

118TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 3395

To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 5, 2023

Mrs. SHAHEEN (for herself, Mr. WICKER, and Mr. DURBIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Belarus Democracy,
5 Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2023”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
8 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
9 to read as follows:

10 **“SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

11 “Congress finds the following:

1 “(1) Consistently, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the
2 illegitimate leader of Belarus, engages in a pattern
3 of clear and persistent violations of human rights,
4 democratic governance, and fundamental freedoms.

5 “(2) Alyaksandr Lukashenka has overseen and
6 participated in multiple fundamentally flawed presi-
7 dential and parliamentary elections undermining the
8 legitimacy of executive, judicial, and legislative au-
9 thority in Belarus.

10 “(3) On August 9, 2020, the Government of
11 Belarus conducted a presidential election that was
12 fraudulent and did not meet international standards.
13 There were serious irregularities with ballot counting
14 and the reporting of election results. The Govern-
15 ment of Belarus also put in place restrictive meas-
16 ures that impeded the work of local independent ob-
17 servers and did not provide sufficient notice to the
18 OSCE to allow for the OSCE to monitor the elec-
19 tions, as is customary.

20 “(4) Independent election monitors recognized
21 Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the legitimate winner
22 of the August 9, 2020 election for president in
23 Belarus following her candidacy after her husband,
24 opposition leader Sergei Tikhanovsky, was impris-

1 oned for challenging Lukashenka for president in
2 2020.

3 “(5) Following threats to her safety, Sviatlana
4 Tsikhanouskaya was forced into exile in Lithuania
5 after Mr. Lukashenka claimed victory in the fraudu-
6 lent 2020 elections, and since that time, the Govern-
7 ment of Lithuania has hosted the Office of Sviatlana
8 Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian Democratic Leader,
9 and the Government of Poland has hosted the
10 Belarusian United Transitional Cabinet.

11 “(6) Thousands of employees at Belarusian
12 state-owned enterprises went on strike across the
13 country to protest Mr. Lukashenka’s illegitimate
14 election and the subsequent crackdowns on peaceful
15 protestors to the contested results of the election, in-
16 cluding at some of Belarus’s largest factories such
17 as the BelAZ truck plant, the Minsk Tractor Works,
18 and the Minsk Automobile Plant.

19 “(7) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
20 election, the Government of Belarus restricted the
21 free flow of information to silence the opposition and
22 to conceal the regime’s violent crackdown on peace-
23 ful protestors, including by stripping the accredita-
24 tion of journalists from major foreign news outlets,
25 disrupting internet access, limiting access to social

1 media and other digital communication platforms,
2 and detaining and harassing countless journalists.

3 “(8) The Government of Belarus, led by
4 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to subject thou-
5 sands of pro-democracy political activists and peace-
6 ful protesters to harassment, beatings, enforced dis-
7 appearance, and imprisonment, particularly as a re-
8 sult of their attempts to peacefully exercise their
9 right to freedom of assembly and association, includ-
10 ing following violent crackdowns on peaceful
11 protestors and mass detentions of peaceful pro-
12 testers resisting the results of the contested 2020
13 election.

14 “(9) Women serve as the leading force in dem-
15 onstrations across the country, protesting police bru-
16 tality and mass detentions by wearing white, car-
17 rying flowers, forming ‘solidarity chains’, and un-
18 masking undercover police trying to arrest dem-
19 onstrators.

20 “(10) The Government of Belarus, led by
21 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, suppresses independent
22 media and journalists and restricts access to the
23 internet, including social media and other digital
24 communication platforms, in violation of the right to

1 freedom of speech and expression of those dissenting
2 from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

3 “(11) The Government of Belarus, led by
4 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has criminalized access to
5 independent media sources and media channels, in-
6 cluding foreign media, by designating such sources
7 and channels as extremist and conducting arbitrary
8 arrests and detainments of media workers, activists,
9 and users.

10 “(12) The Government of Belarus, led by
11 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues a systematic
12 campaign of harassment, repression, and closure of
13 nongovernmental organizations, including inde-
14 pendent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating a
15 climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil
16 society and social solidarity.

17 “(13) The Government of Belarus, led by
18 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has pursued a policy un-
19 dermining the country’s sovereignty and independ-
20 ence by making Belarus political, economic, cultural,
21 and societal interests subservient to those of Russia.

22 “(14) Against the will of the majority of the
23 Belarusian people, Russian President Vladimir Putin
24 has propped up the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime,
25 including by offering security assistance, providing

1 significant financial support, and sending Russian
2 propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime and
3 pro-Kremlin propaganda on Belarus state television.

4 “(15) Efforts by the Government of the Rus-
5 sian Federation to subsume Belarus into its sphere
6 of influence and consider Belarus as part of the
7 Russian empire or as a ‘Union State’ include secu-
8 rity, political, economic, and ideological integration
9 between Russia and Belarus, which intensified in
10 2020 after President Putin supported Mr.
11 Lukashenka’s illegitimate election and resulted in
12 the Government of Belarus permitting Russian
13 troops to use Belarusian territory to conduct mili-
14 tary exercises ahead of the February 2022 further
15 invasion of Ukraine and staging part of the Feb-
16 ruary 2022 further invasion of Ukraine from
17 Belarusian territory, including by providing Russia
18 with the use of airbases which allowed Russia to
19 shoot artillery and missiles from Belarusian territory
20 into Ukraine.

21 “(16) The United States Government and
22 United States partners and allies have imposed sanc-
23 tions on Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the Govern-
24 ment of Belarus in response to anti-democratic ac-
25 tivities and human rights abuses for more than 20

1 years, including in response to the Government of
2 Belarus' support for Russia's further invasion of
3 Ukraine, which include property blocking and visa
4 restrictions and export restrictions.

5 “(17) The Kremlin has provided the Govern-
6 ment of Belarus with loans amounting to more than
7 \$1,500,000,000 dollars to prop up Lukashenka's il-
8 legitimate regime and Russia continues to provide
9 Belarus with access to an economic market to avoid
10 the impacts of United States and allied countries'
11 sanctions on key Belarusian industries.

12 “(18) The Government of Belarus is relied
13 upon by the Government of the Russian Federation
14 to increase production of ammunition and other mili-
15 tary equipment to facilitate the Kremlin's crimes of
16 aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity
17 during the illegal war in Ukraine.

18 “(19) Since before the 2022 further invasion of
19 Ukraine, the Government of Belarus has hosted
20 Russian troops on Belarusian territory and enabled
21 the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty by Russia in
22 February 2022 and since the further invasion of
23 Ukraine, the Government of Belarus has also hosted
24 Russian mercenary fighters and reportedly hosted
25 Russian nuclear warheads.

1 “(20) The international community has seen
2 credible evidence that children forcibly removed from
3 Ukraine by Russia during the further invasion of
4 Ukraine have transited through the territory of
5 Belarus or been illegally removed to the territory of
6 Belarus with support from Alyaksandr Lukashenka
7 and been subjected to Russian re-education pro-
8 grams.

9 “(21) The Government of Belarus’ continued
10 support of Russia, especially in the unprovoked fur-
11 ther invasion of Ukraine, and continued oppression
12 of the Belarusian people may amount to crimes
13 against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of ag-
14 gression.

15 “(22) The Government of Belarus also threat-
16 ens the safety, security, and sovereignty of European
17 countries, including NATO allies Latvia, Lithuania,
18 and Poland, by facilitating illegal migration through
19 the territory of Belarus, resulting in efforts by the
20 United States to support a Customs and Border Pa-
21 trol Technical Assessment in Latvia to ensure Euro-
22 pean allies and partners can secure their borders.

23 “(23) The Government of Lithuania and other
24 United States partners and allies host independent
25 Belarusian free media, including Radio Free Europe/

1 Radio Liberty’s Minsk bureau, and facilitate infor-
2 mation and content in the Belarusian language,
3 which the Lukashenka regime has dismissed and de-
4 facto outlawed as an inferior language to Russian
5 for the purpose of facilitating Russification cam-
6 paigns in Belarus.

7 “(24) The governments of Lithuania, Latvia,
8 Poland, and other European partners host members
9 of the Belarusian pro-democracy movement, includ-
10 ing political leaders, free and independent media,
11 and exiled civil society groups and provide essential
12 support to these individuals and groups that make
13 up the Belarus democracy movement.

14 “(25) The Government of Belarus has further
15 attempted to suppress freedom of movement of
16 Belarusian people and Belarusian diaspora and re-
17 taliate against those Belarusians living overseas and
18 who have fled the Lukashenka regime by refusing to
19 provide overseas passport services.

20 “(26) The International Civil Aviation Organi-
21 zation found that the Government of Belarus com-
22 mitted an act of unlawful interference when it delib-
23 erately diverted Ryanair Flight 9478 in order to ar-
24 rest two Belarusian citizens, including an opposition
25 activist and journalist.

1 “(27) The Belarus democracy movement has le-
2 gitimate aspirations for a transatlantic future for
3 the people of Belarus and continue to seek justice
4 for those imprisoned and oppressed by the
5 Lukashenka regime and resist Russian encroach-
6 ment on Belarusian territory, culture, and identity.”.

7 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

8 Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
9 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
10 to read as follows:

11 **“SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

12 “It is the policy of the United States—

13 “(1) to condemn the conduct of the August 9,
14 2020, presidential election and crackdown on opposi-
15 tion candidates, members of the Coordination Coun-
16 cil, peaceful protestors, employees from state-owned
17 enterprises participating in strikes, independent elec-
18 tion observers, and independent journalists and
19 bloggers;

20 “(2) to recognize Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as
21 the Democratic Leader of Belarus;

22 “(3) to refuse to recognize Alyaksandr
23 Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader of
24 Belarus;

1 “(4) to seek to engage with the United Transi-
2 tional Cabinet as the executive body that represents
3 the aspirations and beliefs of the Belarusian people
4 and as a legitimate institution to participate in a
5 dialogue on a peaceful transition of power and sup-
6 port its stated objectives of—

7 “(A) defending the independence and sov-
8 ereignty of the Republic of Belarus;

9 “(B) representing the national interests of
10 Belarus;

11 “(C) carrying out the de-facto de-occupa-
12 tion of Belarus;

13 “(D) restoring constitutional legality and
14 the rule of law;

15 “(E) developing and implementing meas-
16 ures to thwart illegal retention of power;

17 “(F) ensuring the transition of power from
18 dictatorship to democracy;

19 “(G) creating conditions for free and fair
20 elections in Belarus; and

21 “(H) developing and implementing solu-
22 tions needed to secure democratic changes in
23 Belarus;

1 “(5) to continue to call for the immediate re-
2 lease without preconditions of all political prisoners
3 in Belarus;

4 “(6) to continue to support the aspirations of
5 the people of Belarus for democracy, human rights,
6 and the rule of law;

7 “(7) to continue to support actively the aspira-
8 tions of the people of the Republic of Belarus to pre-
9 serve the independence and sovereignty of their
10 country and to pursue a Euro-Atlantic future;

11 “(8) not to recognize any incorporation of
12 Belarus into a ‘Union State’ with Russia, as this so-
13 called ‘Union State’ would be both an attempt to ab-
14 sorb Belarus and a step to reconstituting the totali-
15 tarian Soviet Union;

16 “(9) to condemn efforts by the Government of
17 the Russian Federation to undermine the sov-
18 ereignty and independence of Belarus, and to con-
19 tinue to implement policies, including sanctions, that
20 serve to punish Russia for its anti-democratic and il-
21 legal actions involving Belarus;

22 “(10) to continue to reject the fraudulent vic-
23 tory of Mr. Lukashenka on August 9, 2020, and to
24 support calls for new presidential and parliamentary
25 elections, conducted in a manner that is free and

1 fair according to OSCE standards and under the su-
2 pervision of OSCE observers and independent do-
3 mestic observers;

4 “(11) to continue to call for the fulfillment by
5 the Government of Belarus of Belarus’s freely un-
6 dertaken obligations as an OSCE participating state
7 and as a signatory of the Charter of the United Na-
8 tions;

9 “(12) to support an OSCE role in mediating a
10 dialogue within Belarus between the government and
11 genuine representatives of Belarusian society;

12 “(13) to support international efforts to launch
13 investigations into the Government of Belarus and
14 individuals associated with the Government of
15 Belarus for war crimes and crimes against humanity
16 against the people of Belarus and the people of
17 Ukraine for their actions during the further invasion
18 of Ukraine;

19 “(14) to support a United States diplomatic
20 presence to engage with the people of Belarus, in-
21 cluding the regular appointment of a United States
22 Special Envoy to Belarus until such a time that the
23 credentials of a United States Ambassador to
24 Belarus are recognized by the Government of
25 Belarus;

1 “(15) to continue to work closely with the Eu-
2 ropean Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and
3 other countries and international organizations, to
4 promote the principles of democracy, the rule of law,
5 and human rights in Belarus;

6 “(16) to remain open to reevaluating United
7 States policy toward Belarus as warranted by de-
8 monstrable progress made by the Government of
9 Belarus consistent with the aims of this Act, as stat-
10 ed in this section;

11 “(17) to express concern in the event that social
12 media or technology companies move to block inde-
13 pendent media content or participate in media black-
14 outs that prevent free and independent media serv-
15 ices from transmitting information into Belarus;

16 “(18) to continue to support Belarusian lan-
17 guage and cultural programs, including by sup-
18 porting Belarusian language independent media pro-
19 grams, and Belarusian civil society, including efforts
20 to restore democracy and the regular function of
21 democratic institutions in Belarus;

22 “(19) to work with the Belarusian democratic
23 movement and European allies and partners to en-
24 sure Belarusian nationals living outside of Belarus
25 have access to national identification documentation

1 following the Lukashenka regime’s decision to stop
2 supplying overseas passport services to Belarusians;

3 “(20) to provide technical support to the United
4 Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and European allies
5 and partners to develop and implement national
6 identification documents (New Belarusian Passport)
7 that will enable the more than 2,000,000
8 Belarusians living abroad to access freedom of move-
9 ment and essential services while maintaining
10 Belarusian national identity and unity;

11 “(21) to include Belarusian nationals living in
12 Ukraine as of February 24, 2022, in the Uniting
13 For Ukraine program to provide a pathway for
14 Belarusian nations and their immediate family mem-
15 bers outside of the United States to come to the
16 United States and stay for a period of not more
17 than two years of parole and subject those
18 Belarusian nationals to the same qualifications for
19 entry into the program as Ukrainian nationals;

20 “(22) to engage in the United States-Belarus
21 democratic movement strategic dialogue when nec-
22 essary to reaffirm commitments to promoting free-
23 dom and democracy in Belarus and promote efforts
24 to restore free and open presidential and parliamen-
25 tary elections in Belarus that are conducted con-

1 sistent with OSCE standards and under the super-
2 vision of OSCE observers and independent domestic
3 observers;

4 “(23) to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of
5 the Lukashenka regime to enter into any inter-
6 national agreements or treaties;

7 “(24) to advocate for the inclusion of the
8 Belarus democratic movement to participate in inter-
9 national institutions and be granted Permanent Ob-
10 server Status by the United Nations General Assem-
11 bly;

12 “(25) to establish a Belarus service at Voice of
13 America through the United States Agency for Glob-
14 al Media that broadcasts in the Belarusian language;

15 “(26) to continue to support the Governments
16 of Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland in providing crit-
17 ical support to the Belarusian government, civil soci-
18 ety, and media in exile;

19 “(27) to transfer when applicable existing bilat-
20 eral funding for Belarus toward sustaining pro-de-
21 mocracy and civil society initiatives outside the terri-
22 tory of Belarus;

23 “(28) to continue to ban ticket sales for air
24 travel to Belarus until such a time that civilians do
25 not face random arrests by the Government of

1 Belarus, a ban that was enacted following the un-
2 lawful actions of the Government of Belarus to de-
3 liberately divert Ryanair Flight 9478; and

4 “(29) to continue to work with international al-
5 lies and partners to coordinate support for the peo-
6 ple of Belarus and their legitimate aspirations for a
7 free, open, and democratic society and the regular
8 conduct of free and fair elections.”.

9 **SEC. 4. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR BELARUS.**

10 (a) **SPECIAL ENVOY.**—The President shall appoint a
11 Special Envoy for Belarus within the Department of State
12 (referred to in this section as the “Special Envoy”).

13 (b) **QUALIFICATIONS.**—The Special Envoy—

14 (1) should be a person of recognized distinction
15 in the field of European security, geopolitics, democ-
16 racy, and human rights; and

17 (2) may be a career foreign service officer.

18 (c) **CENTRAL OBJECTIVE.**—The central objective of
19 the Special Envoy is to coordinate and promote efforts—

20 (1) to improve respect for the fundamental
21 human rights of the people of Belarus;

22 (2) to sustain focus on the national security im-
23 plications, for the United States, of Belarus’s polit-
24 ical and military alignment; and

1 (3) to respond to the political, economic, and
2 security impacts of events in Belarus on neighboring
3 countries and the wider region.

4 (d) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special
5 Envoy shall—

6 (1) engage in discussions with Belarusian offi-
7 cials regarding human rights and political, economic,
8 and security issues in Belarus;

9 (2) support international efforts to promote
10 human rights and political freedoms in Belarus, in-
11 cluding coordination and dialogue between the
12 United States and the United Nations, the Organi-
13 zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
14 European Union, Belarus, and the other countries in
15 Eastern Europe;

16 (3) consult with nongovernmental organizations
17 that have attempted to address human rights and
18 political and economic instability in Belarus;

19 (4) make recommendations regarding the fund-
20 ing of activities promoting human rights, democracy,
21 the rule of law, and the development of a market
22 economy in Belarus;

23 (5) review strategies for improving protection of
24 human rights in Belarus, including technical train-
25 ing and exchange programs;

1 (6) develop an action plan for holding to ac-
2 count the perpetrators of the human rights viola-
3 tions, documented in the United Nations High Com-
4 missioner for Human Rights report on the situation
5 of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the
6 2020 presidential election and its aftermath (Human
7 Rights Council Resolution 49/36);

8 (7) engage with member countries of the North
9 Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for
10 Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Euro-
11 pean Union with respect to the implications of
12 Belarus's political and security alignment for trans-
13 atlantic security; and

14 (8) work within the Department of State and
15 among partnering countries to sustain focus on the
16 political situation in Belarus.

17 (e) ROLE.—The position of Special Envoy—

18 (1) shall be a full-time position;

19 (2) may not be combined with any other posi-
20 tion within the Department of State;

21 (3) shall only exist for the period during which
22 United States diplomatic operations in Belarus at
23 the United States Embassy in Minsk have been sus-
24 pended; and

1 (4) shall oversee the operations and personnel
2 of the Belarus Affairs Unit of the Department of
3 State.

4 (f) REPORT ON ACTIVITIES.—Not later than 180
5 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annu-
6 ally thereafter for the following [five] years, the Secretary
7 of State, in consultation with the Special Envoy, shall sub-
8 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
9 that describes the activities undertaken pursuant to sub-
10 section (d) during the reporting period.

11 (g) TERMINATION.—The position of Special Envoy
12 for Belarus Affairs and the authorities provided by this
13 section shall terminate on the date that is [five] years
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act.

15 **SEC. 5. STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH THE BELARUS DEMOC-**
16 **RACY MOVEMENT.**

17 (a) STRATEGIC DIALOGUE.—The President shall di-
18 rect the Secretary of State to host a strategic dialogue
19 with the Belarus Democracy Movement not fewer than
20 once every 12 months following the date of the enactment
21 of this Act.

22 (b) CENTRAL OBJECTIVE.—The central objective of
23 the strategic dialogue required under subsection (a) is to
24 coordinate and promote efforts—

1 (1) to consider the efforts needed to return to
2 democratic rule in Belarus, including the efforts
3 needed to support free and fair elections in Belarus;

4 (2) to support the day-to-day functions of the
5 Belarus Democracy Movement, which represents the
6 legitimate aspirations of the Belarusian people, and
7 ensure that Belarusians living outside the territory
8 of Belarus have adequate access to essential services;
9 and

10 (3) to respond to the political, economic, and
11 security impacts of events in Belarus and Russia on
12 neighboring countries and the wider region.

13 (c) TERMINATION.—The strategic dialogue with the
14 Belarus Democracy Movement and the authorities pro-
15 vided by this section shall terminate on the date that is
16 **【five】** years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

17 **SEC. 6. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SO-**
18 **CIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.**

19 Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
20 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
21 ed—

22 (1) in subsection (c)—

23 (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting “, in-
24 cluding by establishing a Belarus service at

1 Voice of America to include broadcasts in the
2 Belarusian language” after “within Belarus”;

3 (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting “in the
4 Belarusian language” after “and Internet
5 media”;

6 (C) by striking paragraphs (11) and (14);

7 (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3)
8 through (10) as paragraphs (4) through (11),
9 respectively;

10 (E) by inserting after paragraph (2) the
11 following new paragraph:

12 “(3) countering internet and media censorship
13 and repressive surveillance technology that seeks to
14 limit free association, control access to information,
15 and prevent citizens from exercising their rights to
16 free speech;”;

17 (F) in paragraph (11), as redesignated by
18 subparagraph (C), by inserting “and the devel-
19 opment of Belarusian cultural programs” after
20 “supporting the development of Belarusian lan-
21 guage education”;

22 (G) in paragraph (12), by inserting “, in-
23 cluding refugees from Belarus in Ukraine and
24 refugees from Ukraine fleeing Russia’s
25 unprovoked war following the February 2022

1 further invasion of Ukraine” after “supporting
2 political refugees in neighboring European
3 countries fleeing the crackdown in Belarus”;

4 (H) in paragraph (13)—

5 (i) by inserting “and war crimes”
6 after “human rights abuses”; and

7 (ii) by striking the semicolon and in-
8 serting “; and”; and

9 (I) by redesignating paragraph (15) as
10 paragraph (14);

11 (2) in subsection (f), by striking “2020” and
12 inserting “2023”; and

13 (3) by striking subsection (g).

14 **SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREE-**
15 **DOM, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN**
16 **BELARUS.**

17 Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights,
18 and Sovereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22
19 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

20 (1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting “and
21 Voice of America” after “Radio Free Europe/Radio
22 Liberty”; and

23 (2) in subsection (b)(1)—

24 (A) by striking “2020” and inserting
25 “2023”;

1 (B) in subparagraph (A) by inserting “, in-
2 cluding through social media platforms,” after
3 “communications in Belarus”; and

4 (C) in subparagraph (C) by inserting “, in-
5 cluding by ensuring private companies do not
6 comply with media blackouts directed by or fa-
7 vored by the Government of Belarus” after “ac-
8 cess and block content online”.

9 **SEC. 8. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF**
10 **BELARUS.**

11 Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights,
12 and Sovereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22
13 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

14 (1) in subsection (b)—

15 (A) by redesignating paragraphs (2)
16 through (5) as paragraphs (3) through (6), re-
17 spectively;

18 (B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the
19 following new paragraph:

20 “(2) The release of Ukrainian nationals illegally
21 held in Belarus, including those illegally transferred
22 to Belarus after the 2022 Russian further invasion
23 of Ukraine.”;

24 (C) in paragraph (3), as redesignated by
25 subparagraph (A), by inserting “, and people

1 who protested the support of the Government of
2 Belarus for the further Russian invasion of
3 Ukraine and cooperation of the Government of
4 Belarus with Russia” after “August 9, 2020”;
5 and

6 (D) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated,
7 by inserting “, or for providing support in con-
8 nection with the illegal further Russian invasion
9 of Ukraine” after “August 9, 2020”; and
10 (2) in subsection (c)—

11 (A) in the subsection heading, by inserting
12 “AND THE FEBRUARY, 24, 2022, FURTHER IN-
13 VASION OF UKRAINE” after “ELECTION”;

14 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (5)
15 through (9) as paragraphs (6) through (10), re-
16 spectively;

17 (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the
18 following new paragraph:

19 “(5) assisted the Government of Belarus in—

20 “(A) supporting security cooperation with
21 the Government of Russia in advance of the
22 February 24, 2022, further invasion of
23 Ukraine;

24 “(B) supporting the presence of Russian
25 mercenaries in the territory of Belarus; or

1 “(C) supporting ongoing security coopera-
2 tion with the Government of Russia, including
3 the Government of Belarus’ decision to host
4 Russian tactical nuclear weapons;” and

5 (D) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by
6 subparagraph (B), by inserting “, or in connec-
7 tion with the 2022 Russian further invasion of
8 Ukraine” after “August 9, 2020”.

9 **SEC. 9. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.**

10 Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights,
11 and Sovereignty Act of 2020 (Public Law 108–347; 22
12 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

13 (1) in paragraph (1); by striking “; and” and
14 inserting a semicolon;

15 (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at
16 the end and inserting “; and”; and

17 (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the fol-
18 lowing new paragraphs:

19 “(3) to condemn the continued collaboration be-
20 tween the Government of Belarus and the Govern-
21 ment of Russia, particularly as it relates to the fur-
22 ther invasion of Ukraine, and further the purposes
23 of this Act, including, as appropriate, to levy sanc-
24 tions and additional measures against the Govern-
25 ment of Belarus for its complicity in war crimes and

1 crimes against humanity committed in the territory
2 of Ukraine; and

3 “(4) to provide technical assistance to the
4 Belarus democracy movement on the creation and
5 international recognition of national identity docu-
6 mentation following the Lukashenka regime’s deci-
7 sion to cease overseas passport services for
8 Belarusian nationals, with the objective of maintain-
9 ing Belarusian national identity and unity but pro-
10 viding Belarusians living overseas with freedom of
11 movement and the ability to access essential serv-
12 ices.”.

13 **SEC. 10. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR**
14 **UKRAINE.**

15 The Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sov-
16 ereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C.
17 5811 note) is amended—

18 (1) by redesignating sections 8 and 9 as sec-
19 tions 9 and 10, respectively; and

20 (2) by inserting after section 7 the following
21 new section:

22 **“SEC. 8. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR**
23 **UKRAINE.**

24 “(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that—

1 “(1) there are a significant number of
2 Belarusian nationals residing in Ukraine and suf-
3 fering from Russian aggression during the further
4 Russian invasion of Ukraine; and

5 “(2) Belarusian nationals may experience
6 threats to their physical security due to political per-
7 secution or retribution or human rights abuses if
8 they return to Belarus.

9 “(b) UNITING FOR UKRAINE PARTICIPATION.—

10 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
11 after the date of the enactment of this section, the
12 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
13 Security shall provide a pathway for Belarusian na-
14 tionals living in Ukraine following the February 24,
15 2022, further invasion of Ukraine to participate in
16 the Uniting for Ukraine program.

17 “(2) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary of State and
18 the Secretary of Homeland Security may delay im-
19 plementation of the pathway required under para-
20 graph (1) if they determine that it is counter to
21 United States national security interests.”.

22 **SEC. 11. REPORTS.**

23 Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights,
24 and Sovereignty Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22

1 U.S.C. 5811 note), as redesignated by section 8(1) of this
2 Act, is amended—

3 (1) in subsection (a)—

4 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “2020”
5 and inserting “2023”; and

6 (B) in paragraph (2)—

7 (i) in subparagraph (G), by striking “;
8 and” and inserting a semicolon;

9 (ii) in subparagraph (H), by striking
10 the period at the end and inserting a semi-
11 colon; and

12 (iii) by adding at the end the fol-
13 lowing new subparagraphs:

14 “(I) an assessment of how the Government
15 of Russia is working to achieve deeper security
16 cooperation and interdependence or integration
17 with Belarus;

18 “(J) a description of the Government of
19 Belarus actions to support the 2022 further
20 Russian invasion of Ukraine and ongoing Rus-
21 sian aggression in Ukraine;

22 “(K) a description of how the Government
23 of Belarus supports, adopts, and deploys Rus-
24 sian disinformation campaigns or Belarusian
25 disinformation campaigns; and

1 “(L) an identification of Belarusian offi-
2 cials involved in continued support to Russia
3 and the further invasion of Ukraine and an
4 identification of Russian officials involved in
5 continued support to Belarus and the further
6 invasion of Ukraine.”;

7 (2) in subsection (b)(1)—

8 (A) by striking “2020” and inserting
9 “2023”;

10 (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking “;
11 and” and inserting a semicolon;

12 (C) in subparagraph (B), by striking the
13 period at the end and inserting a semicolon;
14 and

15 (D) by adding at the end the following new
16 subparagraphs:

17 “(C) an identification of efforts by the
18 Government of Belarus and the Government of
19 Russia to circumvent sanctions, including those
20 imposed by the United States in response to the
21 further invasion of Ukraine;

22 “(D) an assessment of the shared assets
23 and business interests of Vladimir Putin and
24 Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the Government of
25 Belarus and the Government of Russia; and

1 “(E) a determination on the possibility for
2 Belarus to host free and fair elections during
3 the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2024
4 and the presidential election scheduled for
5 2025, including a proposal of how the United
6 States may support a return to democracy in
7 the anticipated elections in Belarus.”; and

8 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
9 section:

10 “(c) REPORT ON EFFORTS TO ENABLE
11 BELARUSIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF
12 BELARUS TO TRAVEL FREELY.—

13 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
14 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
15 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
16 2023, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
17 the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to
18 the appropriate congressional committees a report
19 describing efforts to provide Belarusians living out-
20 side the territory of Belarus with national identifica-
21 tion documents.

22 “(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
23 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

24 “(A) An assessment of the European
25 Union’s efforts to provide Belarusians living

1 overseas with national identification documents
2 that maintain Belarusian nationality but enable
3 Belarusians living overseas to travel freely and
4 access essential services.

5 “(B) A description of efforts to provide
6 technical assistance to the Belarus democratic
7 movement on the creation of national identifica-
8 tion documents that fulfill the needs described
9 in subparagraph (A).

10 “(3) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
11 section shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
12 may contain a classified annex.”

13 **SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS.**

14 Section 10(1)(B) of the Belarus Democracy Act of
15 2004 (Public Law 108–347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note), as re-
16 designated by section 10(1) of this Act, is amended by
17 striking “Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
18 fairs” and inserting “the Committee on Homeland Secu-
19 rity and Governmental Affairs”.

○