
HOUSE BILL 2275

State of Washington 64th Legislature 2015 2nd Special Session

By Representative Klippert

Prefiled 06/27/15.

1 AN ACT Relating to prohibiting the use of voluntary intoxication
2 as a defense against a criminal charge; amending RCW 9A.16.090 and
3 9A.08.010; adding a new section to chapter 9A.16 RCW; and creating a
4 new section.

5 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:

6 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 1.** A new section is added to chapter 9A.16
7 RCW to read as follows:

8 The legislature finds that voluntary intoxication from alcohol
9 and drugs and the pain and suffering that often result are
10 increasingly serious problems which have reached a crisis point both
11 in this state and throughout the nation. The overwhelming prevalence
12 of alcohol and drug use and their critical connections with crime and
13 violence are obvious and irrefutable. In *Mont. v. Egelhoff*, 518 U.S.
14 37; 116 S. Ct. 2013; 135 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1996), the United States
15 supreme court addressed the relevancy of voluntary intoxication to
16 considerations of mens rea. In *Egelhoff*, the court noted the long
17 common law tradition of excluding intoxication evidence and held that
18 the combination of that tradition, the number of states that still
19 employed the common law doctrine, and the deference accorded to
20 states in instituting their criminal justice systems justified the
21 evidentiary restriction. The legislature finds that it has the

1 constitutional prerogative to define crimes, that their definitions
2 control unless an express constitutional provision unambiguously
3 requires otherwise, that excluding evidence of intoxication in
4 criminal cases deters the commission of crimes while intoxicated, and
5 that under both state and federal rules of evidence, there are a
6 number of evidentiary exclusions that have been found constitutional,
7 including the danger of misleading the jury or unfair prejudice, and
8 various hearsay exclusions. The legislature further finds that
9 individuals are personally responsible for the choices they make and
10 the forces they set in motion, and that a person who is in a
11 voluntarily intoxicated condition or state is criminally responsible
12 for his or her conduct. The legislature intends by this act to
13 unequivocally and solely provide a legislative redefinition of the
14 mens rea element for specific and general intent crimes where
15 voluntary intoxication is alleged as part of a defense, that a
16 voluntary intoxicated condition or state is not a defense to any
17 criminal offense, and that voluntary intoxication may not be taken
18 into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state
19 which is an element of the offense unless the defendant proves that
20 he or she did not know that it was an intoxicating substance when he
21 or she consumed the substance causing the condition or state. The
22 legislature does not intend by this act to shift the burden of the
23 prosecution to the defendant, nor does it intend to reduce the burden
24 of the prosecution in proving the defendant intentionally, knowingly,
25 or recklessly committed the crime under circumstances that would
26 otherwise establish intent, knowledge, or recklessness but for the
27 defendant's voluntary intoxication.

28 **Sec. 2.** RCW 9A.16.090 and 2011 c 336 s 355 are each amended to
29 read as follows:

30 (1) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary
31 intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his or her
32 condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular mental
33 state is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or
34 degree of crime, the fact of his or her intoxication may be taken
35 into consideration in determining such mental state. Voluntary
36 intoxication is not a defense to any criminal charge, nor may the
37 fact of voluntary intoxication be used by a defendant to demonstrate
38 the lack of any particular mental state that is an element of a crime

1 charged. Nothing in this section prohibits the prosecution from
2 introducing evidence of a defendant's intoxication.

3 (2) This section applies to voluntary intoxication produced by
4 any agent including, but not limited to, alcohol or any drug.

5 **Sec. 3.** RCW 9A.08.010 and 2009 c 549 s 1002 are each amended to
6 read as follows:

7 (1) Kinds of Culpability Defined.

8 (a) INTENT. A person acts with intent or intentionally when ((he
9 or she));

10 (i) The person acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a
11 result which constitutes a crime; or

12 (ii) The person is voluntarily intoxicated and acts in a manner
13 that would be considered intentional if the person were not
14 intoxicated.

15 (b) KNOWLEDGE. A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge
16 when:

17 (i) ((he or she)) The person is aware of a fact, facts, or
18 circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense;
19 ((or))

20 (ii) ((he or she)) The person has information which would lead a
21 reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist
22 which facts are described by a statute defining an offense; or

23 (iii) The person is voluntarily intoxicated and acts in a manner
24 that would be considered knowing if the person were not intoxicated.

25 (c) RECKLESSNESS. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when
26 ((he or she));

27 (i) The person knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a
28 wrongful act may occur and ((his or her)) the disregard of such
29 substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable
30 person would exercise in the same situation; or

31 (ii) The person is voluntarily intoxicated and acts in a manner
32 that would be considered reckless if the person were not intoxicated.

33 (d) CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. A person is criminally negligent or acts
34 with criminal negligence when ((he or she)) the person fails to be
35 aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and ((his
36 or her)) the failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes
37 a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
38 would exercise in the same situation.

1 (2) Substitutes for Criminal Negligence, Recklessness, and
2 Knowledge. When a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices
3 to establish an element of an offense, such element also is
4 established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
5 When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also
6 is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When
7 acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also
8 is established if a person acts intentionally.

9 (3) Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense. When the
10 grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is
11 committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal
12 negligence, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the
13 determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any
14 material element of the offense.

15 (4) Requirement of (~~Willfulness~~) Willfulness Satisfied by Acting
16 Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed (~~wilfully~~)
17 willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the
18 material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further
19 requirements plainly appears.

20 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 4.** This act applies prospectively only and
21 not retroactively. It applies only to causes of action that arise on
22 or after the effective date of this section.

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