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—*

11 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Of the amount appropriated*
12 *pursuant to subsection (a) (relating to foreign mili-*
13 *tary financing assistance), there is authorized to be*
14 *appropriated to the Department of State for the Indo-*
15 *Pacific Maritime Security Initiative and other re-*
16 *lated regional programs exactly—*

17 (A) *\$70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;*

18 (B) *\$80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;*

19 (C) *\$90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;*

20 (D) *\$100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and*

21 (E) *\$110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.*

22 (2) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The “Indo-Pacific*
23 *Maritime Security Initiative” and funds authorized*
24 *for the Initiative shall include existing regional pro-*
25 *grams carried out by the Department of State related*

1 *to maritime security, including the Southeast Asia*
2 *Maritime Security Initiative.*

3 *(h) ELIGIBILITY AND PRIORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE.—*

4 *(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall*
5 *use the following considerations when selecting which*
6 *countries in the Indo-Pacific region should receive as-*
7 *sistance pursuant to the Initiative:*

8 *(A) Assistance may be provided to a coun-*
9 *try in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance the ca-*
10 *pabilities of that country according to the objec-*
11 *tives outlined in (f), or of a regional organiza-*
12 *tion that includes that country, to conduct—*

13 *(i) maritime intelligence, surveillance,*
14 *and reconnaissance;*

15 *(ii) littoral and port security;*

16 *(iii) Coast Guard operations;*

17 *(iv) command and control; and*

18 *(v) management and oversight of mari-*
19 *time activities.*

20 *(B) Priority shall be placed on assistance to*
21 *enhance the maritime security capabilities of the*
22 *military or security forces of countries in the*
23 *Indo-Pacific region that have maritime missions*
24 *and the government agencies responsible for such*
25 *forces.*

1 (2) *TYPES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.*—

2 (A) *AUTHORIZED ELEMENTS OF ASSIST-*
3 *ANCE.*—*Assistance provided under paragraph*
4 *(1)(A) may include the provision of equipment,*
5 *training, and small-scale military construction.*

6 (B) *REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF ASSISTANCE*
7 *AND TRAINING.*—*Assistance and training pro-*
8 *vided under subparagraph (A) shall include ele-*
9 *ments that promote—*

10 (i) *the observance of and respect for*
11 *human rights; and*

12 (ii) *respect for legitimate civilian au-*
13 *thority within the country to which the as-*
14 *sistance is provided.*

15 **SEC. 226. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT PILOT**
16 **PROGRAM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

17 (a) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There is*
18 *authorized to be appropriated \$20,000,000 for each of fiscal*
19 *years 2022 and 2023 for the creation of a pilot program*
20 *for foreign military financing (FMF) compacts.*

21 (b) *ASSISTANCE.*—

22 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State is au-*
23 *thorized to create a pilot program, for a duration of*
24 *two years, with an assessment for any additional or*
25 *permanent programming, to provide assistance under*

1 *this section for each country that enters into an FMF*
2 *Challenge Compact with the United States pursuant*
3 *to subsection (d) to support policies and programs*
4 *that advance the progress of the country in achieving*
5 *lasting security and civilian-military governance*
6 *through respect for human rights, good governance*
7 *(including transparency and free and fair elections),*
8 *and cooperation with United States and international*
9 *counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking, and counter-crime*
10 *efforts and programs.*

11 (2) *FORM OF ASSISTANCE.*—*Assistance under*
12 *this subsection may be provided in the form of grants,*
13 *cooperative agreements, contracts, or no-interest loans*
14 *to the government of an eligible country described in*
15 *subsection (c).*

16 (c) *ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.*—

17 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*A country shall be a can-*
18 *didate country for purposes of eligibility for assist-*
19 *ance for fiscal years 2022 and 2023 if—*

20 (A) *the country is classified as a lower mid-*
21 *dle income country in the then-most recent edi-*
22 *tion of the World Development Report for Recon-*
23 *struction and Development published by the*
24 *International Bank for Reconstruction and De-*
25 *velopment and has an income greater than the*

1 *historical ceiling for International Development*
2 *Association eligibility for the fiscal year in-*
3 *volved; and*

4 *(B) the Secretary of State determines that*
5 *the country is committed to seeking just and*
6 *democratic governance, including with a dem-*
7 *onstrated commitment to—*

8 *(i) the promotion of political plu-*
9 *ralism, equality, and the rule of law;*

10 *(ii) respect for human and civil rights;*

11 *(iii) protection of private property*
12 *rights;*

13 *(iv) transparency and accountability*
14 *of government;*

15 *(v) anti-corruption; and*

16 *(vi) the institution of effective civilian*
17 *control, professionalization, and respect for*
18 *human rights by and the accountability of*
19 *the armed forces.*

20 *(2) IDENTIFICATION OF ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—*

21 *Not later than 90 days prior to the date on which the*
22 *Secretary of State determines eligible countries for an*
23 *FMM Challenge Compact, the Secretary—*

24 *(A) shall prepare and submit to the appro-*
25 *priate congressional committees a report that*

1 *contains a list of all eligible countries identified*
2 *that have met the requirements under paragraph*
3 *(1) for the fiscal year; and*

4 *(B) shall consult with the appropriate con-*
5 *gressional committees on the extent to which such*
6 *countries meet the criteria described in para-*
7 *graph (1).*

8 *(d) FMF CHALLENGE COMPACT.—*

9 *(1) COMPACT.—The Secretary of State may pro-*
10 *vide assistance for an eligible country only if the*
11 *country enters into an agreement with the United*
12 *States, to be known as an “FMF Challenge Compact”*
13 *(in this subsection referred to as a “Compact”) that*
14 *establishes a multi-year plan for achieving shared se-*
15 *curity objectives in furtherance of the purposes of this*
16 *title.*

17 *(2) ELEMENTS.—The elements of the Compact*
18 *shall be those listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for deter-*
19 *mining eligibility, and be designed to significantly*
20 *advance the performance of those commitments during*
21 *the period of the Compact.*

22 *(3) IN GENERAL.—The Compact should take into*
23 *account the national strategy of the eligible country*
24 *and shall include—*

1 (A) *the specific objectives that the country*
2 *and the United States expect to achieve during*
3 *the term of the Compact, including both how the*
4 *foreign military financing under the Compact*
5 *will advance shared security interests and ad-*
6 *vance partner capacity building efforts as well*
7 *as to advance national efforts towards just and*
8 *democratic governance;*

9 (B) *the responsibilities of the country and*
10 *the United States in the achievement of such ob-*
11 *jectives;*

12 (C) *regular benchmarks to measure, where*
13 *appropriate, progress toward achieving such ob-*
14 *jectives; and*

15 (D) *the strategy of the eligible country to*
16 *sustain progress made toward achieving such ob-*
17 *jectives after expiration of the Compact.*

18 (e) *CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION PRIOR TO COM-*
19 *PACT NEGOTIATIONS.—Not later than 15 days before com-*
20 *mencing negotiations of a Compact with an eligible coun-*
21 *try, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appro-*
22 *priate congressional committees with respect to the proposed*
23 *Compact negotiation and shall identify the objectives and*
24 *mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of the Compact.*

1 (f) *ASSESSMENT OF PILOT PROGRAM AND REC-*
2 *COMMENDATIONS.*—*Not later than 90 days after the conclu-*
3 *sion of the pilot program, the Secretary of State shall pro-*
4 *vide a report to the appropriate congressional committees*
5 *with respect to the pilot program, including an assessment*
6 *of the success and utility of the pilot program established*
7 *under this subsection in meeting United States objectives*
8 *and a recommendation with respect to whether to continue*
9 *a further foreign military financing compact program on*
10 *a pilot or permanent basis.*

11 **SEC. 227. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILI-**
12 **TARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE**
13 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

14 *There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fis-*
15 *cal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department*
16 *of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise made*
17 *available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the*
18 *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (re-*
19 *lating to international military education and training*
20 *(IMET) assistance), \$45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-*
21 *Pacific region in accordance with this Act.*

22 **SEC. 228. PRIORITIZING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE TRANS-**
23 **FERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

24 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
25 *that the United States Government should prioritize the re-*

1 *view of excess defense article transfers to Indo-Pacific part-*
2 *ners.*

3 (b) *FIVE-YEAR PLAN.*—*Not later than 90 days after*
4 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall*
5 *develop a five-year plan to prioritize excess defense article*
6 *transfers to the Indo-Pacific and provide a report describ-*
7 *ing such plan to the appropriate committees of Congress.*

8 (c) *TRANSFER AUTHORITY.*—*Section 516(c)(2) of the*
9 *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)) is*
10 *amended by inserting “, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and*
11 *Malaysia” after “and to the Philippines”.*

12 (d) *REQUIRED COORDINATION.*—*The United States*
13 *Government shall coordinate and align excess defense article*
14 *transfers with capacity building efforts of regional allies*
15 *and partners.*

16 (e) *TAIWAN.*—*Taiwan shall receive the same benefits*
17 *conferred for the purposes of transfers pursuant to section*
18 *516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.*
19 *2321j(c)(2)).*

20 **SEC. 229. PRIORITIZING EXCESS NAVAL VESSEL TRANS-**
21 **FERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

22 (a) *AUTHORITY.*—*The President is authorized to*
23 *transfer to a government of a country listed pursuant to*
24 *the amendment made under section 228(c) two OLIVER*
25 *HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates on a grant*

1 *basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of*
2 *1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).*

3 **(b) GRANTS NOT COUNTED IN ANNUAL TOTAL OF**
4 *TRANSFERRED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.—The value of*
5 *a vessel transferred to another country on a grant basis pur-*
6 *suant to authority provided by this section shall not be*
7 *counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles*
8 *transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the For-*
9 *oreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).*

10 **(c) COSTS OF TRANSFERS.—Any expense incurred by**
11 *the United States in connection with a transfer authorized*
12 *by this section shall be charged to the recipient notwith-*
13 *standing section 516(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of*
14 *1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).*

15 **(d) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT IN UNITED STATES**
16 *SHIPYARDS.—To the maximum extent practicable, the*
17 *President shall require, as a condition of the transfer of a*
18 *vessel under this subsection, that the recipient to which the*
19 *vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of*
20 *the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces*
21 *of that recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the*
22 *United States.*

23 **(e) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.—The authority to**
24 *transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end*

1 *of the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enactment*
2 *of this Act.*

3 **SEC. 230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM**
4 **OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-**
5 **WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC**
6 **AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE**
7 **SOUTH CHINA SEA.**

8 *(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—*

9 *(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or*
10 *the use of force to impede freedom of operations in*
11 *international airspace by military or civilian air-*
12 *craft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the*
13 *Indo-Pacific region;*

14 *(2) urges the Government of the People’s Repub-*
15 *lic of China to refrain from implementing the de-*
16 *clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification*
17 *Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea,*
18 *which is contrary to freedom of overflight in inter-*
19 *national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar*
20 *provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re-*
21 *gion;*

22 *(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of*
23 *Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on*
24 *both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s*

1 *claims to offshore resources across most of the South*
2 *China Sea are unlawful; and*

3 *(4) condemns the People’s Republic of China for*
4 *failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Ar-*
5 *bitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as a*
6 *state party to the United Nations Convention on the*
7 *Law of the Sea.*

8 *(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of*
9 *the United States to—*

10 *(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-*
11 *lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-*
12 *ing longstanding United States policy regarding Arti-*
13 *cle V of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense*
14 *Treaty and reaffirm its position that Article V of the*
15 *United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies*
16 *to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;*

17 *(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights,*
18 *freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace*
19 *above it, that belong to all nations, and oppose the*
20 *militarization of new and reclaimed land features in*
21 *the South China Sea;*

22 *(3) continue certain policies with respect to the*
23 *PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely—*

1 (A) that PRC claims in the South China
2 Sea, including to offshore resources across most
3 of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

4 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a
5 maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in
6 areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration
7 found to be in the Philippines' Exclusive Eco-
8 nomic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

9 (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
10 yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived
11 from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands;
12 and

13 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial
14 or maritime claim to James Shoal;

15 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
16 destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation
17 or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over
18 disputed claims;

19 (5) ensure that disputes are managed without in-
20 timidation, coercion, or force;

21 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust
22 claims in accordance with international law;

23 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and
24 maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-

1 *torial seas, must be derived from land features and*
2 *otherwise comport with international law;*

3 *(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-*
4 *tions covering disputed areas in the South China Sea,*
5 *regulations which have raised tensions in the region;*

6 *(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that*
7 *Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast*
8 *Asian claimant states and does not serve as a vehicle*
9 *for the People's Republic of China to advance its un-*
10 *lawful maritime claims;*

11 *(10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-*
12 *national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-*
13 *national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,*
14 *done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is suf-*
15 *ficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the*
16 *United States Armed Forces and the forces of other*
17 *countries, including the People's Republic of China;*

18 *(11) support the development of regional institu-*
19 *tions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional*
20 *Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus,*
21 *the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN*
22 *Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in*
23 *the region and reinforce the role of international law;*

24 *(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships*
25 *with other countries in the region for maritime do-*

1 (1) *the Secretary of State should expand and*
2 *strengthen existing measures under the United States*
3 *Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capa-*
4 *bilities to allies and partners consistent with agreed-*
5 *on division of responsibility for alliance roles, mis-*
6 *sions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-*
7 *ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with*
8 *United States strategic imperatives;*

9 (2) *the United States should design for export to*
10 *Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical*
11 *to maintaining a favorable military balance in the*
12 *region, including long-range precision fires, air and*
13 *missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land*
14 *attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic sys-*
15 *tems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance*
16 *capabilities, and command and control systems;*

17 (3) *the United States should pursue, to the max-*
18 *imum extent possible, anticipatory technology secu-*
19 *rity and foreign disclosure policy on the systems de-*
20 *scribed in paragraph (2); and*

21 (4) *the Secretary of State, in coordination with*
22 *the Secretary of Defense, should—*

23 (A) *urge allies and partners to invest in*
24 *sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contin-*

1 *gency requirements and avoid the need for ac-*
2 *cessing United States stocks in wartime; and*

3 *(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such mu-*
4 *nitions, or when necessary, to increase allies' ca-*
5 *capacity to produce such munitions.*

6 *(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In*
7 *this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress”*
8 *means—*

9 *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the*
10 *Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and*

11 *(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the*
12 *Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-*
13 *resentatives.*

14 *(c) REPORT.—*

15 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after*
16 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
17 *State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,*
18 *shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-*
19 *gress a report that describes United States priorities*
20 *for building more capable security partners in the*
21 *Indo-Pacific region.*

22 *(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-*
23 *quired under paragraph (1) shall—*

24 *(A) provide a priority list of defense and*
25 *military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and*

1 *partners must possess for the United States to be*
2 *able to achieve its military objectives in the*
3 *Indo-Pacific region;*

4 *(B) identify, from the list referred to in sub-*
5 *paragraph (A), the capabilities that are best pro-*
6 *vided, or can only be provided, by the United*
7 *States;*

8 *(C) identify—*

9 *(i) actions required to prioritize*
10 *United States Government resources and*
11 *personnel to expedite fielding the capabili-*
12 *ties identified in subparagraph (B); and*

13 *(ii) steps needed to fully account for*
14 *and a plan to integrate all means of United*
15 *States foreign military sales, direct com-*
16 *mercial sales, security assistance, and all*
17 *applicable authorities of the Department of*
18 *State and the Department of Defense;*

19 *(D) assess the requirements for United*
20 *States security assistance, including Inter-*
21 *national Military Education and Training, in*
22 *the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means*
23 *to deliver critical partner capability require-*
24 *ments identified in subparagraph (B);*

1 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet
2 the requirements for United States security as-
3 sistance, and identify resource gaps;

4 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
5 requirements for United States security assist-
6 ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re-
7 sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative
8 and policy barriers, and factors related to spe-
9 cific partner countries;

10 (G) identify limitations on the ability of the
11 United States to provide such capabilities, in-
12 cluding those identified under subparagraph (B),
13 because of existing United States treaty obliga-
14 tions, United States policies, or other regula-
15 tions;

16 (H) recommend improvements to the process
17 for developing requirements for United States
18 partner capabilities; and

19 (I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
20 ommendations for infrastructure and posture,
21 based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

22 (3) FORM.—The report required under this sub-
23 section shall be unclassified, but may include a classi-
24 fied annex.

1 **SEC. 232. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUS-**
2 **TRIAL BASE.**

3 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
4 *that—*

5 (1) *a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated*
6 *approach, which leverages economies of scale with*
7 *major allies, is necessary for the United States to re-*
8 *tain its lead in defense technology;*

9 (2) *allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer*
10 *of defense-related technologies and services to members*
11 *of the national technology and industrial base (as de-*
12 *finied in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code)*
13 *would advance United States security interests by*
14 *helping to leverage the defense-related technologies and*
15 *skilled workforces of trusted allies to reduce the de-*
16 *pendence on other countries, including countries that*
17 *pose challenges to United States interests around the*
18 *world, for defense-related innovation and investment;*
19 *and*

20 (3) *it is in the interest of the United States to*
21 *continue to increase cooperation with Australia, Can-*
22 *ada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and*
23 *Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-related*
24 *technology and services and leverage the investments*
25 *of like-minded, major ally nations in order to maxi-*

1 *mize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology*
2 *innovation.*

3 *(b) REPORT.—*

4 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after*
5 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
6 *State shall submit a report to the appropriate con-*
7 *gressional committees that—*

8 *(A) describes the Department of State’s ef-*
9 *forts to facilitate access among the national tech-*
10 *nology and industrial base to defense articles*
11 *and services subject to the United States Muni-*
12 *tions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms*
13 *Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and*

14 *(B) identifies foreign legal and regulatory*
15 *challenges, as well as foreign policy or other*
16 *challenges or considerations that prevent or frus-*
17 *trate these efforts, to include any gaps in the re-*
18 *spective export control regimes implemented by*
19 *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern*
20 *Ireland, Australia, or Canada.*

21 *(2) FORM.—This report required under para-*
22 *graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a*
23 *classified annex.*

1 **SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RE-**
2 **SPECT TO CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA-**
3 **TIONS OVERSEAS.**

4 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
6 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
7 a report to the appropriate committees of Congress regard-
8 ing United States diplomatic engagement with other na-
9 tions that host or are considering hosting any military in-
10 stallation of the Government of the People’s Republic of
11 China.

12 (b) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.*—The report required
13 under subsection (a) shall include—

14 (1) a list of countries that currently host or are
15 considering hosting any military installation of the
16 Government of the People’s Republic of China;

17 (2) a detailed description of United States diplo-
18 matic and related efforts to engage countries that are
19 considering hosting a military installation of the
20 Government of the People’s Republic of China, and
21 the results of such efforts;

22 (3) an assessment of the adverse impact on
23 United States interests of the Government of the Peo-
24 ple’s Republic of China successfully establishing a
25 military installation at any of the locations it is cur-
26 rently considering;

1 (1) *pressing all nations, including the PRC, to*
2 *implement and enforce existing United Nations sanc-*
3 *tions with regard to the DPRK;*

4 (2) *pressing all nations, including the PRC, and*
5 *in accordance with United Nations Security Council*
6 *resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK citi-*
7 *zens as guest workers, recognizing that such workers*
8 *are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of rev-*
9 *enue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear ambitions;*

10 (3) *pressing all nations, including the PRC, to*
11 *pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from*
12 *the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent*
13 *with United Nations Security Council resolutions;*

14 (4) *pressing the PRC and PRC entities—*

15 (A) *to cease business activities with United*
16 *Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in*
17 *the DPRK; and*

18 (B) *to expel from the PRC individuals who*
19 *enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its nu-*
20 *clear and ballistic missile programs; and*

21 (5) *enforcing United Nations Security Council*
22 *resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United*
23 *States sanctions, including those pursuant to the*
24 *North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act*
25 *of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), the Countering Amer-*

1 *ica’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law*
2 *115–44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear*
3 *Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI*
4 *of division F of Public Law 116–92), and relevant*
5 *United States executive orders.*

6 **SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES**
7 **HOSTING CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA-**
8 **TIONS.**

9 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
10 *that—*

11 (1) *although it casts the Belt and Road Initia-*
12 *tive (BRI) as a development initiative, the People’s*
13 *Republic of China is also utilizing the BRI to ad-*
14 *vance its own security interests, including to expand*
15 *its power projection capabilities and facilitate greater*
16 *access for the People’s Liberation Army through over-*
17 *seas military installations; and*

18 (2) *the expansion of the People’s Liberation*
19 *Army globally through overseas military installations*
20 *will undermine the medium- and long-term security*
21 *of the United States and the security and development*
22 *of strategic partners in critical regions around the*
23 *world, which is at odds with United States goals to*
24 *promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among*

1 *partner nations, including through the Millennium*
2 *Challenge Corporation.*

3 (b) *LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.*—*Except as provided*
4 *in subsection (c), for fiscal years 2022 through 2031, the*
5 *government of a country that is hosting on its territory a*
6 *military installation of the Government of the People’s Re-*
7 *public of China or facilitates the expansion of the presence*
8 *of the People’s Liberation Army for purposes other than*
9 *participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or*
10 *for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief*
11 *operations in such country shall not be eligible for assist-*
12 *ance under sections 609 or 616 of the Millennium Challenge*
13 *Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).*

14 (c) *NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.*—*The President*
15 *may, on a case by case basis, waive the limitation in sub-*
16 *section (b) if the President submits to the appropriate con-*
17 *gressional committees—*

18 (1) *a written determination that the waiver is*
19 *important to the national interests of the United*
20 *States; and*

21 (2) *a detailed explanation of how the waiver is*
22 *important to those interests.*

1 ***Subtitle C—Regional Strategies to***
2 ***Counter the People’s Republic of***
3 ***China***

4 **SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
5 ***ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD***
6 ***WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC***
7 ***OF CHINA.***

8 *It is the policy of the United States—*

9 *(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships in*
10 *Europe and with like-minded countries around the*
11 *globe to effectively compete with the People’s Republic*
12 *of China; and*

13 *(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and*
14 *partners—*

15 *(A) to address significant diplomatic, eco-*
16 *nomi, and military challenges posed by the Peo-*
17 *ple’s Republic of China;*

18 *(B) to deter the People’s Republic of China*
19 *from pursuing military aggression;*

20 *(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of ter-*
21 *ritorial disputes in accordance with inter-*
22 *national law;*

23 *(D) to promote private sector-led long-term*
24 *economic development while countering efforts by*
25 *the Government of the People’s Republic of*

1 *China to leverage predatory economic practices*
2 *as a means of political and economic coercion in*
3 *the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;*

4 *(E) to promote the values of democracy and*
5 *human rights, including through efforts to end*
6 *the repression by the Chinese Communist Party*
7 *of political dissidents and Uyghurs and other*
8 *ethnic Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists,*
9 *Christians, and other minorities;*

10 *(F) to respond to the crackdown by the Chi-*
11 *nese Communist Party, in contravention of the*
12 *commitments made under the Sino-British Joint*
13 *Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law of Hong*
14 *Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of the people*
15 *of Hong Kong; and*

16 *(G) to counter the Chinese Communist Par-*
17 *ty's efforts to spread disinformation in the Peo-*
18 *ple's Republic of China and beyond with respect*
19 *to the response of the Chinese Communist Party*
20 *to COVID-19.*

21 ***PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE***

22 ***SEC. 245. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED***
23 ***STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.***

24 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

1 (1) *the United States and Canada have a unique*
2 *relationship based on shared geography, extensive per-*
3 *sonal connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense*
4 *commitments, and a shared vision to uphold democ-*
5 *racy, human rights, and the rules based international*
6 *order established after World War II;*

7 (2) *the United States and Canada can better ad-*
8 *dress the People’s Republic of China’s economic, polit-*
9 *ical, and security influence through closer cooperation*
10 *on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship,*
11 *transparent practices in public procurement and in-*
12 *frastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and*
13 *connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations,*
14 *bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy,*
15 *good governance, and human rights;*

16 (3) *amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United*
17 *States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives*
18 *to address border management, commercial and trade*
19 *relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with*
20 *respect to the People’s Republic of China, and*
21 *transnational challenges, including pandemics, energy*
22 *security, and environmental stewardship;*

23 (4) *the United States and Canada should en-*
24 *hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation,*

1 *influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-*
2 *ganda efforts;*

3 *(5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-*
4 *ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-*
5 *cations technology, extraction of natural resources,*
6 *and port infrastructure, pose national security risks*
7 *for the United States and Canada;*

8 *(6) the United States should share, as appro-*
9 *priate, intelligence gathered regarding—*

10 *(A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and*

11 *(B) the PRC government’s intentions with*
12 *respect to 5G expansion;*

13 *(7) the United States and Canada should con-*
14 *tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple-*
15 *ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada*
16 *Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development*
17 *Collaboration; and*

18 *(8) the United States and Canada must*
19 *prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in*
20 *the Arctic, including by modernizing the North Amer-*
21 *ican Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to effec-*
22 *tively defend the Northern Hemisphere against the*
23 *range of threats by peer competitors, including long-*
24 *range missiles and high-precision weapons.*

1 **SEC. 246. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERN-**
2 **MENT OF CHINA'S ARBITRARY IMPRISON-**
3 **MENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.**

4 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

5 *(1) the Government of the People's Republic of*
6 *China's apparent arbitrary detention and abusive*
7 *treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and*
8 *Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-*
9 *ernment of Canada's arrest of Meng Wanzhou is deep-*
10 *ly concerning;*

11 *(2) the Government of Canada has shown inter-*
12 *national leadership by—*

13 *(A) upholding the rule of law and com-*
14 *plying with its international legal obligations,*
15 *including those pursuant to the Extradition*
16 *Treaty Between the United States of America*
17 *and Canada, signed at Washington December 3,*
18 *1971; and*

19 *(B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-*
20 *bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,*
21 *which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the*
22 *European Union, and reaffirms well-established*
23 *prohibitions under international human rights*
24 *conventions against the arbitrary detention of*
25 *foreign nationals to be used as leverage in state-*
26 *to-state relations; and*

1 (3) *the United States continues to join the Gov-*
2 *ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-*
3 *lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for*
4 *due process for Canadian national Robert*
5 *Schellenberg.*

6 **SEC. 247. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
7 **CANADA.**

8 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 90 days after the*
9 *date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit*
10 *a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees that*
11 *describes how the United States will enhance cooperation*
12 *with the Government of Canada in managing relations with*
13 *the PRC government.*

14 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The strategy required under sub-*
15 *section (a) shall—*

16 (1) *identify key policy points of convergence and*
17 *divergence between the United States and Canada in*
18 *managing relations with the People’s Republic of*
19 *China in the areas of technology, trade, economic*
20 *practices, cyber security, secure supply chains and*
21 *critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;*

22 (2) *include a description of United States devel-*
23 *opment and coordination efforts with Canadian coun-*
24 *terparts to enhance the cooperation between the*
25 *United States and Canada with respect to—*

1 (A) *managing economic relations with the*
2 *People’s Republic of China;*

3 (B) *democracy and human rights in the*
4 *People’s Republic of China;*

5 (C) *technology issues involving the People’s*
6 *Republic of China;*

7 (D) *defense issues involving the People’s Re-*
8 *public of China; and*

9 (E) *international law enforcement and*
10 *transnational organized crime issues.*

11 (3) *detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to*
12 *work with Canada to counter the PRC’s projection of*
13 *an authoritarian governing model around the world;*

14 (4) *detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence*
15 *cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-*
16 *nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to*
17 *Huawei’s 5G technology;*

18 (5) *detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—*

19 (A) *to advance joint United States-Can-*
20 *adian priorities for responsible stewardship in the*
21 *Arctic Region; and*

22 (B) *to counter the PRC’s efforts to project*
23 *political, economic, and military influence into*
24 *the Arctic Region; and*

1 *ing United States economic competitiveness and promoting*
2 *good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in*
3 *Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in*
4 *the areas of investment, equitable and sustainable develop-*
5 *ment, commercial relations, anti-corruption activities, and*
6 *infrastructure projects, to—*

7 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
8 *Senate;*

9 (2) *the Committee on Finance of the Senate;*

10 (3) *the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen-*
11 *ate;*

12 (4) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
13 *House of Representatives;*

14 (5) *the Committee on Ways and Means of the*
15 *House of Representatives; and*

16 (6) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
17 *House of Representatives.*

18 (b) *ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required*
19 *under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-*
20 *ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—*

21 (1) *enhance the technical capacity of countries in*
22 *the region to advance the sustainable development of*
23 *equitable economies;*

24 (2) *reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between*
25 *the countries of the Americas;*

1 (3) *facilitate a more open, transparent, and com-*
2 *petitive environment for United States businesses in*
3 *the region;*

4 (4) *establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-*
5 *view long term financial sustainability and security*
6 *implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-*
7 *tors or services, including transportation, commu-*
8 *nications, natural resources, and energy;*

9 (5) *establish competitive and transparent infra-*
10 *structure project selection and procurement processes*
11 *that promote transparency, open competition, finan-*
12 *cial sustainability, adherence to robust global stand-*
13 *ards, and the employment of the local workforce;*

14 (6) *strengthen legal structures critical to robust*
15 *democratic governance, fair competition, combatting*
16 *corruption, and ending impunity;*

17 (7) *identify and mitigate obstacles to private sec-*
18 *tor-led economic growth in Latin America and the*
19 *Caribbean; and*

20 (8) *maintain transparent and affordable access*
21 *to the internet and digital infrastructure in the West-*
22 *ern Hemisphere.*

23 (c) *BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.*—*Not later than 1 year*
24 *after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually*
25 *thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, after consulta-*

1 *tion with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of*
2 *Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade*
3 *Representative, and the leadership of the United States*
4 *International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief*
5 *the congressional committees listed in subsection (a) regard-*
6 *ing the implementation of this part, including examples of*
7 *successes and challenges.*

8 **SEC. 249. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-**
9 **TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN**
10 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

11 *(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
12 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
13 *of Congress” means—*

14 *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
15 *Senate;*

16 *(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the*
17 *Senate;*

18 *(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen-*
19 *ate;*

20 *(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
21 *House of Representatives;*

22 *(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-*
23 *ligence of the House of Representatives; and*

24 *(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the*
25 *House of Representatives.*

1 **(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.**—

2 **(1) IN GENERAL.**—*Not later than 90 days after*
3 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
4 *State, working through the Assistant Secretary of*
5 *State for Intelligence and Research, and in coordina-*
6 *tion with the Director of National Intelligence and*
7 *the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall*
8 *submit a report to the appropriate congressional com-*
9 *mittees that assesses the nature, intent, and impact to*
10 *United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic*
11 *activity aimed at influencing the decisions, proce-*
12 *dures, and programs of multilateral organizations in*
13 *Latin America and the Caribbean, including the*
14 *World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organi-*
15 *zation of American States, and the Inter-American*
16 *Development Bank.*

17 **(2) DEFENSE SECTOR.**—*The report required*
18 *under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of*
19 *the nature, intent, and impact on United States stra-*
20 *tegic interests of Chinese military activity in Latin*
21 *America and the Caribbean, including military edu-*
22 *cation and training programs, weapons sales, and*
23 *space-related activities in the military or civilian*
24 *spheres, such as—*

1 (A) the satellite and space control station
2 the People's Republic of China constructed in
3 Argentina; and

4 (B) defense and security cooperation carried
5 out by the People's Republic of China in Latin
6 America and the Caribbean, including sales of
7 surveillance and monitoring technology to gov-
8 ernments in the region such as Venezuela, Cuba,
9 Ecuador, and Colombia, and the potential use of
10 such technologies as tools of Chinese intelligence
11 services.

12 (3) *FORM.*—The report required under para-
13 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and
14 shall include classified annexes.

15 **SEC. 250. ADDRESSING CHINA'S SOVEREIGN LENDING**
16 **PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CAR-**
17 **IBBEAN.**

18 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress
19 that—

20 (1) since 2005, the Government of the People's
21 Republic of China has expanded sovereign lending to
22 governments in Latin America and the Caribbean
23 with loans that are repaid or collateralized with nat-
24 ural resources or commodities;

1 (2) *several countries in Latin American and the*
2 *Caribbean that have received a significant amount of*
3 *sovereign lending from the Government of the People’s*
4 *Republic of China face challenges in repaying such*
5 *loans;*

6 (3) *the Government of the People’s Republic of*
7 *China’s predatory economic practices and sovereign*
8 *lending practices in Latin America and the Carib-*
9 *bean negatively influence United States national in-*
10 *terests in the Western Hemisphere;*

11 (4) *the Inter-American Development Bank, the*
12 *premier multilateral development bank dedicated to*
13 *the Western Hemisphere, should play a significant*
14 *role supporting the countries of Latin America and*
15 *the Caribbean in achieving sustainable and service-*
16 *able debt structures; and*

17 (5) *a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-*
18 *American Development Bank would strengthen the*
19 *Bank’s ability to help the countries of Latin America*
20 *and the Caribbean achieve sustainable and serviceable*
21 *debt structures.*

22 (b) *SUPPORT FOR A GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE.—*
23 *The President shall take steps to support a tenth general*
24 *capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank,*
25 *including advancing diplomatic engagement to build sup-*

1 port among member countries of the Bank for a tenth gen-
 2 eral capital increase for the Bank.

3 (c) *TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.*—*The Inter-American*
 4 *Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended*
 5 *by adding at the end the following:*

6 **“SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.**

7 “(a) *VOTE AUTHORIZED.*—*The United States Gov-*
 8 *ernor of the Bank is authorized to vote in favor of a resolu-*
 9 *tion to increase the capital stock of the Bank by*
 10 *\$80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 years.*

11 “(b) *SUBSCRIPTION AUTHORIZED.*—

12 “(1) *IN GENERAL.*—*The United States Governor*
 13 *of the Bank may subscribe on behalf of the United*
 14 *States to 1,990,714 additional shares of the capital*
 15 *stock of the Bank.*

16 “(2) *LIMITATION.*—*Any subscription by the*
 17 *United States to the capital stock of the Bank shall*
 18 *be effective only to such extent and in such amounts*
 19 *as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts.*

20 “(c) *LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-*
 21 *TIONS.*—

22 “(1) *IN GENERAL.*—*In order to pay for the in-*
 23 *crease in the United States subscription to the Bank*
 24 *under subsection (b), there is authorized to be appro-*

1 *appropriated \$24,014,857,191 for payment by the Secretary*
2 *of the Treasury.*

3 *“(2) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amount*
4 *authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1)—*

5 *“(A) \$600,371,430 shall be for paid in*
6 *shares of the Bank; and*

7 *“(B) \$23,414,485,761 shall be for callable*
8 *shares of the Bank.”.*

9 *(d) ADDRESSING CHINA’S SOVEREIGN LENDING IN*
10 *THE AMERICAS.—The Secretary of the Treasury and the*
11 *United States Executive Director to the Inter-American De-*
12 *velopment Bank shall use the voice, vote, and influence of*
13 *the United States—*

14 *(1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help coun-*
15 *tries restructure debt resulting from sovereign lending*
16 *by the Government of the People’s Republic of China*
17 *in order to achieve sustainable and serviceable debt*
18 *structures; and*

19 *(2) to establish appropriate safeguards and*
20 *transparency and conditionality measures to protect*
21 *debt-vulnerable member countries of the Inter-Amer-*
22 *ican Development Bank that borrow from the Bank*
23 *for the purposes of restructuring Chinese bilateral*
24 *debt held by such countries and preventing such coun-*
25 *tries from incurring subsequent Chinese bilateral debt.*

1 (e) *BRIEFINGS.*—

2 (1) *IMPLEMENTATION.*—Not later than 90 days
3 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every
4 90 days thereafter for 6 years, the President shall pro-
5 vide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
6 Senate, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, the
7 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
8 resentatives, and the Committee on Financial Services
9 of the House of Representatives a briefing detailing
10 efforts to carry out subsection (b) and (d) and the
11 amendment made by subsection (c).

12 (2) *PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE AND*
13 *SERVICEABLE DEBT STRUCTURES.*—Not later than
14 180 days after the successful completion of a tenth
15 general capital increase for the Inter-American Devel-
16 opment Bank, and every 180 days thereafter for a pe-
17 riod of 3 years, the President shall provide to the
18 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the
19 Committee on Finance of the Senate, the Committee
20 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives,
21 and the Committee on Financial Services of the
22 House of Representatives a briefing on efforts by the
23 Bank to support countries in Latin American and the
24 Caribbean in their efforts to achieve sustainable and
25 serviceable debt structures.

1 **SEC. 251. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND**
2 **THE CARIBBEAN.**

3 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*There is authorized to be appro-*
4 *priated to the Department of State \$12,000,000 for the*
5 *International Military Education and Training Program*
6 *for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal*
7 *years 2022 through 2026.*

8 (b) *MODERNIZATION.*—*The Secretary of State shall*
9 *take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs receiv-*
10 *ing funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such pro-*
11 *grams are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice*
12 *for international military education and training for Latin*
13 *American and Caribbean partners.*

14 (c) *REQUIRED ELEMENTS.*—*The programs referred to*
15 *in subsection (a) shall—*

16 (1) *provide training and capacity-building op-*
17 *portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-*
18 *rity services;*

19 (2) *provide practical skills and frameworks for—*
20 (A) *improving the functioning and organi-*
21 *zation of security services in Latin America and*
22 *the Caribbean;*

23 (B) *creating a better understanding of the*
24 *United States and its values; and*

25 (C) *using technology for maximum effi-*
26 *ciency and organization; and*

1 (3) *promote and ensure that security services in*
2 *Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian au-*
3 *thority and operate in compliance with international*
4 *norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including*
5 *a respect for human rights.*

6 (d) *LIMITATION.*—*Security assistance under this sec-*
7 *tion is subject to limitations as enshrined in the require-*
8 *ments of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*
9 *(22 U.S.C. 2378d).*

10 **SEC. 252. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN**
11 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING**
12 **ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE**
13 **RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-**
14 **NOLOGIES.**

15 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
16 *that—*

17 (1) *the Government of the People’s Republic of*
18 *China is exporting its model for internal security and*
19 *state control of society through advanced technology*
20 *and artificial intelligence; and*

21 (2) *the inclusion of communication networks and*
22 *communications supply chains with equipment and*
23 *services from companies with close ties to or that are*
24 *susceptible to pressure from governments or security*
25 *services without reliable legal checks on governmental*

1 *powers can lead to breaches of citizens' private infor-*
2 *mation, increased censorship, violations of human*
3 *rights, and harassment of political opponents.*

4 *(b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of*
5 *State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-*
6 *ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and*
7 *the Caribbean to—*

8 *(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil*
9 *liberties posed by technologies and services described*
10 *in subsection (a); and*

11 *(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate*
12 *such risks.*

13 *(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Exec-*
14 *utive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media,*
15 *working through the Open Technology Fund, and the Sec-*
16 *retary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy,*
17 *Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom and Busi-*
18 *ness and Human Rights Section, shall expand and*
19 *prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and*
20 *services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean,*
21 *in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share*
22 *digital news and information.*

23 *(d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of*
24 *State, through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democ-*
25 *racy, Human Rights, and Labor, and in coordination with*

1 *the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-*
2 *national Development, shall work through nongovernmental*
3 *organizations to—*

4 (1) *support and promote programs that support*
5 *internet freedom and the free flow of information on-*
6 *line in Latin America and the Caribbean;*

7 (2) *protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-*
8 *able access to internet in Latin America and the Car-*
9 *ibbean;*

10 (3) *provide integrated support to civil society for*
11 *technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and*
12 *applied research programs in Latin America and the*
13 *Caribbean;*

14 (4) *train journalists and civil society leaders in*
15 *Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative*
16 *techniques necessary to ensure public accountability*
17 *and prevent government overreach in the digital*
18 *sphere;*

19 (5) *assist independent media outlets and journal-*
20 *ists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build*
21 *their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth*
22 *news reports covering governance and human rights*
23 *topics;*

24 (6) *provide training for journalists and civil so-*
25 *ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to*

1 *improve transparency and accountability in govern-*
2 *ment and the private sector;*

3 *(7) provide training on investigative reporting of*
4 *incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business*
5 *and commercial practices related to the People's Re-*
6 *public of China, including the role of the Government*
7 *of the People's Republic of China in such practices;*

8 *(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to*
9 *strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities de-*
10 *scribed in paragraph (7); and*

11 *(9) identify local resources to support the pre-*
12 *ponderance of activities that would be carried out*
13 *under this subsection.*

14 *(e) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not more than 180*
15 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every*
16 *180 days thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, the*
17 *Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-*
18 *national Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of*
19 *the United States Agency for Global Media shall provide*
20 *a briefing regarding the efforts described in subsections (c),*
21 *(d), and (e) to—*

22 *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
23 *Senate;*

24 *(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen-*
25 *ate;*

1 (3) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
2 *House of Representatives; and*

3 (4) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
4 *House of Representatives.*

5 **PART II—TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE**

6 **SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC**
7 **ALLIANCE.**

8 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

9 (1) *the United States, European Union, and Eu-*
10 *ropean countries are close partners, sharing values*
11 *grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency,*
12 *and the rules-based international order established*
13 *after World War II;*

14 (2) *without a common approach by the United*
15 *States, European Union, and European countries on*
16 *connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and sup-*
17 *port for democracy and human rights, the People’s*
18 *Republic of China will continue to increase its eco-*
19 *nomical, political, and security leverage in Europe;*

20 (3) *the People’s Republic of China’s deployment*
21 *of assistance to European countries following the*
22 *COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to*
23 *aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep economic*
24 *ties to the People’s Republic of China;*

1 (4) as *European states seek to recover from the*
2 *economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United*
3 *States must stand in partnership with Europe to sup-*
4 *port our collective economic recovery, reinforce our*
5 *collective national security, and defend shared values;*

6 (5) *the United States, European Union, and Eu-*
7 *ropean countries should coordinate on joint strategies*
8 *to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the*
9 *People’s Republic of China, especially in the medical*
10 *and pharmaceutical sectors;*

11 (6) *the United States, European Union, and Eu-*
12 *ropean countries should leverage their respective eco-*
13 *nomics innovation capabilities to support the global*
14 *economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and*
15 *draw a contrast with the centralized economy of the*
16 *People’s Republic of China;*

17 (7) *the United States, United Kingdom, and Eu-*
18 *ropean Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate*
19 *their trade disputes, including negotiating a United*
20 *States-European Union trade agreement that benefits*
21 *workers and the broader economy in both the United*
22 *States and European Union;*

23 (8) *the United States, European Union, and*
24 *Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address*

1 *economic challenges posed by the People’s Republic of*
2 *China;*

3 *(9) the United States, European Union, and*
4 *countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to*
5 *counter PRC disinformation, influence operations,*
6 *and propaganda efforts;*

7 *(10) the United States and European nations*
8 *share serious concerns with the repressions being sup-*
9 *ported and executed by the Government of the People’s*
10 *Republic of China, and should continue implementing*
11 *measures to address the Government of the People’s*
12 *Republic of China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong*
13 *Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mecha-*
14 *nisms and programs to prevent the export of China’s*
15 *authoritarian governance model to countries around*
16 *the world;*

17 *(11) the United States and European nations*
18 *should remain united in their shared values against*
19 *attempts by the Government of the People’s Republic*
20 *of China at the United Nations and other multilateral*
21 *organizations to promote efforts that erode the Uni-*
22 *versal Declaration of Human Rights, like the “com-*
23 *munity of a shared future for mankind” and “democ-*
24 *ratization of international relations”;*

1 (12) *the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-*
2 *ture investments around the world, particularly in*
3 *5G telecommunications technology and port infra-*
4 *structure, could threaten democracy across Europe*
5 *and the national security of key countries;*

6 (13) *as appropriate, the United States should*
7 *share intelligence with European allies and partners*
8 *on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of the*
9 *Government of the People’s Republic of China with*
10 *respect to 5G expansion in Europe;*

11 (14) *the European Union’s Investment Screening*
12 *Regulation, which came into force in October 2020, is*
13 *a welcome development, and member states should*
14 *closely scrutinize PRC investments in their countries*
15 *through their own national investment screening*
16 *measures;*

17 (15) *the President should actively engage the Eu-*
18 *ropean Union on the implementation of the Export*
19 *Control Reform Act regulations and to better har-*
20 *monize United States and European Union policies*
21 *with respect to export controls;*

22 (16) *the President should strongly advocate for*
23 *the listing of more items and technologies to restrict*
24 *dual use exports controlled at the National Security*

1 *and above level to the People's Republic of China*
2 *under the Wassenaar Arrangement;*

3 *(17) the United States should explore the value*
4 *of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Com-*
5 *mittee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that*
6 *would specifically coordinate United States and Eu-*
7 *ropean Union export control policies with respect to*
8 *limiting exports of sensitive technologies to the Peo-*
9 *ple's Republic of China; and*

10 *(18) the United States should work with counter-*
11 *parts in Europe to—*

12 *(A) evaluate United States and European*
13 *overreliance on goods originating in the People's*
14 *Republic of China, including in the medical and*
15 *pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strate-*
16 *gies to diversify supply chains;*

17 *(B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID-19-*
18 *related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure*
19 *developing countries by offering relevant United*
20 *States and European expertise and assistance;*
21 *and*

22 *(C) leverage the United States and Euro-*
23 *pean private sectors to advance the post-COVID-*
24 *19 economic recovery.*

1 **SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-**
2 **OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S**
3 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

4 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 90 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief
6 the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
7 Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
8 Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House
9 of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States
10 will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO,
11 and European partner countries with respect to the People's
12 Republic of China.

13 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—The briefing required by subsection
14 (a) shall do the following:

15 (1) *Identify the senior Senate-confirmed Depart-*
16 *ment of State official that leads United States efforts*
17 *to cooperate with the European Union, NATO, and*
18 *European partner countries to advance a shared ap-*
19 *proach with respect to the People's Republic of China.*

20 (2) *Identify key policy points of convergence and*
21 *divergence between the United States and European*
22 *partners with respect to the People's Republic of*
23 *China in the areas of technology, trade, and economic*
24 *practices.*

25 (3) *Describe efforts to advance shared interests*
26 *with European counterparts on—*

1 (A) economic challenges with respect to the
2 People's Republic of China;

3 (B) democracy and human rights challenges
4 with respect to the People's Republic of China;

5 (C) technology issues with respect to the
6 People's Republic of China;

7 (D) defense issues with respect to the Peo-
8 ple's Republic of China; and

9 (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to
10 respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
11 established by the Government of the People's Re-
12 public of China.

13 (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among
14 key regional and functional bureaus within the De-
15 partment of State and Department of Defense tasked
16 with engaging with European partners on the Peo-
17 ple's Republic of China.

18 (5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of the
19 briefing and future plans to work with European
20 partners to counter the Government of the People's
21 Republic of China's advancement of an authoritarian
22 governance model around the world.

23 (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the
24 date of the briefing and future plans to support Euro-

1 *pean efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to*
2 *Huawei's 5G technology.*

3 *(7) Detail how United States public diplomacy*
4 *tools, including the Global Engagement Center of the*
5 *Department of State, will coordinate efforts with*
6 *counterpart entities within the European Union to*
7 *counter Chinese propaganda.*

8 *(8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the*
9 *Department of State dedicates to engagement between*
10 *the United States and the European Union on the*
11 *People's Republic of China and provide an assessment*
12 *of out-year resource needs to execute the strategy.*

13 *(9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with Euro-*
14 *pean partners to track and counter Chinese attempts*
15 *to exert influence across multilateral fora, including*
16 *at the World Health Organization.*

17 *(c) FORM.—The briefing required by section (a) shall*
18 *be classified.*

19 *(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the*
20 *date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days there-*
21 *after for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with*
22 *the appropriate congressional committees regarding the de-*
23 *velopment and implementation of the elements described in*
24 *subsection (b).*

1 **SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON**
2 **PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.**

3 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The President should work with*
4 *transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among the*
5 *Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, and*
6 *the European Development Finance Institutions (called the*
7 *DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on shared objectives*
8 *to foster private sector-led development and provide market-*
9 *based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging*
10 *markets, particularly as related to the People’s Republic of*
11 *China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by inte-*
12 *grating efforts such as—*

13 (1) *the European Union Strategy on Connecting*
14 *Europe and Asia;*

15 (2) *the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Ini-*
16 *tiative Fund;*

17 (3) *the Blue Dot Network among the United*
18 *States, Japan, and Australia; and*

19 (4) *a European Union-Japan initiative that has*
20 *leveraged \$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects*
21 *and emphasizes transparency standards.*

22 (b) *COOPERATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS.*—*The*
23 *United States, European Union, and European countries*
24 *should coordinate efforts to address the Government of the*
25 *People’s Republic of China’s use of the United Nations to*
26 *advance and legitimize BRI as a global good, including the*

1 *proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the*
2 *People’s Republic of China and United Nations funds and*
3 *programs on BRI implementation.*

4 (c) *STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro-*
5 *pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to en-*
6 *hance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the*
7 *Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for*
8 *Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel-*
9 *oping countries.*

10 **SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE-**
11 **TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN**
12 **CHINA AND RUSSIA.**

13 (a) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
14 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
15 *of Congress” means—*

16 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Se-*
17 *lect Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on*
18 *Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce,*
19 *Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En-*
20 *ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Bank-*
21 *ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on*
22 *Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the*
23 *Senate; and*

24 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-*
25 *manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-*

1 *mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy*
2 *and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services,*
3 *the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Com-*
4 *mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-*
5 *tives.*

6 *(b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—*

7 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after*
8 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of*
9 *National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the*
10 *Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec-*
11 *retary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Sec-*
12 *retary of the Treasury, and such other heads of Fed-*
13 *eral agencies as the Director considers appropriate,*
14 *submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a*
15 *report and brief the appropriate committees of Con-*
16 *gress on cooperation between the People’s Republic of*
17 *China and the Islamic Republic of Iran and between*
18 *the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Fed-*
19 *eration.*

20 *(2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under*
21 *paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:*

22 *(A) An identification of major areas of dip-*
23 *lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan-*
24 *cial, economic, military, and space coopera-*
25 *tion—*

1 (i) *between the People’s Republic of*
2 *China and the Islamic Republic of Iran;*
3 *and*

4 (ii) *between the People’s Republic of*
5 *China and the Russian Federation.*

6 (B) *An assessment of the effect of the*
7 *COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation.*

8 (C) *An assessment of the effect that United*
9 *States compliance with the Joint Comprehensive*
10 *Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in January*
11 *14, 2016, and United States withdrawal from*
12 *the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the coopera-*
13 *tion described in subparagraph (A)(i).*

14 (D) *An assessment of the effect on the co-*
15 *operation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that*
16 *would be had by the United States reentering*
17 *compliance with the JCPOA or a successor*
18 *agreement and the effect of the United States not*
19 *reentering compliance with the JCPOA or reach-*
20 *ing a successor agreement.*

21 (3) *FORM.—The report submitted under para-*
22 *graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but*
23 *may include a classified annex.*

24 (c) *SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES*
25 *AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Direc-*

1 *tor of National Intelligence and the heads of other appro-*
2 *priate Federal departments and agencies should share the*
3 *findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) with*
4 *important allies and partners of the United States, as ap-*
5 *propriate.*

6 **SEC. 259. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AL-**
7 **TERNATIVES TO THE BELT AND ROAD INITIA-**
8 **TIVE.**

9 *(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek opportu-*
10 *nities to partner with multilateral development finance in-*
11 *stitutions to develop financing tools based on shared devel-*
12 *opment finance criteria and mechanisms to support invest-*
13 *ments in developing countries that—*

14 *(1) support low carbon economic development;*
15 *and*

16 *(2) promote resiliency and adaptation to envi-*
17 *ronmental changes.*

18 *(b) PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.—The Chief Executive*
19 *Officer of the United States International Development Fi-*
20 *nance Corporation should seek to partner with other multi-*
21 *lateral development finance institutions and development*
22 *finance institutions to leverage the respective available*
23 *funds to support low carbon economic development, which*
24 *may include nuclear energy projects, environmental adap-*
25 *tation, and resilience activities in developing countries.*

1 (c) *ALTERNATIVES TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF*
2 *CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.*—*The President shall*
3 *work with European counterparts to establish a formal*
4 *United States-European Commission Working Group to de-*
5 *velop a comprehensive strategy to develop alternatives to the*
6 *Government of the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and*
7 *Road Initiative for development finance. United States par-*
8 *ticipants in the working group shall seek to integrate exist-*
9 *ing efforts into the strategy, including efforts to address the*
10 *Government of the People’s Republic of China’s use of the*
11 *United Nations to advance the Belt and Road Initiative,*
12 *including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding*
13 *between the People’s Republic of China and United Nations*
14 *funds and programs regarding the implementation of the*
15 *Belt and Road Initiative.*

16 (d) *CO-FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.*—

17 (1) *AUTHORIZATION.*—*Subject to paragraph (2),*
18 *the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the*
19 *United States Development Agency, and other rel-*
20 *evant agency heads are authorized to co-finance infra-*
21 *structure projects that advance the development objec-*
22 *tives of the United States overseas and provide viable*
23 *alternatives to projects that would otherwise be in-*
24 *cluded within China’s Belt and Road Initiative.*

1 (2) *CONDITIONS.—Co-financing arrangements*
2 *authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be ap-*
3 *proved unless—*

4 (A) *the projects to be financed—*

5 (i) *promote the public good;*

6 (ii) *promote low carbon emissions,*
7 *which may include nuclear energy projects;*
8 *and*

9 (iii) *will have substantially lower envi-*
10 *ronmental impact than the proposed Belt*
11 *and Road Initiative alternative; and*

12 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
13 *the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs*
14 *of the House of Representatives are notified not*
15 *later than 15 days in advance of entering into*
16 *such co-financing arrangements.*

17 **PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

18 **SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL**

19 **ASIA.**

20 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

21 (1) *the United States should continue to stand*
22 *with friends and partners in South and Central Asia*
23 *as they contend with efforts by the Government of the*
24 *People's Republic of China to interfere in their re-*

1 *spective political systems and encroach upon their*
2 *sovereign territory; and*

3 *(2) the United States should reaffirm its commit-*
4 *ment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partner-*
5 *ship with India and further deepen bilateral defense*
6 *consultations and collaboration with India commen-*
7 *surate with its status as a major defense partner.*

8 **SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
9 **SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.**

10 *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the*
11 *date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit*
12 *to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee*
13 *on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on For-*
14 *ign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the*
15 *House of Representatives a strategy for how the United*
16 *States will engage with the countries of South and Central*
17 *Asia, including through the C5+1 mechanism, with respect*
18 *to the People’s Republic of China.*

19 *(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-*
20 *section (a) shall include the following elements:*

21 *(1) A detailed description of the security and*
22 *economic challenges that the People’s Republic of*
23 *China poses to the countries of South and Central*
24 *Asia, including border disputes with South and Cen-*
25 *tral Asian countries that border the People’s Republic*

1 *of China, PRC investments in land and sea ports,*
2 *transportation infrastructure, and energy projects*
3 *across the region.*

4 *(2) A detailed description of United States ef-*
5 *forts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in in-*
6 *frastructure and other sectors in South and Central*
7 *Asia.*

8 *(3) A detailed description of bilateral and re-*
9 *gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia on*
10 *strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts to*
11 *interfere in their political systems and economies.*

12 *(4) A detailed description of United States diplo-*
13 *matic efforts to work with the Government of Afghani-*
14 *stan on addressing the challenges posed by PRC in-*
15 *vestment in the Afghan mineral sector.*

16 *(5) A detailed description of United States diplo-*
17 *matic efforts with the Government of Pakistan with*
18 *respect to matters relevant to the People's Republic of*
19 *China, including investments by the People's Republic*
20 *of China in Pakistan through the Belt and Road Ini-*
21 *tiative.*

22 *(6) In close consultation with the Government of*
23 *India, identification of areas where the United States*
24 *Government can provide diplomatic and other sup-*
25 *port as appropriate for India's efforts to address eco-*

1 *conomic and security challenges posed by the People's*
2 *Republic of China in the region.*

3 *(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms*
4 *among key regional and functional bureaus within*
5 *the Department of State and Department of Defense*
6 *tasked with engaging with the countries of South and*
7 *Central Asia on issues relating to the People's Repub-*
8 *lic of China.*

9 *(8) A description of the efforts being made by*
10 *Federal departments agencies, including the Depart-*
11 *ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-*
12 *national Development, the Department of Commerce,*
13 *the Department of Energy, and the Office of the*
14 *United States Trade Representative, to help the na-*
15 *tions of South and Central Asia develop trade and*
16 *commerce links that will help those nations diversify*
17 *their trade away from the People's Republic of China.*

18 *(9) A detailed description of United States diplo-*
19 *matic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey,*
20 *and any other countries with significant populations*
21 *of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing perse-*
22 *cution in the People's Republic of China to press*
23 *those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic mi-*
24 *norities to the People's Republic of China, protect eth-*
25 *nic minorities from intimidation by Chinese govern-*

1 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
2 *mittee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select*
3 *Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-*
4 *tives.*

5 (b) *INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.*—*Not later than 180*
6 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-*
7 *retary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of*
8 *National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees*
9 *of Congress a report that assesses the nature and impact*
10 *of the People’s Republic of China’s political, economic, and*
11 *security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on United*
12 *States strategic interests, including—*

13 (1) *the amount and impact of direct investment,*
14 *loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and*
15 *other preferential trading arrangements;*

16 (2) *the involvement of PRC state-owned enter-*
17 *prises in Africa;*

18 (3) *the amount of African debt held by the Peo-*
19 *ple’s Republic of China;*

20 (4) *the involvement of PRC private security,*
21 *technology and media companies in Africa;*

22 (5) *the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to*
23 *African countries;*

1 (6) *the scope of Chinese investment in and con-*
2 *trol of African energy resources and minerals critical*
3 *for emerging and foundational technologies;*

4 (7) *an analysis on the linkages between Beijing's*
5 *aid and assistance to African countries and African*
6 *countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals in inter-*
7 *national fora;*

8 (8) *the methods, tools, and tactics used to facili-*
9 *tate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in*
10 *counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex-*
11 *tractive resources and wildlife products, from Africa*
12 *to the People's Republic of China;*

13 (9) *the methods and techniques that the People's*
14 *Republic of China uses to exert undue influence on*
15 *African governments and facilitate corrupt activity*
16 *in Africa, including through the CCP's party-to-party*
17 *training program, and to influence African multilat-*
18 *eral organizations; and*

19 (10) *an analysis of the soft power, cultural and*
20 *educational activities undertaken by the PRC and*
21 *CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa.*

1 **SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE**
2 **UNITED STATES IN AFRICA.**

3 (a) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
4 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
5 *of Congress” means—*

6 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
7 *Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on*
8 *Finance of the Senate; and*

9 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
10 *mittee on Appropriations, and the Committee on*
11 *Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.*

12 (b) *STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.*—*Not later than 180*
13 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-*
14 *retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary of*
15 *the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney Gen-*
16 *eral, the United States Trade Representative, the Adminis-*
17 *trator of the United States Agency for International Devel-*
18 *opment, and the leadership of the United States Inter-*
19 *national Development Finance Corporation, submit to the*
20 *appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth*
21 *a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic*
22 *competitiveness and promoting improvements in the invest-*
23 *ment climate in Africa, including through support for*
24 *democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property*
25 *rights, and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and*
26 *governance.*

1 (c) *ELEMENTS.*—*The strategy submitted pursuant to*
2 *subsection (a) shall include—*

3 (1) *a description and assessment of barriers to*
4 *United States investment in Africa for United States*
5 *businesses, including a clear identification of the dif-*
6 *ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized*
7 *businesses, and an assessment of whether existing pro-*
8 *grams effectively address such barriers;*

9 (2) *a description and assessment of barriers to*
10 *African diaspora investment in Africa, and rec-*
11 *ommendations to overcome such barriers;*

12 (3) *an identification of the economic sectors in*
13 *the United States that have a comparative advantage*
14 *in African markets;*

15 (4) *a determination of priority African countries*
16 *for promoting two-way trade and investment and an*
17 *assessment of additional foreign assistance needs, in-*
18 *cluding democracy and governance and rule of law*
19 *support, to promote a conducive operating environ-*
20 *ment in priority countries;*

21 (5) *an identification of opportunities for stra-*
22 *tegic cooperation with European allies on trade and*
23 *investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue*
24 *on trade, security, development, and environmental*
25 *issues of mutual interest; and*

1 (6) *a plan to regularly host a United States-Af-*
2 *rica Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and*
3 *investment, strategic engagement, and security in Af-*
4 *rica*

5 (d) *ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT*
6 *HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller General*
7 *of the United States shall—*

8 (1) *conduct a review of the number of Foreign*
9 *Commercial Service Officers and Department of State*
10 *Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub-*
11 *Saharan Africa; and*

12 (2) *develop and submit to the appropriate con-*
13 *gressional committees an assessment of whether*
14 *human resource capacity in such embassies is ade-*
15 *quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco-*
16 *nomie programs and initiatives in Africa, including*
17 *the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Pros-*
18 *per Africa.*

19 **SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT**
20 **TO AFRICA.**

21 (a) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
22 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
23 *of Congress” means—*

1 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
2 *Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-*
3 *mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and*

4 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
5 *mittee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select*
6 *Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-*
7 *tives.*

8 (b) *INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER PRC*
9 *CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.—*

10 (1) *IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish*
11 *an interagency Working Group, which shall include*
12 *representatives of the Department of State, the De-*
13 *partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of Na-*
14 *tional Intelligence, and such other agencies of the*
15 *United States Government as the President considers*
16 *appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggres-*
17 *sion with respect to Africa.*

18 (2) *DUTIES.—The Working Group established*
19 *pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit*
20 *to the appropriate congressional committees a set of*
21 *recommendations for—*

22 (A) *bolstering the capacity of governments*
23 *in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data*
24 *networks and critical infrastructure where appli-*
25 *cable;*

1 (B) providing alternatives to Huawei;

2 (C) an action plan for United States embas-
3 sies in Africa to offer to provide assistance to
4 host-country governments with respect to pro-
5 tecting their vital digital networks and infra-
6 structure from PRC espionage, including an as-
7 sessment of staffing resources needed to imple-
8 ment the action plan in embassies in Africa;

9 (D) utilizing interagency resources to
10 counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in
11 traditional and digital media targeted to Afri-
12 can audiences; and

13 (E) helping civil society in Africa counter
14 digital authoritarianism and identifying tools
15 and assistance to enhance and promote digital
16 democracy.

17 **SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EM-**
18 **BASSIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED**
19 **ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

20 *The Secretary of State may station on a permanent*
21 *basis Department of State personnel at such United States*
22 *embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as the Secretary considers*
23 *appropriate focused on the activities, policies and invest-*
24 *ments of the People's Republic of China in Africa.*

1 **SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA-**
2 **TIVE.**

3 (a) *FINDING.*—Congress finds that youth in Africa can
4 have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth,
5 improve public sector transparency and governance, and
6 counter extremism, and should be an area of focus for
7 United States outreach on the continent.

8 (b) *POLICY.*—It is the policy of the United States, in
9 cooperation and collaboration with private sector compa-
10 nies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
11 and national and regional public sector entities, to commit
12 resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and leadership
13 skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing their
14 ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors
15 in order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strength-
16 en democratic governance, and enhance peace and security
17 in their respective countries of origin and across Africa.

18 (c) *YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.*—

19 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—There is hereby established the
20 Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by
21 the Secretary of State.

22 (2) *FELLOWSHIPS.*—The Secretary is authorized
23 to support the participation in the Initiative estab-
24 lished under this paragraph, in the United States, of
25 fellows from Africa each year for such education and
26 training in leadership and professional development

1 through the Department of State as the Secretary of
2 State considers appropriate. The Secretary shall es-
3 tablish and publish criteria for eligibility for partici-
4 pation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows
5 among eligible applicants for a fellowship.

6 (3) *RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.*—Under the Ini-
7 tiative, United States citizens may engage in such re-
8 ciprocal exchanges in connection with and collabora-
9 tion on projects with fellows under paragraph (1) as
10 the Secretary considers appropriate.

11 (4) *REGIONAL CENTERS AND NETWORKS.*—The
12 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
13 national Development shall establish each of the fol-
14 lowing:

15 (A) Not fewer than four regional centers in
16 Africa to provide in-person and online training
17 throughout the year in business and entrepre-
18 neurship, civic leadership, and public manage-
19 ment.

20 (B) An online network that provides infor-
21 mation and online courses on, and connections
22 with leaders in, the private and public sectors in
23 Africa.

24 (d) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress
25 that the Secretary of State should increase the number of

1 *fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela Wash-*
2 *ington Fellowship above the current 700 projected for fiscal*
3 *year 2021.*

4 **SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.**

5 *Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment*
6 *of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global*
7 *Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-*
8 *mittees a report on the resources and timeline needed to*
9 *establish within the Agency an organization whose mission*
10 *shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in*
11 *Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news*
12 *and information to the people of Africa and counter*
13 *disinformation from malign actors, especially in countries*
14 *where a free press is banned by the government or not fully*
15 *established, about the region, the world, and the United*
16 *States through uncensored news, responsible discussion, and*
17 *open debate.*

18 **PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

19 **SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN,**
20 **AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND**
21 **NORTH AFRICA.**

22 *(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
23 *that—*

24 *(1) the economic influence of the People’s Repub-*
25 *lic of China through its oil and gas imports from the*

1 *Middle East, infrastructure investments, technology*
2 *transfer, and arms sales provides influence and lever-*
3 *age that runs counter to United States interests in the*
4 *region;*

5 *(2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to erode*
6 *United States influence in the Middle East and North*
7 *Africa through the sale of Chinese arms, associated*
8 *weapons technology, and joint weapons research and*
9 *development initiatives;*

10 *(3) the People’s Republic of China seeks to estab-*
11 *lish military or dual use facilities in geographically*
12 *strategic locations in the Middle East and North Afri-*
13 *ca to further the Chinese Communist Party’s Belt and*
14 *Road Initiative at the expense of United States na-*
15 *tional security interests; and*

16 *(4) the export of certain communications infra-*
17 *structure from the People’s Republic of China de-*
18 *grades the security of partner networks, exposes intel-*
19 *lectual property to theft, threatens the ability of the*
20 *United States to conduct security cooperation with*
21 *compromised regional partners, and furthers China’s*
22 *authoritarian surveillance model.*

23 *(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—*

24 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after*
25 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*

1 *State, in consultation with the Administrator of the*
2 *United States Agency for International Development*
3 *and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies,*
4 *shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate*
5 *congressional committees a strategy for countering*
6 *and limiting Chinese influence in, and access to, the*
7 *Middle East and North Africa.*

8 (2) *ELEMENTS.*—*The strategy required under*
9 *paragraph (1) shall include—*

10 (A) *an assessment of the People’s Republic*
11 *of China’s intent with regards to increased co-*
12 *operation with Middle East and North African*
13 *countries and how these activities fit into its*
14 *broader global strategic objectives;*

15 (B) *an assessment of how governments*
16 *across the region are responding to the People’s*
17 *Republic of China’s efforts to increase its mili-*
18 *tary presence in their countries;*

19 (C) *efforts to improve regional cooperation*
20 *through foreign military sales, financing, and ef-*
21 *forts to build partner capacity and increase*
22 *interoperability with the United States;*

23 (D) *an assessment of the People’s Republic*
24 *of China’s joint research and development with*
25 *the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on*

1 *the United States' national security interests,*
2 *and recommended steps to mitigate the People's*
3 *Republic of China's influence in this area;*

4 *(E) an assessment of arms sales and weap-*
5 *ons technology transfers from the People's Repub-*
6 *lic of China to the Middle East and North Afri-*
7 *ca, impacts on United States' national security*
8 *interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the*
9 *People's Republic of China's influence in this*
10 *area;*

11 *(F) an assessment of the People's Republic*
12 *of China's military sales to the region including*
13 *lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;*

14 *(G) an assessment of People's Republic of*
15 *China military basing and dual-use facility ini-*
16 *tiatives across the Middle East and North Africa,*
17 *impacts on United States' national security in-*
18 *terests, and recommended steps to mitigate the*
19 *People's Republic of China's influence in this*
20 *area;*

21 *(H) efforts to improve regional security co-*
22 *operation with United States allies and partners*
23 *with a focus on—*

1 (i) *maritime security in the Arabian*
2 *Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi-*
3 *terranean;*

4 (ii) *integrated air and missile defense;*

5 (iii) *cyber security;*

6 (iv) *border security; and*

7 (v) *critical infrastructure security, to*
8 *include energy security;*

9 (I) *increased support for government-to-gov-*
10 *ernment engagement on critical infrastructure*
11 *development projects including ports and water*
12 *infrastructure;*

13 (J) *efforts to encourage United States pri-*
14 *vate sector and public-private partnerships in*
15 *healthcare technology and foreign direct invest-*
16 *ment in non-energy sectors;*

17 (K) *efforts to expand youth engagement and*
18 *professional education exchanges with key part-*
19 *ner countries;*

20 (L) *specific steps to counter increased in-*
21 *vestment from the People's Republic of China in*
22 *telecommunications infrastructure and diplo-*
23 *matic efforts to stress the political, economic, and*
24 *social benefits of a free and open internet;*

1 (M) efforts to promote United States private
2 sector engagement in and public-private partner-
3 ships on renewable energy development;

4 (N) the expansion of public-private partner-
5 ship efforts on water, desalination, and irriga-
6 tion projects; and

7 (O) efforts to warn United States partners
8 in the Middle East and North Africa of the risks
9 associated with the People's Republic of China's
10 telecommunications infrastructure and provide
11 alternative "clean paths" to the People's Repub-
12 lic of China's technology.

13 **SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND**
14 **NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.**

15 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress makes the following findings:

16 (1) *The United States and the international*
17 *community have long-term interests in the stability,*
18 *security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle*
19 *East and North Africa.*

20 (2) *In addition to and apart from military and*
21 *security efforts, the United States should harness a*
22 *whole of government approach, including bilateral*
23 *and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort,*
24 *and public diplomacy to compete with and counter*
25 *Chinese Communist Party influence.*

1 (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging
2 as a major theater of conflict in ongoing stra-
3 tegic competition;

4 (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit-
5 toral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol
6 the increased vessel traffic in this remote region,
7 which is a result of diminished annual levels of
8 sea ice;

9 (D) impacts public safety due to increased
10 human activity in the Arctic region where search
11 and rescue capacity remains very limited; and

12 (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's frag-
13 ile and pristine environment and the unique and
14 highly sensitive species found in the Arctic's ma-
15 rine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

16 (2) the United States should reduce the con-
17 sequences outlined in paragraph (1) by—

18 (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety
19 and dynamic set of security and safety risks un-
20 folding in the Arctic;

21 (B) developing policies and making prep-
22 arations to mitigate and respond to threats and
23 risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to
24 work with allies and partners in the Arctic re-

1 *gion to deter potential aggressive activities and*
2 *build Arctic competencies;*

3 *(C) adequately funding the National Earth*
4 *System Prediction Capability to substantively*
5 *improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on*
6 *the time scales necessary to ensure regional secu-*
7 *rity and trans-Arctic shipping;*

8 *(D) investing in resources, including a sig-*
9 *nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure*
10 *that the United States has adequate capacity to*
11 *prevent and respond to security threats in the*
12 *Arctic region;*

13 *(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with*
14 *all nations in the Arctic region for—*

15 *(i) maintaining peace and stability in*
16 *the Arctic region;*

17 *(ii) fostering cooperation on steward-*
18 *ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-*
19 *gion;*

20 *(iii) ensuring safe and efficient man-*
21 *agement of commercial maritime traffic in*
22 *the Arctic;*

23 *(iv) promoting responsible natural re-*
24 *source management and economic develop-*
25 *ment; and*

1 (v) *countering China’s Polar Silk*
2 *Road initiative; and*
3 (F) *examining the possibility of reconvening*
4 *the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum.*

5 (b) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
6 *United States—*

7 (1) *to recognize only the nations enumerated in*
8 *subsection (c)(1) as Arctic nations, and to reject all*
9 *other claims to this status; and*

10 (2) *that the militarization of the Arctic poses a*
11 *serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the*
12 *interests of United States allies and partners.*

13 (c) *DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

14 (1) *ARCTIC NATIONS.—The term “Arctic na-*
15 *tions” means the 8 nations with territory or exclusive*
16 *economic zones that extend north of the 66.56083 par-*
17 *allel latitude north of the equator, namely Russia,*
18 *Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (in-*
19 *cluding Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.*

20 (2) *ARCTIC REGION.—The term “Arctic Region”*
21 *means the geographic region north of the 66.56083*
22 *parallel latitude north of the equator.*

23 (d) *DESIGNATION.—The Assistant Secretary of State*
24 *for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific*
25 *Affairs (OES) shall designate a deputy assistant secretary*

1 *...serving within the Bureau of Oceans and International En-*
2 *vironmental and Scientific Affairs as “Deputy Assistant*
3 *Secretary for Arctic Affairs”, who shall be responsible for*
4 *OES affairs in the Arctic Region.*

5 *(e) DUTIES.—The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arc-*
6 *ctic Affairs shall—*

7 *(1) facilitate the development and coordination*
8 *of United States foreign policy in the Arctic Region*
9 *relating to—*

10 *(A) strengthening institutions for coopera-*
11 *tion among the Arctic nations;*

12 *(B) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-*
13 *search on local, regional, and global environ-*
14 *mental issues;*

15 *(C) protecting the Arctic environment and*
16 *conserving its biological resources;*

17 *(D) promoting responsible natural resource*
18 *management and economic development; and*

19 *(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in*
20 *decisions that affect them.*

21 *(2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives with re-*
22 *spect to the activities described in paragraph (1),*
23 *and, as appropriate, represent the United States*
24 *within multilateral fora that address international*

1 *cooperation and foreign policy matters in the Arctic*
2 *Region;*

3 (3) *help inform, in coordination with the Bureau*
4 *of Economic and Business Affairs, transnational com-*
5 *merce and commercial maritime transit in the Arctic*
6 *Region;*

7 (4) *coordinate the integration of scientific data*
8 *on the current and projected effects of emerging envi-*
9 *ronmental changes on the Arctic Region and ensure*
10 *that such data is applied to the development of secu-*
11 *rity strategies for the Arctic Region;*

12 (5) *make available the methods and approaches*
13 *on the integration of environmental science and data*
14 *to other regional security planning programs in the*
15 *Department of State to better ensure that broader de-*
16 *cision making processes may more adequately account*
17 *for the changing environment;*

18 (6) *assist with the development of, and facilitate*
19 *the implementation of, an Arctic Region Security*
20 *Policy in accordance with subsection (f);*

21 (7) *use the voice, vote, and influence of the*
22 *United States to encourage other countries and inter-*
23 *national multilateral organizations to support the*
24 *principles of the Arctic Region Security Policy imple-*
25 *mented pursuant to subsection (f); and*

1 (8) *perform such other duties and exercise such*
2 *powers as the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans*
3 *and International Environmental and Scientific Af-*
4 *airs shall prescribe.*

5 (f) *RANK AND STATUS.*—*The Secretary of State may*
6 *change the title of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic*
7 *Affairs designated under subsection (c) to Special Rep-*
8 *resentative or Special Envoy with the rank of Ambassador*
9 *if—*

10 (1) *the President nominates the person so des-*
11 *ignated to that rank and status; and*

12 (2) *the Senate confirms such person to such rank*
13 *and status.*

14 (g) *ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.*—*The Bureau*
15 *of European and Eurasian Affairs shall be the lead bureau*
16 *for developing and implementing the United States' Arctic*
17 *Region Security Policy, in coordination with the Bureau*
18 *of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific*
19 *Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, embassies,*
20 *other regional bureaus, and relevant offices to advance*
21 *United States national security interests, including through*
22 *conflict prevention efforts, security assistance, humani-*
23 *tarian disaster response and prevention, and economic and*
24 *other relevant assistance programs. The Arctic Region Secu-*

1 rity Policy shall assess, develop, budget for, and implement
2 plans, policies, and actions—

3 (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the
4 United States in Arctic nations, including through
5 enhancements to diplomatic missions and facilities,
6 participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-
7 lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United
8 States initiatives and assistance programs across
9 agencies to protect the national security of the United
10 States and its allies and partners;

11 (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic
12 nations to the effects of environmental change and in-
13 creased civilian and military activity by Arctic na-
14 tions and other nations that may result from in-
15 creased accessibility of the Arctic Region;

16 (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Re-
17 gion and Arctic nations that—

18 (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic
19 environment; and

20 (B) are strategically significant to the
21 United States;

22 (4) to coordinate the integration of environ-
23 mental change and national security risk and vulner-
24 ability assessments into the decision making process
25 on foreign assistance awards with Greenland;

1 (5) to advance principles of good governance by
2 encouraging and cooperating with Arctic nations on
3 collaborative approaches—

4 (A) to responsibly manage natural resources
5 in the Arctic Region;

6 (B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
7 time safety in the Arctic Region;

8 (C) to prevent the escalation of security ten-
9 sions by mitigating against the militarization of
10 the Arctic Region;

11 (D) to develop mutually agreed upon multi-
12 lateral policies among Arctic nations on the
13 management of maritime transit routes through
14 the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the
15 transit policies for access to and transit in the
16 Arctic Region by non-Arctic nations; and

17 (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic
18 Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability
19 and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
20 mane and responsible fashion; and

21 (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
22 vivability, and resiliency of United States interests
23 and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region.

PART VII—OCEANIA**SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-
GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.**

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic national security and economic priority of the United States Government;

(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open Indo-Pacific region;

(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the entire region;

(4) to work with the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic development;

(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in existing regional organizations and international structures to promote the national security

1 *and economic goals of the United States and countries*
2 *of the Oceania region;*

3 *(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United*
4 *States strategy that will enhance youth engagement*
5 *and advance long-term growth and development*
6 *throughout the region, especially as it relates to pro-*
7 *tecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-*
8 *hoods and strengthening the resilience of the countries*
9 *of the Oceania region against current and future*
10 *threats resulting from extreme weather and severe*
11 *changes in the environment;*

12 *(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign*
13 *influence and corruption aimed at undermining the*
14 *political, environmental, social, and economic sta-*
15 *bility of the people and governments of the countries*
16 *of Oceania;*

17 *(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries*
18 *of Oceania to address public health challenges and*
19 *improve global health security;*

20 *(9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar-*
21 *ket-based private sector investments that adhere to*
22 *best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain-*
23 *ability, and environmental and social safeguards as*
24 *an alternative to state-directed investments by author-*
25 *itarian governments;*

1 (10) to ensure the people and communities of
2 Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and degrad-
3 ing munitions hazards and other debris that threaten
4 health and livelihoods;

5 (11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering
6 United States support for maintaining Taiwan's dip-
7 lomatic partners in Oceania; and

8 (12) to work cooperatively with all governments
9 in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re-
10 mains of members of the United States Armed Forces
11 that are missing in action from previous conflicts in
12 the Indo-Pacific region.

13 **SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.**

14 (a) *OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.*—Not later than
15 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
16 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
17 sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening
18 United States engagement with the countries of Oceania,
19 including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with
20 Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared con-
21 cerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security and
22 resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

23 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—The strategic roadmap required by
24 subsection (a) shall include the following:

1 (1) *A description of United States regional goals*
2 *and concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing*
3 *engagement with the countries of Oceania.*

4 (2) *An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of*
5 *United States regional goals and concerns that are*
6 *shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in-*
7 *cluding a review of issues related to anticorruption,*
8 *maritime and other security issues, environmental*
9 *protection, fisheries management, economic growth*
10 *and development, and disaster resilience and pre-*
11 *paredness.*

12 (3) *A review of ongoing programs and initiatives*
13 *by the governments of the United States, Australia,*
14 *New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of those shared*
15 *regional goals and concerns, including with respect to*
16 *the issues described in paragraph (1).*

17 (4) *A review of ongoing programs and initiatives*
18 *by regional organizations and other related intergov-*
19 *ernmental structures aimed at addressing the issues*
20 *described in paragraph (1).*

21 (5) *A plan for aligning United States programs*
22 *and resources in pursuit of those shared regional*
23 *goals and concerns, as appropriate.*

1 (6) *Recommendations for additional United*
2 *States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources*
3 *necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.*

4 (7) *Any other elements the Secretary considers*
5 *appropriate.*

6 **SEC. 293. REVIEW OF USAID PROGRAMMING IN OCEANIA.**

7 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, in coordi-*
8 *nation with the Administrator of the United States Agency*
9 *for International Development (in this section referred to*
10 *as “USAID”), should include the Indo-Pacific countries of*
11 *Oceania in existing strategic planning and multi-sector*
12 *program evaluation processes, including the Department of*
13 *State’s Integrated Country Strategies and USAID’s Coun-*
14 *try Development Cooperation Strategies, the Joint Strategic*
15 *Plan, and the Journey to Self-Reliance Country Roadmaps.*

16 (b) *PROGRAMMATIC CONSIDERATIONS.*—*Evaluations*
17 *and considerations for Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania in*
18 *the program planning and strategic development processes*
19 *under subsection (a) should include—*

20 (1) *descriptions of the diplomatic and develop-*
21 *ment challenges of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce-*
22 *ania as those challenges relate to the strategic, eco-*
23 *nomic, and humanitarian interests of the United*
24 *States;*

1 (2) reviews of existing Department of State and
2 USAID programs to address the diplomatic and de-
3 velopment challenges of those countries evaluated
4 under paragraph (1);

5 (3) descriptions of the barriers, if any, to in-
6 creasing Department of State and USAID program-
7 ming to Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania, includ-
8 ing—

9 (A) the relative income level of the Indo-Pa-
10 cific countries of Oceania relative to other re-
11 gions where there is high demand for United
12 States foreign assistance to support development
13 needs;

14 (B) the relative capacity of the Indo-Pacific
15 countries of Oceania to absorb United States for-
16 eign assistance for diplomatic and development
17 needs through partner governments and civil so-
18 ciety institutions; and

19 (C) any other factor that the Secretary or
20 Administrator determines may constitute a bar-
21 rier to deploying or increasing United States
22 foreign assistance to the Indo-Pacific countries of
23 Oceania;

24 (4) assessments of the presence of, degree of inter-
25 national development by, partner country indebted-

1 *ness to, and political influence of malign foreign gov-*
2 *ernments, such as the Government of the People's Re-*
3 *public of China, and non-state actors;*

4 *(5) assessments of new foreign economic assist-*
5 *ance modalities that could assist in strengthening*
6 *United States foreign assistance in the Indo-Pacific*
7 *countries of Oceania, including the deployment of*
8 *technical assistance and asset recovery tools to part-*
9 *ner governments and civil society institutions to help*
10 *develop the capacity and expertise necessary to*
11 *achieve self-sufficiency;*

12 *(6) an evaluation of the existing budget and re-*
13 *source management processes for the Department of*
14 *State's and USAID's mission and work with respect*
15 *to its programming in the Indo-Pacific countries of*
16 *Oceania;*

17 *(7) an explanation of how the Secretary and the*
18 *Administrator will use existing programming proc-*
19 *esses, including those with respect to development of*
20 *an Integrated Country Strategy, Country Develop-*
21 *ment Cooperation Strategy, the Joint Strategic Plan,*
22 *and the Journey to Self-Reliance Country Roadmaps,*
23 *to advance the long-term growth, governance, eco-*
24 *nomics development, and resilience of the Indo-Pacific*
25 *countries of Oceania; and*

1 (8) *any recommendations about appropriate*
2 *budgetary, resource management, and programmatic*
3 *changes necessary to assist in strengthening United*
4 *States foreign assistance programming in the Indo-*
5 *Pacific countries of Oceania.*

6 **SEC. 294. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

7 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than one year after the*
8 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State*
9 *shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the*
10 *feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States-*
11 *based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be*
12 *known as the “Oceania Security Dialogue”) among the*
13 *countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring*
14 *and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic,*
15 *and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce-*
16 *ania.*

17 (b) *REPORT REQUIRED.*—*The briefing required by*
18 *subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following:*

19 (1) *A review of the ability of the Department of*
20 *State to participate in a public-private sponsored se-*
21 *curity dialogue.*

22 (2) *An assessment of the potential locations for*
23 *conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the ju-*
24 *risdiction of the United States.*

1 (3) *Consideration of dates for conducting an*
2 *Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize par-*
3 *ticipation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific*
4 *countries of Oceania.*

5 (4) *A review of the funding modalities available*
6 *to the Department of State to help finance an Oce-*
7 *ania Security Dialogue, including grant-making au-*
8 *thorities available to the Department of State.*

9 (5) *An assessment of any administrative, statu-*
10 *tory, or other legal limitations that would prevent the*
11 *establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue with*
12 *participation and support of the Department of State*
13 *as described in subsection (a).*

14 (6) *An analysis of how an Oceania Security*
15 *Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration*
16 *on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the*
17 *changing environment as the greatest existential*
18 *threat to countries of Oceania.*

19 (7) *An evaluation of how an Oceania Security*
20 *Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of*
21 *existing regional structures and organizations dedi-*
22 *cated to the security of the Oceania region, such as*
23 *the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental*
24 *Security Forum.*

1 (8) *An analysis of how an Oceania Security*
2 *Dialogue would help with implementation of the stra-*
3 *tegic roadmap required by section 292 and advance*
4 *the National Security Strategy of the United States.*

5 (c) *INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent*
6 *practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the*
7 *Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the*
8 *lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Studies*
9 *of the Department of Defense to determine the feasibility*
10 *and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security Dia-*
11 *logue.*

12 **SEC. 295. REPORT ON COUNTERING ILLEGAL, UNRE-**
13 **PORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING IN**
14 **OCEANIA.**

15 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
16 *that—*

17 (1) *many countries of the Oceania region depend*
18 *on commercial tuna fisheries as a critical component*
19 *of their economies;*

20 (2) *the Government of the People’s Republic of*
21 *China has used its licensed fishing fleet to exert great-*
22 *er influence in Oceania, but at the same time, its li-*
23 *icensed fishing fleet is also a major contributor to ille-*
24 *gal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (in this sec-*
25 *tion referred to as “IUU fishing”) activities;*

1 (3) *the sustainability of Oceania's fisheries is*
2 *threatened by IUU fishing, which depletes both com-*
3 *mercially important fish stocks and non-targeted spe-*
4 *cies that help maintain the integrity of the ocean eco-*
5 *system;*

6 (4) *in addition, IUU fishing puts pressure on*
7 *protected species of marine mammals, sea turtles, and*
8 *sea birds, which also jeopardizes the integrity of the*
9 *ocean ecosystem;*

10 (5) *further, because IUU fishing goes unrecorded,*
11 *the loss of biomass compromises scientists' work to as-*
12 *sess and model fishery stocks and advise managers on*
13 *sustainable catch levels;*

14 (6) *beyond the damage to living marine re-*
15 *sources, IUU fishing also contributes directly to ille-*
16 *gal activity in the Oceania region, such as food fraud,*
17 *smuggling, and human trafficking;*

18 (7) *current approaches to IUU fishing enforce-*
19 *ment rely on established methods, such as vessel moni-*
20 *toring systems, logbooks maintained by government*
21 *fisheries enforcement authorities to record the catches*
22 *landed by fishing vessels, and corroborating data on*
23 *catches hand-collected by human observer programs;*

24 (8) *such established methods are imperfect be-*
25 *cause—*

1 (A) vessels can turn off monitoring systems
2 and unlicensed vessels do not use them; and

3 (B) observer coverage is thin and subject to
4 human error and corruption;

5 (9) maritime domain awareness technology solu-
6 tions for vessel monitoring have gained credibility in
7 recent years and include systems such as observing
8 instruments deployed on satellites, crewed and
9 uncrewed air and surface systems, aircraft, and sur-
10 face vessels, as well as electronic monitoring systems
11 on fishing vessels;

12 (10) maritime domain awareness technologies
13 hold the promise of significantly augmenting the cur-
14 rent IUU fishing enforcement capacities; and

15 (11) maritime domain awareness technologies
16 offer an avenue for addressing key United States na-
17 tional interests, including those interests related to—

18 (A) increasing bilateral diplomatic ties with
19 key allies and partners in the Oceania region;

20 (B) countering illicit trafficking in arms,
21 narcotics, and human beings associated with
22 IUU fishing;

23 (C) advancing security, long-term growth,
24 and development in the Oceania region;

1 (D) supporting ocean conservation objec-
2 tives;

3 (E) reducing food insecurity; and

4 (F) countering attempts by the Government
5 of the People's Republic of China to grow its in-
6 fluence in the Oceania region.

7 (b) *REPORT REQUIRED.*—

8 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days after
9 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
10 State, in consultation with the Administrator of the
11 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
12 the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Sec-
13 retary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate con-
14 gressional committees a report assessing the use of ad-
15 vanced maritime domain awareness technology sys-
16 tems to combat IUU fishing in Oceania.

17 (2) *ELEMENTS.*—The report required by para-
18 graph (1) shall include—

19 (A) a review of the effectiveness of existing
20 monitoring technologies, including electronic
21 monitoring systems, to combat IUU fishing;

22 (B) recommendations for effectively inte-
23 grating effective monitoring technologies into a
24 Oceania-wide strategy for IUU fishing enforce-
25 ment;

1 (C) an assessment and recommendations for
2 the secure and reliable processing of data from
3 such monitoring technologies, including the secu-
4 rity and verification issues;

5 (D) the technical and financial capacity of
6 countries of the Oceania region to deploy and
7 maintain large-scale use of maritime domain
8 awareness technological systems for the purposes
9 of combating IUU fishing and supporting fish-
10 eries resource management;

11 (E) a review of the technical and financial
12 capacity of regional organizations and inter-
13 national structures to support countries of the
14 Oceania region in the deployment and mainte-
15 nance of large-scale use of maritime domain
16 awareness technology systems for the purposes of
17 combating IUU fishing and supporting fisheries
18 resource management;

19 (F) an evaluation of the utility of using for-
20 eign assistance, security assistance, and develop-
21 ment assistance provided by the United States to
22 countries of the Oceania region to support the
23 large-scale deployment and operations of mari-
24 time domain awareness systems to increase mar-
25 itime security across the region; and

1 (G) *an assessment of the role of large-scale*
2 *deployment and operations of maritime domain*
3 *awareness systems throughout Oceania to sup-*
4 *porting United States economic and national se-*
5 *curity interests in the Oceania region, including*
6 *efforts related to countering IUU fishing, im-*
7 *proving maritime security, and countering ma-*
8 *lign foreign influence.*

9 **SEC. 296. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.**

10 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than one year after the*
11 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace*
12 *Corps shall submit to Congress a report on strategies for*
13 *to reasonably and safely expand the number of Peace Corps*
14 *volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of—*

15 (1) *expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to*
16 *all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and*

17 (2) *working with regional and international*
18 *partners of the United States to expand the presence*
19 *of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania*
20 *communities in support of climate resilience initia-*
21 *tives.*

22 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The report required by subsection (a)*
23 *shall—*

1 (1) *assess the factors contributing to the current*
2 *absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oce-*
3 *ania;*

4 (2) *examine potential remedies that include*
5 *working with United States Government agencies and*
6 *regional governments, including governments of*
7 *United States allies—*

8 (A) *to increase the health infrastructure and*
9 *medical evacuation capabilities of the countries*
10 *of Oceania to better support the safety of Peace*
11 *Corps volunteers while in those countries;*

12 (B) *to address physical safety concerns that*
13 *have decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to*
14 *operate in Oceania; and*

15 (C) *to increase transportation infrastruc-*
16 *ture in the countries of Oceania to better support*
17 *the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and their ac-*
18 *cess to necessary facilities;*

19 (3) *evaluate the potential to expand the deploy-*
20 *ment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the*
21 *countries of Oceania address social, economic, and de-*
22 *velopment needs of their communities that require*
23 *specific professional expertise; and*

1 (4) *explore potential new operational models to*
 2 *address safety and security needs of Peace Corps vol-*
 3 *unteers in the countries of Oceania, including—*

4 (A) *changes to volunteer deployment dura-*
 5 *tions; and*

6 (B) *scheduled redeployment of volunteers to*
 7 *regional or United States-based healthcare facili-*
 8 *ties for routine physical and behavioral health*
 9 *evaluation.*

10 (c) *VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMU-*
 11 *NITIES.—*

12 (1) *IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential to*
 13 *expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-*
 14 *income Oceania communities under subsection (a)(2),*
 15 *the Director of the Peace Corps shall consider the de-*
 16 *velopment of initiatives described in paragraph (2).*

17 (2) *INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives de-*
 18 *scribed in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives*
 19 *that help the countries of Oceania address social, eco-*
 20 *nomie, and development needs of their communities,*
 21 *including by—*

22 (A) *addressing, through appropriate resil-*
 23 *ience-based interventions, the vulnerability that*
 24 *communities in Oceania face as result of extreme*

1 *weather, severe environmental change, and other*
2 *climate related trends; and*

3 *(B) improving, through smart infrastruc-*
4 *ture principles, access to transportation and*
5 *connectivity infrastructure that will help address*
6 *the economic and social challenges that commu-*
7 *nities in Oceania confront as a result of poor or*
8 *nonexistent infrastructure.*

9 *(d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term*
10 *“Oceania” includes the following:*

11 *(1) Easter Island of Chile.*

12 *(2) Fiji.*

13 *(3) French Polynesia of France.*

14 *(4) Kiribati.*

15 *(5) New Caledonia of France.*

16 *(6) Nieu of New Zealand.*

17 *(7) Papua New Guinea.*

18 *(8) Samoa.*

19 *(9) Vanuatu.*

20 *(10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Aus-*
21 *tralia.*

22 *(11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.*

23 *(12) The Coral Islands of Australia.*

24 *(13) The Federated States of Micronesia.*

25 *(14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.*

1 (15) *The Pitcairn Islands of the United King-*
2 *dom.*

3 (16) *The Republic of the Marshal Islands.*

4 (17) *The Republic of Palau.*

5 (18) *The Solomon Islands.*

6 (19) *Tokelau of New Zealand.*

7 (20) *Tonga.*

8 (21) *Tuvalu.*

9 (22) *Wallis and Futuna of France.*

10 ***TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR***
11 ***VALUES***

12 ***SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-***
13 ***MOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG.***

14 (a) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*
15 *authorized to be appropriated \$10,000,000 for fiscal year*
16 *2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and*
17 *Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy in*
18 *Hong Kong.*

19 (b) *ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall*
20 *designate an office with the Department of State to admin-*
21 *ister and coordinate the provision of such funds described*
22 *in subsection (a) within the Department of State and across*
23 *the United States Government.*

1 **SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO**
2 **FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR**
3 **AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

4 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
5 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
6 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

7 (1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as sub-
8 paragraph (F); and

9 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the fol-
10 lowing:

11 “(E) Serious human rights abuses in con-
12 nection with forced labor.”.

13 (b) *EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.*—The amend-
14 ment made by subsection (a)—

15 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
16 this Act; and

17 (2) applies with respect to the first report re-
18 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human
19 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date
20 of enactment.

1 **SEC. 303. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
2 **SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION,**
3 **FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY**
4 **CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE**
5 **XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

6 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
7 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
8 22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as amended by section 302, is further
9 amended—

10 (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) as sub-
11 paragraph (G); and

12 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the fol-
13 lowing:

14 “(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion,
15 forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive
16 implantation policies and practices.”

17 (b) *EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.*—The amend-
18 ment made by subsection (a)—

19 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
20 this Act; and

21 (2) applies with respect to the first report re-
22 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human
23 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date
24 of enactment.

1 **SEC. 304. REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR OF-**
2 **FICIALS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S**
3 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

4 (a) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
5 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
6 *of Congress” means—*

7 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
8 *Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,*
9 *and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Sen-*
10 *ate; and*

11 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
12 *mittee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Se-*
13 *lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-*
14 *resentatives.*

15 (b) *ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.*—

16 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 180 days after*
17 *the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually*
18 *thereafter through 2026, the Director of the Central*
19 *Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the Sec-*
20 *retary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, and any*
21 *other relevant United States Government official,*
22 *shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-*
23 *gress a report on the corruption and corrupt activities*
24 *of senior officials of the Government of China.*

25 (2) *ELEMENTS.*—

1 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—Each report under para-
2 graph (1) shall include the following elements:

3 (i) *A description of the wealth and*
4 *sources of wealth of senior officials of the*
5 *Government of China.*

6 (ii) *A description of corrupt activities,*
7 *including activities taking place outside of*
8 *China, engaged in by senior officials of the*
9 *Government of China.*

10 (iii) *A description of any gaps in the*
11 *ability of the intelligence community to col-*
12 *lect information covered in clauses (i) and*
13 *(ii).*

14 (B) *SCOPE OF REPORTS.*—The first report
15 under paragraph (1) shall include comprehensive
16 information on the matters described in subpara-
17 graph (A). Any succeeding report under para-
18 graph (1) may consist of an update or supple-
19 ment to the preceding report under that sub-
20 section.

21 (3) *FORM.*—Each report under paragraph (1)
22 shall include an unclassified executive summary of
23 the elements described in clauses (i) and (ii) of para-
24 graph (2)(A), and may include a classified annex.

1 (c) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
2 *that the United States should undertake every effort and*
3 *pursue every opportunity to expose the corruption and re-*
4 *lated practices of senior officials of the Government of*
5 *China, including President Xi Jinping.*

6 **SEC. 305. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS**
7 **HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT**
8 **HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.**

9 *The President shall direct the Permanent Representa-*
10 *tive of the United States to the United Nations to use the*
11 *voice, vote, and influence of the United States to—*

12 (1) *reform the process for removing members of*
13 *the United Nations Human Rights Council that com-*
14 *mit gross and systemic violations of human rights,*
15 *including—*

16 (A) *lowering the threshold vote at the*
17 *United Nations General Assembly for removal to*
18 *a simple majority;*

19 (B) *ensuring information detailing the*
20 *member country's human rights record is pub-*
21 *licly available before the vote on removal; and*

22 (C) *making the vote of each country on the*
23 *removal from the United Nations Human Rights*
24 *Council publicly available;*

1 (2) *reform the rules on electing members to the*
2 *United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure*
3 *United Nations members that have committed gross*
4 *and systemic violations of human rights are not elect-*
5 *ed to the Human Rights Council; and*

6 (3) *oppose the election to the Human Rights*
7 *Council of any United Nations member—*

8 (A) *currently designated as a country en-*
9 *gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations*
10 *of internationally recognized human rights pur-*
11 *suant to section 116 or section 502B of the For-*
12 *ign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n,*
13 *2304);*

14 (B) *currently designated as a state sponsor*
15 *of terrorism;*

16 (C) *currently designated as a Tier 3 coun-*
17 *try under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act*
18 *of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);*

19 (D) *the government of which is identified on*
20 *the list published by the Secretary of State pur-*
21 *suant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Pre-*
22 *vention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)) as a*
23 *government that recruits and uses child soldiers;*
24 *or*

1 (E) the government of which the United
2 States determines to have committed genocide or
3 crimes against humanity.

4 **SEC. 306. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.**

5 (a) *RANK OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR*
6 *FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.*—Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy
7 Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

8 (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d),
9 as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and

10 (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol-
11 lowing:

12 “(b) *RANK.*—The Special Coordinator shall either be
13 appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of
14 the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank of
15 Under Secretary of State or higher.”.

16 (b) *TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN BEI-*
17 *JING.*—

18 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—The Secretary of State shall
19 establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the
20 United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic
21 of China.

22 (2) *OPERATION.*—The Tibet Unit established
23 under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as
24 the Government of the People’s Republic of China per-
25 mits—

1 (A) *the United States Consulate General in*
 2 *Chengdu, People’s Republic of China, to reopen;*
 3 *or*

4 (B) *a United States Consulate General in*
 5 *Lhasa, Tibet, to open.*

6 (3) *STAFF.—*

7 (A) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall—*

8 (i) *assign not fewer than 2 United*
 9 *States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet*
 10 *Unit established under paragraph (1); and*

11 (ii) *hire not fewer than 1 locally en-*
 12 *gaged staff member for such unit.*

13 (B) *LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary*
 14 *shall make Tibetan language training available*
 15 *to the personnel assigned under subparagraph*
 16 *(A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of*
 17 *2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).*

18 **SEC. 307. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EN-**
 19 **GAGEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OR REIN-**
 20 **CARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELI-**
 21 **GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.**

22 (a) *REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of*
 23 *the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of divi-*
 24 *sion FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Pub-*
 25 *lic Law 116–260), that any “interference by the Govern-*

1 *ment of the People’s Republic of China or any other govern-*
 2 *ment in the process of recognizing a successor or reincarna-*
 3 *tion of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas*
 4 *would represent a clear abuse of the right to religious free-*
 5 *dom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people”.*

6 *(b) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS*
 7 *FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—The Secretary of*
 8 *State should engage with United States allies and partners*
 9 *to—*

10 *(1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders’*
 11 *sole religious authority to identify and install the*
 12 *15th Dalai Lama;*

13 *(2) oppose claims by the Government of the Peo-*
 14 *ple’s Republic of China that the PRC has the author-*
 15 *ity to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai*
 16 *Lama; and*

17 *(3) reject interference by the Government of the*
 18 *People’s Republic of China in the religious freedom of*
 19 *Tibetan Buddhists.*

20 **SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF**
 21 **UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES**
 22 **IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-**
 23 **GION.**

24 *(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

1 (1) *The Uyghurs are one of several predomi-*
2 *nantly Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang*
3 *Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the north-*
4 *west of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).*

5 (2) *Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest*
6 *in 2009 and clashes with government security per-*
7 *sonnel and other violent incidents in subsequent*
8 *years, PRC leaders sought to “stabilize” the XUAR*
9 *through large-scale arrests and extreme security meas-*
10 *ures, under the pretext of combatting alleged ter-*
11 *rorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism.*

12 (3) *In May 2014, the PRC launched its “Strike*
13 *Hard Against Violent Extremism” campaign, which*
14 *placed further restrictions on and facilitated addi-*
15 *tional human rights violations against minorities in*
16 *the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism.*

17 (4) *In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party*
18 *(CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet*
19 *Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary, known*
20 *for overseeing intensifying security operations and*
21 *human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as*
22 *Party Secretary of the XUAR.*

23 (5) *Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have*
24 *sought to forcibly “assimilate” Uyghurs and other*

1 *Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a pol-*
2 *icy of cultural erasure known as “Sinicization”.*

3 (6) *Since 2018, credible reporting including from*
4 *the BBC, France24, and the New York Times has*
5 *shown that the Government of the PRC has built mass*
6 *internment camps in the XUAR, which it calls “voca-*
7 *tional training” centers, and detained Uyghurs and*
8 *other groups in them and other facilities.*

9 (7) *Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbi-*
10 *trarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs—*
11 *12.5 percent of the XUAR’s official Uyghur popu-*
12 *lation of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of other*
13 *ethnic minorities in the “vocational training” centers*
14 *and other detention and pre-detention facilities.*

15 (8) *In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than*
16 *two percent of the PRC’s total population but 21 per-*
17 *cent of all arrests in China.*

18 (9) *The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other*
19 *sources have revealed that detainees are forced to re-*
20 *nounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs and*
21 *repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and identity.*

22 (10) *Investigations by Human Rights Watch and*
23 *other human rights organizations have documented*
24 *how detainees are subject to political indoctrination,*
25 *forced labor, crowded and unsanitary conditions, in-*

1 *voluntary biometric data collection, both medical ne-*
2 *glect and intrusive medical interventions, food and*
3 *water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and tor-*
4 *ture.*

5 *(11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy*
6 *Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many detain-*
7 *ees have been placed in higher security facilities and*
8 *convicted of formal crimes.*

9 *(12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the*
10 *PRC uses data collection programs, including facial*
11 *recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the*
12 *XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities*
13 *may detain.*

14 *(13) PRC authorities have placed countless chil-*
15 *dren whose parents are detained or in exile in state-*
16 *run institutions and boarding schools without the*
17 *consent of their parents.*

18 *(14) New York Times reporting revealed that nu-*
19 *merous local PRC officials who did not agree with the*
20 *policies carried out in XUAR have been fired and im-*
21 *prisoned.*

22 *(15) Associated Press reporting documented*
23 *widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities*
24 *to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to*

1 *subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening*
2 *to detain those who do not comply.*

3 (16) *PRC authorities prohibit family members*
4 *and advocates inside and outside China from having*
5 *regular communications with relatives and friends*
6 *imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and en-*
7 *trepreneur Ekpar Asat.*

8 (17) *PRC authorities have imposed pervasive re-*
9 *strictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the*
10 *XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch as-*
11 *serts the PRC “has effectively outlawed the practice of*
12 *Islam”.*

13 (18) *Individuals who are not detained in camps*
14 *have been forced to attend political indoctrination ses-*
15 *sions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass sur-*
16 *veillance systems, involuntary biometric data collec-*
17 *tion, and other human rights abuses.*

18 (19) *International media, nongovernmental or-*
19 *ganizations, scholars, families, and survivors have re-*
20 *ported on the systemic nature of many of these abuses.*

21 (20) *On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 inde-*
22 *pendent United Nations experts jointly expressed*
23 *alarm over China’s deteriorating human rights*
24 *record, including its repression in Xinjiang, and*
25 *called on the international community “to act collec-*

1 *tively and decisively to ensure China respects human*
2 *rights and abides by its international obligations”.*

3 *(21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations*
4 *member countries issued a public statement con-*
5 *demning human rights violations by PRC authorities*
6 *and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations*
7 *High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered ac-*
8 *cess to Xinjiang.*

9 *(22) The United States Congress passed the*
10 *Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public*
11 *Law 116–145).*

12 *(23) The United States Congress passed the Glob-*
13 *al Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (sub-*
14 *title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C.*
15 *2656 note), which has been used to sanction PRC offi-*
16 *cials and entities for their activities in the XUAR.*

17 *(24) The United States Government has imple-*
18 *mented additional targeted restrictions on trade with*
19 *Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions*
20 *on PRC officials and entities for their activities in*
21 *the XUAR.*

22 *(25) The United States Government has docu-*
23 *mented human rights abuses and violations of indi-*
24 *vidual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019*

1 *Department of State Report on International Reli-*
2 *gious Freedom.*

3 (26) *On January 19, 2021, then-Secretary of*
4 *State Michael Pompeo “determined that the PRC,*
5 *under the direction and control of the CCP, has com-*
6 *mitted genocide against the predominantly Muslim*
7 *Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority*
8 *groups in Xinjiang”.*

9 (27) *On January 19, 2021, during his confirma-*
10 *tion hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken testi-*
11 *fied that “forcing men, women, and children into con-*
12 *centration camps, trying to in effect reeducate them*
13 *to be adherents to the Chinese Communist Party—all*
14 *of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide”.*

15 (28) *On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the*
16 *Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation*
17 *hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of “hor-*
18 *rendous human rights abuses”.*

19 (29) *On January 27, 2021, in response to a*
20 *question from the press regarding the Uyghurs, Sec-*
21 *retary Blinken stated that his “judgement remains*
22 *that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs”.*

23 (30) *On March 10, 2021, in response to a ques-*
24 *tion on Xinjiang during his testimony before the*
25 *Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-*

1 *representatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, “We’ve*
2 *been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as geno-*
3 *cide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and we’ll*
4 *continue to make that clear.”.*

5 *(31) The 2020 Department of State Country Re-*
6 *ports on Human Rights Practices: China states that*
7 *“[g]enocide and crimes against humanity occurred*
8 *during the year against the predominantly Muslim*
9 *Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority*
10 *groups in Xinjiang”.*

11 *(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
12 *that—*

13 *(1) the atrocities committed by the CCP against*
14 *Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim Turkic*
15 *groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor, sexual vi-*
16 *olence, the internment of over 1,000,000 individuals,*
17 *and other horrific abuses must be condemned;*

18 *(2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the*
19 *United States Ambassador to the United Nations*
20 *should speak publicly about the ongoing human rights*
21 *abuses in the XUAR, including in formal speeches at*
22 *the United Nations and other international fora;*

23 *(3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the*
24 *United States Ambassador to the United Nations*
25 *should appeal to the United Nations Secretary-Gen-*

1 *eral to take a more proactive and public stance on the*
2 *situation in the XUAR, including by supporting calls*
3 *for an investigation and accountability for individ-*
4 *uals and entities involved in abuses against the peo-*
5 *ple of the XUAR;*

6 *(4) the United States should continue to use tar-*
7 *geted sanctions and all diplomatic tools available to*
8 *hold those responsible for the atrocities in Xinjiang to*
9 *account;*

10 *(5) United States agencies engaged with China*
11 *on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues*
12 *should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as*
13 *a consideration in developing United States policy;*

14 *(6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia*
15 *Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in*
16 *the world independent of Chinese government influ-*
17 *ence; and*

18 *(7) the United States recognizes the repeated re-*
19 *quests from the United Nations High Commissioner*
20 *for Human Rights for unfettered access to the XUAR*
21 *and the PRC's refusal to comply, and therefore—*

22 *(A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered*
23 *access by the United Nations Office of the High*
24 *Commissioner for Human Rights to the XUAR;*

1 (B) the United States should urge collabo-
2 rative action between the United States Govern-
3 ment and international partners to pressure
4 PRC authorities to allow unfettered access to the
5 XUAR;

6 (C) the President, the Secretary of State,
7 and the United States Ambassador to the United
8 Nations should simultaneously outline a strategy
9 to investigate the human rights abuses and
10 crimes that have taken place in the XUAR, col-
11 lect evidence, and transfer the evidence to a com-
12 petent court; and

13 (D) United States partners and allies
14 should undertake similar strategies in an effort
15 to build an international investigation outside of
16 the PRC if PRC authorities do not comply with
17 a United Nations investigation in the XUAR.

18 **SEC. 309. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET**
19 **FREEDOM AND GREAT FIREWALL CIR-**
20 **CUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF**
21 **HONG KONG.**

22 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress makes the following findings:

23 (1) *The People’s Republic of China has repeat-*
24 *edly violated its obligations under the Joint Declara-*

1 *tion by suppressing the basic rights and freedoms of*
2 *Hong Kongers.*

3 (2) *On June 30, 2020, the National People’s*
4 *Congress passed a “National Security Law” that fur-*
5 *ther erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables au-*
6 *thorities to suppress dissent.*

7 (3) *The Government of the People’s Republic of*
8 *China continues to utilize the National Security Law*
9 *to undermine the fundamental rights of the Hong*
10 *Kong people through suppression of the freedom of*
11 *speech, assembly, religion, and the press.*

12 (4) *Article 9 of the National Security Law au-*
13 *thorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of*
14 *internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded*
15 *police powers to force internet service providers to*
16 *cancel content, hand over user information, and block*
17 *access to platforms.*

18 (5) *On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong*
19 *Broadband Network blocked public access to HK*
20 *Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy view-*
21 *points, under the authorities of the National Security*
22 *Law.*

23 (6) *On February 12, 2021, internet service pro-*
24 *viders blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Jus-*
25 *tice Commission website in Hong Kong.*

1 (7) *Major tech companies including Facebook,*
2 *Twitter, WhatsApp and Google have stopped review-*
3 *ing requests for user data from Hong Kong authori-*
4 *ties.*

5 (8) *On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy ac-*
6 *tivists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged*
7 *under the National Security Law on the charge of*
8 *“conspiracy to commit subversion”.*

9 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
10 *that the United States should—*

11 (1) *support the ability of the people of Hong*
12 *Kong to maintain their freedom to access information*
13 *online; and*

14 (2) *focus on investments in technologies that fa-*
15 *cilitate the unhindered exchange of information in*
16 *Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the*
17 *Chinese Communist Party—*

18 (A) *to suppress internet access;*

19 (B) *to increase online censorship; or*

20 (C) *to inhibit online communication and*
21 *content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong.*

22 (c) *DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

23 (1) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—*
24 *The term “appropriate congressional committees”*
25 *means—*

1 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
2 *the Senate;*

3 (B) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
4 *Senate;*

5 (C) *the Select Committee on Intelligence of*
6 *the Senate;*

7 (D) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
8 *House of Representatives;*

9 (E) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
10 *House of Representatives; and*

11 (F) *the Permanent Select Committee on In-*
12 *telligence of the House of Representatives.*

13 (2) *WORKING GROUP.*—*The term “working*
14 *group” means—*

15 (A) *the Under Secretary of State for Civil-*
16 *ian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;*

17 (B) *the Assistant Secretary of State for*
18 *East Asian and Pacific Affairs;*

19 (C) *the Chief Executive Officer of the*
20 *United States Agency for Global Media and the*
21 *President of the Open Technology Fund; and*

22 (D) *the Administrator of the United States*
23 *Agency for International Development.*

24 (3) *JOINT DECLARATION.*—*The term “Joint Dec-*
25 *laration” means the Joint Declaration of the Govern-*

1 *ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and*
2 *Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's*
3 *Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,*
4 *done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.*

5 *(d) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.—*

6 *(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is au-*
7 *thorized to establish a working group to develop a*
8 *strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online ac-*
9 *cess in Hong Kong. The Secretary shall establish a*
10 *Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in the Bureau*
11 *of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the De-*
12 *partment of State. Additionally, the President of the*
13 *Technology Fund is authorized to establish a Hong*
14 *Kong Internet Freedom Program. These programs*
15 *shall operate independently, but in strategic coordina-*
16 *tion with other entities in the working group. The*
17 *Open Technology Fund shall remain independent*
18 *from Department of State direction in its implemen-*
19 *tation of this, and any other Internet Freedom Pro-*
20 *grams.*

21 *(2) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period begin-*
22 *ning on the date of the enactment of this Act and end-*
23 *ing on September 30, 2023, the Program shall be car-*
24 *ried out independent from the mainland China inter-*
25 *net freedom portfolios in order to focus on supporting*

1 *liberties presently enjoyed by the people of Hong*
2 *Kong.*

3 (3) *CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE*
4 *PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Sec-*
5 *retary of State may—*

6 (A) *consolidate the Program with the main-*
7 *land China initiatives in the Bureau of Democ-*
8 *racy, Human Rights, and Labor; or*

9 (B) *continue to carry out the Program in*
10 *accordance with paragraph (2).*

11 (4) *CONSOLIDATION OF OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND*
12 *PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Presi-*
13 *dent of the Open Technology Fund may—*

14 (A) *consolidate the Program with the main-*
15 *land China initiatives in the Open Technology*
16 *Fund; or*

17 (B) *continue to carry out the Program in*
18 *accordance with paragraph (2).*

19 (e) *SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECHNOLOGY*
20 *PROGRAMS.—*

21 (1) *GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—*

22 (A) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State,*
23 *working through the Bureau of Democracy,*
24 *Human Rights, and Labor, and the Open Tech-*
25 *nology Fund, separately and independently from*

1 *the Secretary of State, are authorized to award*
2 *grants and contracts to private organizations to*
3 *support and develop programs in Hong Kong*
4 *that promote or expand—*

5 *(i) open, interoperable, reliable and se-*
6 *cure internet; and*

7 *(ii) the online exercise of human rights*
8 *and fundamental freedoms of individual*
9 *citizens, activists, human rights defenders,*
10 *independent journalists, civil society orga-*
11 *nizations, and marginalized populations in*
12 *Hong Kong.*

13 *(B) GOALS.—The goals of the programs de-*
14 *veloped with grants authorized under subpara-*
15 *graph (A) should be—*

16 *(i) to make the internet available in*
17 *Hong Kong;*

18 *(ii) to increase the number of the tools*
19 *in the technology portfolio;*

20 *(iii) to promote the availability of such*
21 *technologies and tools in Hong Kong;*

22 *(iv) to encourage the adoption of such*
23 *technologies and tools by the people of Hong*
24 *Kong;*

1 (v) to scale up the distribution of such
2 technologies and tools throughout Hong
3 Kong;

4 (vi) to prioritize the development of
5 tools, components, code, and technologies
6 that are fully open-source, to the extent
7 practicable;

8 (vii) to conduct research on repressive
9 tactics that undermine internet freedom in
10 Hong Kong;

11 (viii) to ensure digital safety guidance
12 and support is available to repressed indi-
13 vidual citizens, human rights defenders,
14 independent journalists, civil society orga-
15 nizations and marginalized populations in
16 Hong Kong; and

17 (ix) to engage American private indus-
18 try, including e-commerce firms and social
19 networking companies, on the importance of
20 preserving internet access in Hong Kong.

21 (C) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants author-
22 ized under this paragraph shall be distributed to
23 multiple vendors and suppliers through an open,
24 fair, competitive, and evidence-based decision
25 process—

1 (i) to diversify the technical base; and
2 (ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad
3 actors.

4 (D) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies
5 developed using grants from this paragraph shall
6 undergo comprehensive security audits to ensure
7 that such technologies are secure and have not
8 been compromised in a manner detrimental to
9 the interests of the United States or to individ-
10 uals or organizations benefitting from programs
11 supported by the Open Technology Fund.

12 (2) FUNDING SOURCE.—The Secretary of State is
13 authorized to expend funds from the Human Rights
14 and Democracy Fund of the Bureau of Democracy,
15 Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State
16 during fiscal year 2020 for grants authorized under
17 paragraph (1) at any entity in the working group.

18 (3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

19 (A) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—In addition
20 to the funds authorized to be expended pursuant
21 to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be ap-
22 propriated to the Open Technology Fund
23 \$5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and
24 2023 to carry out this subsection. This funding
25 is in addition to the funds authorized for the

1 *Open Technology Fund through the National De-*
2 *fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021*
3 *(Public Law 116–92).*

4 (B) *BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN*
5 *RIGHTS, AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds*
6 *authorized to be expended pursuant to para-*
7 *graph (2), there are authorized to be appro-*
8 *priated to the Office of Internet Freedom Pro-*
9 *grams in the Bureau of Democracy, Human*
10 *Rights, and Labor of the Department of State*
11 *\$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and*
12 *2023 to carry out this section.*

13 (C) *AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated*
14 *pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall re-*
15 *main available until expended.*

16 (f) *STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT.—Not later than*
17 *120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the*
18 *Secretary of State and the working group shall submit a*
19 *classified report to the appropriate committees of Congress*
20 *that—*

21 (1) *describes the Federal Government’s plan to*
22 *bolster and increase the availability of Great Firewall*
23 *circumvention and internet freedom technology in*
24 *Hong Kong during fiscal year 2022;*

25 (2) *outlines a plan for—*

1 (A) supporting the preservation of an open,
2 interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in
3 Hong Kong;

4 (B) increasing the supply of the technology
5 referred to in paragraph (1);

6 (C) accelerating the dissemination of such
7 technology;

8 (D) promoting the availability of internet
9 freedom in Hong Kong;

10 (E) utilizing presently-available tools in the
11 existing relevant portfolios for further use in the
12 unique context of Hong Kong;

13 (F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order
14 to diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and
15 resiliency of the circumvention efforts;

16 (G) providing training for high-risk groups
17 and individuals in Hong Kong; and

18 (H) detecting analyzing, and responding to
19 new and evolving censorship threats;

20 (3) includes a detailed description of the tech-
21 nical and fiscal steps necessary to safely implement
22 the plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), in-
23 cluding an analysis of the market conditions in Hong
24 Kong;

1 (4) describes the Federal Government’s plans for
2 awarding grants to private organizations for the pur-
3 poses described in subsection (e)(1)(A);

4 (5) outlines the working group’s consultations re-
5 garding the implementation of this section to ensure
6 that all Federal efforts are aligned and well coordi-
7 nated; and

8 (6) outlines the Department of State’s strategy to
9 influence global internet legal standards at inter-
10 national organizations and multilateral fora.

11 **SEC. 310. ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY ON INTERNATIONAL**
12 **AGREEMENTS AND QUALIFYING NON-BIND-**
13 **ING INSTRUMENTS.**

14 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Section 112b of title 1, United
15 States Code, is amended—

16 (1) in the section heading, by striking “**trans-**
17 **mission to Congress**” and inserting “**trans-**
18 **parency provisions**”;

19 (2) by striking subsection (e);

20 (3) in subsection (a), by striking “The Sec-
21 retary” and all that follows through “notice from the
22 President.”;

23 (4) by redesignating subsection (a), as amended
24 by paragraph (2), as subsection (e);

1 (5) *by inserting before subsection (b) the fol-*
2 *lowing:*

3 “(a)(1) *Not later than 5 business days after the date*
4 *on which the Secretary or an officer or employee of the De-*
5 *partment of State approves the negotiation or conclusion*
6 *of an international agreement or qualifying non-binding*
7 *instrument, the Secretary, through the Legal Adviser of the*
8 *Department, shall provide written notice of such approval*
9 *to the appropriate congressional committees.*

10 “(2) *The written notice required by paragraph (1)*
11 *shall include the following:*

12 “(A) *A description of the intended scope, sub-*
13 *stance, form, and parties to or participants in the*
14 *international agreement or qualifying non-binding*
15 *instrument.*

16 “(B) *A description of the primary legal author-*
17 *ity that, in the view of the Secretary, provides author-*
18 *ization for the negotiation, conclusion, or negotiation*
19 *and conclusion of the international agreement or*
20 *qualifying non-binding instrument. If multiple au-*
21 *thorities are relied upon, the Secretary may cite all*
22 *such authorities but shall identify a primary author-*
23 *ity. All citations to a treaty or statute shall include*
24 *the specific article or section and subsection reference*
25 *whenever available and, if not available, shall be as*

1 *specific as possible. If the primary authority relied*
2 *upon is article II of the Constitution of the United*
3 *States, the Secretary shall explain the basis for that*
4 *reliance.*

5 *“(C) A statement of intended opportunities for*
6 *public comment on the proposed international agree-*
7 *ment or qualifying non-binding instrument and the*
8 *timing of such opportunities.*

9 *“(D) A statement describing any new or amend-*
10 *ed statutory or regulatory authority anticipated to be*
11 *required to fully implement the proposed inter-*
12 *national agreement or qualifying non-binding instru-*
13 *ment.*

14 *“(3) The written notice required by paragraph (1) and*
15 *all information contained therein shall be provided in un-*
16 *classified form, unless the proposed text of the international*
17 *agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument that is the*
18 *subject of the notification is classified.”;*

19 *(6) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the*
20 *following:*

21 *“(b)(1) Not later than 5 business days after the date*
22 *on which an international agreement or a qualifying non-*
23 *binding instrument is signed or otherwise concluded, the*
24 *Secretary shall transmit the text of the international agree-*

1 *ment or qualifying non-binding instrument to the appro-*
2 *priate congressional committees.*

3 “(2) *The Secretary should simultaneously make the*
4 *text of the international agreement or qualifying non-bind-*
5 *ing instrument, and the notification required by subsection*
6 *(a), available to the public on the website of the Department*
7 *of State, unless such text or notification is classified.”;*

8 (7) *in subsection (c), in the first sentence, by*
9 *striking “of State”;*

10 (8) *by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection*
11 *(h);*

12 (9) *by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection*
13 *(k);*

14 (10) *by inserting after subsection (b) the fol-*
15 *lowing:*

16 “(c)(1) *Not later than 15 business days after the date*
17 *on which an international agreement enters into force or*
18 *a qualifying non-binding instrument becomes effective, the*
19 *Secretary shall make the text of the international agreement*
20 *or qualifying non-binding instrument and the notification*
21 *required by subsection (a) available to the public on the*
22 *website of the Department of State.*

23 “(2) *The requirement in paragraph (1)—*

1 “(A) shall not apply to any text of the inter-
2 national agreement or qualifying non-binding instru-
3 ment that is classified; and

4 “(B) shall apply to any text of the international
5 agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument that
6 is unclassified.

7 “(d)(1) Not later than 5 business days after the date
8 on which any implementing material, whether binding or
9 non-binding, for an international agreement or qualifying
10 non-binding instrument, is concluded, the Secretary shall
11 submit such material to the appropriate congressional com-
12 mittees.

13 “(2) Paragraph (1) shall apply—

14 “(A) with respect to an international agreement,
15 until the agreement is no longer in force; and

16 “(B) with respect to a qualifying non-binding
17 instrument, until the instrument is no longer effec-
18 tive.”;

19 (11) in subsection (e), as redesignated by para-
20 graph (4)—

21 (A) by inserting “or qualifying non-binding
22 instrument” after “international agreement”;
23 and

24 (B) by striking “shall transmit” and all
25 that follows and inserting the following: “shall—

1 “(1) provide to the Secretary the text of such
2 agreement or non-binding instrument not later than
3 5 business days after the date on which such agree-
4 ment or non-binding instrument is signed or other-
5 wise concluded; and

6 “(2) on an ongoing basis, provide any imple-
7 menting material to the Secretary for transmittal to
8 Congress.”;

9 (12) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection
10 (l);

11 (13) by inserting after subsection (e) the fol-
12 lowing:

13 “(f)(1) Each department or agency of the United
14 States Government that enters into any international
15 agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument on behalf
16 of the United States shall designate a Chief International
17 Agreements Officer, who shall—

18 “(A) be selected from among employees of such
19 department or agency;

20 “(B) serve concurrently as the Chief Inter-
21 national Agreements Officer; and

22 “(C) subject to the authority of the head of such
23 department or agency, have department- or agency-
24 wide responsibility for efficient and appropriate com-
25 pliance with this section.

1 “(2) *The Chief International Agreements Officer of the*
2 *Department of State shall serve in the Office of the Legal*
3 *Adviser with the title of International Agreements Compli-*
4 *ance Officer.*

5 “(g) *Texts of oral international agreements and quali-*
6 *fying non-binding instruments shall be reduced to writing*
7 *and subject to the requirements of subsections (a) through*
8 *(c).”;*

9 (14) *by inserting after subsection (h), as redesign-*
10 *ated by paragraph (8), the following:*

11 “(i) *Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no*
12 *amounts appropriated to the Department of State under*
13 *any law shall be available for obligation or expenditure to*
14 *conclude or implement or to support the conclusion or im-*
15 *plementation of (including through the use of personnel or*
16 *resources subject to the authority of a chief of mission) an*
17 *international agreement or qualifying non-binding instru-*
18 *ment, other than to facilitate compliance with this section,*
19 *until the Secretary satisfies the substantive requirements in*
20 *subsections (a) through (c) and subsection (f).*

21 “(j)(1) *Not less frequently than twice each year, the*
22 *Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an*
23 *audit of the compliance of the Secretary with the require-*
24 *ments of this section.*

1 “(2) *In any instance in which a failure by the Sec-*
2 *retary to comply with such requirements is due to the fail-*
3 *ure or refusal of another agency to provide information or*
4 *material to the Department of State, or the failure to do*
5 *so in a timely manner, the Comptroller General shall en-*
6 *gage such other agency to determine—*

7 “(A) *the cause and scope of such failure or re-*
8 *fusals;*

9 “(B) *the specific office or offices responsible for*
10 *such failure or refusal; and*

11 “(C) *penalties or other recommendations for*
12 *measures to ensure compliance with statutory require-*
13 *ments.*

14 “(3) *The Comptroller General shall submit to the ap-*
15 *propriate congressional committees the results of each audit*
16 *required by paragraph (1).*

17 “(4) *The Comptroller General and the Secretary shall*
18 *make the results of each audit required by paragraph (1)*
19 *publicly available on the websites of the Government Ac-*
20 *countability Office and the Department of State, respec-*
21 *tively.”;*

22 (15) *in subsection (k), as redesignated by para-*
23 *graph (9)—*

24 (A) *in paragraph (1)—*

1 (i) by striking “The Secretary of State
2 shall annually submit to Congress” and in-
3 serting “Not later than February 1 of each
4 year, the Secretary shall submit to the ap-
5 propriate congressional committees”; and

6 (ii) by striking “an index of” and all
7 that follows and inserting the following: “a
8 list of—

9 “(A) all international agreements and qualifying
10 non-binding instruments that were signed or other-
11 wise concluded, entered into force or otherwise became
12 effective, or that were modified or otherwise amended
13 during the preceding calendar year; and

14 “(B) for each agreement and instrument in-
15 cluded in the list under subparagraph (A)—

16 “(i) the dates of any action described in
17 such subparagraph;

18 “(ii) the title of the agreement or instru-
19 ment; and

20 “(iii) a summary of the agreement or in-
21 strument (including a description of the dura-
22 tion of activities under the agreement or instru-
23 ment and a description of the agreement or in-
24 strument).”;

1 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking “may be
2 submitted in classified form” and inserting
3 “shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
4 may include a classified annex”; and

5 (C) by adding at the end the following:

6 “(3)(A) The Secretary should make the report, except
7 for any classified annex, available to the public on the
8 website of the Department of State.

9 “(B) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Sec-
10 retary shall make available to the public on the website of
11 the Department of State each part of the report involving
12 an international agreement or qualifying non-binding in-
13 strument that entered into force or became effective during
14 the preceding calendar year, except for any classified annex
15 or information contained therein.”; and

16 (16) by adding after subsection (l), as redesign-
17 ated by paragraph (12), the following:

18 “(m) There is authorized to be appropriated
19 \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for
20 purposes of implementing the requirements of this section.

21 “(n) In this section:

22 “(1) The term ‘appropriate congressional com-
23 mittees’ means—

24 “(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
25 the Senate; and

1 “(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
2 the House of Representatives.

3 “(2) The term ‘international agreement’ in-
4 cludes—

5 “(A) treaties that require the advice and
6 consent of the Senate, pursuant to article II of
7 the Constitution of the United States; and

8 “(B) other international agreements com-
9 monly referred to as ‘executive agreements’ for
10 purposes of Federal law, and which are not sub-
11 ject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

12 “(3) The term ‘qualifying non-binding instru-
13 ment’ means a non-binding instrument that—

14 “(A) is signed or otherwise concluded with
15 one or more foreign governments or international
16 organizations; and

17 “(B)(i) has an important effect on the for-
18 eign policy of the United States; or

19 “(ii) is the subject of a written communica-
20 tion from the Chair or Ranking Member of either
21 of the appropriate congressional committees to
22 the Secretary.

23 “(4) The term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary of
24 State.

1 “(5) *The term ‘text of the international agree-*
 2 *ment or qualifying non-binding instrument’ includes*
 3 *any annex, appendix, codicil, side agreement, imple-*
 4 *menting material, document, or guidance, technical*
 5 *or other understanding, and any related agreement or*
 6 *non-binding instrument, whether entered into or im-*
 7 *plemented prior to the entry into force of the agree-*
 8 *ment or the effective date of the qualifying non-bind-*
 9 *ing instrument or to be entered into or implemented*
 10 *in the future.”.*

11 **(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—*The table of sections at*
 12 *the beginning of chapter 2 of title 1, United States Code,*
 13 *is amended by striking the item relating to section 112b*
 14 *and inserting the following:*

 “112b. *United States international agreements; transparency provisions.*”.

15 **(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.**—*Section 317(h)(2) of*
 16 *the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 195c(h)(2))*
 17 *is amended by striking “Section 112b(c)” and inserting*
 18 *“Section 112b(h)”.*

19 **SEC. 311. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
 20 **TECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE’S**
 21 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

22 **(a) IN GENERAL.**—*Amounts authorized to be appro-*
 23 *priated or otherwise made available to carry out section*
 24 *409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative (Public Law 115–*
 25 *409) include programs that prioritize the protection and*

1 *advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, reli-*
2 *gion, and expression for women, human rights activists,*
3 *and ethnic and religious minorities in the People's Republic*
4 *of China.*

5 (b) *USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant*
6 *to subsection (a) may be used to fund nongovernmental*
7 *agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that are focused on*
8 *the issues described in subsection (a).*

9 (c) *CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In carrying out*
10 *this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human*
11 *Rights and Labor shall consult with the appropriate con-*
12 *gressional committees and representatives of civil society re-*
13 *garding—*

14 (1) *strengthening the capacity of the organiza-*
15 *tions referred to in subsection (b);*

16 (2) *protecting members of the groups referred to*
17 *in subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest,*
18 *harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abortions,*
19 *forced labor, or intimidation, including members re-*
20 *siding outside of the People's Republic of China; and*

21 (3) *messaging efforts to reach the broadest pos-*
22 *sible audiences within the People's Republic of China*
23 *about United States Government efforts to protect*
24 *freedom of association, expression, assembly, and the*
25 *rights of ethnic minorities.*

1 **SEC. 312. DIPLOMATIC BOYCOTT OF THE XXIV OLYMPIC**
2 **WINTER GAMES AND THE XIII PARALYMPIC**
3 **WINTER GAMES.**

4 (a) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—*It shall be the policy of*
5 *the United States—*

6 (1) *to implement a diplomatic boycott of the*
7 *XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII*
8 *Paralympic Winter Games in the PRC; and*

9 (2) *to call for an end to the Chinese Communist*
10 *Party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including the*
11 *Uyghur genocide.*

12 (b) *FUNDING PROHIBITION.*—

13 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Notwithstanding any other*
14 *provision of law, the Secretary of State may not obli-*
15 *gate or expend any Federal funds to support or facili-*
16 *tate the attendance of the XXIV Olympic Winter*
17 *Games or the XIII Paralympic Winter Games by any*
18 *employee of the United States Government.*

19 (2) *EXCEPTION.*—*Paragraph (1) shall not apply*
20 *to the obligation or expenditure of Federal funds nec-*
21 *essary—*

22 (A) *to support—*

23 (i) *the United States Olympic and*
24 *Paralympic Committee;*

25 (ii) *the national governing bodies of*
26 *amateur sports; or*

1 (iii) athletes, employees, or contractors
 2 of the Olympic and Paralympic Committee
 3 or such national governing bodies; or

4 (B) to provide consular services or security
 5 to, or otherwise protect the health, safety, and
 6 welfare of, United States persons, employees, con-
 7 tractors, and their families.

8 (3) *WAIVER.*—The Secretary of State may waive
 9 the applicability of paragraph (1) in a circumstance
 10 in which the Secretary determines a waiver is the na-
 11 tional interest.

12 **SEC. 313. REPEAL OF SUNSET APPLICABLE TO AUTHORITY**
 13 **UNDER GLOBAL MAGNITSKY HUMAN RIGHTS**
 14 **ACCOUNTABILITY ACT.**

15 Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
 16 Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law
 17 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is repealed.

18 **TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR**
 19 **ECONOMIC STATECRAFT**

20 **SEC. 401. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING**
 21 **THE PRC’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY.**

22 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress makes the following findings:

23 (1) *The People’s Republic of China, at the direc-*
 24 *tion of the Chinese Communist Party, is advancing*

1 *an ecosystem of anticompetitive economic and indus-*
2 *trial policies that—*

3 *(A) distort global markets;*

4 *(B) limit innovation;*

5 *(C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the*
6 *expense of the United States and other foreign*
7 *firms; and*

8 *(D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice con-*
9 *sumer choice.*

10 *(2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and*
11 *industrial policies pursued by the PRC, the mass sub-*
12 *sidization of PRC firms, intellectual property theft,*
13 *and forced technology transfer are among the most*
14 *damaging to the global economy.*

15 *(3) Through regulatory interventions and direct*
16 *financial subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of ad-*
17 *vancing national political and economic objectives,*
18 *directs, coerces, and influences in anti-competitive*
19 *ways the commercial activities of firms that are di-*
20 *rected, financed, influenced, or otherwise controlled by*
21 *the state, including state-owned enterprises, and os-*
22 *tensibly independent and private Chinese companies,*
23 *such as technology firms in strategic sectors.*

24 *(4) The PRC Government, at the national and*
25 *subnational levels, grants special privileges or status*

1 to certain PRC firms in key sectors designated as
2 strategic, such as telecommunications, oil, power,
3 aviation, banking, and semiconductors. Enterprises
4 receive special state preferences in the form of favor-
5 able loans, tax exemptions, and preferential land ac-
6 cess from the CCP.

7 (5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as de-
8 scribed in paragraphs (3) and (4)—

9 (A) enables these companies to sell goods
10 below market prices, allowing them to outbid
11 and crowd out market-based competitors and
12 thereby pursue global dominance of key sectors;

13 (B) distorts the global market economy by
14 undermining longstanding and generally accept-
15 ed market-based principles of fair competition,
16 leading to barriers to entry and forced exit from
17 the market for foreign or private firms, not only
18 in the PRC, but in markets around the world;

19 (C) creates government-sponsored or sup-
20 ported de facto monopolies, cartels, and other
21 anti-market arrangements in key sectors, lim-
22 iting or removing opportunities for other firms;
23 and

24 (D) leads to, as a result of the issues de-
25 scribed in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines

1 *in profits and revenue needed by foreign and*
2 *private firms for research and development.*

3 *(6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers PRC ac-*
4 *tors to steal critical technologies and trade secrets*
5 *from private and foreign competitors operating in the*
6 *PRC and around the world, particularly in areas*
7 *that the CCP has identified as critical to advancing*
8 *PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by the CCP,*
9 *also continues to implement anti-competitive regula-*
10 *tions, policies, and practices that coerce the handover*
11 *of technology and other propriety or sensitive data*
12 *from foreign enterprises to domestic firms in exchange*
13 *for access to the PRC market.*

14 *(7) Companies in the United States and in for-*
15 *ign countries compete with state-subsidized PRC*
16 *companies that enjoy the protection and power of the*
17 *state in third-country markets around the world. The*
18 *advantages granted to PRC firms, combined with sig-*
19 *nificant restrictions to accessing the PRC market*
20 *itself, severely hamper the ability of United States*
21 *and foreign firms to compete, innovate, and pursue*
22 *the provision of best value to customers. The result is*
23 *an unbalanced playing field. Such an unsustainable*
24 *course, if not checked, will over time lead to depressed*

1 *competition around the world, reduced opportunity,*
2 *and harm to both producers and consumers.*

3 (8) *As stated in the United States Trade Rep-*
4 *resentative’s investigation of the PRC’s trade prac-*
5 *tices under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19*
6 *U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 2018, “When U.S.*
7 *companies are deprived of fair returns on their in-*
8 *vestment in IP, they are unable to achieve the growth*
9 *necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this sense,*
10 *China’s technology transfer regime directly burdens*
11 *the innovation ecosystem that is an engine of eco-*
12 *nomical growth in the United States and similarly-sit-*
13 *uated economies.”.*

14 (9) *In addition to forced technology described in*
15 *this subsection, the United States Trade Representa-*
16 *tive’s investigation of the PRC under section 301 of*
17 *the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also identi-*
18 *fied requirements that foreign firms license products*
19 *at less than market value, government-directed and*
20 *government-subsidized acquisition of sensitive tech-*
21 *nology for strategic purposes, and cyber theft as other*
22 *key PRC technology and industrial policies that are*
23 *unreasonable and discriminatory. These policies place*
24 *at risk United States intellectual property rights, in-*

1 *novation and technological development, and jobs in*
2 *dozens of industries.*

3 *(10) Other elements of the PRC's ecosystem of in-*
4 *dustrial policies that harm innovation and distort*
5 *global markets include—*

6 *(A) advancement of policies that encourage*
7 *local production over imports;*

8 *(B) continuation of policies that favor*
9 *unique technical standards in use by PRC firms*
10 *rather than globally accepted standards, which*
11 *often force foreign firms to alter their products*
12 *and manufacturing chains to compete;*

13 *(C) requirements that foreign companies*
14 *disclose proprietary information to qualify for*
15 *the adoption of their standards for use in the*
16 *PRC domestic market; and*

17 *(D) maintenance of closed procurement*
18 *processes, which limit participation by foreign*
19 *firms, including by setting terms that require*
20 *such firms to use domestic suppliers, transfer*
21 *know-how to firms in the PRC, and disclose pro-*
22 *prietary information.*

23 *(11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and as-*
24 *sociated industry-specific efforts under this initiative,*
25 *such as the Digital Silk Road, are key vectors to ad-*

1 *vance the PRC’s mercantilist policies and practices*
2 *globally. The resulting challenges do not only affect*
3 *United States firms. As the European Chamber of*
4 *Commerce reported in a January 2020 report, the*
5 *combination of concessional lending to PRC state-*
6 *owned enterprises, nontransparent procurement and*
7 *bidding processes, closed digital standards, and other*
8 *factors severely limit European and other participa-*
9 *tion in BRI and make “competition [with PRC com-*
10 *panies] in third-country markets extremely chal-*
11 *lenging”. This underscores a key objective of BRI,*
12 *which is to ensure the reliance of infrastructure, dig-*
13 *ital technologies, and other important goods on PRC*
14 *supply chains and technical standards.*

15 *(12) On January 9, 2021, the Ministry of Com-*
16 *merce of the PRC issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled*
17 *“Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial*
18 *Application of Foreign Legislation and other Meas-*
19 *ures”, which establishes a blocking regime in response*
20 *to foreign sanctions on Chinese individuals and enti-*
21 *ties. That order allows the Government of the PRC to*
22 *designate specific foreign laws as “unjustified*
23 *extraterritorial application of foreign legislation” and*
24 *to prohibit compliance with such foreign laws.*

1 **(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—*It is the sense of Congress*
2 *that—*

3 (1) *the challenges presented by a nonmarket*
4 *economy like the PRC’s economy, which has captured*
5 *such a large share of global economic exchange, are in*
6 *many ways unprecedented and require sufficiently*
7 *elevated and sustained long-term focus and engage-*
8 *ment;*

9 (2) *in order to truly address the most detri-*
10 *mental aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist economic*
11 *strategy, the United States must adopt policies that—*

12 (A) *expose the full scope and scale of intel-*
13 *lectual property theft and mass subsidization of*
14 *Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the*
15 *United States, foreign markets, and the global*
16 *economy;*

17 (B) *ensure that PRC companies face costs*
18 *and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;*

19 (C) *provide options for affected United*
20 *States persons to address and respond to unrea-*
21 *sonable and discriminatory CCP-directed indus-*
22 *trial policies; and*

23 (D) *strengthen the protection of critical*
24 *technology and sensitive data, while still fos-*

1 *tering an environment that provides incentives*
2 *for innovation and competition;*

3 *(3) the United States must work with its allies*
4 *and partners through the Organization for Economic*
5 *Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World*
6 *Trade Organization, and other venues and fora—*

7 *(A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac-*
8 *cepted principles of fair competition and market*
9 *behavior and address the PRC's anticompetitive*
10 *economic and industrial policies that undermine*
11 *decades of global growth and innovation;*

12 *(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted*
13 *the same treatment as that of a free-market econ-*
14 *omy until it ceases the implementation of laws,*
15 *regulations, policies, and practices that provide*
16 *unfair advantage to PRC firms in furtherance of*
17 *national objectives and impose unreasonable, dis-*
18 *criminatory, and illegal burdens on market-*
19 *based international commerce; and*

20 *(C) to align policies with respect to curbing*
21 *state-directed subsidization of the private sector,*
22 *such as advocating for global rules related to*
23 *transparency and adherence to notification re-*
24 *quirements, including through the efforts cur-*

1 *rently being advanced by the United States,*
2 *Japan, and the European Union;*

3 *(4) the United States and its allies and partners*
4 *must collaborate to provide incentives to their respec-*
5 *tive companies to cooperate in areas such as—*

6 *(A) advocating for protection of intellectual*
7 *property rights in markets around the world;*

8 *(B) fostering open technical standards; and*

9 *(C) increasing joint investments in overseas*
10 *markets; and*

11 *(5) the United States should develop policies*
12 *that—*

13 *(A) insulate United States entities from*
14 *PRC pressure against complying with United*
15 *States laws;*

16 *(B) counter the potential impact of the*
17 *blocking regime of the PRC described in sub-*
18 *section (a)(12), including by working with allies*
19 *and partners of the United States and multilat-*
20 *eral institutions; and*

21 *(C) plan for future actions that the Govern-*
22 *ment of the PRC may take to undermine the*
23 *lawful application of United States legal au-*
24 *thorities, including with respect to the use of*
25 *sanctions.*

1 **SEC. 402. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.**

2 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than one year after the
3 date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently
4 than annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State,
5 in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Attor-
6 ney General, the United States Trade Representative, and
7 the Director of National Intelligence, shall create a list (re-
8 ferred to in this section as the “intellectual property viola-
9 tors list”) that identifies—

10 (1) *all centrally administered state-owned enter-*
11 *prises incorporated in the People’s Republic of China*
12 *that have benefitted from—*

13 (A) *a significant act or series of acts of in-*
14 *tellectual property theft that subjected a United*
15 *States economic sector or particular company*
16 *incorporated in the United States to harm; or*

17 (B) *an act or government policy of involun-*
18 *tary or coerced technology transfer of intellectual*
19 *property ultimately owned by a company incor-*
20 *porated in the United States; and*

21 (2) *any corporate officer of, or principal share-*
22 *holder with controlling interests in, an entity de-*
23 *scribed in paragraph (1).*

24 (b) *RULES FOR IDENTIFICATION.*—To determine
25 whether there is a credible basis for determining that a com-
26 pany should be included on the intellectual property viola-

1 *tors list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the*
2 *Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Represent-*
3 *ative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall con-*
4 *sider—*

5 (1) *any finding by a United States court that*
6 *the company has violated relevant United States laws*
7 *intended to protect intellectual property rights; or*

8 (2) *substantial and credible information received*
9 *from any entity described in subsection (c) or other*
10 *interested persons.*

11 (c) *CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the*
12 *Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of*
13 *Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the*
14 *Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as necessary*
15 *and appropriate, with—*

16 (1) *other Federal agencies, including inde-*
17 *pendent agencies;*

18 (2) *the private sector;*

19 (3) *civil society organizations with relevant ex-*
20 *pertise; and*

21 (4) *the Governments of Australia, Canada, the*
22 *European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea,*
23 *and the United Kingdom.*

24 (d) *REPORT.—*

1 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State shall*
2 *publish, in the Federal Register, an annual report*
3 *that—*

4 (A) *lists the companies engaged in the ac-*
5 *tivities described in subsection (a)(1); and*

6 (B) *describes the circumstances surrounding*
7 *actions described in subsection (a)(2), including*
8 *any role of the PRC government;*

9 (C) *assesses, to the extent practicable, the*
10 *economic advantage derived by the companies*
11 *engaged in the activities described in subsection*
12 *(a)(1); and*

13 (D) *assesses whether each company engaged*
14 *in the activities described in subsection (a)(1) is*
15 *using or has used the stolen intellectual property*
16 *in commercial activity in Australia, Canada, the*
17 *European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South*
18 *Korea, the United Kingdom, or the United*
19 *States.*

20 (2) *FORM.*—*The report published under para-*
21 *graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a*
22 *classified annex.*

23 (e) *DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.*—*The Director*
24 *of National Intelligence may authorize the declassification*

1 of information, as appropriate, to inform the contents of
2 the report published pursuant to subsection (d).

3 (f) *REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT BUSINESS-CONFIDEN-*
4 *TIAL INFORMATION.—*

5 (1) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and*
6 *the heads of all other Federal agencies involved in the*
7 *production of the intellectual property violators list*
8 *shall protect from disclosure any proprietary infor-*
9 *mation submitted by a private sector participant and*
10 *marked as business-confidential information, unless*
11 *the party submitting the confidential business infor-*
12 *mation—*

13 (A) *had notice, at the time of submission,*
14 *that such information would be released by the*
15 *Secretary; or*

16 (B) *subsequently consents to the release of*
17 *such information.*

18 (2) *NONCONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF REPORT.—If*
19 *confidential business information is provided by a*
20 *private sector participant, a nonconfidential version*
21 *of the report under subsection (d) shall be published*
22 *in the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes, if*
23 *necessary, the confidential business information.*

1 (3) *TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.*—*Propri-*
2 *etary information submitted by a private party under*
3 *this section—*

4 (A) *shall be considered to be trade secrets*
5 *and commercial or financial information (as de-*
6 *fined under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United*
7 *States Code); and*

8 (B) *shall be exempt from disclosure without*
9 *the express approval of the private party.*

10 **SEC. 403. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF**
11 **CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST.**

12 (a) *REPORT.*—*Not later than one year after the date*
13 *of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for*
14 *5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the*
15 *United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of*
16 *Commerce, shall publish an unclassified report in the Fed-*
17 *eral Register that identifies—*

18 (1) *subsidies provided by the PRC government to*
19 *enterprises in the PRC; and*

20 (2) *discriminatory treatment favoring enter-*
21 *prises in the PRC over foreign market participants.*

22 (b) *SUBSIDIES AND DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT DE-*
23 *SCRIBED.*—*In compiling the report under subsection (a),*
24 *the Secretary of State shall consider—*

1 (1) *regulatory and other policies enacted or pro-*
2 *moted by the PRC government that—*

3 (A) *discriminate in favor of enterprises in*
4 *the PRC at the expense of foreign market par-*
5 *ticipants;*

6 (B) *shield centrally administered, state-*
7 *owned enterprises from competition; or*

8 (C) *otherwise suppress market-based com-*
9 *petition;*

10 (2) *financial subsidies, including favorable lend-*
11 *ing terms, from or promoted by the PRC government*
12 *or centrally administered, state-owned enterprises*
13 *that materially benefit PRC enterprises over foreign*
14 *market participants in contravention of generally ac-*
15 *cepted market principles; and*

16 (3) *any subsidy that meets the definition of sub-*
17 *sidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies*
18 *and Countervailing Measures referred to in section*
19 *101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19*
20 *U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).*

21 (c) *CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-*
22 *nation with the Secretary of Commerce and the United*
23 *States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appro-*
24 *priate, consult with—*

1 (1) *other Federal agencies, including inde-*
2 *pendent agencies;*

3 (2) *the private sector; and*

4 (3) *civil society organizations with relevant ex-*
5 *pertise.*

6 **SEC. 404. COUNTERING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES.**

7 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, in coordi-*
8 *nation with the Attorney General, shall offer to provide*
9 *technical assistance to establish legislative and regulatory*
10 *frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public officials*
11 *consistent with the principles of the OECD Convention on*
12 *Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-*
13 *national Business Transactions to the governments of coun-*
14 *tries—*

15 (1) *that are partners of the United States;*

16 (2) *that have demonstrated a will to combat for-*
17 *ign corrupt practices responsibly; and*

18 (3) *for which technical assistance will have the*
19 *greatest opportunity to achieve measurable results.*

20 (b) *STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.*—*Not later than 90*
21 *days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary*
22 *of State shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activi-*
23 *ties described in subsections (a) to the appropriate congres-*
24 *sional committees.*

1 (c) *COORDINATION.*—*In formulating the strategy de-*
2 *scribed in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall coordi-*
3 *nate with the Attorney General.*

4 (d) *SEMIANNUAL BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.*—*Not later*
5 *than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and*
6 *every 180 days thereafter for five years, the Secretary of*
7 *State shall provide a briefing regarding the activities de-*
8 *scribed in subsection (a) and the strategy submitted under*
9 *subsection (b) to the appropriate congressional committees.*

10 **SEC. 405. DEBT RELIEF FOR COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR AS-**
11 **SISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DE-**
12 **VELOPMENT ASSOCIATION.**

13 (a) *POLICY STATEMENT.*—*It is the policy of the United*
14 *States to coordinate with the international community to*
15 *provide debt relief for debt that is held by countries eligible*
16 *for assistance from the International Development Associa-*
17 *tion that request forbearance to respond to the COVID–19*
18 *pandemic.*

19 (b) *DEBT RELIEF.*—*The Secretary of the Treasury, in*
20 *consultation with the Secretary of State, shall engage with*
21 *international financial institutions and other bilateral offi-*
22 *cial creditors to advance policy discussions on restruc-*
23 *turing, rescheduling, or canceling the sovereign debt of*
24 *countries eligible for assistance from the International De-*

1 *velopment Association, as necessary, to respond to the*
2 *COVID–19 pandemic.*

3 (c) *REPORTING REQUIREMENT.*—*Not later than 45*
4 *days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every*
5 *90 days thereafter until the end of the COVID–19 pan-*
6 *demic, as determined by the World Health Organization,*
7 *or until two years after the date of the enactment of this*
8 *Act, whichever is earlier, the Secretary of the Treasury, in*
9 *coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to*
10 *the committees specified in subsection (d) a report that de-*
11 *scribes—*

12 (1) *actions that have been taken to advance debt*
13 *relief for countries eligible for assistance from the*
14 *International Development Association that request*
15 *forbearance to respond to the COVID–19 pandemic in*
16 *coordination with international financial institu-*
17 *tions, the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20 (G20),*
18 *Paris Club members, and the Institute of Inter-*
19 *national Finance;*

20 (2) *mechanisms that have been utilized and*
21 *mechanisms that are under consideration to provide*
22 *the debt relief described in paragraph (1);*

23 (3) *any United States policy concerns regarding*
24 *debt relief to specific countries;*

1 (4) *the balance and status of repayments on all*
2 *loans from the People’s Republic of China to countries*
3 *eligible for assistance from the International Develop-*
4 *ment Association, including—*

5 (A) *loans provided as part of the Belt and*
6 *Road Initiative of the People’s Republic of*
7 *China;*

8 (B) *loans made by the Export-Import Bank*
9 *of China;*

10 (C) *loans made by the China Development*
11 *Bank; and*

12 (D) *loans made by the Asian Infrastructure*
13 *Investment Bank; and*

14 (5) *the transparency measures established or pro-*
15 *posed to ensure that funds saved through the debt re-*
16 *lief described in paragraph (1) will be used for activi-*
17 *ties—*

18 (A) *that respond to the health, economic,*
19 *and social consequences of the COVID–19 pan-*
20 *demic; and*

21 (B) *that are consistent with the interests*
22 *and values of the United States.*

23 (d) *COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—The committees speci-*
24 *fied in this subsection are—*

1 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
 2 *Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on*
 3 *Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;*
 4 *and*

5 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
 6 *mittee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Fi-*
 7 *nancial Services of the House of Representatives.*

8 **SEC. 406. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE**
 9 **GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG**
 10 **KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS**
 11 **AND PROTECTIONS.**

12 *Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act*
 13 *of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at*
 14 *the end the following:*

15 **“SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH**
 16 **THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS**
 17 **HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED**
 18 **STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.**

19 “(a) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
 20 *date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State*
 21 *shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a*
 22 *report on the manner and extent to which the Government*
 23 *of the People’s Republic of China uses the status of Hong*
 24 *Kong to circumvent the laws and protections of the United*
 25 *States.*

1 “(b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The report required by subsection*
2 *(a) shall include the following:*

3 “(1) *In consultation with the Secretary of Com-*
4 *merce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the*
5 *Director of National Intelligence—*

6 “(A) *an assessment of how the Government*
7 *of the People’s Republic of China uses Hong*
8 *Kong to circumvent United States export con-*
9 *trols; and*

10 “(B) *a list of all significant incidents in*
11 *which the Government of the People’s Republic of*
12 *China used Hong Kong to circumvent such con-*
13 *trols during the reporting period.*

14 “(2) *In consultation with the Secretary of the*
15 *Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce—*

16 “(A) *an assessment of how the Government*
17 *of the People’s Republic of China uses Hong*
18 *Kong to circumvent duties on merchandise ex-*
19 *ported to the United States from the People’s Re-*
20 *public of China; and*

21 “(B) *a list of all significant incidents in*
22 *which the Government of the People’s Republic of*
23 *China used Hong Kong to circumvent such du-*
24 *ties during the reporting period.*

1 “(3) *In consultation with the Secretary of the*
2 *Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and*
3 *the Director of National Intelligence—*

4 “(A) *an assessment of how the Government*
5 *of the People’s Republic of China uses Hong*
6 *Kong to circumvent sanctions imposed by the*
7 *United States or pursuant to multilateral re-*
8 *gimes; and*

9 “(B) *a list of all significant incidents in*
10 *which the Government of the People’s Republic of*
11 *China used Hong Kong to circumvent such sanc-*
12 *tions during the reporting period.*

13 “(4) *In consultation with the Secretary of Home-*
14 *land Security and the Director of National Intel-*
15 *ligence, an assessment of how the Government of the*
16 *People’s Republic of China uses formal or informal*
17 *means to extradite or coercively move individuals, in-*
18 *cluding United States persons, from Hong Kong to*
19 *the People’s Republic of China.*

20 “(5) *In consultation with the Secretary of De-*
21 *fense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the*
22 *Director of Homeland Security—*

23 “(A) *an assessment of how the intelligence,*
24 *security, and law enforcement agencies of the*
25 *Government of the People’s Republic of China,*

1 including the Ministry of State Security, the
2 Ministry of Public Security, and the People's
3 Armed Police, use the Hong Kong Security Bu-
4 reau and other security agencies in Hong Kong
5 to conduct espionage on foreign nationals, in-
6 cluding United States persons, conduct influence
7 operations, or violate civil liberties guaranteed
8 under the laws of Hong Kong; and

9 “(B) a list of all significant incidents of
10 such espionage, influence operations, or viola-
11 tions of civil liberties during the reporting pe-
12 riod.

13 “(c) *FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.*—

14 “(1) *FORM.*—The report required by subsection
15 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
16 include a classified index.

17 “(2) *AVAILABILITY.*—The unclassified portion of
18 the report required by subsection (a) shall be posted
19 on a publicly available internet website of the Depart-
20 ment of State.

21 “(d) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this section:

22 “(1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
23 *TEES.*—The term ‘appropriate congressional commit-
24 *tees’ means—*

1 “(A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations,*
2 *the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban*
3 *Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Se-*
4 *lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and*

5 “(B) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the*
6 *Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent*
7 *Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-*
8 *mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep-*
9 *resentatives.*

10 “(2) *FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term ‘foreign na-*
11 *tional’ means a person that is neither—*

12 “(A) *an individual who is a citizen or na-*
13 *tional of the People’s Republic of China; or*

14 “(B) *an entity organized under the laws of*
15 *the People’s Republic of China or of a jurisdic-*
16 *tion within the People’s Republic of China.*

17 “(3) *REPORTING PERIOD.—The term ‘reporting*
18 *period’ means the 5-year period preceding submission*
19 *of the report required by subsection (a).*

20 “(4) *UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term*
21 *‘United States person’ means—*

22 “(A) *a United States citizen or an alien*
23 *lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the*
24 *United States; or*

1 “(B) an entity organized under the laws of
2 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
3 the United States, including a foreign branch of
4 such an entity.”.

5 **SEC. 407. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE**
6 **COMPANIES IN UNITED STATES CAPITAL**
7 **MARKETS.**

8 (a) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.*—In
9 this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress”
10 means—

11 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
12 *Senate;*

13 (2) *the Select Committee on Intelligence of the*
14 *Senate;*

15 (3) *the Committee on Banking, Housing, and*
16 *Urban Affairs of the Senate;*

17 (4) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
18 *House of Representatives;*

19 (5) *the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-*
20 *ligence of the House of Representatives; and*

21 (6) *the Committee on Financial Services of the*
22 *House of Representatives.*

23 (b) *REPORT.*—

24 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days after
25 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually

1 *thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of*
2 *State, in consultation with the Director of National*
3 *Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall*
4 *submit an unclassified report to the appropriate com-*
5 *mittees of Congress that describes the risks posed to*
6 *the United States by the presence in United States*
7 *capital markets of companies incorporated in the*
8 *PRC.*

9 (2) *MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-*
10 *quired under paragraph (1) shall—*

11 (A) *identify companies incorporated in the*
12 *PRC that—*

13 (i) *are listed or traded on one or sev-*
14 *eral stock exchanges within the United*
15 *States, including over-the-counter market*
16 *and “A Shares” added to indexes and ex-*
17 *change-traded funds out of mainland ex-*
18 *changes in the PRC; and*

19 (ii) *based on the factors for consider-*
20 *ation described in paragraph (3), have*
21 *knowingly and materially contributed to—*

22 (I) *activities that undermine*
23 *United States national security;*

24 (II) *serious abuses of internation-*
25 *ally recognized human rights; or*

1 (III) a substantially increased fi-
2 nancial risk exposure for United
3 States-based investors;

4 (B) describe the activities of the companies
5 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and
6 their implications for the United States; and

7 (C) develop policy recommendations for the
8 United States Government, State governments,
9 United States financial institutions, United
10 States equity and debt exchanges, and other rel-
11 evant stakeholders to address the risks posed by
12 the presence in United States capital markets of
13 the companies identified pursuant to subpara-
14 graph (A).

15 (3) *FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION.*—In com-
16 pleting the report under paragraph (1), the President
17 shall consider whether a company identified pursuant
18 to paragraph (2)(A)—

19 (A) has materially contributed to the devel-
20 opment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated
21 procurement by the PLA, of lethal military
22 equipment or component parts of such equip-
23 ment;

1 (B) has contributed to the construction and
2 militarization of features in the South China
3 Sea;

4 (C) has been sanctioned by the United
5 States or has been determined to have conducted
6 business with sanctioned entities;

7 (D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts
8 of intellectual property theft;

9 (E) has engaged in corporate or economic
10 espionage;

11 (F) has contributed to the proliferation of
12 nuclear or missile technology in violation of
13 United Nations Security Council resolutions or
14 United States sanctions;

15 (G) has contributed to the repression of reli-
16 gious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, in-
17 cluding in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
18 or Tibet Autonomous Region;

19 (H) has contributed to the development of
20 technologies that enable censorship directed or di-
21 rectly supported by the PRC government;

22 (I) has failed to comply fully with Federal
23 securities laws (including required audits by the
24 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board)

1 and “material risk” disclosure requirements of
2 the Securities and Exchange Commission; or

3 (J) has contributed to other activities or be-
4 havior determined to be relevant by the Presi-
5 dent.

6 (c) *REPORT FORM.*—The report required under sub-
7 section (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
8 may include a classified annex.

9 (d) *PUBLICATION.*—The unclassified portion of the re-
10 port under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the
11 public online through relevant United States Government
12 websites.

13 **SEC. 408. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.**

14 (a) *PILOT PROGRAM.*—Not later than 180 days after
15 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, acting
16 through the Secretary of State, shall develop and implement
17 a pilot program for the creation of deployable economic de-
18 fense response teams to help provide emergency technical
19 assistance and support to a country subjected to the threat
20 or use of coercive economic measures and to play a liaison
21 role between the legitimate government of that country and
22 the United States Government. Such assistance and support
23 may include the following activities:

24 (1) Reducing the partner country’s vulnerability
25 to coercive economic measures.

1 (2) *Minimizing the damage that such measures*
2 *by an adversary could cause to that country.*

3 (3) *Implementing any bilateral or multilateral*
4 *contingency plans that may exist for responding to*
5 *the threat or use of such measures.*

6 (4) *In coordination with the partner country, de-*
7 *veloping or improving plans and strategies by the*
8 *country for reducing vulnerabilities and improving*
9 *responses to such measures in the future.*

10 (5) *Assisting the partner country in dealing with*
11 *foreign sovereign investment in infrastructure or re-*
12 *lated projects that may undermine the partner coun-*
13 *try's sovereignty.*

14 (6) *Assisting the partner country in responding*
15 *to specific efforts from an adversary attempting to*
16 *employ economic coercion that undermines the part-*
17 *ner country's sovereignty, including efforts in the*
18 *cyber domain, such as efforts that undermine cyberse-*
19 *curity or digital security of the partner country or*
20 *initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a*
21 *manner that undermines freedom, security, and sov-*
22 *ereignty of the partner country.*

23 (7) *Otherwise providing direct and relevant*
24 *short-to-medium term economic or other assistance*
25 *from the United States and marshalling other re-*

1 *sources in support of effective responses to such meas-*
2 *ures.*

3 *(b) INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT.—The pilot program re-*
4 *quired by subsection (a) should include the following ele-*
5 *ments:*

6 *(1) Identification and designation of relevant*
7 *personnel within the United States Government with*
8 *expertise relevant to the objectives specified in sub-*
9 *section (a), including personnel in—*

10 *(A) the Department of State, for overseeing*
11 *the economic defense response team’s activities,*
12 *engaging with the partner country government*
13 *and other stakeholders, and other purposes rel-*
14 *evant to advancing the success of the mission of*
15 *the economic defense response team;*

16 *(B) the United States Agency for Inter-*
17 *national Development, for the purposes of pro-*
18 *viding technical, humanitarian, and other assist-*
19 *ance, generally;*

20 *(C) the Department of the Treasury, for the*
21 *purposes of providing advisory support and as-*
22 *sistance on all financial matters and fiscal im-*
23 *plications of the crisis at hand;*

24 *(D) the Department of Commerce, for the*
25 *purposes of providing economic analysis and as-*

1 *sistance in market development relevant to the*
2 *partner country's response to the crisis at hand,*
3 *technology security as appropriate, and other*
4 *matters that may be relevant;*

5 *(E) the Department of Energy, for the pur-*
6 *poses of providing advisory services and tech-*
7 *nical assistance with respect to energy needs as*
8 *affected by the crisis at hand;*

9 *(F) the Department of Homeland Security,*
10 *for the purposes of providing assistance with re-*
11 *spect to digital and cybersecurity matters, and*
12 *assisting in the development of any contingency*
13 *plans referred to in paragraphs (3) and (6) of*
14 *subsection (a) as appropriate;*

15 *(G) the Department of Agriculture, for pro-*
16 *viding advisory and other assistance with respect*
17 *to responding to coercive measures such as arbi-*
18 *trary market closures that affect the partner*
19 *country's agricultural sector;*

20 *(H) the Office of the United States Trade*
21 *Representative with respect to providing support*
22 *and guidance on trade and investment matters;*
23 *and*

24 *(I) other Federal departments and agencies*
25 *as determined by the President.*

1 (2) *Negotiation of memoranda of understanding,*
2 *where appropriate, with other United States Govern-*
3 *ment components for the provision of any relevant*
4 *participating or detailed non-Department of State*
5 *personnel identified under paragraph (1).*

6 (3) *Negotiation of contracts, as appropriate,*
7 *with private sector representatives or other individ-*
8 *uals with relevant expertise to advance the objectives*
9 *specified in subsection (a).*

10 (4) *Development within the United States Gov-*
11 *ernment of—*

12 (A) *appropriate training curricula for rel-*
13 *evant experts identified under paragraph (1)*
14 *and for United States diplomatic personnel in a*
15 *country actually or potentially threatened by co-*
16 *ercive economic measures;*

17 (B) *operational procedures and appropriate*
18 *protocols for the rapid assembly of such experts*
19 *into one or more teams for deployment to a*
20 *country actually or potentially threatened by co-*
21 *ercive economic measures; and*

22 (C) *procedures for ensuring appropriate*
23 *support for such teams when serving in a coun-*
24 *try actually or potentially threatened by coercive*
25 *economic measures, including, as applicable,*

1 *logistical assistance, office space, information*
2 *support, and communications.*

3 (5) *Negotiation with relevant potential host*
4 *countries of procedures and methods for ensuring the*
5 *rapid and effective deployment of such teams, and the*
6 *establishment of appropriate liaison relationships*
7 *with local public and private sector officials and enti-*
8 *ties.*

9 (c) *REPORTS REQUIRED .—*

10 (1) *REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT.—Upon estab-*
11 *lishment of the pilot program required by subsection*
12 *(a), the Secretary of State shall provide the appro-*
13 *prate committees of Congress with a detailed report*
14 *and briefing describing the pilot program, the major*
15 *elements of the program, the personnel and institu-*
16 *tions involved, and the degree to which the program*
17 *incorporates the elements described in subsection (a).*

18 (2) *FOLLOW-UP REPORT.—Not later than one*
19 *year after the report required by paragraph (1), the*
20 *Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate com-*
21 *mittees of Congress with a detailed report and brief-*
22 *ing describing the operations over the previous year*
23 *of the pilot program established pursuant to sub-*
24 *section (a), as well as the Secretary's assessment of its*

1 *performance and suitability for becoming a perma-*
2 *nent program.*

3 (3) *FORM.*—*Each report required under this sub-*
4 *section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but*
5 *may include a classified annex.*

6 (d) *DECLARATION OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS RE-*
7 *QUIRED.*—

8 (1) *NOTIFICATION.*—*The President may activate*
9 *an economic defense response team for a period of 180*
10 *days under the authorities of this section to assist a*
11 *partner country in responding to an unusual and ex-*
12 *traordinary economic coercive threat by an adversary*
13 *of the United States upon the declaration of a coer-*
14 *cive economic emergency, together with notification to*
15 *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and*
16 *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of*
17 *Representatives.*

18 (2) *EXTENSION AUTHORITY.*—*The President may*
19 *activate the response team for an additional 180 days*
20 *upon the submission of a detailed analysis to the com-*
21 *mittees described in paragraph (1) justifying why the*
22 *continued deployment of the economic defense re-*
23 *sponse team in response to the economic emergency is*
24 *in the national security interest of the United States.*

1 (e) *SUNSET.*—*The authorities provided under this sec-*
2 *tion shall expire on December 31, 2026.*

3 (f) *RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.*—*Neither the authority*
4 *to declare an economic crisis provided for in subsection (d),*
5 *nor the declaration of an economic crisis pursuant to sub-*
6 *section (d), shall confer or be construed to confer any au-*
7 *thority, power, duty, or responsibility to the President other*
8 *than the authority to activate an economic defense response*
9 *team as described in this section.*

10 (g) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
11 *FINED.*—*In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
12 *of Congress” means—*

13 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
14 *Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,*
15 *the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-*
16 *tation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-*
17 *sources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and*
18 *Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Sen-*
19 *ate; and*

20 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
21 *mittee on Financial Services, the Committee on En-*
22 *ergy and Commerce, the Committee on Agriculture,*
23 *and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House*
24 *of Representatives.*

1 **TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC**
2 **SECURITY**

3 **SEC. 501. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS**
4 **CONTROL.**

5 *Congress makes the following findings:*

6 *(1) The United States and the PRC have both*
7 *made commitments to advancing strategic security*
8 *through enforceable arms control and non-prolifera-*
9 *tion agreements as states parties to the Treaty on the*
10 *Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash-*
11 *ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.*

12 *(2) The United States has long taken tangible*
13 *steps to seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms*
14 *control and non-proliferation agreements that support*
15 *United States and allied security by—*

16 *(A) controlling the spread of nuclear mate-*
17 *rials and technology;*

18 *(B) placing limits on the production, stock-*
19 *piling, and deployment of nuclear weapons;*

20 *(C) decreasing misperception and mis-*
21 *calculation; and*

22 *(D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms*
23 *competition.*

24 *(3) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intel-*
25 *ligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley*

1 stated, “China is likely to at least double the size of
2 its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the
3 most rapid expansion and diversification of its nu-
4 clear arsenal in China’s history.”. The PLA is build-
5 ing a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile
6 ground-based launchers and new capabilities for nu-
7 clear-armed bombers and submarine-launched bal-
8 listic missiles.

9 (4) In June 2020, the Department of State
10 raised concerns in its annual “Adherence to and
11 Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
12 Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” report
13 to Congress that the PRC is not complying with the
14 “zero-yield” nuclear testing ban and accused the PRC
15 of “blocking the flow of data from the monitoring sta-
16 tions” in China.

17 (5) The Department of Defense 2020 Report on
18 Military and Security Developments Involving the
19 People’s Republic of China states that the PRC “in-
20 tends to increase peacetime readiness of its nuclear
21 forces by moving to a launch on warning posture
22 with an expanded silo-based force”.

23 (6) The Department of Defense report also states
24 that, over the next decade, the PRC’s nuclear stock-
25 pile—currently estimated in the low 200s—is pro-

1 jected to least double in size as the PRC expands and
2 modernizes its nuclear force.

3 (7) *The PRC is conducting research on its first*
4 *potential early warning radar, with technical co-*
5 *operation from Russia. This radar could indicate that*
6 *the PRC is moving to a launch-on warning posture.*

7 (8) *The PRC plans to use its increasingly capa-*
8 *ble space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities*
9 *against United States early warning systems and*
10 *critical infrastructure in a crisis scenario. This poses*
11 *great risk to strategic security, as it could lead to in-*
12 *advertent escalation.*

13 (9) *The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a*
14 *part of a massive modernization of the PLA which,*
15 *combined with the PLA's aggressive actions, has in-*
16 *creasingly destabilized the Indo-Pacific region.*

17 (10) *The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which*
18 *was elevated in 2015 to become a separate branch*
19 *within the PLA, has formed 11 new missile brigades*
20 *since May 2017, some of which are capable of both*
21 *conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United*
22 *States, which separates its conventional strike and*
23 *nuclear capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only*
24 *co-locate conventional and nuclear forces, including*
25 *dual-use missiles like the DF-26, but to task the same*

1 *unit with both nuclear and conventional missions.*
2 *Such intermingling could lead to inadvertent esca-*
3 *lation in a crisis. The United States Defense Intel-*
4 *ligence Agency determined in March 2020 that the*
5 *PLA tested more ballistic missiles than the rest of the*
6 *world combined in 2019.*

7 (11) *A January 2021 report from the Institute*
8 *for Defense Analysis found that many United States*
9 *and international observers viewed China's no first-*
10 *use policy with skepticism, especially in the wake of*
11 *the expansion and modernization of its nuclear capa-*
12 *bilities.*

13 (12) *The long-planned United States nuclear*
14 *modernization program will not increase the United*
15 *States nuclear weapons stockpile, predates China's*
16 *conventional military and nuclear expansion, and is*
17 *not an arms race against China.*

18 (13) *The United States extended nuclear deter-*
19 *rence—*

20 (A) *provides critical strategic security*
21 *around the world;*

22 (B) *is an essential element of United States*
23 *military alliances; and*

24 (C) *serves a vital non-proliferation func-*
25 *tion.*

1 (14) *As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-*
 2 *Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash-*
 3 *ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, the PRC*
 4 *is obligated under Article Six of the treaty to pursue*
 5 *arms control negotiations in good faith.*

6 (15) *The United States has, on numerous occa-*
 7 *sions, called on the PRC to participate in strategic*
 8 *arms control negotiations, but the PRC has thus far*
 9 *declined.*

10 (16) *The Governments of Japan, the United*
 11 *Kingdom, Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, Lat-*
 12 *via, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania,*
 13 *Austria, Montenegro, Ukraine, Slovakia, Spain,*
 14 *North Macedonia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Cro-*
 15 *atia, and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary*
 16 *General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,*
 17 *have all encouraged the PRC to join arms control dis-*
 18 *cussions.*

19 **SEC. 502. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA-**
 20 **LOGUE.**

21 (a) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the*
 22 *United States—*

23 (1) *to pursue, in coordination with United*
 24 *States allies, arms control negotiations and sustained*
 25 *and regular engagement with the PRC—*

1 (A) to enhance understanding of each oth-
2 er's respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca-
3 pabilities;

4 (B) to improve transparency; and

5 (C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula-
6 tion and misperception;

7 (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Govern-
8 ment of the People's Republic of China on relevant bi-
9 lateral issues that lays the groundwork for bringing
10 the People's Republic of China into an arms control
11 framework, including—

12 (A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms
13 control leading to the convening of bilateral stra-
14 tegic security talks;

15 (B) negotiating norms for outer space;

16 (C) developing pre-launch notification re-
17 gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation;
18 and

19 (D) expanding lines of communication be-
20 tween both governments for the purposes of re-
21 ducing the risks of conventional war and in-
22 creasing transparency;

23 (3) to pursue relevant capabilities in coordina-
24 tion with our allies and partners to ensure the secu-
25 rity of United States and allied interests in the face

1 *of the PRC's military modernization and expansion,*
2 *including—*

3 *(A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic*
4 *missiles;*

5 *(B) integrated air and missile defense;*

6 *(C) hypersonic missiles;*

7 *(D) intelligence, surveillance, and recon-*
8 *naissance;*

9 *(E) space-based capabilities;*

10 *(F) cyber capabilities; and*

11 *(G) command, control, and communica-*
12 *tions;*

13 *(4) to maintain sufficient force structure, pos-*
14 *ture, and capabilities to provide extended nuclear de-*
15 *terrence to United States allies and partners;*

16 *(5) to maintain appropriate missile defense ca-*
17 *pabilities to protect against threats to the United*
18 *States homeland and our forces across the theater*
19 *from rogue intercontinental ballistic missiles from the*
20 *Indo-Pacific region; and*

21 *(6) to ensure that the United States declaratory*
22 *policy reflects the requirements of extended deterrence,*
23 *to both assure allies and to preserve its non-prolifera-*
24 *tion benefits.*

1 **(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—*It is the sense of Congress*
2 *that—*

3 (1) *in the midst of growing competition between*
4 *the United States and the PRC, it is in the interest*
5 *of both nations to cooperate in reducing risks of con-*
6 *ventional and nuclear escalation;*

7 (2) *a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other*
8 *PLA attack on United States early warning satellites,*
9 *other portions of the nuclear command and control*
10 *enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a high risk*
11 *to inadvertent but rapid escalation;*

12 (3) *the United States and its allies should pro-*
13 *mote international norms on military operations in*
14 *space, the employment of cyber capabilities, and the*
15 *military use of artificial intelligence, as an element*
16 *of risk reduction regarding nuclear command and*
17 *control; and*

18 (4) *United States allies and partners should*
19 *share the burden of promoting and protecting such*
20 *norms by voting against the PRC's proposals regard-*
21 *ing the weaponization of space, highlighting unsafe*
22 *behavior by the PRC that violates international*
23 *norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity oper-*
24 *ations, and promoting responsible behavior in space*
25 *and all other domains.*

1 **SEC. 503. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE**
2 **THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NU-**
3 **CLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE**
4 **ISSUES.**

5 (a) *REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-*
6 *CHINA ARMS CONTROL.*—Not later than 180 days after the
7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
8 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
9 retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate commit-
10 tees of Congress a report, and if necessary a separate classi-
11 fied annex, that examines the approaches and strategic ef-
12 fects of engaging the Government of the People's Republic
13 of China on arms control and risk reduction, including—

14 (1) *areas of potential dialogue between the Gov-*
15 *ernments of the United States and the People's Re-*
16 *public of China, including on ballistic, hypersonic*
17 *glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, nu-*
18 *clear, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other*
19 *new strategic domains, which could reduce the likeli-*
20 *hood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to*
21 *occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the*
22 *Indo-Pacific;*

23 (2) *how the United States Government can*
24 *incentivize the Government of the People's Republic of*
25 *China to engage in a constructive arms control dia-*
26 *logue;*

1 (3) *identifying strategic military capabilities of*
2 *the People’s Republic of China that the United States*
3 *Government is most concerned about and how lim-*
4 *iting these capabilities may benefit United States and*
5 *allied security interests;*

6 (4) *mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nu-*
7 *clear, conventional, and unconventional military es-*
8 *calation between the United States and the People’s*
9 *Republic of China;*

10 (5) *the personnel and expertise required to effec-*
11 *tively engage the People’s Republic of China in stra-*
12 *tegic stability and arms control dialogues; and*

13 (6) *opportunities and methods to encourage*
14 *transparency from the People’s Republic of China.*

15 (b) *REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE*
16 *RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF*
17 *CHINA.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-*
18 *ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation*
19 *with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy,*
20 *shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a*
21 *report that describes—*

22 (1) *a concrete plan for arms control talks that*
23 *includes both the People’s Republic of China and the*
24 *Russian Federation;*

1 (2) *if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not*
2 *arise, what alternative plans the Department of State*
3 *envisages for ensuring the security of the United*
4 *States and its allies security from Russian and Chi-*
5 *nese nuclear weapons;*

6 (3) *effects on the credibility of United States ex-*
7 *tended deterrence assurances to allies and partners if*
8 *the United States is faced with two nuclear-armed*
9 *peer competitors and any likely corresponding impli-*
10 *cations for regional security architectures;*

11 (4) *efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of*
12 *China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilat-*
13 *eral or multilateral basis; and*

14 (5) *the interest level of the Government of China*
15 *in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral*
16 *or multilateral basis.*

17 (c) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-*
18 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees*
19 *of Congress” means—*

20 (1) *the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
21 *Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on*
22 *Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and*

23 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-*
24 *mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on En-*
25 *ergy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.*

1 **SEC. 504. COUNTERING CHINA'S PROLIFERATION OF BAL-**
2 **LISTIC MISSILES AND NUCLEAR TECH-**
3 **NOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST.**

4 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress makes the following findings:

5 (1) *The People's Republic of China became a full*
6 *participant of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004,*
7 *committing it to apply a strong presumption of de-*
8 *denial in exporting nuclear-related items that a foreign*
9 *country could divert to a nuclear weapons program.*

10 (2) *China also committed to the United States,*
11 *in November 2000, to abide by the foundational prin-*
12 *ciples of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime*
13 *(MTCR) to not “assist, in any way, any country in*
14 *the development of ballistic missiles that can be used*
15 *to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of*
16 *delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a*
17 *distance of at least 300 kilometers)”.*

18 (3) *The 2020 Department of State Report on the*
19 *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,*
20 *Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and*
21 *Commitments found that China “continued to supply*
22 *MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs of pro-*
23 *liferation concern in 2019” and that the United*
24 *States imposed sanctions on nine Chinese entities for*
25 *covered missile transfers to Iran.*

1 (4) A June 5, 2019, press report indicated that
2 China allegedly provided assistance to Saudi Arabia
3 in the development of a ballistic missile facility,
4 which if confirmed, would violate the purpose of the
5 MTCR and run contrary to the longstanding United
6 States policy priority to prevent weapons of mass de-
7 struction proliferation in the Middle East.

8 (5) The Arms Export and Control Act of 1976
9 (Public Law 93–329) requires the President to sanc-
10 tion any foreign person or government who knowingly
11 “exports, transfers, or otherwise engages in the trade
12 of any MTCR equipment or technology” to a country
13 that does not adhere to the MTCR.

14 (6) China concluded two nuclear cooperation
15 agreements with Saudi Arabia in 2012 and 2017, re-
16 spectively, which may facilitate China’s bid to build
17 two reactors in Saudi Arabia to generate 2.9
18 Gigawatt-electric (GWe) of electricity.

19 (7) On August 4, 2020, a press report revealed
20 the alleged existence of a previously undisclosed ura-
21 nium yellowcake extraction facility in Saudi Arabia
22 allegedly constructed with the assistance of China,
23 which if confirmed, would indicate significant
24 progress by Saudi Arabia in developing the early

1 *stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that precede uranium*
2 *enrichment.*

3 (8) *Saudi Arabia's outdated Small Quantities*
4 *Protocol and its lack of an in-force Additional Pro-*
5 *TOCOL to its International Atomic Energy Agency*
6 *(IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement se-*
7 *verely curtails IAEA inspections, which has led the*
8 *Agency to call upon Saudi Arabia to either rescind*
9 *or update its Small Quantities Protocol.*

10 (b) *MTCR TRANSFERS.*—*Not later than 30 days after*
11 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall*
12 *submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written*
13 *determination, and any documentation to support that de-*
14 *termination detailing—*

15 (1) *whether any foreign person in China know-*
16 *ingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of*
17 *any item designated under Category I of the MTCR*
18 *Annex to any foreign person in the previous three fis-*
19 *cal years; and*

20 (2) *the sanctions the President has imposed or*
21 *intends to impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the*
22 *Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.*
23 *4612(b)) against any foreign person who knowingly*
24 *engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item*
25 *or items.*

1 (c) *CHINA'S NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COOPERATION.*—
2 *Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of*
3 *this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate com-*
4 *mittees of Congress a report detailing—*

5 (1) *whether any foreign person in China engaged*
6 *in cooperation with any other foreign person in the*
7 *previous three fiscal years in the construction of any*
8 *nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity that has*
9 *not been notified to the IAEA and would be subject*
10 *to complementary access if an Additional Protocol*
11 *was in force; and*

12 (2) *the policy options required to prevent and re-*
13 *spond to any future effort by China to export to any*
14 *foreign person an item classified as “plants for the*
15 *separation of isotopes of uranium” or “plants for the*
16 *reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel ele-*
17 *ments” under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory*
18 *Commission export licensing authority.*

19 (d) *FORM OF REPORT.*—*The determination required*
20 *under subsection (b) and the report required under sub-*
21 *section (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.*

22 (e) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

23 (1) *The term “appropriate committees of Con-*
24 *gress” means—*

1 (A) *the Select Committee on Intelligence of*
2 *the Senate;*

3 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
4 *the Senate;*

5 (C) *the Select Committee on Intelligence of*
6 *the House of Representatives; and*

7 (D) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
8 *House of Representatives.*

9 (2) *FOREIGN PERSON; PERSON.—The terms “for-*
10 *ign person” and “person” mean—*

11 (A) *a natural person that is an alien;*

12 (B) *a corporation, business association,*
13 *partnership, society, trust, or any other non-*
14 *governmental entity, organization, or group, that*
15 *is organized under the laws of a foreign country*
16 *or has its principal place of business in a foreign*
17 *country;*

18 (C) *any foreign governmental entity oper-*
19 *ating as a business enterprise; and*

20 (D) *any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of*
21 *any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).*

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