Bill Text: IL HB3762 | 2023-2024 | 103rd General Assembly | Chaptered


Bill Title: Amends the Criminal Code of 2012. Makes technical changes in the first degree murder statute. Eliminates references to imposition of the death penalty for first degree murder. Repeals provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 that refer to the execution of a death sentence and the type of drugs that can be administered to cause death. Amends the Unified Code of Corrections. Lists the aggravating factors for first degree murder in which the defendant may be sentenced to natural life imprisonment. Amends various statutes to remove, other than historic references, references to "capital offense", "death penalty", "sentenced to death", and "sentence of death".

Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Democrat 3-0)

Status: (Passed) 2023-06-09 - Public Act . . . . . . . . . 103-0051 [HB3762 Detail]

Download: Illinois-2023-HB3762-Chaptered.html



Public Act 103-0051
HB3762 EnrolledLRB103 29450 RLC 55842 b
AN ACT concerning criminal law.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly:
Section 5. The Counties Code is amended by changing
Section 3-4011 as follows:
(55 ILCS 5/3-4011) (from Ch. 34, par. 3-4011)
Sec. 3-4011. Expenses and legal services for indigent
defendants in felony cases. It shall be the duty of the county
board in counties containing fewer than 500,000 inhabitants to
appropriate a sufficient sum for the purpose of paying for the
legal services necessarily rendered for the defense of
indigent persons in felony cases, and for costs, expenses and
legal services necessary in the prosecution of an appeal when
the sentence is death, which is to be paid upon the orders of a
court of competent jurisdiction. It shall likewise be the duty
of the county board in counties containing fewer than 500,000
inhabitants to appropriate a sufficient sum for the payment of
out of pocket expenses necessarily incurred by appointed
counsel in the prosecution of an appeal on behalf of an
indigent incarcerated defendant in felony cases. In such cases
payment shall be made upon the order of the reviewing court.
(Source: P.A. 86-962.)
Section 10. The School Code is amended by changing Section
21B-85 as follows:
(105 ILCS 5/21B-85)
Sec. 21B-85. Conviction of felony.
(a) Whenever the holder of any license issued under this
Article is employed by the school board of a school district,
including a special charter district or a school district
organized under Article 34 of this Code, and is convicted,
either after a bench trial, trial by jury, or plea of guilty,
of any offense for which a sentence to death or a term of
imprisonment in a penitentiary for one year or more is
provided, the school board shall promptly notify the State
Superintendent of Education, in writing, of the name of the
license holder, the fact of the conviction, and the name and
location of the court in which the conviction occurred.
(b) Whenever the school board of a school district,
including a special charter district or a school district
organized under Article 34 of this Code, learns that any
person who is a teacher, as that term is defined in Section
16-106 of the Illinois Pension Code, has been convicted,
either after a bench trial, trial by jury, or plea of guilty,
of any offense for which a sentence to death or a term of
imprisonment in a penitentiary for one year or more is
provided, the school board shall promptly notify, in writing,
the board of trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System of
the State of Illinois and the board of trustees of the Public
School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of the City of
Chicago of the name of the license holder, the fact of the
conviction, the name and location of the court in which the
conviction occurred, and the number assigned in that court to
the case in which the conviction occurred.
(Source: P.A. 102-552, eff. 1-1-22.)
Section 15. The Illinois Public Aid Code is amended by
changing Section 1-8 as follows:
(305 ILCS 5/1-8)
Sec. 1-8. Fugitives ineligible.
(a) The following persons are not eligible for aid under
this Code, or federal food stamps or federal food stamp
benefits:
(1) A person who has fled from the jurisdiction of any
court of record of this or any other state or of the United
States to avoid prosecution for a felony or to avoid
giving testimony in any criminal proceeding involving the
alleged commission of a felony.
(2) A person who has fled to avoid imprisonment in a
correctional facility of this or any other state or the
United States for having committed a felony.
(3) A person who has escaped from a correctional
facility of this or any other state or the United States if
the person was incarcerated for having committed a felony.
(4) A person who is violating a condition of probation
or parole imposed under federal or State law.
In this Section, "felony" means a violation of a penal
statute of this or any other state or the United States for
which a sentence to death or to a term of imprisonment in a
penitentiary for one year or more is provided or in which the
death penalty may be imposed in another state.
To implement this Section, the Illinois Department may
exchange necessary information with an appropriate law
enforcement agency of this or any other state, a political
subdivision of this or any other state, or the United States.
(b) (Blank).
(Source: P.A. 92-111, eff. 1-1-02.)
Section 20. The Criminal Code of 2012 is amended by
changing Sections 2-7, 8-4, 9-1, 9-1.2, 12-3.05, and 30-1 as
follows:
(720 ILCS 5/2-7) (from Ch. 38, par. 2-7)
Sec. 2-7. "Felony".
"Felony" means an offense for which a sentence to death or
to a term of imprisonment in a penitentiary for one year or
more is provided.
(Source: P.A. 77-2638.)
(720 ILCS 5/8-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 8-4)
Sec. 8-4. Attempt.
(a) Elements of the offense.
A person commits the offense of attempt when, with intent
to commit a specific offense, he or she does any act that
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that
offense.
(b) Impossibility.
It is not a defense to a charge of attempt that because of
a misapprehension of the circumstances it would have been
impossible for the accused to commit the offense attempted.
(c) Sentence.
A person convicted of attempt may be fined or imprisoned
or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense
attempted but, except for an attempt to commit the offense
defined in Section 33A-2 of this Code:
(1) the sentence for attempt to commit first degree
murder is the sentence for a Class X felony, except that
(A) an attempt to commit first degree murder when
at least one of the aggravating factors specified in
clauses (iii), (iv), and (v) of subsection (a)(1)(c)
of Section 5-8-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections
paragraphs (1), (2), and (12) of subsection (b) of
Section 9-1 is present is a Class X felony for which
the sentence shall be a term of imprisonment of not
less than 20 years and not more than 80 years;
(B) an attempt to commit first degree murder while
armed with a firearm is a Class X felony for which 15
years shall be added to the term of imprisonment
imposed by the court;
(C) an attempt to commit first degree murder
during which the person personally discharged a
firearm is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be
added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the
court;
(D) an attempt to commit first degree murder
during which the person personally discharged a
firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm,
permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or
death to another person is a Class X felony for which
25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added
to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court; and
(E) if the defendant proves by a preponderance of
the evidence at sentencing that, at the time of the
attempted murder, he or she was acting under a sudden
and intense passion resulting from serious provocation
by the individual whom the defendant endeavored to
kill, or another, and, had the individual the
defendant endeavored to kill died, the defendant would
have negligently or accidentally caused that death,
then the sentence for the attempted murder is the
sentence for a Class 1 felony;
(2) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class X
felony is the sentence for a Class 1 felony;
(3) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class 1
felony is the sentence for a Class 2 felony;
(4) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class 2
felony is the sentence for a Class 3 felony; and
(5) the sentence for attempt to commit any felony
other than those specified in items (1), (2), (3), and (4)
of this subsection (c) is the sentence for a Class A
misdemeanor.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
(720 ILCS 5/9-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-1)
Sec. 9-1. First degree murder; death penalties;
exceptions; separate hearings; proof; findings; appellate
procedures; reversals.
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits first degree murder if, in performing
the acts which cause the death:
(1) he or she either intends to kill or do great bodily
harm to that individual or another, or knows that such
acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) he or she knows that such acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to that
individual or another; or
(3) he or she, acting alone or with one or more
participants, commits or attempts to commit a forcible
felony other than second degree murder, and in the course
of or in furtherance of such crime or flight therefrom, he
or she or another participant causes the death of a
person.
(b) (Blank). Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the
time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of
18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder
may be sentenced to death if:
(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or
fireman killed in the course of performing his official
duties, to prevent the performance of his or her official
duties, or in retaliation for performing his or her
official duties, and the defendant knew or should have
known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or
fireman; or
(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an
institution or facility of the Department of Corrections,
or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the
course of performing his or her official duties, to
prevent the performance of his or her official duties, or
in retaliation for performing his or her official duties,
or the murdered individual was an inmate at such
institution or facility and was killed on the grounds
thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present
in such institution or facility with the knowledge and
approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or
(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two
or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section
or under any law of the United States or of any state which
is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section
regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of
the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so
long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to
kill more than one person or of separate acts which the
defendant knew would cause death or create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another; or
(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of
the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus, or other
public conveyance; or
(5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a
contract, agreement, or understanding by which he or she
was to receive money or anything of value in return for
committing the murder or procured another to commit the
murder for money or anything of value; or
(6) the murdered individual was killed in the course
of another felony if:
(a) the murdered individual:
(i) was actually killed by the defendant, or
(ii) received physical injuries personally
inflicted by the defendant substantially
contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by
one or more persons for whose conduct the
defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-2
of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted
by either the defendant or the other person or
persons for whose conduct he is legally
accountable caused the death of the murdered
individual; and
(b) in performing the acts which caused the death
of the murdered individual or which resulted in
physical injuries personally inflicted by the
defendant on the murdered individual under the
circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a)
of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section,
the defendant acted with the intent to kill the
murdered individual or with the knowledge that his
acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
(c) the other felony was an inherently violent
crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent
crime. In this subparagraph (c), "inherently violent
crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery,
robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated
arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and
home invasion; or
(7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age
and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
(8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to
prevent the murdered individual from testifying or
participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution
or giving material assistance to the State in any
investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant
or another; or the defendant committed the murder because
the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution
or gave material assistance to the State in any
investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant
or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8),
"participating in any criminal investigation or
prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the
proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses,
or jurors; or
(9) the defendant, while committing an offense
punishable under Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2,
407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a
conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense,
intentionally killed an individual or counseled,
commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional
killing of the murdered individual; or
(10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution
or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time
of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable
as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a
conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense,
intentionally killed an individual or counseled,
commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional
killing of the murdered individual; or
(11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated
and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means,
and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable
expectation that the death of a human being would result
therefrom; or
(12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical
technician - ambulance, emergency medical technician -
intermediate, emergency medical technician - paramedic,
ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid
personnel, employed by a municipality or other
governmental unit, killed in the course of performing his
official duties, to prevent the performance of his
official duties, or in retaliation for performing his
official duties, and the defendant knew or should have
known that the murdered individual was an emergency
medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical
technician - intermediate, emergency medical technician -
paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance
or first aid personnel; or
(13) the defendant was a principal administrator,
organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug
conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of
authority superior to that of all other members of the
conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of
the murdered person; or
(14) the murder was intentional and involved the
infliction of torture. For the purpose of this Section
torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme
physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or
prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim; or
(15) the murder was committed as a result of the
intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a
motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the
motor vehicle; or
(16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or
older and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
(17) the murdered individual was a person with a
disability and the defendant knew or should have known
that the murdered individual was a person with a
disability. For purposes of this paragraph (17), "person
with a disability" means a person who suffers from a
permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from
disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital
condition that renders the person incapable of adequately
providing for his or her own health or personal care; or
(18) the murder was committed by reason of any
person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to
prevent any person from engaging in activity as a
community policing volunteer; or
(19) the murdered individual was subject to an order
of protection and the murder was committed by a person
against whom the same order of protection was issued under
the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or
(20) the murdered individual was known by the
defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any
school and the teacher or other employee is upon the
grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is
in any part of a building used for school purposes; or
(21) the murder was committed by the defendant in
connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism
as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this Code; or
(22) the murdered individual was a member of a
congregation engaged in prayer or other religious
activities at a church, synagogue, mosque, or other
building, structure, or place used for religious worship.
(b-5) (Blank). Aggravating Factor; Natural Life
Imprisonment. A defendant who has been found guilty of first
degree murder and who at the time of the commission of the
offense had attained the age of 18 years or more may be
sentenced to natural life imprisonment if (i) the murdered
individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist,
nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse, (ii) the
defendant knew or should have known that the murdered
individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist,
nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse, and (iii) the
murdered individual was killed in the course of acting in his
or her capacity as a physician, physician assistant,
psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse, or
to prevent him or her from acting in that capacity, or in
retaliation for his or her acting in that capacity.
(c) (Blank). Consideration of factors in Aggravation and
Mitigation.
The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to
consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are
relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating
factors may include but need not be limited to those factors
set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating factors may include
but need not be limited to the following:
(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity;
(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense
to prosecution;
(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the
defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the
homicidal act;
(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat
or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great
bodily harm;
(5) the defendant was not personally present during
commission of the act or acts causing death;
(6) the defendant's background includes a history of
extreme emotional or physical abuse;
(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental
capacity.
Provided, however, that an action that does not otherwise
mitigate first degree murder cannot qualify as a mitigating
factor for first degree murder because of the discovery,
knowledge, or disclosure of the victim's sexual orientation as
defined in Section 1-103 of the Illinois Human Rights Act.
(d) (Blank). Separate sentencing hearing.
Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a
separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of
factors set forth in subsection (b) and to consider any
aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection
(c). The proceeding shall be conducted:
(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's
guilt; or
(2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the
proceeding if:
A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of
guilty; or
B. the defendant was convicted after a trial
before the court sitting without a jury; or
C. the court for good cause shown discharges the
jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or
(3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a
jury for the separate proceeding.
(e) (Blank). Evidence and Argument.
During the proceeding any information relevant to any of
the factors set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by
either the State or the defendant under the rules governing
the admission of evidence at criminal trials. Any information
relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any
mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be
presented by the State or defendant regardless of its
admissibility under the rules governing the admission of
evidence at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall
be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at
the hearing.
(f) (Blank). Proof.
The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any
of the factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and
shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(g) (Blank). Procedure - Jury.
If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds
that none of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists,
the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that
one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exist,
the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as
instructed by the court and shall determine whether the
sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury determines
unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court
shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not
concur with the jury determination that death is the
appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in
writing including what facts or circumstances the court relied
upon, along with any relevant documents, that compelled the
court to non-concur with the sentence. This document and any
attachments shall be part of the record for appellate review.
The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing
determination.
If after weighing the factors in aggravation and
mitigation, one or more jurors determines that death is not
the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the
defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections.
(h) (Blank). Procedure - No Jury.
In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds
that none of the factors found in subsection (b) exists, the
court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment
under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set
forth in subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider any
aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in subsection
(c). If the Court determines, after weighing the factors in
aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate
sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.
If the court finds that death is not the appropriate
sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections.
(h-5) (Blank). Decertification as a capital case.
In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of
first degree murder by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for
resentencing, and the State seeks the death penalty as an
appropriate sentence, on the court's own motion or the written
motion of the defendant, the court may decertify the case as a
death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence
supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated
testimony of an informant witness, as defined in Section
115-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, concerning
the confession or admission of the defendant or that the sole
evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or
single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence. If
the court decertifies the case as a capital case under either
of the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a written
finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the
decertification pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If
the court does not decertify the case as a capital case, the
matter shall proceed to the eligibility phase of the
sentencing hearing.
(i) (Blank). Appellate Procedure.
The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to
automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in
accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The
Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and
order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections if the court finds that the death
sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular
case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the death
sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular
case, independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the
Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written opinion
explaining this finding.
(j) (Blank). Disposition of reversed death sentence.
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to
be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States
or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of first
degree murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of
Corrections.
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the
sentencing provisions of this Section is declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or
of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a
person previously sentenced to death shall cause the defendant
to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence
the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections.
(k) (Blank). Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.
The Attorney General and State's Attorneys Association
shall consult on voluntary guidelines for procedures governing
whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines do not
have the force of law and are only advisory in nature.
(Source: P.A. 100-460, eff. 1-1-18; 100-513, eff. 1-1-18;
100-863, eff. 8-14-18; 101-223, eff. 1-1-20; 101-652, eff.
7-1-21.)
(720 ILCS 5/9-1.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-1.2)
Sec. 9-1.2. Intentional homicide of an unborn child.
(a) A person commits the offense of intentional homicide
of an unborn child if, in performing acts which cause the death
of an unborn child, he without lawful justification:
(1) either intended to cause the death of or do great
bodily harm to the pregnant individual or unborn child or
knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm
to the pregnant individual or unborn child; or
(2) knew that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to the pregnant individual or
unborn child; and
(3) knew that the individual was pregnant.
(b) For purposes of this Section, (1) "unborn child" shall
mean any individual of the human species from the implantation
of an embryo until birth, and (2) "person" shall not include
the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.
(c) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the
death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during
any abortion, as defined in Section 1-10 of the Reproductive
Health Act, to which the pregnant individual has consented.
This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed
pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice
during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
(d) Penalty. The sentence for intentional homicide of an
unborn child shall be the same as for first degree murder,
except that:
(1) (blank) the death penalty may not be imposed;
(2) if the person committed the offense while armed
with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court;
(3) if, during the commission of the offense, the
person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be
added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
(4) if, during the commission of the offense, the
person personally discharged a firearm that proximately
caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent
disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up
to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court.
(e) The provisions of this Act shall not be construed to
prohibit the prosecution of any person under any other
provision of law.
(Source: P.A. 101-13, eff. 6-12-19.)
(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05) (was 720 ILCS 5/12-4)
Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery.
(a) Offense based on injury. A person commits aggravated
battery when, in committing a battery, other than by the
discharge of a firearm, he or she knowingly does any of the
following:
(1) Causes great bodily harm or permanent disability
or disfigurement.
(2) Causes severe and permanent disability, great
bodily harm, or disfigurement by means of a caustic or
flammable substance, a poisonous gas, a deadly biological
or chemical contaminant or agent, a radioactive substance,
or a bomb or explosive compound.
(3) Causes great bodily harm or permanent disability
or disfigurement to an individual whom the person knows to
be a peace officer, community policing volunteer, fireman,
private security officer, correctional institution
employee, or Department of Human Services employee
supervising or controlling sexually dangerous persons or
sexually violent persons:
(i) performing his or her official duties;
(ii) battered to prevent performance of his or her
official duties; or
(iii) battered in retaliation for performing his
or her official duties.
(4) Causes great bodily harm or permanent disability
or disfigurement to an individual 60 years of age or
older.
(5) Strangles another individual.
(b) Offense based on injury to a child or person with an
intellectual disability. A person who is at least 18 years of
age commits aggravated battery when, in committing a battery,
he or she knowingly and without legal justification by any
means:
(1) causes great bodily harm or permanent disability
or disfigurement to any child under the age of 13 years, or
to any person with a severe or profound intellectual
disability; or
(2) causes bodily harm or disability or disfigurement
to any child under the age of 13 years or to any person
with a severe or profound intellectual disability.
(c) Offense based on location of conduct. A person commits
aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, other than
by the discharge of a firearm, he or she is or the person
battered is on or about a public way, public property, a public
place of accommodation or amusement, a sports venue, or a
domestic violence shelter, or in a church, synagogue, mosque,
or other building, structure, or place used for religious
worship.
(d) Offense based on status of victim. A person commits
aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, other than
by discharge of a firearm, he or she knows the individual
battered to be any of the following:
(1) A person 60 years of age or older.
(2) A person who is pregnant or has a physical
disability.
(3) A teacher or school employee upon school grounds
or grounds adjacent to a school or in any part of a
building used for school purposes.
(4) A peace officer, community policing volunteer,
fireman, private security officer, correctional
institution employee, or Department of Human Services
employee supervising or controlling sexually dangerous
persons or sexually violent persons:
(i) performing his or her official duties;
(ii) battered to prevent performance of his or her
official duties; or
(iii) battered in retaliation for performing his
or her official duties.
(5) A judge, emergency management worker, emergency
medical services personnel, or utility worker:
(i) performing his or her official duties;
(ii) battered to prevent performance of his or her
official duties; or
(iii) battered in retaliation for performing his
or her official duties.
(6) An officer or employee of the State of Illinois, a
unit of local government, or a school district, while
performing his or her official duties.
(7) A transit employee performing his or her official
duties, or a transit passenger.
(8) A taxi driver on duty.
(9) A merchant who detains the person for an alleged
commission of retail theft under Section 16-26 of this
Code and the person without legal justification by any
means causes bodily harm to the merchant.
(10) A person authorized to serve process under
Section 2-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure or a special
process server appointed by the circuit court while that
individual is in the performance of his or her duties as a
process server.
(11) A nurse while in the performance of his or her
duties as a nurse.
(12) A merchant: (i) while performing his or her
duties, including, but not limited to, relaying directions
for healthcare or safety from his or her supervisor or
employer or relaying health or safety guidelines,
recommendations, regulations, or rules from a federal,
State, or local public health agency; and (ii) during a
disaster declared by the Governor, or a state of emergency
declared by the mayor of the municipality in which the
merchant is located, due to a public health emergency and
for a period of 6 months after such declaration.
(e) Offense based on use of a firearm. A person commits
aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, he or she
knowingly does any of the following:
(1) Discharges a firearm, other than a machine gun or
a firearm equipped with a silencer, and causes any injury
to another person.
(2) Discharges a firearm, other than a machine gun or
a firearm equipped with a silencer, and causes any injury
to a person he or she knows to be a peace officer,
community policing volunteer, person summoned by a police
officer, fireman, private security officer, correctional
institution employee, or emergency management worker:
(i) performing his or her official duties;
(ii) battered to prevent performance of his or her
official duties; or
(iii) battered in retaliation for performing his
or her official duties.
(3) Discharges a firearm, other than a machine gun or
a firearm equipped with a silencer, and causes any injury
to a person he or she knows to be emergency medical
services personnel:
(i) performing his or her official duties;
(ii) battered to prevent performance of his or her
official duties; or
(iii) battered in retaliation for performing his
or her official duties.
(4) Discharges a firearm and causes any injury to a
person he or she knows to be a teacher, a student in a
school, or a school employee, and the teacher, student, or
employee is upon school grounds or grounds adjacent to a
school or in any part of a building used for school
purposes.
(5) Discharges a machine gun or a firearm equipped
with a silencer, and causes any injury to another person.
(6) Discharges a machine gun or a firearm equipped
with a silencer, and causes any injury to a person he or
she knows to be a peace officer, community policing
volunteer, person summoned by a police officer, fireman,
private security officer, correctional institution
employee or emergency management worker:
(i) performing his or her official duties;
(ii) battered to prevent performance of his or her
official duties; or
(iii) battered in retaliation for performing his
or her official duties.
(7) Discharges a machine gun or a firearm equipped
with a silencer, and causes any injury to a person he or
she knows to be emergency medical services personnel:
(i) performing his or her official duties;
(ii) battered to prevent performance of his or her
official duties; or
(iii) battered in retaliation for performing his
or her official duties.
(8) Discharges a machine gun or a firearm equipped
with a silencer, and causes any injury to a person he or
she knows to be a teacher, or a student in a school, or a
school employee, and the teacher, student, or employee is
upon school grounds or grounds adjacent to a school or in
any part of a building used for school purposes.
(f) Offense based on use of a weapon or device. A person
commits aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, he
or she does any of the following:
(1) Uses a deadly weapon other than by discharge of a
firearm, or uses an air rifle as defined in Section
24.8-0.1 of this Code.
(2) Wears a hood, robe, or mask to conceal his or her
identity.
(3) Knowingly and without lawful justification shines
or flashes a laser gunsight or other laser device attached
to a firearm, or used in concert with a firearm, so that
the laser beam strikes upon or against the person of
another.
(4) Knowingly video or audio records the offense with
the intent to disseminate the recording.
(g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits
aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm,
he or she does any of the following:
(1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled
substance to another and any user experiences great bodily
harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection,
inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled
substance.
(2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes
him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat
or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any
intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic,
anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another
person any food containing any substance or object
intended to cause physical injury if eaten.
(3) Knowingly causes or attempts to cause a
correctional institution employee or Department of Human
Services employee to come into contact with blood, seminal
fluid, urine, or feces by throwing, tossing, or expelling
the fluid or material, and the person is an inmate of a
penal institution or is a sexually dangerous person or
sexually violent person in the custody of the Department
of Human Services.
(h) Sentence. Unless otherwise provided, aggravated
battery is a Class 3 felony.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (a)(4),
(d)(4), or (g)(3) is a Class 2 felony.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (a)(3) or
(g)(1) is a Class 1 felony.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (a)(1) is a
Class 1 felony when the aggravated battery was intentional and
involved the infliction of torture, as defined in paragraph
(10) (14) of subsection (b-5) (b) of Section 5-8-1 of the
Unified Code of Corrections Section 9-1 of this Code, as the
infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain,
motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain,
suffering, or agony of the victim.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (a)(1) is a
Class 2 felony when the person causes great bodily harm or
permanent disability to an individual whom the person knows to
be a member of a congregation engaged in prayer or other
religious activities at a church, synagogue, mosque, or other
building, structure, or place used for religious worship.
Aggravated battery under subdivision (a)(5) is a Class 1
felony if:
(A) the person used or attempted to use a dangerous
instrument while committing the offense;
(B) the person caused great bodily harm or permanent
disability or disfigurement to the other person while
committing the offense; or
(C) the person has been previously convicted of a
violation of subdivision (a)(5) under the laws of this
State or laws similar to subdivision (a)(5) of any other
state.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (e)(1) is a
Class X felony.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (a)(2) is a
Class X felony for which a person shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of a minimum of 6 years and a maximum of 45
years.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (e)(5) is a
Class X felony for which a person shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of a minimum of 12 years and a maximum of 45
years.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (e)(2),
(e)(3), or (e)(4) is a Class X felony for which a person shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of a minimum of 15 years
and a maximum of 60 years.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (e)(6),
(e)(7), or (e)(8) is a Class X felony for which a person shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of a minimum of 20 years
and a maximum of 60 years.
Aggravated battery as defined in subdivision (b)(1) is a
Class X felony, except that:
(1) if the person committed the offense while armed
with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court;
(2) if, during the commission of the offense, the
person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be
added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
(3) if, during the commission of the offense, the
person personally discharged a firearm that proximately
caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent
disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up
to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court.
(i) Definitions. In this Section:
"Building or other structure used to provide shelter" has
the meaning ascribed to "shelter" in Section 1 of the Domestic
Violence Shelters Act.
"Domestic violence" has the meaning ascribed to it in
Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.
"Domestic violence shelter" means any building or other
structure used to provide shelter or other services to victims
or to the dependent children of victims of domestic violence
pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or the
Domestic Violence Shelters Act, or any place within 500 feet
of such a building or other structure in the case of a person
who is going to or from such a building or other structure.
"Firearm" has the meaning provided under Section 1.1 of
the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, and does not
include an air rifle as defined by Section 24.8-0.1 of this
Code.
"Machine gun" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section
24-1 of this Code.
"Merchant" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section
16-0.1 of this Code.
"Strangle" means intentionally impeding the normal
breathing or circulation of the blood of an individual by
applying pressure on the throat or neck of that individual or
by blocking the nose or mouth of that individual.
(Source: P.A. 101-223, eff. 1-1-20; 101-651, eff. 8-7-20.)
(720 ILCS 5/30-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 30-1)
Sec. 30-1. Treason.
(a) A person owing allegiance to this State commits
treason when he or she knowingly:
(1) levies war against this State; or
(2) adheres to the enemies of this State, giving them
aid or comfort.
(b) No person may be convicted of treason except on the
testimony of 2 witnesses to the same overt act, or on his
confession in open court.
(c) Sentence. Treason is a Class X felony for which an
offender may be sentenced to death under Section 5-5-3 of the
Unified Code of Corrections.
(Source: P.A. 80-1099.)
Section 25. The Cannabis Control Act is amended by
changing Section 9 as follows:
(720 ILCS 550/9) (from Ch. 56 1/2, par. 709)
Sec. 9. (a) Any person who engages in a calculated
criminal cannabis conspiracy, as defined in subsection (b), is
guilty of a Class 3 felony, and fined not more than $200,000
and shall be subject to the forfeitures prescribed in
subsection (c); except that, if any person engages in such
offense after one or more prior convictions under this
Section, Section 4 (d), Section 5 (d), Section 8 (d) or any law
of the United States or of any State relating to cannabis, or
controlled substances as defined in the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act, in addition to the fine and forfeiture
authorized above, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 felony for
which an offender may not be sentenced to death.
(b) For purposes of this section, a person engages in a
calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy when:
(1) he violates Section 4 (d), 4 (e), 5 (d), 5 (e), 8 (c)
or 8 (d) of this Act; and
(2) such violation is a part of a conspiracy undertaken or
carried on with 2 or more other persons; and
(3) he obtains anything of value greater than $500 from,
or organizes, directs or finances such violation or
conspiracy.
(c) Any person who is convicted under this Section of
engaging in a calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy shall
forfeit to the State of Illinois:
(1) the receipts obtained by him in such conspiracy; and
(2) any of his interests in, claims against, receipts
from, or property or rights of any kind affording a source of
influence over, such conspiracy.
(d) The circuit court may enter such injunctions,
restraining orders, directions, or prohibitions, or take such
other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory
performance bonds, in connection with any property, claim,
receipt, right or other interest subject to forfeiture under
this Section, as it deems proper.
(Source: P.A. 84-1233.)
Section 30. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is
amended by changing Sections 104-26, 111-3, 116-4, 121-13,
122-1, 122-2.1, 122-2.2, and 122-4 as follows:
(725 ILCS 5/104-26) (from Ch. 38, par. 104-26)
Sec. 104-26. Disposition of Defendants suffering
disabilities.
(a) A defendant convicted following a trial conducted
under the provisions of Section 104-22 shall not be sentenced
before a written presentence report of investigation is
presented to and considered by the court. The presentence
report shall be prepared pursuant to Sections 5-3-2, 5-3-3 and
5-3-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections, as now or hereafter
amended, and shall include a physical and mental examination
unless the court finds that the reports of prior physical and
mental examinations conducted pursuant to this Article are
adequate and recent enough so that additional examinations
would be unnecessary.
(b) (Blank). A defendant convicted following a trial under
Section 104-22 shall not be subject to the death penalty.
(c) A defendant convicted following a trial under Section
104-22 shall be sentenced according to the procedures and
dispositions authorized under the Unified Code of Corrections,
as now or hereafter amended, subject to the following
provisions:
(1) The court shall not impose a sentence of
imprisonment upon the offender if the court believes that
because of his disability a sentence of imprisonment would
not serve the ends of justice and the interests of society
and the offender or that because of his disability a
sentence of imprisonment would subject the offender to
excessive hardship. In addition to any other conditions of
a sentence of conditional discharge or probation the court
may require that the offender undergo treatment
appropriate to his mental or physical condition.
(2) After imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon an
offender who has a mental disability, the court may remand
him to the custody of the Department of Human Services and
order a hearing to be conducted pursuant to the provisions
of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code,
as now or hereafter amended. If the offender is committed
following such hearing, he shall be treated in the same
manner as any other civilly committed patient for all
purposes except as provided in this Section. If the
defendant is not committed pursuant to such hearing, he
shall be remanded to the sentencing court for disposition
according to the sentence imposed.
(3) If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment
upon an offender who has a mental disability but does not
proceed under subparagraph (2) of paragraph (c) of this
Section, it shall order the Department of Corrections to
proceed pursuant to Section 3-8-5 of the Unified Code of
Corrections, as now or hereafter amended.
(3.5) If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment
upon an offender who has a mental disability, the court
shall direct the circuit court clerk to immediately notify
the Illinois State Police, Firearm Owner's Identification
(FOID) Office, in a form and manner prescribed by the
Illinois State Police and shall forward a copy of the
court order to the Department.
(4) If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment
upon an offender who has a physical disability, it may
authorize the Department of Corrections to place the
offender in a public or private facility which is able to
provide care or treatment for the offender's disability
and which agrees to do so.
(5) When an offender is placed with the Department of
Human Services or another facility pursuant to
subparagraph (2) or (4) of this paragraph (c), the
Department or private facility shall not discharge or
allow the offender to be at large in the community without
prior approval of the court. If the defendant is placed in
the custody of the Department of Human Services, the
defendant shall be placed in a secure setting unless the
court determines that there are compelling reasons why
such placement is not necessary. The offender shall accrue
good time and shall be eligible for parole in the same
manner as if he were serving his sentence within the
Department of Corrections. When the offender no longer
requires hospitalization, care, or treatment, the
Department of Human Services or the facility shall
transfer him, if his sentence has not expired, to the
Department of Corrections. If an offender is transferred
to the Department of Corrections, the Department of Human
Services shall transfer to the Department of Corrections
all related records pertaining to length of custody and
treatment services provided during the time the offender
was held.
(6) The Department of Corrections shall notify the
Department of Human Services or a facility in which an
offender has been placed pursuant to subparagraph (2) or
(4) of paragraph (c) of this Section of the expiration of
his sentence. Thereafter, an offender in the Department of
Human Services shall continue to be treated pursuant to
his commitment order and shall be considered a civilly
committed patient for all purposes including discharge. An
offender who is in a facility pursuant to subparagraph (4)
of paragraph (c) of this Section shall be informed by the
facility of the expiration of his sentence, and shall
either consent to the continuation of his care or
treatment by the facility or shall be discharged.
(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)
(725 ILCS 5/111-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 111-3)
Sec. 111-3. Form of charge.
(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission
of an offense by:
(1) Stating the name of the offense;
(2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have
been violated;
(3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the
offense charged;
(4) Stating the date and county of the offense as
definitely as can be done; and
(5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and if
not known, designate the accused by any name or
description by which he can be identified with reasonable
certainty.
(a-5) If the victim is alleged to have been subjected to an
offense involving an illegal sexual act including, but not
limited to, a sexual offense defined in Article 11 or Section
10-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the charge shall state the
identity of the victim by name, initials, or description.
(b) An indictment shall be signed by the foreman of the
Grand Jury and an information shall be signed by the State's
Attorney and sworn to by him or another. A complaint shall be
sworn to and signed by the complainant; provided, that when a
peace officer observes the commission of a misdemeanor and is
the complaining witness, the signing of the complaint by the
peace officer is sufficient to charge the defendant with the
commission of the offense, and the complaint need not be sworn
to if the officer signing the complaint certifies that the
statements set forth in the complaint are true and correct and
are subject to the penalties provided by law for false
certification under Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and perjury under Section 32-2 of the Criminal Code
of 2012; and further provided, however, that when a citation
is issued on a Uniform Traffic Ticket or Uniform Conservation
Ticket (in a form prescribed by the Conference of Chief
Circuit Judges and filed with the Supreme Court), the copy of
such Uniform Ticket which is filed with the circuit court
constitutes a complaint to which the defendant may plead,
unless he specifically requests that a verified complaint be
filed.
(c) When the State seeks an enhanced sentence because of a
prior conviction, the charge shall also state the intention to
seek an enhanced sentence and shall state such prior
conviction so as to give notice to the defendant. However, the
fact of such prior conviction and the State's intention to
seek an enhanced sentence are not elements of the offense and
may not be disclosed to the jury during trial unless otherwise
permitted by issues properly raised during such trial. For the
purposes of this Section, "enhanced sentence" means a sentence
which is increased by a prior conviction from one
classification of offense to another higher level
classification of offense set forth in Section 5-4.5-10 of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-10); it does not
include an increase in the sentence applied within the same
level of classification of offense.
(c-5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all
cases in which the imposition of the death penalty is not a
possibility, if an alleged fact (other than the fact of a prior
conviction) is not an element of an offense but is sought to be
used to increase the range of penalties for the offense beyond
the statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for the
offense, the alleged fact must be included in the charging
instrument or otherwise provided to the defendant through a
written notification before trial, submitted to a trier of
fact as an aggravating factor, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Failure to prove the fact beyond a reasonable doubt is
not a bar to a conviction for commission of the offense, but is
a bar to increasing, based on that fact, the range of penalties
for the offense beyond the statutory maximum that could
otherwise be imposed for that offense. Nothing in this
subsection (c-5) requires the imposition of a sentence that
increases the range of penalties for the offense beyond the
statutory maximum that could otherwise be imposed for the
offense if the imposition of that sentence is not required by
law.
(d) At any time prior to trial, the State on motion shall
be permitted to amend the charge, whether brought by
indictment, information or complaint, to make the charge
comply with subsection (c) or (c-5) of this Section. Nothing
in Section 103-5 of this Code precludes such an amendment or a
written notification made in accordance with subsection (c-5)
of this Section.
(e) The provisions of subsection (a) of Section 5-4.5-95
of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95) shall
not be affected by this Section.
(Source: P.A. 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13; 98-416, eff. 1-1-14.)
(725 ILCS 5/116-4)
Sec. 116-4. Preservation of evidence for forensic testing.
(a) Before or after the trial in a prosecution for a
violation of Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50,
11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or in a
prosecution for an offense defined in Article 9 of that Code,
or in a prosecution for an attempt in violation of Section 8-4
of that Code of any of the above-enumerated offenses, unless
otherwise provided herein under subsection (b) or (c), a law
enforcement agency or an agent acting on behalf of the law
enforcement agency shall preserve, subject to a continuous
chain of custody, any physical evidence in their possession or
control that is reasonably likely to contain forensic
evidence, including, but not limited to, fingerprints or
biological material secured in relation to a trial and with
sufficient documentation to locate that evidence.
(b) After a judgment of conviction is entered, the
evidence shall either be impounded with the Clerk of the
Circuit Court or shall be securely retained by a law
enforcement agency. Retention shall be permanent in cases
where a sentence of death is imposed. Retention shall be until
the completion of the sentence, including the period of
mandatory supervised release for the offense, or January 1,
2006, whichever is later, for any conviction for an offense or
an attempt of an offense defined in Article 9 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 or in Section
11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-13, 12-14,
12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the
Criminal Code of 2012 or for 7 years following any conviction
for any other felony for which the defendant's genetic profile
may be taken by a law enforcement agency and submitted for
comparison in a forensic DNA database for unsolved offenses.
(c) After a judgment of conviction is entered, the law
enforcement agency required to retain evidence described in
subsection (a) may petition the court with notice to the
defendant or, in cases where the defendant has died, his
estate, his attorney of record, or an attorney appointed for
that purpose by the court for entry of an order allowing it to
dispose of evidence if, after a hearing, the court determines
by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) it has no significant value for forensic science
analysis and should be returned to its rightful owner,
destroyed, used for training purposes, or as otherwise
provided by law; or
(2) it has no significant value for forensic science
analysis and is of a size, bulk, or physical character not
usually retained by the law enforcement agency and cannot
practicably be retained by the law enforcement agency; or
(3) there no longer exists a reasonable basis to
require the preservation of the evidence because of the
death of the defendant; however, this paragraph (3) does
not apply if a sentence of death was imposed.
(d) The court may order the disposition of the evidence if
the defendant is allowed the opportunity to take reasonable
measures to remove or preserve portions of the evidence in
question for future testing.
(d-5) Any order allowing the disposition of evidence
pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) shall be a final and
appealable order. No evidence shall be disposed of until 30
days after the order is entered, and if a notice of appeal is
filed, no evidence shall be disposed of until the mandate has
been received by the circuit court from the appellate court.
(d-10) All records documenting the possession, control,
storage, and destruction of evidence and all police reports,
evidence control or inventory records, and other reports cited
in this Section, including computer records, must be retained
for as long as the evidence exists and may not be disposed of
without the approval of the Local Records Commission.
(e) In this Section, "law enforcement agency" includes any
of the following or an agent acting on behalf of any of the
following: a municipal police department, county sheriff's
office, any prosecuting authority, the Illinois State Police,
or any other State, university, county, federal, or municipal
police unit or police force.
"Biological material" includes, but is not limited to, any
blood, hair, saliva, or semen from which genetic marker
groupings may be obtained.
(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)
(725 ILCS 5/121-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 121-13)
Sec. 121-13. Pauper Appeals.
(a) In any case wherein the defendant was convicted of a
felony, if the court determines that the defendant desires
counsel on appeal but is indigent the Public Defender or the
State Appellate Defender shall be appointed as counsel, unless
with the consent of the defendant and for good cause shown, the
court may appoint counsel other than the Public Defender or
the State Appellate Defender.
(b) In any case wherein the defendant was convicted of a
felony and a sentence of death was not imposed in the trial
court the reviewing court, upon petition of the defendant's
counsel made not more frequently than every 60 days after
appointment, shall determine a reasonable amount to be allowed
an indigent defendant's counsel other than the Public Defender
or the State Appellate Defender for compensation and
reimbursement of expenditures necessarily incurred in the
prosecution of the appeal or review proceedings. The
compensation shall not exceed $1500 in each case, except that,
in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the
limits herein stated may be made if the reviewing court
certifies that the payment is necessary to provide fair
compensation for protracted representation. The reviewing
court shall enter an order directing the county treasurer of
the county where the case was tried to pay the amount allowed
by the court. The reviewing court may order the provisional
payment of sums during the pendency of the cause.
(c) (blank). In any case in which a sentence of death was
imposed in the trial court, the Supreme Court, upon written
petition of the defendant's counsel made not more than every
60 days after appointment, shall determine reasonable
compensation for an indigent defendant's attorneys on appeal.
The compensation shall not exceed $2,000 in each case, except
that, in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the
limits herein stated may be made if the reviewing court
certifies that the payment is necessary to provide fair
compensation for protracted representation. The Supreme Court
shall enter an order directing the county treasurer of the
county where the case was tried to pay compensation and
reimburse expenditures necessarily incurred in the prosecution
of the appeal or review proceedings. The Supreme Court may
order the provisional payment of sums during the pendency of
the cause.
(Source: P.A. 86-318; 87-580.)
(725 ILCS 5/122-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-1)
Sec. 122-1. Petition in the trial court.
(a) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary may
institute a proceeding under this Article if the person
asserts that:
(1) in the proceedings which resulted in his or her
conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her
rights under the Constitution of the United States or of
the State of Illinois or both;
(2) (blank) the death penalty was imposed and there is
newly discovered evidence not available to the person at
the time of the proceeding that resulted in his or her
conviction that establishes a substantial basis to believe
that the defendant is actually innocent by clear and
convincing evidence; or
(3) (blank).
(a-5) A proceeding under paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
may be commenced within a reasonable period of time after the
person's conviction notwithstanding any other provisions of
this Article. In such a proceeding regarding actual innocence,
if the court determines the petition is frivolous or is
patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a
written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions
of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of
dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the
petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry.
(b) The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the
clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a
petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by affidavit.
Petitioner shall also serve another copy upon the State's
Attorney by any of the methods provided in Rule 7 of the
Supreme Court. The clerk shall docket the petition for
consideration by the court pursuant to Section 122-2.1 upon
his or her receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the
attention of the court.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a-5), if
the petitioner is under sentence of death and a petition for
writ of certiorari is filed, no proceedings under this Article
shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of
proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the
petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to
his or her culpable negligence. If a petition for certiorari
is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be
commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a
certiorari petition, unless the petitioner alleges facts
showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable
negligence.
No When a defendant has a sentence other than death, no
proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6
months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United
States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts
showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable
negligence. If a petition for certiorari is not filed, no
proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6
months from the date for filing a certiorari petition, unless
the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not
due to his or her culpable negligence. If a defendant does not
file a direct appeal, the post-conviction petition shall be
filed no later than 3 years from the date of conviction, unless
the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not
due to his or her culpable negligence.
This limitation does not apply to a petition advancing a
claim of actual innocence.
(d) A person seeking relief by filing a petition under
this Section must specify in the petition or its heading that
it is filed under this Section. A trial court that has received
a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails
to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed
under this Section need not evaluate the petition to determine
whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief
under this Article.
(e) (Blank). A proceeding under this Article may not be
commenced on behalf of a defendant who has been sentenced to
death without the written consent of the defendant, unless the
defendant, because of a mental or physical condition, is
incapable of asserting his or her own claim.
(f) Only one petition may be filed by a petitioner under
this Article without leave of the court. Leave of court may be
granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her
failure to bring the claim in his or her initial
post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that
failure. For purposes of this subsection (f): (1) a prisoner
shows cause by identifying an objective factor that impeded
his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her
initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows
prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during
his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the
trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due
process.
(Source: P.A. 101-411, eff. 8-16-19; 102-639, eff. 8-27-21.)
(725 ILCS 5/122-2.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-2.1)
Sec. 122-2.1. (a) Within 90 days after the filing and
docketing of each petition, the court shall examine such
petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section.
(1) (Blank). If the petitioner is under sentence of
death and is without counsel and alleges that he is
without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether
or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him.
If appointment of counsel is so requested, the court shall
appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no
means to procure counsel.
(2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and
the court determines the petition is frivolous or is
patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a
written order, specifying the findings of fact and
conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such
order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served
upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of
its entry.
(b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this
Section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for
further consideration in accordance with Sections 122-4
through 122-6. If the petitioner is under sentence of death,
the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further
consideration and hearing within one year of the filing of the
petition. Continuances may be granted as the court deems
appropriate.
(c) In considering a petition pursuant to this Section,
the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which
the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate
court in such proceeding and any transcripts of such
proceeding.
(Source: P.A. 93-605, eff. 11-19-03.)
(725 ILCS 5/122-2.2)
Sec. 122-2.2. Intellectual disability and post-conviction
relief.
(a) (Blank). In cases where no determination of an
intellectual disability was made and a defendant has been
convicted of first-degree murder, sentenced to death, and is
in custody pending execution of the sentence of death, the
following procedures shall apply:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule
of court, a defendant may seek relief from the death
sentence through a petition for post-conviction relief
under this Article alleging that the defendant was a
person with an intellectual disability as defined in
Section 114-15 at the time the offense was alleged to have
been committed.
(2) The petition must be filed within 180 days of the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General
Assembly or within 180 days of the issuance of the mandate
by the Illinois Supreme Court setting the date of
execution, whichever is later.
(b) All other provisions of this Article governing
petitions for post-conviction relief shall apply to a petition
for post-conviction relief alleging an intellectual
disability.
(Source: P.A. 99-78, eff. 7-20-15; 99-143, eff. 7-27-15.)
(725 ILCS 5/122-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 122-4)
Sec. 122-4. Pauper Petitions. If the petition is not
dismissed pursuant to Section 122-2.1, and alleges that the
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the
court may order that the petitioner be permitted to proceed as
a poor person and order a transcript of the proceedings
delivered to petitioner in accordance with Rule of the Supreme
Court. If the petitioner is without counsel and alleges that
he is without means to procure counsel, he shall state whether
or not he wishes counsel to be appointed to represent him. If
appointment of counsel is so requested, and the petition is
not dismissed pursuant to Section 122-2.1, the court shall
appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner has no means
to procure counsel. A petitioner who is a prisoner in an
Illinois Department of Corrections facility who files a
pleading, motion, or other filing that purports to be a legal
document seeking post-conviction relief under this Article
against the State, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the
Prisoner Review Board, or any of their officers or employees
in which the court makes a specific finding that the pleading,
motion, or other filing that purports to be a legal document is
frivolous shall not proceed as a poor person and shall be
liable for the full payment of filing fees and actual court
costs as provided in Article XXII of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
A Circuit Court or the Illinois Supreme Court may appoint
the State Appellate Defender to provide post-conviction
representation in a case in which the defendant is sentenced
to death. Any attorney assigned by the Office of the State
Appellate Defender to provide post-conviction representation
for indigent defendants in cases in which a sentence of death
was imposed in the trial court may, from time to time submit
bills and time sheets to the Office of the State Appellate
Defender for payment of services rendered and the Office of
the State Appellate Defender shall pay bills from funds
appropriated for this purpose in accordance with rules
promulgated by the State Appellate Defender.
The court, at the conclusion of the proceedings upon
receipt of a petition by the appointed counsel, shall
determine a reasonable amount to be allowed an indigent
defendant's counsel other than the Public Defender or the
State Appellate Defender for compensation and reimbursement of
expenditures necessarily incurred in the proceedings. The
compensation shall not exceed $500 in each case, except that,
in extraordinary circumstances, payment in excess of the
limits herein stated may be made if the trial court certifies
that the payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for
protracted representation, and the amount is approved by the
chief judge of the circuit. The court shall enter an order
directing the county treasurer of the county where the case
was tried to pay the amount thereby allowed by the court. The
court may order the provisional payment of sums during the
pendency of the cause.
(Source: P.A. 90-505, eff. 8-19-97.)
(725 ILCS 5/114-15 rep.)
(725 ILCS 5/119-5 rep.)
Section 35. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 is
amended by repealing Sections 114-15 and 119-5.
Section 40. The State Appellate Defender Act is amended by
changing Section 10.5 as follows:
(725 ILCS 105/10.5)
Sec. 10.5. Competitive bidding for appellate services.
(a) The State Appellate Defender may, to the extent
necessary to dispose of its backlog of indigent criminal
appeals, institute a competitive bidding program under which
contracts for the services of attorneys in non-death penalty
criminal appeals are awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.
(b) The State Appellate Defender, before letting out bids
for contracts for the services of attorneys to represent
indigent defendants on appeal in criminal cases, shall
advertise the letting of the bids in a publication or
publications of the Illinois State Bar Association, the
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, and the Chicago Lawyer. The State
Appellate Defender shall also advertise the letting of the
bids in newspapers of general circulation in major
municipalities to be determined by the State Appellate
Defender. The State Appellate Defender shall mail notices of
the letting of the bids to county and local bar associations.
(c) Bids may be let in packages of one to 5, appeals.
Additional cases may be assigned, in the discretion of the
State Appellate Defender, after a successful bidder completes
work on existing packages.
(d) A bid for services of an attorney under this Section
shall be let only to an attorney licensed to practice law in
Illinois who has prior criminal appellate experience or to an
attorney who is a member or employee of a law firm which has at
least one member with that experience. Prospective bidders
must furnish legal writing samples that are deemed acceptable
to the State Appellate Defender.
(e) An attorney who is awarded a contract under this
Section shall communicate with each of his or her clients and
shall file each initial brief before the due date established
by Supreme Court Rule or by the Appellate Court. The State
Appellate Defender may rescind the contract for attorney
services and may require the return of the record on appeal if
the contracted attorney fails to make satisfactory progress,
in the opinion of the State Appellate Defender, toward filing
a brief.
(f) Gross compensation for completing of a case shall be
$40 per hour but shall not exceed $2,000 per case. The contract
shall specify the manner of payment.
(g) (Blank).
(h) (Blank).
(Source: P.A. 89-689, eff. 12-31-96; 90-505, eff. 8-19-97.)
Section 45. The Uniform Rendition of Prisoners as
Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings Act is amended by changing
Section 5 as follows:
(725 ILCS 235/5) (from Ch. 38, par. 157-5)
Sec. 5. Exceptions.
This act does not apply to any person in this State
confined as mentally ill or , in need of mental treatment, or
under sentence of death.
(Source: Laws 1963, p. 2171.)
Section 50. The Unified Code of Corrections is amended by
changing Sections 3-3-13, 3-6-3, 3-8-10, 5-1-9, 5-4-1, 5-4-3,
5-4.5-20, 5-5-3, and 5-8-1 as follows:
(730 ILCS 5/3-3-13) (from Ch. 38, par. 1003-3-13)
Sec. 3-3-13. Procedure for executive clemency.
(a) Petitions seeking pardon, commutation, or reprieve
shall be addressed to the Governor and filed with the Prisoner
Review Board. The petition shall be in writing and signed by
the person under conviction or by a person on his behalf. It
shall contain a brief history of the case, the reasons for
seeking executive clemency, and other relevant information the
Board may require.
(a-5) After a petition has been denied by the Governor,
the Board may not accept a repeat petition for executive
clemency for the same person until one full year has elapsed
from the date of the denial. The Chairman of the Board may
waive the one-year requirement if the petitioner offers in
writing new information that was unavailable to the petitioner
at the time of the filing of the prior petition and which the
Chairman determines to be significant. The Chairman also may
waive the one-year waiting period if the petitioner can show
that a change in circumstances of a compelling humanitarian
nature has arisen since the denial of the prior petition.
(b) Notice of the proposed application shall be given by
the Board to the committing court and the state's attorney of
the county where the conviction was had.
(b-5) Victims registered with the Board shall receive
reasonable written notice not less than 30 days prior to the
executive clemency hearing date. The victim has the right to
submit a victim statement to the Prisoner Review Board for
consideration at an executive clemency hearing as provided in
subsection (c) of this Section. Victim statements provided to
the Board shall be confidential and privileged, including any
statements received prior to the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 101st General Assembly, except if the
statement was an oral statement made by the victim at a hearing
open to the public.
(c) The Board shall, upon due notice, give a hearing to
each application, allowing representation by counsel, if
desired, after which it shall confidentially advise the
Governor by a written report of its recommendations which
shall be determined by majority vote. The written report to
the Governor shall be confidential and privileged, including
any reports made prior to the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 101st General Assembly. The Board shall
meet to consider such petitions no less than 4 times each year.
Application for executive clemency under this Section may
not be commenced on behalf of a person who has been sentenced
to death without the written consent of the defendant, unless
the defendant, because of a mental or physical condition, is
incapable of asserting his or her own claim.
(d) The Governor shall decide each application and
communicate his decision to the Board which shall notify the
petitioner.
In the event a petitioner who has been convicted of a Class
X felony is granted a release, after the Governor has
communicated such decision to the Board, the Board shall give
written notice to the Sheriff of the county from which the
offender was sentenced if such sheriff has requested that such
notice be given on a continuing basis. In cases where arrest of
the offender or the commission of the offense took place in any
municipality with a population of more than 10,000 persons,
the Board shall also give written notice to the proper law
enforcement agency for said municipality which has requested
notice on a continuing basis.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit
the power of the Governor under the constitution to grant a
reprieve, commutation of sentence, or pardon.
(Source: P.A. 101-288, eff. 1-1-20.)
(730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3)
Sec. 3-6-3. Rules and regulations for sentence credit.
(a)(1) The Department of Corrections shall prescribe rules
and regulations for awarding and revoking sentence credit for
persons committed to the Department of Corrections and the
Department of Juvenile Justice shall prescribe rules and
regulations for awarding and revoking sentence credit for
persons committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice under
Section 5-8-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections, which shall
be subject to review by the Prisoner Review Board.
(1.5) As otherwise provided by law, sentence credit may be
awarded for the following:
(A) successful completion of programming while in
custody of the Department of Corrections or the Department
of Juvenile Justice or while in custody prior to
sentencing;
(B) compliance with the rules and regulations of the
Department; or
(C) service to the institution, service to a
community, or service to the State.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this
subsection (a), the rules and regulations on sentence credit
shall provide, with respect to offenses listed in clause (i),
(ii), or (iii) of this paragraph (2) committed on or after June
19, 1998 or with respect to the offense listed in clause (iv)
of this paragraph (2) committed on or after June 23, 2005 (the
effective date of Public Act 94-71) or with respect to offense
listed in clause (vi) committed on or after June 1, 2008 (the
effective date of Public Act 95-625) or with respect to the
offense of being an armed habitual criminal committed on or
after August 2, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-398)
or with respect to the offenses listed in clause (v) of this
paragraph (2) committed on or after August 13, 2007 (the
effective date of Public Act 95-134) or with respect to the
offense of aggravated domestic battery committed on or after
July 23, 2010 (the effective date of Public Act 96-1224) or
with respect to the offense of attempt to commit terrorism
committed on or after January 1, 2013 (the effective date of
Public Act 97-990), the following:
(i) that a prisoner who is serving a term of
imprisonment for first degree murder or for the offense of
terrorism shall receive no sentence credit and shall serve
the entire sentence imposed by the court;
(ii) that a prisoner serving a sentence for attempt to
commit terrorism, attempt to commit first degree murder,
solicitation of murder, solicitation of murder for hire,
intentional homicide of an unborn child, predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal
sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated battery with a firearm as described
in Section 12-4.2 or subdivision (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
or (e)(4) of Section 12-3.05, heinous battery as described
in Section 12-4.1 or subdivision (a)(2) of Section
12-3.05, being an armed habitual criminal, aggravated
battery of a senior citizen as described in Section 12-4.6
or subdivision (a)(4) of Section 12-3.05, or aggravated
battery of a child as described in Section 12-4.3 or
subdivision (b)(1) of Section 12-3.05 shall receive no
more than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each month of his
or her sentence of imprisonment;
(iii) that a prisoner serving a sentence for home
invasion, armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking,
aggravated discharge of a firearm, or armed violence with
a category I weapon or category II weapon, when the court
has made and entered a finding, pursuant to subsection
(c-1) of Section 5-4-1 of this Code, that the conduct
leading to conviction for the enumerated offense resulted
in great bodily harm to a victim, shall receive no more
than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each month of his or
her sentence of imprisonment;
(iv) that a prisoner serving a sentence for aggravated
discharge of a firearm, whether or not the conduct leading
to conviction for the offense resulted in great bodily
harm to the victim, shall receive no more than 4.5 days of
sentence credit for each month of his or her sentence of
imprisonment;
(v) that a person serving a sentence for gunrunning,
narcotics racketeering, controlled substance trafficking,
methamphetamine trafficking, drug-induced homicide,
aggravated methamphetamine-related child endangerment,
money laundering pursuant to clause (c) (4) or (5) of
Section 29B-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal
Code of 2012, or a Class X felony conviction for delivery
of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled
substance with intent to manufacture or deliver,
calculated criminal drug conspiracy, criminal drug
conspiracy, street gang criminal drug conspiracy,
participation in methamphetamine manufacturing,
aggravated participation in methamphetamine
manufacturing, delivery of methamphetamine, possession
with intent to deliver methamphetamine, aggravated
delivery of methamphetamine, aggravated possession with
intent to deliver methamphetamine, methamphetamine
conspiracy when the substance containing the controlled
substance or methamphetamine is 100 grams or more shall
receive no more than 7.5 days sentence credit for each
month of his or her sentence of imprisonment;
(vi) that a prisoner serving a sentence for a second
or subsequent offense of luring a minor shall receive no
more than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each month of his
or her sentence of imprisonment; and
(vii) that a prisoner serving a sentence for
aggravated domestic battery shall receive no more than 4.5
days of sentence credit for each month of his or her
sentence of imprisonment.
(2.1) For all offenses, other than those enumerated in
subdivision (a)(2)(i), (ii), or (iii) committed on or after
June 19, 1998 or subdivision (a)(2)(iv) committed on or after
June 23, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act 94-71) or
subdivision (a)(2)(v) committed on or after August 13, 2007
(the effective date of Public Act 95-134) or subdivision
(a)(2)(vi) committed on or after June 1, 2008 (the effective
date of Public Act 95-625) or subdivision (a)(2)(vii)
committed on or after July 23, 2010 (the effective date of
Public Act 96-1224), and other than the offense of aggravated
driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs,
or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination
thereof as defined in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of
subsection (d) of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code,
and other than the offense of aggravated driving under the
influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating
compound or compounds, or any combination thereof as defined
in subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of
Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code committed on or
after January 1, 2011 (the effective date of Public Act
96-1230), the rules and regulations shall provide that a
prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment shall receive
one day of sentence credit for each day of his or her sentence
of imprisonment or recommitment under Section 3-3-9. Each day
of sentence credit shall reduce by one day the prisoner's
period of imprisonment or recommitment under Section 3-3-9.
(2.2) A prisoner serving a term of natural life
imprisonment or a prisoner who has been sentenced to death
shall receive no sentence credit.
(2.3) Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this
subsection (a), the rules and regulations on sentence credit
shall provide that a prisoner who is serving a sentence for
aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug
or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any
combination thereof as defined in subparagraph (F) of
paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of Section 11-501 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code, shall receive no more than 4.5 days of
sentence credit for each month of his or her sentence of
imprisonment.
(2.4) Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this
subsection (a), the rules and regulations on sentence credit
shall provide with respect to the offenses of aggravated
battery with a machine gun or a firearm equipped with any
device or attachment designed or used for silencing the report
of a firearm or aggravated discharge of a machine gun or a
firearm equipped with any device or attachment designed or
used for silencing the report of a firearm, committed on or
after July 15, 1999 (the effective date of Public Act 91-121),
that a prisoner serving a sentence for any of these offenses
shall receive no more than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each
month of his or her sentence of imprisonment.
(2.5) Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this
subsection (a), the rules and regulations on sentence credit
shall provide that a prisoner who is serving a sentence for
aggravated arson committed on or after July 27, 2001 (the
effective date of Public Act 92-176) shall receive no more
than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each month of his or her
sentence of imprisonment.
(2.6) Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this
subsection (a), the rules and regulations on sentence credit
shall provide that a prisoner who is serving a sentence for
aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug
or drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds or any
combination thereof as defined in subparagraph (C) of
paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of Section 11-501 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code committed on or after January 1, 2011
(the effective date of Public Act 96-1230) shall receive no
more than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each month of his or
her sentence of imprisonment.
(3) In addition to the sentence credits earned under
paragraphs (2.1), (4), (4.1), (4.2), and (4.7) of this
subsection (a), the rules and regulations shall also provide
that the Director of Corrections or the Director of Juvenile
Justice may award up to 180 days of earned sentence credit for
prisoners serving a sentence of incarceration of less than 5
years, and up to 365 days of earned sentence credit for
prisoners serving a sentence of 5 years or longer. The
Director may grant this credit for good conduct in specific
instances as either Director deems proper for eligible persons
in the custody of each Director's respective Department. The
good conduct may include, but is not limited to, compliance
with the rules and regulations of the Department, service to
the Department, service to a community, or service to the
State.
Eligible inmates for an award of earned sentence credit
under this paragraph (3) may be selected to receive the credit
at either Director's or his or her designee's sole discretion.
Eligibility for the additional earned sentence credit under
this paragraph (3) may be based on, but is not limited to,
participation in programming offered by the Department as
appropriate for the prisoner based on the results of any
available risk/needs assessment or other relevant assessments
or evaluations administered by the Department using a
validated instrument, the circumstances of the crime,
demonstrated commitment to rehabilitation by a prisoner with a
history of conviction for a forcible felony enumerated in
Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the inmate's
behavior and improvements in disciplinary history while
incarcerated, and the inmate's commitment to rehabilitation,
including participation in programming offered by the
Department.
The Director of Corrections or the Director of Juvenile
Justice shall not award sentence credit under this paragraph
(3) to an inmate unless the inmate has served a minimum of 60
days of the sentence; except nothing in this paragraph shall
be construed to permit either Director to extend an inmate's
sentence beyond that which was imposed by the court. Prior to
awarding credit under this paragraph (3), each Director shall
make a written determination that the inmate:
(A) is eligible for the earned sentence credit;
(B) has served a minimum of 60 days, or as close to 60
days as the sentence will allow;
(B-1) has received a risk/needs assessment or other
relevant evaluation or assessment administered by the
Department using a validated instrument; and
(C) has met the eligibility criteria established by
rule for earned sentence credit.
The Director of Corrections or the Director of Juvenile
Justice shall determine the form and content of the written
determination required in this subsection.
(3.5) The Department shall provide annual written reports
to the Governor and the General Assembly on the award of earned
sentence credit no later than February 1 of each year. The
Department must publish both reports on its website within 48
hours of transmitting the reports to the Governor and the
General Assembly. The reports must include:
(A) the number of inmates awarded earned sentence
credit;
(B) the average amount of earned sentence credit
awarded;
(C) the holding offenses of inmates awarded earned
sentence credit; and
(D) the number of earned sentence credit revocations.
(4)(A) Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this
subsection (a), the rules and regulations shall also provide
that any prisoner who is engaged full-time in substance abuse
programs, correctional industry assignments, educational
programs, work-release programs or activities in accordance
with Article 13 of Chapter III of this Code, behavior
modification programs, life skills courses, or re-entry
planning provided by the Department under this paragraph (4)
and satisfactorily completes the assigned program as
determined by the standards of the Department, shall receive
one day of sentence credit for each day in which that prisoner
is engaged in the activities described in this paragraph. The
rules and regulations shall also provide that sentence credit
may be provided to an inmate who was held in pre-trial
detention prior to his or her current commitment to the
Department of Corrections and successfully completed a
full-time, 60-day or longer substance abuse program,
educational program, behavior modification program, life
skills course, or re-entry planning provided by the county
department of corrections or county jail. Calculation of this
county program credit shall be done at sentencing as provided
in Section 5-4.5-100 of this Code and shall be included in the
sentencing order. The rules and regulations shall also provide
that sentence credit may be provided to an inmate who is in
compliance with programming requirements in an adult
transition center.
(B) The Department shall award sentence credit under this
paragraph (4) accumulated prior to January 1, 2020 (the
effective date of Public Act 101-440) in an amount specified
in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph (4) to an inmate serving
a sentence for an offense committed prior to June 19, 1998, if
the Department determines that the inmate is entitled to this
sentence credit, based upon:
(i) documentation provided by the Department that the
inmate engaged in any full-time substance abuse programs,
correctional industry assignments, educational programs,
behavior modification programs, life skills courses, or
re-entry planning provided by the Department under this
paragraph (4) and satisfactorily completed the assigned
program as determined by the standards of the Department
during the inmate's current term of incarceration; or
(ii) the inmate's own testimony in the form of an
affidavit or documentation, or a third party's
documentation or testimony in the form of an affidavit
that the inmate likely engaged in any full-time substance
abuse programs, correctional industry assignments,
educational programs, behavior modification programs, life
skills courses, or re-entry planning provided by the
Department under paragraph (4) and satisfactorily
completed the assigned program as determined by the
standards of the Department during the inmate's current
term of incarceration.
(C) If the inmate can provide documentation that he or she
is entitled to sentence credit under subparagraph (B) in
excess of 45 days of participation in those programs, the
inmate shall receive 90 days of sentence credit. If the inmate
cannot provide documentation of more than 45 days of
participation in those programs, the inmate shall receive 45
days of sentence credit. In the event of a disagreement
between the Department and the inmate as to the amount of
credit accumulated under subparagraph (B), if the Department
provides documented proof of a lesser amount of days of
participation in those programs, that proof shall control. If
the Department provides no documentary proof, the inmate's
proof as set forth in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) shall
control as to the amount of sentence credit provided.
(D) If the inmate has been convicted of a sex offense as
defined in Section 2 of the Sex Offender Registration Act,
sentencing credits under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph
(4) shall be awarded by the Department only if the conditions
set forth in paragraph (4.6) of subsection (a) are satisfied.
No inmate serving a term of natural life imprisonment shall
receive sentence credit under subparagraph (B) of this
paragraph (4).
Educational, vocational, substance abuse, behavior
modification programs, life skills courses, re-entry planning,
and correctional industry programs under which sentence credit
may be earned under this paragraph (4) and paragraph (4.1) of
this subsection (a) shall be evaluated by the Department on
the basis of documented standards. The Department shall report
the results of these evaluations to the Governor and the
General Assembly by September 30th of each year. The reports
shall include data relating to the recidivism rate among
program participants.
Availability of these programs shall be subject to the
limits of fiscal resources appropriated by the General
Assembly for these purposes. Eligible inmates who are denied
immediate admission shall be placed on a waiting list under
criteria established by the Department. The rules and
regulations shall provide that a prisoner who has been placed
on a waiting list but is transferred for non-disciplinary
reasons before beginning a program shall receive priority
placement on the waitlist for appropriate programs at the new
facility. The inability of any inmate to become engaged in any
such programs by reason of insufficient program resources or
for any other reason established under the rules and
regulations of the Department shall not be deemed a cause of
action under which the Department or any employee or agent of
the Department shall be liable for damages to the inmate. The
rules and regulations shall provide that a prisoner who begins
an educational, vocational, substance abuse, work-release
programs or activities in accordance with Article 13 of
Chapter III of this Code, behavior modification program, life
skills course, re-entry planning, or correctional industry
programs but is unable to complete the program due to illness,
disability, transfer, lockdown, or another reason outside of
the prisoner's control shall receive prorated sentence credits
for the days in which the prisoner did participate.
(4.1) Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this
subsection (a), the rules and regulations shall also provide
that an additional 90 days of sentence credit shall be awarded
to any prisoner who passes high school equivalency testing
while the prisoner is committed to the Department of
Corrections. The sentence credit awarded under this paragraph
(4.1) shall be in addition to, and shall not affect, the award
of sentence credit under any other paragraph of this Section,
but shall also be pursuant to the guidelines and restrictions
set forth in paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Section.
The sentence credit provided for in this paragraph shall be
available only to those prisoners who have not previously
earned a high school diploma or a State of Illinois High School
Diploma. If, after an award of the high school equivalency
testing sentence credit has been made, the Department
determines that the prisoner was not eligible, then the award
shall be revoked. The Department may also award 90 days of
sentence credit to any committed person who passed high school
equivalency testing while he or she was held in pre-trial
detention prior to the current commitment to the Department of
Corrections. Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this
subsection (a), the rules and regulations shall provide that
an additional 120 days of sentence credit shall be awarded to
any prisoner who obtains an associate degree while the
prisoner is committed to the Department of Corrections,
regardless of the date that the associate degree was obtained,
including if prior to July 1, 2021 (the effective date of
Public Act 101-652). The sentence credit awarded under this
paragraph (4.1) shall be in addition to, and shall not affect,
the award of sentence credit under any other paragraph of this
Section, but shall also be under the guidelines and
restrictions set forth in paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of
this Section. The sentence credit provided for in this
paragraph (4.1) shall be available only to those prisoners who
have not previously earned an associate degree prior to the
current commitment to the Department of Corrections. If, after
an award of the associate degree sentence credit has been made
and the Department determines that the prisoner was not
eligible, then the award shall be revoked. The Department may
also award 120 days of sentence credit to any committed person
who earned an associate degree while he or she was held in
pre-trial detention prior to the current commitment to the
Department of Corrections.
Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this subsection
(a), the rules and regulations shall provide that an
additional 180 days of sentence credit shall be awarded to any
prisoner who obtains a bachelor's degree while the prisoner is
committed to the Department of Corrections. The sentence
credit awarded under this paragraph (4.1) shall be in addition
to, and shall not affect, the award of sentence credit under
any other paragraph of this Section, but shall also be under
the guidelines and restrictions set forth in paragraph (4) of
this subsection (a). The sentence credit provided for in this
paragraph shall be available only to those prisoners who have
not earned a bachelor's degree prior to the current commitment
to the Department of Corrections. If, after an award of the
bachelor's degree sentence credit has been made, the
Department determines that the prisoner was not eligible, then
the award shall be revoked. The Department may also award 180
days of sentence credit to any committed person who earned a
bachelor's degree while he or she was held in pre-trial
detention prior to the current commitment to the Department of
Corrections.
Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this subsection
(a), the rules and regulations shall provide that an
additional 180 days of sentence credit shall be awarded to any
prisoner who obtains a master's or professional degree while
the prisoner is committed to the Department of Corrections.
The sentence credit awarded under this paragraph (4.1) shall
be in addition to, and shall not affect, the award of sentence
credit under any other paragraph of this Section, but shall
also be under the guidelines and restrictions set forth in
paragraph (4) of this subsection (a). The sentence credit
provided for in this paragraph shall be available only to
those prisoners who have not previously earned a master's or
professional degree prior to the current commitment to the
Department of Corrections. If, after an award of the master's
or professional degree sentence credit has been made, the
Department determines that the prisoner was not eligible, then
the award shall be revoked. The Department may also award 180
days of sentence credit to any committed person who earned a
master's or professional degree while he or she was held in
pre-trial detention prior to the current commitment to the
Department of Corrections.
(4.2) The rules and regulations shall also provide that
any prisoner engaged in self-improvement programs, volunteer
work, or work assignments that are not otherwise eligible
activities under paragraph (4), shall receive up to 0.5 days
of sentence credit for each day in which the prisoner is
engaged in activities described in this paragraph.
(4.5) The rules and regulations on sentence credit shall
also provide that when the court's sentencing order recommends
a prisoner for substance abuse treatment and the crime was
committed on or after September 1, 2003 (the effective date of
Public Act 93-354), the prisoner shall receive no sentence
credit awarded under clause (3) of this subsection (a) unless
he or she participates in and completes a substance abuse
treatment program. The Director of Corrections may waive the
requirement to participate in or complete a substance abuse
treatment program in specific instances if the prisoner is not
a good candidate for a substance abuse treatment program for
medical, programming, or operational reasons. Availability of
substance abuse treatment shall be subject to the limits of
fiscal resources appropriated by the General Assembly for
these purposes. If treatment is not available and the
requirement to participate and complete the treatment has not
been waived by the Director, the prisoner shall be placed on a
waiting list under criteria established by the Department. The
Director may allow a prisoner placed on a waiting list to
participate in and complete a substance abuse education class
or attend substance abuse self-help meetings in lieu of a
substance abuse treatment program. A prisoner on a waiting
list who is not placed in a substance abuse program prior to
release may be eligible for a waiver and receive sentence
credit under clause (3) of this subsection (a) at the
discretion of the Director.
(4.6) The rules and regulations on sentence credit shall
also provide that a prisoner who has been convicted of a sex
offense as defined in Section 2 of the Sex Offender
Registration Act shall receive no sentence credit unless he or
she either has successfully completed or is participating in
sex offender treatment as defined by the Sex Offender
Management Board. However, prisoners who are waiting to
receive treatment, but who are unable to do so due solely to
the lack of resources on the part of the Department, may, at
either Director's sole discretion, be awarded sentence credit
at a rate as the Director shall determine.
(4.7) On or after January 1, 2018 (the effective date of
Public Act 100-3), sentence credit under paragraph (3), (4),
or (4.1) of this subsection (a) may be awarded to a prisoner
who is serving a sentence for an offense described in
paragraph (2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), or (2.6) for credit earned
on or after January 1, 2018 (the effective date of Public Act
100-3); provided, the award of the credits under this
paragraph (4.7) shall not reduce the sentence of the prisoner
to less than the following amounts:
(i) 85% of his or her sentence if the prisoner is
required to serve 85% of his or her sentence; or
(ii) 60% of his or her sentence if the prisoner is
required to serve 75% of his or her sentence, except if the
prisoner is serving a sentence for gunrunning his or her
sentence shall not be reduced to less than 75%.
(iii) 100% of his or her sentence if the prisoner is
required to serve 100% of his or her sentence.
(5) Whenever the Department is to release any inmate
earlier than it otherwise would because of a grant of earned
sentence credit under paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of this
Section given at any time during the term, the Department
shall give reasonable notice of the impending release not less
than 14 days prior to the date of the release to the State's
Attorney of the county where the prosecution of the inmate
took place, and if applicable, the State's Attorney of the
county into which the inmate will be released. The Department
must also make identification information and a recent photo
of the inmate being released accessible on the Internet by
means of a hyperlink labeled "Community Notification of Inmate
Early Release" on the Department's World Wide Web homepage.
The identification information shall include the inmate's:
name, any known alias, date of birth, physical
characteristics, commitment offense, and county where
conviction was imposed. The identification information shall
be placed on the website within 3 days of the inmate's release
and the information may not be removed until either:
completion of the first year of mandatory supervised release
or return of the inmate to custody of the Department.
(b) Whenever a person is or has been committed under
several convictions, with separate sentences, the sentences
shall be construed under Section 5-8-4 in granting and
forfeiting of sentence credit.
(c) (1) The Department shall prescribe rules and
regulations for revoking sentence credit, including revoking
sentence credit awarded under paragraph (3) of subsection (a)
of this Section. The Department shall prescribe rules and
regulations establishing and requiring the use of a sanctions
matrix for revoking sentence credit. The Department shall
prescribe rules and regulations for suspending or reducing the
rate of accumulation of sentence credit for specific rule
violations, during imprisonment. These rules and regulations
shall provide that no inmate may be penalized more than one
year of sentence credit for any one infraction.
(2) When the Department seeks to revoke, suspend, or
reduce the rate of accumulation of any sentence credits for an
alleged infraction of its rules, it shall bring charges
therefor against the prisoner sought to be so deprived of
sentence credits before the Prisoner Review Board as provided
in subparagraph (a)(4) of Section 3-3-2 of this Code, if the
amount of credit at issue exceeds 30 days, whether from one
infraction or cumulatively from multiple infractions arising
out of a single event, or when, during any 12-month period, the
cumulative amount of credit revoked exceeds 30 days except
where the infraction is committed or discovered within 60 days
of scheduled release. In those cases, the Department of
Corrections may revoke up to 30 days of sentence credit. The
Board may subsequently approve the revocation of additional
sentence credit, if the Department seeks to revoke sentence
credit in excess of 30 days. However, the Board shall not be
empowered to review the Department's decision with respect to
the loss of 30 days of sentence credit within any calendar year
for any prisoner or to increase any penalty beyond the length
requested by the Department.
(3) The Director of Corrections or the Director of
Juvenile Justice, in appropriate cases, may restore sentence
credits which have been revoked, suspended, or reduced. The
Department shall prescribe rules and regulations governing the
restoration of sentence credits. These rules and regulations
shall provide for the automatic restoration of sentence
credits following a period in which the prisoner maintains a
record without a disciplinary violation.
Nothing contained in this Section shall prohibit the
Prisoner Review Board from ordering, pursuant to Section
3-3-9(a)(3)(i)(B), that a prisoner serve up to one year of the
sentence imposed by the court that was not served due to the
accumulation of sentence credit.
(d) If a lawsuit is filed by a prisoner in an Illinois or
federal court against the State, the Department of
Corrections, or the Prisoner Review Board, or against any of
their officers or employees, and the court makes a specific
finding that a pleading, motion, or other paper filed by the
prisoner is frivolous, the Department of Corrections shall
conduct a hearing to revoke up to 180 days of sentence credit
by bringing charges against the prisoner sought to be deprived
of the sentence credits before the Prisoner Review Board as
provided in subparagraph (a)(8) of Section 3-3-2 of this Code.
If the prisoner has not accumulated 180 days of sentence
credit at the time of the finding, then the Prisoner Review
Board may revoke all sentence credit accumulated by the
prisoner.
For purposes of this subsection (d):
(1) "Frivolous" means that a pleading, motion, or
other filing which purports to be a legal document filed
by a prisoner in his or her lawsuit meets any or all of the
following criteria:
(A) it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact;
(B) it is being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(C) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are not warranted by existing law
or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(D) the allegations and other factual contentions
do not have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; or
(E) the denials of factual contentions are not
warranted on the evidence, or if specifically so
identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of
information or belief.
(2) "Lawsuit" means a motion pursuant to Section 116-3
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, a habeas corpus
action under Article X of the Code of Civil Procedure or
under federal law (28 U.S.C. 2254), a petition for claim
under the Court of Claims Act, an action under the federal
Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983), or a second or
subsequent petition for post-conviction relief under
Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
whether filed with or without leave of court or a second or
subsequent petition for relief from judgment under Section
2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(e) Nothing in Public Act 90-592 or 90-593 affects the
validity of Public Act 89-404.
(f) Whenever the Department is to release any inmate who
has been convicted of a violation of an order of protection
under Section 12-3.4 or 12-30 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or
the Criminal Code of 2012, earlier than it otherwise would
because of a grant of sentence credit, the Department, as a
condition of release, shall require that the person, upon
release, be placed under electronic surveillance as provided
in Section 5-8A-7 of this Code.
(Source: P.A. 101-440, eff. 1-1-20; 101-652, eff. 7-1-21;
102-28, eff. 6-25-21; 102-558, eff. 8-20-21; 102-784, eff.
5-13-22; 102-1100, eff. 1-1-23; revised 12-14-22.)
(730 ILCS 5/3-8-10) (from Ch. 38, par. 1003-8-10)
Sec. 3-8-10. Intrastate Detainers. Subsection Except for
persons sentenced to death, subsection (b), (c) and (e) of
Section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 shall
also apply to persons committed to any institution or facility
or program of the Illinois Department of Corrections who have
untried complaints, charges or indictments pending in any
county of this State, and such person shall include in the
demand under subsection (b), a statement of the place of
present commitment, the term, and length of the remaining
term, the charges pending against him or her to be tried and
the county of the charges, and the demand shall be addressed to
the state's attorney of the county where he or she is charged
with a copy to the clerk of that court and a copy to the chief
administrative officer of the Department of Corrections
institution or facility to which he or she is committed. The
state's attorney shall then procure the presence of the
defendant for trial in his county by habeas corpus. Additional
time may be granted by the court for the process of bringing
and serving an order of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. In the
event that the person is not brought to trial within the
allotted time, then the charge for which he or she has
requested a speedy trial shall be dismissed. The provisions of
this Section do not apply to persons no longer committed to a
facility or program of the Illinois Department of Corrections.
A person serving a period of parole or mandatory supervised
release under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections, for the purpose of this Section, shall not be
deemed to be committed to the Department.
(Source: P.A. 96-642, eff. 8-24-09.)
(730 ILCS 5/5-1-9) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-1-9)
Sec. 5-1-9. Felony.
"Felony" means an offense for which a sentence to death or
to a term of imprisonment in a penitentiary for one year or
more is provided.
(Source: P.A. 77-2097.)
(730 ILCS 5/5-4-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-4-1)
Sec. 5-4-1. Sentencing hearing.
(a) After Except when the death penalty is sought under
hearing procedures otherwise specified, after a determination
of guilt, a hearing shall be held to impose the sentence.
However, prior to the imposition of sentence on an individual
being sentenced for an offense based upon a charge for a
violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a
similar provision of a local ordinance, the individual must
undergo a professional evaluation to determine if an alcohol
or other drug abuse problem exists and the extent of such a
problem. Programs conducting these evaluations shall be
licensed by the Department of Human Services. However, if the
individual is not a resident of Illinois, the court may, in its
discretion, accept an evaluation from a program in the state
of such individual's residence. The court shall make a
specific finding about whether the defendant is eligible for
participation in a Department impact incarceration program as
provided in Section 5-8-1.1 or 5-8-1.3, and if not, provide an
explanation as to why a sentence to impact incarceration is
not an appropriate sentence. The court may in its sentencing
order recommend a defendant for placement in a Department of
Corrections substance abuse treatment program as provided in
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of Section 3-2-2 conditioned
upon the defendant being accepted in a program by the
Department of Corrections. At the hearing the court shall:
(1) consider the evidence, if any, received upon the
trial;
(2) consider any presentence reports;
(3) consider the financial impact of incarceration
based on the financial impact statement filed with the
clerk of the court by the Department of Corrections;
(4) consider evidence and information offered by the
parties in aggravation and mitigation;
(4.5) consider substance abuse treatment, eligibility
screening, and an assessment, if any, of the defendant by
an agent designated by the State of Illinois to provide
assessment services for the Illinois courts;
(5) hear arguments as to sentencing alternatives;
(6) afford the defendant the opportunity to make a
statement in his own behalf;
(7) afford the victim of a violent crime or a
violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code,
or a similar provision of a local ordinance, the
opportunity to present an oral or written statement, as
guaranteed by Article I, Section 8.1 of the Illinois
Constitution and provided in Section 6 of the Rights of
Crime Victims and Witnesses Act. The court shall allow a
victim to make an oral statement if the victim is present
in the courtroom and requests to make an oral or written
statement. An oral or written statement includes the
victim or a representative of the victim reading the
written statement. The court may allow persons impacted by
the crime who are not victims under subsection (a) of
Section 3 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act
to present an oral or written statement. A victim and any
person making an oral statement shall not be put under
oath or subject to cross-examination. All statements
offered under this paragraph (7) shall become part of the
record of the court. In this paragraph (7), "victim of a
violent crime" means a person who is a victim of a violent
crime for which the defendant has been convicted after a
bench or jury trial or a person who is the victim of a
violent crime with which the defendant was charged and the
defendant has been convicted under a plea agreement of a
crime that is not a violent crime as defined in subsection
(c) of 3 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act;
(7.5) afford a qualified person affected by: (i) a
violation of Section 405, 405.1, 405.2, or 407 of the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act or a violation of
Section 55 or Section 65 of the Methamphetamine Control
and Community Protection Act; or (ii) a Class 4 felony
violation of Section 11-14, 11-14.3 except as described in
subdivisions (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B), 11-15, 11-17, 11-18,
11-18.1, or 11-19 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the
Criminal Code of 2012, committed by the defendant the
opportunity to make a statement concerning the impact on
the qualified person and to offer evidence in aggravation
or mitigation; provided that the statement and evidence
offered in aggravation or mitigation shall first be
prepared in writing in conjunction with the State's
Attorney before it may be presented orally at the hearing.
Sworn testimony offered by the qualified person is subject
to the defendant's right to cross-examine. All statements
and evidence offered under this paragraph (7.5) shall
become part of the record of the court. In this paragraph
(7.5), "qualified person" means any person who: (i) lived
or worked within the territorial jurisdiction where the
offense took place when the offense took place; or (ii) is
familiar with various public places within the territorial
jurisdiction where the offense took place when the offense
took place. "Qualified person" includes any peace officer
or any member of any duly organized State, county, or
municipal peace officer unit assigned to the territorial
jurisdiction where the offense took place when the offense
took place;
(8) in cases of reckless homicide afford the victim's
spouse, guardians, parents or other immediate family
members an opportunity to make oral statements;
(9) in cases involving a felony sex offense as defined
under the Sex Offender Management Board Act, consider the
results of the sex offender evaluation conducted pursuant
to Section 5-3-2 of this Act; and
(10) make a finding of whether a motor vehicle was
used in the commission of the offense for which the
defendant is being sentenced.
(b) All sentences shall be imposed by the judge based upon
his independent assessment of the elements specified above and
any agreement as to sentence reached by the parties. The judge
who presided at the trial or the judge who accepted the plea of
guilty shall impose the sentence unless he is no longer
sitting as a judge in that court. Where the judge does not
impose sentence at the same time on all defendants who are
convicted as a result of being involved in the same offense,
the defendant or the State's Attorney may advise the
sentencing court of the disposition of any other defendants
who have been sentenced.
(b-1) In imposing a sentence of imprisonment or periodic
imprisonment for a Class 3 or Class 4 felony for which a
sentence of probation or conditional discharge is an available
sentence, if the defendant has no prior sentence of probation
or conditional discharge and no prior conviction for a violent
crime, the defendant shall not be sentenced to imprisonment
before review and consideration of a presentence report and
determination and explanation of why the particular evidence,
information, factor in aggravation, factual finding, or other
reasons support a sentencing determination that one or more of
the factors under subsection (a) of Section 5-6-1 of this Code
apply and that probation or conditional discharge is not an
appropriate sentence.
(c) In imposing a sentence for a violent crime or for an
offense of operating or being in physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, any other drug or any
combination thereof, or a similar provision of a local
ordinance, when such offense resulted in the personal injury
to someone other than the defendant, the trial judge shall
specify on the record the particular evidence, information,
factors in mitigation and aggravation or other reasons that
led to his sentencing determination. The full verbatim record
of the sentencing hearing shall be filed with the clerk of the
court and shall be a public record.
(c-1) In imposing a sentence for the offense of aggravated
kidnapping for ransom, home invasion, armed robbery,
aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated discharge of a
firearm, or armed violence with a category I weapon or
category II weapon, the trial judge shall make a finding as to
whether the conduct leading to conviction for the offense
resulted in great bodily harm to a victim, and shall enter that
finding and the basis for that finding in the record.
(c-1.5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, in imposing a sentence for an offense that requires
a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment, the court may
instead sentence the offender to probation, conditional
discharge, or a lesser term of imprisonment it deems
appropriate if: (1) the offense involves the use or possession
of drugs, retail theft, or driving on a revoked license due to
unpaid financial obligations; (2) the court finds that the
defendant does not pose a risk to public safety; and (3) the
interest of justice requires imposing a term of probation,
conditional discharge, or a lesser term of imprisonment. The
court must state on the record its reasons for imposing
probation, conditional discharge, or a lesser term of
imprisonment.
(c-2) If the defendant is sentenced to prison, other than
when a sentence of natural life imprisonment or a sentence of
death is imposed, at the time the sentence is imposed the judge
shall state on the record in open court the approximate period
of time the defendant will serve in custody according to the
then current statutory rules and regulations for sentence
credit found in Section 3-6-3 and other related provisions of
this Code. This statement is intended solely to inform the
public, has no legal effect on the defendant's actual release,
and may not be relied on by the defendant on appeal.
The judge's statement, to be given after pronouncing the
sentence, other than when the sentence is imposed for one of
the offenses enumerated in paragraph (a)(4) of Section 3-6-3,
shall include the following:
"The purpose of this statement is to inform the public of
the actual period of time this defendant is likely to spend in
prison as a result of this sentence. The actual period of
prison time served is determined by the statutes of Illinois
as applied to this sentence by the Illinois Department of
Corrections and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. In this
case, assuming the defendant receives all of his or her
sentence credit, the period of estimated actual custody is ...
years and ... months, less up to 180 days additional earned
sentence credit. If the defendant, because of his or her own
misconduct or failure to comply with the institutional
regulations, does not receive those credits, the actual time
served in prison will be longer. The defendant may also
receive an additional one-half day sentence credit for each
day of participation in vocational, industry, substance abuse,
and educational programs as provided for by Illinois statute."
When the sentence is imposed for one of the offenses
enumerated in paragraph (a)(2) of Section 3-6-3, other than
first degree murder, and the offense was committed on or after
June 19, 1998, and when the sentence is imposed for reckless
homicide as defined in subsection (e) of Section 9-3 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 if the
offense was committed on or after January 1, 1999, and when the
sentence is imposed for aggravated driving under the influence
of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or
compounds, or any combination thereof as defined in
subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of Section
11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, and when the sentence is
imposed for aggravated arson if the offense was committed on
or after July 27, 2001 (the effective date of Public Act
92-176), and when the sentence is imposed for aggravated
driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs,
or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination
thereof as defined in subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) of
subsection (d) of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code
committed on or after January 1, 2011 (the effective date of
Public Act 96-1230), the judge's statement, to be given after
pronouncing the sentence, shall include the following:
"The purpose of this statement is to inform the public of
the actual period of time this defendant is likely to spend in
prison as a result of this sentence. The actual period of
prison time served is determined by the statutes of Illinois
as applied to this sentence by the Illinois Department of
Corrections and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. In this
case, the defendant is entitled to no more than 4 1/2 days of
sentence credit for each month of his or her sentence of
imprisonment. Therefore, this defendant will serve at least
85% of his or her sentence. Assuming the defendant receives 4
1/2 days credit for each month of his or her sentence, the
period of estimated actual custody is ... years and ...
months. If the defendant, because of his or her own misconduct
or failure to comply with the institutional regulations
receives lesser credit, the actual time served in prison will
be longer."
When a sentence of imprisonment is imposed for first
degree murder and the offense was committed on or after June
19, 1998, the judge's statement, to be given after pronouncing
the sentence, shall include the following:
"The purpose of this statement is to inform the public of
the actual period of time this defendant is likely to spend in
prison as a result of this sentence. The actual period of
prison time served is determined by the statutes of Illinois
as applied to this sentence by the Illinois Department of
Corrections and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. In this
case, the defendant is not entitled to sentence credit.
Therefore, this defendant will serve 100% of his or her
sentence."
When the sentencing order recommends placement in a
substance abuse program for any offense that results in
incarceration in a Department of Corrections facility and the
crime was committed on or after September 1, 2003 (the
effective date of Public Act 93-354), the judge's statement,
in addition to any other judge's statement required under this
Section, to be given after pronouncing the sentence, shall
include the following:
"The purpose of this statement is to inform the public of
the actual period of time this defendant is likely to spend in
prison as a result of this sentence. The actual period of
prison time served is determined by the statutes of Illinois
as applied to this sentence by the Illinois Department of
Corrections and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. In this
case, the defendant shall receive no earned sentence credit
under clause (3) of subsection (a) of Section 3-6-3 until he or
she participates in and completes a substance abuse treatment
program or receives a waiver from the Director of Corrections
pursuant to clause (4.5) of subsection (a) of Section 3-6-3."
(c-4) Before the sentencing hearing and as part of the
presentence investigation under Section 5-3-1, the court shall
inquire of the defendant whether the defendant is currently
serving in or is a veteran of the Armed Forces of the United
States. If the defendant is currently serving in the Armed
Forces of the United States or is a veteran of the Armed Forces
of the United States and has been diagnosed as having a mental
illness by a qualified psychiatrist or clinical psychologist
or physician, the court may:
(1) order that the officer preparing the presentence
report consult with the United States Department of
Veterans Affairs, Illinois Department of Veterans'
Affairs, or another agency or person with suitable
knowledge or experience for the purpose of providing the
court with information regarding treatment options
available to the defendant, including federal, State, and
local programming; and
(2) consider the treatment recommendations of any
diagnosing or treating mental health professionals
together with the treatment options available to the
defendant in imposing sentence.
For the purposes of this subsection (c-4), "qualified
psychiatrist" means a reputable physician licensed in Illinois
to practice medicine in all its branches, who has specialized
in the diagnosis and treatment of mental and nervous disorders
for a period of not less than 5 years.
(c-6) In imposing a sentence, the trial judge shall
specify, on the record, the particular evidence and other
reasons which led to his or her determination that a motor
vehicle was used in the commission of the offense.
(c-7) In imposing a sentence for a Class 3 or 4 felony,
other than a violent crime as defined in Section 3 of the
Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, the court shall
determine and indicate in the sentencing order whether the
defendant has 4 or more or fewer than 4 months remaining on his
or her sentence accounting for time served.
(d) When the defendant is committed to the Department of
Corrections, the State's Attorney shall and counsel for the
defendant may file a statement with the clerk of the court to
be transmitted to the department, agency or institution to
which the defendant is committed to furnish such department,
agency or institution with the facts and circumstances of the
offense for which the person was committed together with all
other factual information accessible to them in regard to the
person prior to his commitment relative to his habits,
associates, disposition and reputation and any other facts and
circumstances which may aid such department, agency or
institution during its custody of such person. The clerk shall
within 10 days after receiving any such statements transmit a
copy to such department, agency or institution and a copy to
the other party, provided, however, that this shall not be
cause for delay in conveying the person to the department,
agency or institution to which he has been committed.
(e) The clerk of the court shall transmit to the
department, agency or institution, if any, to which the
defendant is committed, the following:
(1) the sentence imposed;
(2) any statement by the court of the basis for
imposing the sentence;
(3) any presentence reports;
(3.5) any sex offender evaluations;
(3.6) any substance abuse treatment eligibility
screening and assessment of the defendant by an agent
designated by the State of Illinois to provide assessment
services for the Illinois courts;
(4) the number of days, if any, which the defendant
has been in custody and for which he is entitled to credit
against the sentence, which information shall be provided
to the clerk by the sheriff;
(4.1) any finding of great bodily harm made by the
court with respect to an offense enumerated in subsection
(c-1);
(5) all statements filed under subsection (d) of this
Section;
(6) any medical or mental health records or summaries
of the defendant;
(7) the municipality where the arrest of the offender
or the commission of the offense has occurred, where such
municipality has a population of more than 25,000 persons;
(8) all statements made and evidence offered under
paragraph (7) of subsection (a) of this Section; and
(9) all additional matters which the court directs the
clerk to transmit.
(f) In cases in which the court finds that a motor vehicle
was used in the commission of the offense for which the
defendant is being sentenced, the clerk of the court shall,
within 5 days thereafter, forward a report of such conviction
to the Secretary of State.
(Source: P.A. 101-81, eff. 7-12-19; 101-105, eff. 1-1-20;
101-652, Article 10, Section 10-281, eff. 7-1-21; 101-652,
Article 20, Section 20-5, eff. 7-1-21; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22.)
(730 ILCS 5/5-4-3) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-4-3)
Sec. 5-4-3. Specimens; genetic marker groups.
(a) Any person convicted of, found guilty under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for, or who received a disposition
of court supervision for, a qualifying offense or attempt of a
qualifying offense, convicted or found guilty of any offense
classified as a felony under Illinois law, convicted or found
guilty of any offense requiring registration under the Sex
Offender Registration Act, found guilty or given supervision
for any offense classified as a felony under the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987, convicted or found guilty of, under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987, any offense requiring registration
under the Sex Offender Registration Act, or institutionalized
as a sexually dangerous person under the Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act, or committed as a sexually violent person under
the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act shall, regardless
of the sentence or disposition imposed, be required to submit
specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to the Illinois State
Police in accordance with the provisions of this Section,
provided such person is:
(1) convicted of a qualifying offense or attempt of a
qualifying offense on or after July 1, 1990 and sentenced
to a term of imprisonment, periodic imprisonment, fine,
probation, conditional discharge or any other form of
sentence, or given a disposition of court supervision for
the offense;
(1.5) found guilty or given supervision under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for a qualifying offense or
attempt of a qualifying offense on or after January 1,
1997;
(2) ordered institutionalized as a sexually dangerous
person on or after July 1, 1990;
(3) convicted of a qualifying offense or attempt of a
qualifying offense before July 1, 1990 and is presently
confined as a result of such conviction in any State
correctional facility or county jail or is presently
serving a sentence of probation, conditional discharge or
periodic imprisonment as a result of such conviction;
(3.5) convicted or found guilty of any offense
classified as a felony under Illinois law or found guilty
or given supervision for such an offense under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 on or after August 22, 2002;
(4) presently institutionalized as a sexually
dangerous person or presently institutionalized as a
person found guilty but mentally ill of a sexual offense
or attempt to commit a sexual offense; or
(4.5) ordered committed as a sexually violent person
on or after the effective date of the Sexually Violent
Persons Commitment Act.
(a-1) Any person incarcerated in a facility of the
Illinois Department of Corrections or the Illinois Department
of Juvenile Justice on or after August 22, 2002, whether for a
term of years or , natural life, or a sentence of death, who
has not yet submitted a specimen of blood, saliva, or tissue
shall be required to submit a specimen of blood, saliva, or
tissue prior to his or her final discharge, or release on
parole, aftercare release, or mandatory supervised release, as
a condition of his or her parole, aftercare release, or
mandatory supervised release, or within 6 months from August
13, 2009 (the effective date of Public Act 96-426), whichever
is sooner. A person incarcerated on or after August 13, 2009
(the effective date of Public Act 96-426) shall be required to
submit a specimen within 45 days of incarceration, or prior to
his or her final discharge, or release on parole, aftercare
release, or mandatory supervised release, as a condition of
his or her parole, aftercare release, or mandatory supervised
release, whichever is sooner. These specimens shall be placed
into the State or national DNA database, to be used in
accordance with other provisions of this Section, by the
Illinois State Police.
(a-2) Any person sentenced to life imprisonment in a
facility of the Illinois Department of Corrections after the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 94th General
Assembly or sentenced to death after the effective date of
this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly shall be
required to provide a specimen of blood, saliva, or tissue
within 45 days after sentencing or disposition at a collection
site designated by the Illinois State Police. Any person
serving a sentence of life imprisonment in a facility of the
Illinois Department of Corrections on the effective date of
this amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly or any person
who is under a sentence of death on the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 94th General Assembly shall be required
to provide a specimen of blood, saliva, or tissue upon request
at a collection site designated by the Illinois State Police.
(a-3) Any person seeking transfer to or residency in
Illinois under Sections 3-3-11.05 through 3-3-11.5 of this
Code, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision,
or the Interstate Agreements on Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
shall be required to provide a specimen of blood, saliva, or
tissue within 45 days after transfer to or residency in
Illinois at a collection site designated by the Illinois State
Police.
(a-3.1) Any person required by an order of the court to
submit a DNA specimen shall be required to provide a specimen
of blood, saliva, or tissue within 45 days after the court
order at a collection site designated by the Illinois State
Police.
(a-3.2) On or after January 1, 2012 (the effective date of
Public Act 97-383), any person arrested for any of the
following offenses, after an indictment has been returned by a
grand jury, or following a hearing pursuant to Section 109-3
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and a judge finds
there is probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed
one of the designated offenses, or an arrestee has waived a
preliminary hearing shall be required to provide a specimen of
blood, saliva, or tissue within 14 days after such indictment
or hearing at a collection site designated by the Illinois
State Police:
(A) first degree murder;
(B) home invasion;
(C) predatory criminal sexual assault of a child;
(D) aggravated criminal sexual assault; or
(E) criminal sexual assault.
(a-3.3) Any person required to register as a sex offender
under the Sex Offender Registration Act, regardless of the
date of conviction as set forth in subsection (c-5.2) shall be
required to provide a specimen of blood, saliva, or tissue
within the time period prescribed in subsection (c-5.2) at a
collection site designated by the Illinois State Police.
(a-5) Any person who was otherwise convicted of or
received a disposition of court supervision for any other
offense under the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of
2012 or who was found guilty or given supervision for such a
violation under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, may,
regardless of the sentence imposed, be required by an order of
the court to submit specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to
the Illinois State Police in accordance with the provisions of
this Section.
(b) Any person required by paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(1.5),
(a)(2), (a)(3.5), and (a-5) to provide specimens of blood,
saliva, or tissue shall provide specimens of blood, saliva, or
tissue within 45 days after sentencing or disposition at a
collection site designated by the Illinois State Police.
(c) Any person required by paragraphs (a)(3), (a)(4), and
(a)(4.5) to provide specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue
shall be required to provide such specimens prior to final
discharge or within 6 months from August 13, 2009 (the
effective date of Public Act 96-426), whichever is sooner.
These specimens shall be placed into the State or national DNA
database, to be used in accordance with other provisions of
this Act, by the Illinois State Police.
(c-5) Any person required by paragraph (a-3) to provide
specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue shall, where feasible,
be required to provide the specimens before being accepted for
conditioned residency in Illinois under the interstate compact
or agreement, but no later than 45 days after arrival in this
State.
(c-5.2) Unless it is determined that a registered sex
offender has previously submitted a specimen of blood, saliva,
or tissue that has been placed into the State DNA database, a
person registering as a sex offender shall be required to
submit a specimen at the time of his or her initial
registration pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act or,
for a person registered as a sex offender on or prior to
January 1, 2012 (the effective date of Public Act 97-383),
within one year of January 1, 2012 (the effective date of
Public Act 97-383) or at the time of his or her next required
registration.
(c-6) The Illinois State Police may determine which type
of specimen or specimens, blood, saliva, or tissue, is
acceptable for submission to the Division of Forensic Services
for analysis. The Illinois State Police may require the
submission of fingerprints from anyone required to give a
specimen under this Act.
(d) The Illinois State Police shall provide all equipment
and instructions necessary for the collection of blood
specimens. The collection of specimens shall be performed in a
medically approved manner. Only a physician authorized to
practice medicine, a registered nurse or other qualified
person trained in venipuncture may withdraw blood for the
purposes of this Act. The specimens shall thereafter be
forwarded to the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic
Services, for analysis and categorizing into genetic marker
groupings.
(d-1) The Illinois State Police shall provide all
equipment and instructions necessary for the collection of
saliva specimens. The collection of saliva specimens shall be
performed in a medically approved manner. Only a person
trained in the instructions promulgated by the Illinois State
Police on collecting saliva may collect saliva for the
purposes of this Section. The specimens shall thereafter be
forwarded to the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic
Services, for analysis and categorizing into genetic marker
groupings.
(d-2) The Illinois State Police shall provide all
equipment and instructions necessary for the collection of
tissue specimens. The collection of tissue specimens shall be
performed in a medically approved manner. Only a person
trained in the instructions promulgated by the Illinois State
Police on collecting tissue may collect tissue for the
purposes of this Section. The specimens shall thereafter be
forwarded to the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic
Services, for analysis and categorizing into genetic marker
groupings.
(d-5) To the extent that funds are available, the Illinois
State Police shall contract with qualified personnel and
certified laboratories for the collection, analysis, and
categorization of known specimens, except as provided in
subsection (n) of this Section.
(d-6) Agencies designated by the Illinois State Police and
the Illinois State Police may contract with third parties to
provide for the collection or analysis of DNA, or both, of an
offender's blood, saliva, and tissue specimens, except as
provided in subsection (n) of this Section.
(e) The genetic marker groupings shall be maintained by
the Illinois State Police, Division of Forensic Services.
(f) The genetic marker grouping analysis information
obtained pursuant to this Act shall be confidential and shall
be released only to peace officers of the United States, of
other states or territories, of the insular possessions of the
United States, of foreign countries duly authorized to receive
the same, to all peace officers of the State of Illinois and to
all prosecutorial agencies, and to defense counsel as provided
by Section 116-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. The
genetic marker grouping analysis information obtained pursuant
to this Act shall be used only for (i) valid law enforcement
identification purposes and as required by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation for participation in the National DNA
database, (ii) technology validation purposes, (iii) a
population statistics database, (iv) quality assurance
purposes if personally identifying information is removed, (v)
assisting in the defense of the criminally accused pursuant to
Section 116-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, or
(vi) identifying and assisting in the prosecution of a person
who is suspected of committing a sexual assault as defined in
Section 1a of the Sexual Assault Survivors Emergency Treatment
Act. Notwithstanding any other statutory provision to the
contrary, all information obtained under this Section shall be
maintained in a single State data base, which may be uploaded
into a national database, and which information may be subject
to expungement only as set forth in subsection (f-1).
(f-1) Upon receipt of notification of a reversal of a
conviction based on actual innocence, or of the granting of a
pardon pursuant to Section 12 of Article V of the Illinois
Constitution, if that pardon document specifically states that
the reason for the pardon is the actual innocence of an
individual whose DNA record has been stored in the State or
national DNA identification index in accordance with this
Section by the Illinois State Police, the DNA record shall be
expunged from the DNA identification index, and the Department
shall by rule prescribe procedures to ensure that the record
and any specimens, analyses, or other documents relating to
such record, whether in the possession of the Department or
any law enforcement or police agency, or any forensic DNA
laboratory, including any duplicates or copies thereof, are
destroyed and a letter is sent to the court verifying the
expungement is completed. For specimens required to be
collected prior to conviction, unless the individual has other
charges or convictions that require submission of a specimen,
the DNA record for an individual shall be expunged from the DNA
identification databases and the specimen destroyed upon
receipt of a certified copy of a final court order for each
charge against an individual in which the charge has been
dismissed, resulted in acquittal, or that the charge was not
filed within the applicable time period. The Department shall
by rule prescribe procedures to ensure that the record and any
specimens in the possession or control of the Department are
destroyed and a letter is sent to the court verifying the
expungement is completed.
(f-5) Any person who intentionally uses genetic marker
grouping analysis information, or any other information
derived from a DNA specimen, beyond the authorized uses as
provided under this Section, or any other Illinois law, is
guilty of a Class 4 felony, and shall be subject to a fine of
not less than $5,000.
(f-6) The Illinois State Police may contract with third
parties for the purposes of implementing this amendatory Act
of the 93rd General Assembly, except as provided in subsection
(n) of this Section. Any other party contracting to carry out
the functions of this Section shall be subject to the same
restrictions and requirements of this Section insofar as
applicable, as the Illinois State Police, and to any
additional restrictions imposed by the Illinois State Police.
(g) For the purposes of this Section, "qualifying offense"
means any of the following:
(1) any violation or inchoate violation of Section
11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-6, 11-9.1, 11-11, 11-18.1, 12-15, or
12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of
2012;
(1.1) any violation or inchoate violation of Section
9-1, 9-2, 10-1, 10-2, 12-11, 12-11.1, 18-1, 18-2, 18-3,
18-4, 18-6, 19-1, 19-2, or 19-6 of the Criminal Code of
1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 for which persons are
convicted on or after July 1, 2001;
(2) any former statute of this State which defined a
felony sexual offense;
(3) (blank);
(4) any inchoate violation of Section 9-3.1, 9-3.4,
11-9.3, 12-7.3, or 12-7.4 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or
the Criminal Code of 2012; or
(5) any violation or inchoate violation of Article 29D
of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.
(g-5) (Blank).
(h) The Illinois State Police shall be the State central
repository for all genetic marker grouping analysis
information obtained pursuant to this Act. The Illinois State
Police may promulgate rules for the form and manner of the
collection of blood, saliva, or tissue specimens and other
procedures for the operation of this Act. The provisions of
the Administrative Review Law shall apply to all actions taken
under the rules so promulgated.
(i)(1) A person required to provide a blood, saliva, or
tissue specimen shall cooperate with the collection of the
specimen and any deliberate act by that person intended to
impede, delay or stop the collection of the blood, saliva, or
tissue specimen is a Class 4 felony.
(2) In the event that a person's DNA specimen is not
adequate for any reason, the person shall provide another DNA
specimen for analysis. Duly authorized law enforcement and
corrections personnel may employ reasonable force in cases in
which an individual refuses to provide a DNA specimen required
under this Act.
(j) (Blank).
(k) All analysis and categorization assessments provided
under the Criminal and Traffic Assessments Act to the State
Crime Laboratory Fund shall be regulated as follows:
(1) (Blank).
(2) (Blank).
(3) Moneys deposited into the State Crime Laboratory
Fund shall be used by Illinois State Police crime
laboratories as designated by the Director of the Illinois
State Police. These funds shall be in addition to any
allocations made pursuant to existing laws and shall be
designated for the exclusive use of State crime
laboratories. These uses may include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(A) Costs incurred in providing analysis and
genetic marker categorization as required by
subsection (d).
(B) Costs incurred in maintaining genetic marker
groupings as required by subsection (e).
(C) Costs incurred in the purchase and maintenance
of equipment for use in performing analyses.
(D) Costs incurred in continuing research and
development of new techniques for analysis and genetic
marker categorization.
(E) Costs incurred in continuing education,
training, and professional development of forensic
scientists regularly employed by these laboratories.
(l) The failure of a person to provide a specimen, or of
any person or agency to collect a specimen, shall in no way
alter the obligation of the person to submit such specimen, or
the authority of the Illinois State Police or persons
designated by the Illinois State Police to collect the
specimen, or the authority of the Illinois State Police to
accept, analyze and maintain the specimen or to maintain or
upload results of genetic marker grouping analysis information
into a State or national database.
(m) If any provision of this amendatory Act of the 93rd
General Assembly is held unconstitutional or otherwise
invalid, the remainder of this amendatory Act of the 93rd
General Assembly is not affected.
(n) Neither the Illinois State Police, the Division of
Forensic Services, nor any laboratory of the Division of
Forensic Services may contract out forensic testing for the
purpose of an active investigation or a matter pending before
a court of competent jurisdiction without the written consent
of the prosecuting agency. For the purposes of this subsection
(n), "forensic testing" includes the analysis of physical
evidence in an investigation or other proceeding for the
prosecution of a violation of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the
Criminal Code of 2012 or for matters adjudicated under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987, and includes the use of forensic
databases and databanks, including DNA, firearm, and
fingerprint databases, and expert testimony.
(o) Mistake does not invalidate a database match. The
detention, arrest, or conviction of a person based upon a
database match or database information is not invalidated if
it is determined that the specimen was obtained or placed in
the database by mistake.
(p) This Section may be referred to as the Illinois DNA
Database Law of 2011.
(Source: P.A. 102-505, eff. 8-20-21; 102-538, eff. 8-20-21.)
(730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20)
Sec. 5-4.5-20. FIRST DEGREE MURDER; SENTENCE. For first
degree murder:
(a) TERM. The defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment
or, if appropriate, death under Section 9-1 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/9-1).
Imprisonment shall be for a determinate term, subject to
Section 5-4.5-115 of this Code, of (1) not less than 20 years
and not more than 60 years; (2) not less than 60 years and not
more than 100 years when an extended term is imposed under
Section 5-8-2 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2); or (3) natural life as
provided in Section 5-8-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1).
(b) PERIODIC IMPRISONMENT. A term of periodic imprisonment
shall not be imposed.
(c) IMPACT INCARCERATION. The impact incarceration program
or the county impact incarceration program is not an
authorized disposition.
(d) PROBATION; CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE. A period of
probation or conditional discharge shall not be imposed.
(e) FINE. Fines may be imposed as provided in Section
5-4.5-50(b) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(b)).
(f) RESTITUTION. See Section 5-5-6 (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6)
concerning restitution.
(g) CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE. The sentence shall
be concurrent or consecutive as provided in Section 5-8-4 (730
ILCS 5/5-8-4) and Section 5-4.5-50 (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50).
(h) DRUG COURT. Drug court is not an authorized
disposition.
(i) CREDIT FOR HOME DETENTION. See Section 5-4.5-100 (730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-100) concerning no credit for time spent in home
detention prior to judgment.
(j) SENTENCE CREDIT. See Section 3-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3)
for rules and regulations for sentence credit.
(k) ELECTRONIC MONITORING AND HOME DETENTION. Electronic
monitoring and home detention are not authorized dispositions,
except in limited circumstances as provided in Section 5-8A-3
(730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3).
(l) PAROLE; MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE. Except as
provided in Section 3-3-8 (730 ILCS 5/3-3-8), the parole or
mandatory supervised release term shall be 3 years upon
release from imprisonment.
(Source: P.A. 100-431, eff. 8-25-17; 100-1182, eff. 6-1-19;
101-288, eff. 1-1-20.)
(730 ILCS 5/5-5-3)
Sec. 5-5-3. Disposition.
(a) (Blank).
(b) (Blank).
(c) (1) (Blank).
(2) A period of probation, a term of periodic imprisonment
or conditional discharge shall not be imposed for the
following offenses. The court shall sentence the offender to
not less than the minimum term of imprisonment set forth in
this Code for the following offenses, and may order a fine or
restitution or both in conjunction with such term of
imprisonment:
(A) First degree murder where the death penalty is not
imposed.
(B) Attempted first degree murder.
(C) A Class X felony.
(D) A violation of Section 401.1 or 407 of the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or a violation of
subdivision (c)(1.5) of Section 401 of that Act which
relates to more than 5 grams of a substance containing
fentanyl or an analog thereof.
(D-5) A violation of subdivision (c)(1) of Section 401
of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act which relates to
3 or more grams of a substance containing heroin or an
analog thereof.
(E) (Blank).
(F) A Class 1 or greater felony if the offender had
been convicted of a Class 1 or greater felony, including
any state or federal conviction for an offense that
contained, at the time it was committed, the same elements
as an offense now (the date of the offense committed after
the prior Class 1 or greater felony) classified as a Class
1 or greater felony, within 10 years of the date on which
the offender committed the offense for which he or she is
being sentenced, except as otherwise provided in Section
40-10 of the Substance Use Disorder Act.
(F-3) A Class 2 or greater felony sex offense or
felony firearm offense if the offender had been convicted
of a Class 2 or greater felony, including any state or
federal conviction for an offense that contained, at the
time it was committed, the same elements as an offense now
(the date of the offense committed after the prior Class 2
or greater felony) classified as a Class 2 or greater
felony, within 10 years of the date on which the offender
committed the offense for which he or she is being
sentenced, except as otherwise provided in Section 40-10
of the Substance Use Disorder Act.
(F-5) A violation of Section 24-1, 24-1.1, or 24-1.6
of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012
for which imprisonment is prescribed in those Sections.
(G) Residential burglary, except as otherwise provided
in Section 40-10 of the Substance Use Disorder Act.
(H) Criminal sexual assault.
(I) Aggravated battery of a senior citizen as
described in Section 12-4.6 or subdivision (a)(4) of
Section 12-3.05 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the
Criminal Code of 2012.
(J) A forcible felony if the offense was related to
the activities of an organized gang.
Before July 1, 1994, for the purposes of this
paragraph, "organized gang" means an association of 5 or
more persons, with an established hierarchy, that
encourages members of the association to perpetrate crimes
or provides support to the members of the association who
do commit crimes.
Beginning July 1, 1994, for the purposes of this
paragraph, "organized gang" has the meaning ascribed to it
in Section 10 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus
Prevention Act.
(K) Vehicular hijacking.
(L) A second or subsequent conviction for the offense
of hate crime when the underlying offense upon which the
hate crime is based is felony aggravated assault or felony
mob action.
(M) A second or subsequent conviction for the offense
of institutional vandalism if the damage to the property
exceeds $300.
(N) A Class 3 felony violation of paragraph (1) of
subsection (a) of Section 2 of the Firearm Owners
Identification Card Act.
(O) A violation of Section 12-6.1 or 12-6.5 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.
(P) A violation of paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
or (7) of subsection (a) of Section 11-20.1 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.
(P-5) A violation of paragraph (6) of subsection (a)
of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the
Criminal Code of 2012 if the victim is a household or
family member of the defendant.
(Q) A violation of subsection (b) or (b-5) of Section
20-1, Section 20-1.2, or Section 20-1.3 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.
(R) A violation of Section 24-3A of the Criminal Code
of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.
(S) (Blank).
(T) (Blank).
(U) A second or subsequent violation of Section 6-303
of the Illinois Vehicle Code committed while his or her
driver's license, permit, or privilege was revoked because
of a violation of Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961
or the Criminal Code of 2012, relating to the offense of
reckless homicide, or a similar provision of a law of
another state.
(V) A violation of paragraph (4) of subsection (c) of
Section 11-20.1B or paragraph (4) of subsection (c) of
Section 11-20.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, or paragraph
(6) of subsection (a) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal
Code of 2012 when the victim is under 13 years of age and
the defendant has previously been convicted under the laws
of this State or any other state of the offense of child
pornography, aggravated child pornography, aggravated
criminal sexual abuse, aggravated criminal sexual assault,
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or any of
the offenses formerly known as rape, deviate sexual
assault, indecent liberties with a child, or aggravated
indecent liberties with a child where the victim was under
the age of 18 years or an offense that is substantially
equivalent to those offenses.
(W) A violation of Section 24-3.5 of the Criminal Code
of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.
(X) A violation of subsection (a) of Section 31-1a of
the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.
(Y) A conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm
by a street gang member when the firearm was loaded or
contained firearm ammunition.
(Z) A Class 1 felony committed while he or she was
serving a term of probation or conditional discharge for a
felony.
(AA) Theft of property exceeding $500,000 and not
exceeding $1,000,000 in value.
(BB) Laundering of criminally derived property of a
value exceeding $500,000.
(CC) Knowingly selling, offering for sale, holding for
sale, or using 2,000 or more counterfeit items or
counterfeit items having a retail value in the aggregate
of $500,000 or more.
(DD) A conviction for aggravated assault under
paragraph (6) of subsection (c) of Section 12-2 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 if the
firearm is aimed toward the person against whom the
firearm is being used.
(EE) A conviction for a violation of paragraph (2) of
subsection (a) of Section 24-3B of the Criminal Code of
2012.
(3) (Blank).
(4) A minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 10
consecutive days or 30 days of community service shall be
imposed for a violation of paragraph (c) of Section 6-303 of
the Illinois Vehicle Code.
(4.1) (Blank).
(4.2) Except as provided in paragraphs (4.3) and (4.8) of
this subsection (c), a minimum of 100 hours of community
service shall be imposed for a second violation of Section
6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
(4.3) A minimum term of imprisonment of 30 days or 300
hours of community service, as determined by the court, shall
be imposed for a second violation of subsection (c) of Section
6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
(4.4) Except as provided in paragraphs (4.5), (4.6), and
(4.9) of this subsection (c), a minimum term of imprisonment
of 30 days or 300 hours of community service, as determined by
the court, shall be imposed for a third or subsequent
violation of Section 6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. The
court may give credit toward the fulfillment of community
service hours for participation in activities and treatment as
determined by court services.
(4.5) A minimum term of imprisonment of 30 days shall be
imposed for a third violation of subsection (c) of Section
6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
(4.6) Except as provided in paragraph (4.10) of this
subsection (c), a minimum term of imprisonment of 180 days
shall be imposed for a fourth or subsequent violation of
subsection (c) of Section 6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
(4.7) A minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 30
consecutive days, or 300 hours of community service, shall be
imposed for a violation of subsection (a-5) of Section 6-303
of the Illinois Vehicle Code, as provided in subsection (b-5)
of that Section.
(4.8) A mandatory prison sentence shall be imposed for a
second violation of subsection (a-5) of Section 6-303 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code, as provided in subsection (c-5) of that
Section. The person's driving privileges shall be revoked for
a period of not less than 5 years from the date of his or her
release from prison.
(4.9) A mandatory prison sentence of not less than 4 and
not more than 15 years shall be imposed for a third violation
of subsection (a-5) of Section 6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle
Code, as provided in subsection (d-2.5) of that Section. The
person's driving privileges shall be revoked for the remainder
of his or her life.
(4.10) A mandatory prison sentence for a Class 1 felony
shall be imposed, and the person shall be eligible for an
extended term sentence, for a fourth or subsequent violation
of subsection (a-5) of Section 6-303 of the Illinois Vehicle
Code, as provided in subsection (d-3.5) of that Section. The
person's driving privileges shall be revoked for the remainder
of his or her life.
(5) The court may sentence a corporation or unincorporated
association convicted of any offense to:
(A) a period of conditional discharge;
(B) a fine;
(C) make restitution to the victim under Section 5-5-6
of this Code.
(5.1) In addition to any other penalties imposed, and
except as provided in paragraph (5.2) or (5.3), a person
convicted of violating subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code shall have his or her driver's license,
permit, or privileges suspended for at least 90 days but not
more than one year, if the violation resulted in damage to the
property of another person.
(5.2) In addition to any other penalties imposed, and
except as provided in paragraph (5.3), a person convicted of
violating subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of the Illinois
Vehicle Code shall have his or her driver's license, permit,
or privileges suspended for at least 180 days but not more than
2 years, if the violation resulted in injury to another
person.
(5.3) In addition to any other penalties imposed, a person
convicted of violating subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code shall have his or her driver's license,
permit, or privileges suspended for 2 years, if the violation
resulted in the death of another person.
(5.4) In addition to any other penalties imposed, a person
convicted of violating Section 3-707 of the Illinois Vehicle
Code shall have his or her driver's license, permit, or
privileges suspended for 3 months and until he or she has paid
a reinstatement fee of $100.
(5.5) In addition to any other penalties imposed, a person
convicted of violating Section 3-707 of the Illinois Vehicle
Code during a period in which his or her driver's license,
permit, or privileges were suspended for a previous violation
of that Section shall have his or her driver's license,
permit, or privileges suspended for an additional 6 months
after the expiration of the original 3-month suspension and
until he or she has paid a reinstatement fee of $100.
(6) (Blank).
(7) (Blank).
(8) (Blank).
(9) A defendant convicted of a second or subsequent
offense of ritualized abuse of a child may be sentenced to a
term of natural life imprisonment.
(10) (Blank).
(11) The court shall impose a minimum fine of $1,000 for a
first offense and $2,000 for a second or subsequent offense
upon a person convicted of or placed on supervision for
battery when the individual harmed was a sports official or
coach at any level of competition and the act causing harm to
the sports official or coach occurred within an athletic
facility or within the immediate vicinity of the athletic
facility at which the sports official or coach was an active
participant of the athletic contest held at the athletic
facility. For the purposes of this paragraph (11), "sports
official" means a person at an athletic contest who enforces
the rules of the contest, such as an umpire or referee;
"athletic facility" means an indoor or outdoor playing field
or recreational area where sports activities are conducted;
and "coach" means a person recognized as a coach by the
sanctioning authority that conducted the sporting event.
(12) A person may not receive a disposition of court
supervision for a violation of Section 5-16 of the Boat
Registration and Safety Act if that person has previously
received a disposition of court supervision for a violation of
that Section.
(13) A person convicted of or placed on court supervision
for an assault or aggravated assault when the victim and the
offender are family or household members as defined in Section
103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 or convicted
of domestic battery or aggravated domestic battery may be
required to attend a Partner Abuse Intervention Program under
protocols set forth by the Illinois Department of Human
Services under such terms and conditions imposed by the court.
The costs of such classes shall be paid by the offender.
(d) In any case in which a sentence originally imposed is
vacated, the case shall be remanded to the trial court. The
trial court shall hold a hearing under Section 5-4-1 of this
Code which may include evidence of the defendant's life, moral
character and occupation during the time since the original
sentence was passed. The trial court shall then impose
sentence upon the defendant. The trial court may impose any
sentence which could have been imposed at the original trial
subject to Section 5-5-4 of this Code. If a sentence is vacated
on appeal or on collateral attack due to the failure of the
trier of fact at trial to determine beyond a reasonable doubt
the existence of a fact (other than a prior conviction)
necessary to increase the punishment for the offense beyond
the statutory maximum otherwise applicable, either the
defendant may be re-sentenced to a term within the range
otherwise provided or, if the State files notice of its
intention to again seek the extended sentence, the defendant
shall be afforded a new trial.
(e) In cases where prosecution for aggravated criminal
sexual abuse under Section 11-1.60 or 12-16 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 results in conviction
of a defendant who was a family member of the victim at the
time of the commission of the offense, the court shall
consider the safety and welfare of the victim and may impose a
sentence of probation only where:
(1) the court finds (A) or (B) or both are
appropriate:
(A) the defendant is willing to undergo a court
approved counseling program for a minimum duration of
2 years; or
(B) the defendant is willing to participate in a
court approved plan, including, but not limited to,
the defendant's:
(i) removal from the household;
(ii) restricted contact with the victim;
(iii) continued financial support of the
family;
(iv) restitution for harm done to the victim;
and
(v) compliance with any other measures that
the court may deem appropriate; and
(2) the court orders the defendant to pay for the
victim's counseling services, to the extent that the court
finds, after considering the defendant's income and
assets, that the defendant is financially capable of
paying for such services, if the victim was under 18 years
of age at the time the offense was committed and requires
counseling as a result of the offense.
Probation may be revoked or modified pursuant to Section
5-6-4; except where the court determines at the hearing that
the defendant violated a condition of his or her probation
restricting contact with the victim or other family members or
commits another offense with the victim or other family
members, the court shall revoke the defendant's probation and
impose a term of imprisonment.
For the purposes of this Section, "family member" and
"victim" shall have the meanings ascribed to them in Section
11-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
(f) (Blank).
(g) Whenever a defendant is convicted of an offense under
Sections 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-14,
11-14.3, 11-14.4 except for an offense that involves keeping a
place of juvenile prostitution, 11-15, 11-15.1, 11-16, 11-17,
11-18, 11-18.1, 11-19, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 12-13, 12-14,
12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the
Criminal Code of 2012, the defendant shall undergo medical
testing to determine whether the defendant has any sexually
transmissible disease, including a test for infection with
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or any other identified
causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).
Any such medical test shall be performed only by appropriately
licensed medical practitioners and may include an analysis of
any bodily fluids as well as an examination of the defendant's
person. Except as otherwise provided by law, the results of
such test shall be kept strictly confidential by all medical
personnel involved in the testing and must be personally
delivered in a sealed envelope to the judge of the court in
which the conviction was entered for the judge's inspection in
camera. Acting in accordance with the best interests of the
victim and the public, the judge shall have the discretion to
determine to whom, if anyone, the results of the testing may be
revealed. The court shall notify the defendant of the test
results. The court shall also notify the victim if requested
by the victim, and if the victim is under the age of 15 and if
requested by the victim's parents or legal guardian, the court
shall notify the victim's parents or legal guardian of the
test results. The court shall provide information on the
availability of HIV testing and counseling at Department of
Public Health facilities to all parties to whom the results of
the testing are revealed and shall direct the State's Attorney
to provide the information to the victim when possible. The
court shall order that the cost of any such test shall be paid
by the county and may be taxed as costs against the convicted
defendant.
(g-5) When an inmate is tested for an airborne
communicable disease, as determined by the Illinois Department
of Public Health, including, but not limited to, tuberculosis,
the results of the test shall be personally delivered by the
warden or his or her designee in a sealed envelope to the judge
of the court in which the inmate must appear for the judge's
inspection in camera if requested by the judge. Acting in
accordance with the best interests of those in the courtroom,
the judge shall have the discretion to determine what if any
precautions need to be taken to prevent transmission of the
disease in the courtroom.
(h) Whenever a defendant is convicted of an offense under
Section 1 or 2 of the Hypodermic Syringes and Needles Act, the
defendant shall undergo medical testing to determine whether
the defendant has been exposed to human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) or any other identified causative agent of acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Except as otherwise provided
by law, the results of such test shall be kept strictly
confidential by all medical personnel involved in the testing
and must be personally delivered in a sealed envelope to the
judge of the court in which the conviction was entered for the
judge's inspection in camera. Acting in accordance with the
best interests of the public, the judge shall have the
discretion to determine to whom, if anyone, the results of the
testing may be revealed. The court shall notify the defendant
of a positive test showing an infection with the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The court shall provide
information on the availability of HIV testing and counseling
at Department of Public Health facilities to all parties to
whom the results of the testing are revealed and shall direct
the State's Attorney to provide the information to the victim
when possible. The court shall order that the cost of any such
test shall be paid by the county and may be taxed as costs
against the convicted defendant.
(i) All fines and penalties imposed under this Section for
any violation of Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Illinois
Vehicle Code, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, and
any violation of the Child Passenger Protection Act, or a
similar provision of a local ordinance, shall be collected and
disbursed by the circuit clerk as provided under the Criminal
and Traffic Assessment Act.
(j) In cases when prosecution for any violation of Section
11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 11-6, 11-8, 11-9,
11-11, 11-14, 11-14.3, 11-14.4, 11-15, 11-15.1, 11-16, 11-17,
11-17.1, 11-18, 11-18.1, 11-19, 11-19.1, 11-19.2, 11-20.1,
11-20.1B, 11-20.3, 11-21, 11-30, 11-40, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1,
12-15, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal
Code of 2012, any violation of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act, any violation of the Cannabis Control Act, or
any violation of the Methamphetamine Control and Community
Protection Act results in conviction, a disposition of court
supervision, or an order of probation granted under Section 10
of the Cannabis Control Act, Section 410 of the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act, or Section 70 of the
Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act of a
defendant, the court shall determine whether the defendant is
employed by a facility or center as defined under the Child
Care Act of 1969, a public or private elementary or secondary
school, or otherwise works with children under 18 years of age
on a daily basis. When a defendant is so employed, the court
shall order the Clerk of the Court to send a copy of the
judgment of conviction or order of supervision or probation to
the defendant's employer by certified mail. If the employer of
the defendant is a school, the Clerk of the Court shall direct
the mailing of a copy of the judgment of conviction or order of
supervision or probation to the appropriate regional
superintendent of schools. The regional superintendent of
schools shall notify the State Board of Education of any
notification under this subsection.
(j-5) A defendant at least 17 years of age who is convicted
of a felony and who has not been previously convicted of a
misdemeanor or felony and who is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections shall
as a condition of his or her sentence be required by the court
to attend educational courses designed to prepare the
defendant for a high school diploma and to work toward a high
school diploma or to work toward passing high school
equivalency testing or to work toward completing a vocational
training program offered by the Department of Corrections. If
a defendant fails to complete the educational training
required by his or her sentence during the term of
incarceration, the Prisoner Review Board shall, as a condition
of mandatory supervised release, require the defendant, at his
or her own expense, to pursue a course of study toward a high
school diploma or passage of high school equivalency testing.
The Prisoner Review Board shall revoke the mandatory
supervised release of a defendant who wilfully fails to comply
with this subsection (j-5) upon his or her release from
confinement in a penal institution while serving a mandatory
supervised release term; however, the inability of the
defendant after making a good faith effort to obtain financial
aid or pay for the educational training shall not be deemed a
wilful failure to comply. The Prisoner Review Board shall
recommit the defendant whose mandatory supervised release term
has been revoked under this subsection (j-5) as provided in
Section 3-3-9. This subsection (j-5) does not apply to a
defendant who has a high school diploma or has successfully
passed high school equivalency testing. This subsection (j-5)
does not apply to a defendant who is determined by the court to
be a person with a developmental disability or otherwise
mentally incapable of completing the educational or vocational
program.
(k) (Blank).
(l) (A) Except as provided in paragraph (C) of subsection
(l), whenever a defendant, who is not a citizen or national of
the United States, is convicted of any felony or misdemeanor
offense, the court after sentencing the defendant may, upon
motion of the State's Attorney, hold sentence in abeyance and
remand the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General of
the United States or his or her designated agent to be deported
when:
(1) a final order of deportation has been issued
against the defendant pursuant to proceedings under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and
(2) the deportation of the defendant would not
deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and
would not be inconsistent with the ends of justice.
Otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced as provided in
this Chapter V.
(B) If the defendant has already been sentenced for a
felony or misdemeanor offense, or has been placed on probation
under Section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act, Section 410 of
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or Section 70 of the
Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act, the
court may, upon motion of the State's Attorney to suspend the
sentence imposed, commit the defendant to the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States or his or her designated
agent when:
(1) a final order of deportation has been issued
against the defendant pursuant to proceedings under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and
(2) the deportation of the defendant would not
deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and
would not be inconsistent with the ends of justice.
(C) This subsection (l) does not apply to offenders who
are subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of subsection
(a) of Section 3-6-3.
(D) Upon motion of the State's Attorney, if a defendant
sentenced under this Section returns to the jurisdiction of
the United States, the defendant shall be recommitted to the
custody of the county from which he or she was sentenced.
Thereafter, the defendant shall be brought before the
sentencing court, which may impose any sentence that was
available under Section 5-5-3 at the time of initial
sentencing. In addition, the defendant shall not be eligible
for additional earned sentence credit as provided under
Section 3-6-3.
(m) A person convicted of criminal defacement of property
under Section 21-1.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the
Criminal Code of 2012, in which the property damage exceeds
$300 and the property damaged is a school building, shall be
ordered to perform community service that may include cleanup,
removal, or painting over the defacement.
(n) The court may sentence a person convicted of a
violation of Section 12-19, 12-21, 16-1.3, or 17-56, or
subsection (a) or (b) of Section 12-4.4a, of the Criminal Code
of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 (i) to an impact
incarceration program if the person is otherwise eligible for
that program under Section 5-8-1.1, (ii) to community service,
or (iii) if the person has a substance use disorder, as defined
in the Substance Use Disorder Act, to a treatment program
licensed under that Act.
(o) Whenever a person is convicted of a sex offense as
defined in Section 2 of the Sex Offender Registration Act, the
defendant's driver's license or permit shall be subject to
renewal on an annual basis in accordance with the provisions
of license renewal established by the Secretary of State.
(Source: P.A. 101-81, eff. 7-12-19; 102-168, eff. 7-27-21;
102-531, eff. 1-1-22; 102-813, eff. 5-13-22; 102-1030, eff.
5-27-22.)
(730 ILCS 5/5-8-1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1)
Sec. 5-8-1. Natural life imprisonment; enhancements for
use of a firearm; mandatory supervised release terms.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining
the offense or in Article 4.5 of Chapter V, a sentence of
imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set
by the court under this Section, subject to Section 5-4.5-115
of this Code, according to the following limitations:
(1) for first degree murder,
(a) (blank),
(b) if a trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection
(a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating
factors listed in subparagraph (b-5) subsection (b) or
(b-5) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or
the Criminal Code of 2012 are present, the court may
sentence the defendant, subject to Section 5-4.5-105,
to a term of natural life imprisonment, or
(b-5) A defendant who at the time of the
commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or
more and who has been found guilty of first degree
murder may be sentenced to a term of natural life
imprisonment if:
(1) the murdered individual was an inmate at
an institution or facility of the Department of
Corrections, or any similar local correctional
agency and was killed on the grounds thereof, or
the murdered individual was otherwise present in
such institution or facility with the knowledge
and approval of the chief administrative officer
thereof;
(2) the murdered individual was killed as a
result of the hijacking of an airplane, train,
ship, bus, or other public conveyance;
(3) the defendant committed the murder
pursuant to a contract, agreement, or
understanding by which he or she was to receive
money or anything of value in return for
committing the murder or procured another to
commit the murder for money or anything of value;
(4) the murdered individual was killed in the
course of another felony if:
(A) the murdered individual:
(i) was actually killed by the
defendant, or
(ii) received physical injuries
personally inflicted by the defendant
substantially contemporaneously with
physical injuries caused by one or more
persons for whose conduct the defendant is
legally accountable under Section 5-2 of
this Code, and the physical injuries
inflicted by either the defendant or the
other person or persons for whose conduct
he is legally accountable caused the death
of the murdered individual; and (B) in
performing the acts which caused the death
of the murdered individual or which
resulted in physical injuries personally
inflicted by the defendant on the murdered
individual under the circumstances of
subdivision (ii) of clause (A) of this
clause (4), the defendant acted with the
intent to kill the murdered individual or
with the knowledge that his or her acts
created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another; and
(B) in performing the acts which caused
the death of the murdered individual or which
resulted in physical injuries personally
inflicted by the defendant on the murdered
individual under the circumstances of
subdivision (ii) of clause (A) of this clause
(4), the defendant acted with the intent to
kill the murdered individual or with the
knowledge that his or her acts created a
strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to the murdered individual or another;
and
(C) the other felony was an inherently
violent crime or the attempt to commit an
inherently violent crime. In this clause (C),
"inherently violent crime" includes, but is
not limited to, armed robbery, robbery,
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking,
aggravated arson, aggravated stalking,
residential burglary, and home invasion;
(5) the defendant committed the murder with
intent to prevent the murdered individual from
testifying or participating in any criminal
investigation or prosecution or giving material
assistance to the State in any investigation or
prosecution, either against the defendant or
another; or the defendant committed the murder
because the murdered individual was a witness in
any prosecution or gave material assistance to the
State in any investigation or prosecution, either
against the defendant or another; for purposes of
this clause (5), "participating in any criminal
investigation or prosecution" is intended to
include those appearing in the proceedings in any
capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or
jurors;
(6) the defendant, while committing an offense
punishable under Section 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405,
405.2, 407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section
404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or
while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to
commit such offense, intentionally killed an
individual or counseled, commanded, induced,
procured or caused the intentional killing of the
murdered individual;
(7) the defendant was incarcerated in an
institution or facility of the Department of
Corrections at the time of the murder, and while
committing an offense punishable as a felony under
Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or
solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally
killed an individual or counseled, commanded,
induced, procured or caused the intentional
killing of the murdered individual;
(8) the murder was committed in a cold,
calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a
preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a
human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of
the defendant created a reasonable expectation
that the death of a human being would result
therefrom;
(9) the defendant was a principal
administrator, organizer, or leader of a
calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of
a hierarchical position of authority superior to
that of all other members of the conspiracy, and
the defendant counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or caused the intentional killing of the
murdered person;
(10) the murder was intentional and involved
the infliction of torture. For the purpose of this
clause (10), torture means the infliction of or
subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by
an intent to increase or prolong the pain,
suffering or agony of the victim;
(11) the murder was committed as a result of
the intentional discharge of a firearm by the
defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was
not present within the motor vehicle;
(12) the murdered individual was a person with
a disability and the defendant knew or should have
known that the murdered individual was a person
with a disability. For purposes of this clause
(12), "person with a disability" means a person
who suffers from a permanent physical or mental
impairment resulting from disease, an injury, a
functional disorder, or a congenital condition
that renders the person incapable of adequately
providing for his or her own health or personal
care;
(13) the murdered individual was subject to an
order of protection and the murder was committed
by a person against whom the same order of
protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act of 1986;
(14) the murdered individual was known by the
defendant to be a teacher or other person employed
in any school and the teacher or other employee is
upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent
to a school, or is in any part of a building used
for school purposes;
(15) the murder was committed by the defendant
in connection with or as a result of the offense of
terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this
Code;
(16) the murdered individual was a member of a
congregation engaged in prayer or other religious
activities at a church, synagogue, mosque, or
other building, structure, or place used for
religious worship; or
(17)(i) the murdered individual was a
physician, physician assistant, psychologist,
nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse;
(ii) the defendant knew or should have known
that the murdered individual was a physician,
physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or
advanced practice registered nurse; and
(iii) the murdered individual was killed in
the course of acting in his or her capacity as a
physician, physician assistant, psychologist,
nurse, or advanced practice registered nurse, or
to prevent him or her from acting in that
capacity, or in retaliation for his or her acting
in that capacity.
(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a
term of natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at
the time of the commission of the murder, had attained
the age of 18, and:
(i) has previously been convicted of first
degree murder under any state or federal law, or
(ii) is found guilty of murdering more than
one victim, or
(iii) is found guilty of murdering a peace
officer, fireman, or emergency management worker
when the peace officer, fireman, or emergency
management worker was killed in the course of
performing his official duties, or to prevent the
peace officer or fireman from performing his
official duties, or in retaliation for the peace
officer, fireman, or emergency management worker
from performing his official duties, and the
defendant knew or should have known that the
murdered individual was a peace officer, fireman,
or emergency management worker, or
(iv) is found guilty of murdering an employee
of an institution or facility of the Department of
Corrections, or any similar local correctional
agency, when the employee was killed in the course
of performing his official duties, or to prevent
the employee from performing his official duties,
or in retaliation for the employee performing his
official duties, or
(v) is found guilty of murdering an emergency
medical technician - ambulance, emergency medical
technician - intermediate, emergency medical
technician - paramedic, ambulance driver or other
medical assistance or first aid person while
employed by a municipality or other governmental
unit when the person was killed in the course of
performing official duties or to prevent the
person from performing official duties or in
retaliation for performing official duties and the
defendant knew or should have known that the
murdered individual was an emergency medical
technician - ambulance, emergency medical
technician - intermediate, emergency medical
technician - paramedic, ambulance driver, or other
medical assistant or first aid personnel, or
(vi) (blank), or
(vii) is found guilty of first degree murder
and the murder was committed by reason of any
person's activity as a community policing
volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging
in activity as a community policing volunteer. For
the purpose of this Section, "community policing
volunteer" has the meaning ascribed to it in
Section 2-3.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012.
For purposes of clause (v), "emergency medical
technician - ambulance", "emergency medical technician -
intermediate", "emergency medical technician -
paramedic", have the meanings ascribed to them in the
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.
(d)(i) if the person committed the offense while
armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to
the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
(ii) if, during the commission of the offense, the
person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall
be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the
court;
(iii) if, during the commission of the offense,
the person personally discharged a firearm that
proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent
disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to
another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural
life shall be added to the term of imprisonment
imposed by the court.
(2) (blank);
(2.5) for a person who has attained the age of 18 years
at the time of the commission of the offense and who is
convicted under the circumstances described in subdivision
(b)(1)(B) of Section 11-1.20 or paragraph (3) of
subsection (b) of Section 12-13, subdivision (d)(2) of
Section 11-1.30 or paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of
Section 12-14, subdivision (b)(1.2) of Section 11-1.40 or
paragraph (1.2) of subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1,
subdivision (b)(2) of Section 11-1.40 or paragraph (2) of
subsection (b) of Section 12-14.1 of the Criminal Code of
1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, the sentence shall be a
term of natural life imprisonment.
(b) (Blank).
(c) (Blank).
(d) Subject to earlier termination under Section 3-3-8,
the parole or mandatory supervised release term shall be
written as part of the sentencing order and shall be as
follows:
(1) for first degree murder or for the offenses of
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated
criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual assault if
committed on or before December 12, 2005, 3 years;
(1.5) except as provided in paragraph (7) of this
subsection (d), for a Class X felony except for the
offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual
assault if committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the
effective date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the
offense of aggravated child pornography under Section
11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1 with sentencing under
subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1 of the Criminal Code
of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if committed on or
after January 1, 2009, 18 months;
(2) except as provided in paragraph (7) of this
subsection (d), for a Class 1 felony or a Class 2 felony
except for the offense of criminal sexual assault if
committed on or after December 13, 2005 (the effective
date of Public Act 94-715) and except for the offenses of
manufacture and dissemination of child pornography under
clauses (a)(1) and (a)(2) of Section 11-20.1 of the
Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, if
committed on or after January 1, 2009, 12 months;
(3) except as provided in paragraph (4), (6), or (7)
of this subsection (d), for a Class 3 felony or a Class 4
felony, 6 months; no later than 45 days after the onset of
the term of mandatory supervised release, the Prisoner
Review Board shall conduct a discretionary discharge
review pursuant to the provisions of Section 3-3-8, which
shall include the results of a standardized risk and needs
assessment tool administered by the Department of
Corrections; the changes to this paragraph (3) made by
this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly apply to
all individuals released on mandatory supervised release
on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of
the 102nd General Assembly, including those individuals
whose sentences were imposed prior to the effective date
of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly;
(4) for defendants who commit the offense of predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal
sexual assault, or criminal sexual assault, on or after
December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act
94-715), or who commit the offense of aggravated child
pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1
with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1
of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012,
manufacture of child pornography, or dissemination of
child pornography after January 1, 2009, the term of
mandatory supervised release shall range from a minimum of
3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the defendant;
(5) if the victim is under 18 years of age, for a
second or subsequent offense of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse or felony criminal sexual abuse, 4 years, at least
the first 2 years of which the defendant shall serve in an
electronic monitoring or home detention program under
Article 8A of Chapter V of this Code;
(6) for a felony domestic battery, aggravated domestic
battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, and a felony
violation of an order of protection, 4 years;
(7) for any felony described in paragraph (a)(2)(ii),
(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(2)(vi), (a)(2.1), (a)(2.3),
(a)(2.4), (a)(2.5), or (a)(2.6) of Article 5, Section
3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections requiring an
inmate to serve a minimum of 85% of their court-imposed
sentence, except for the offenses of predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual
assault, and criminal sexual assault if committed on or
after December 13, 2005 (the effective date of Public Act
94-715) and except for the offense of aggravated child
pornography under Section 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, or 11-20.1
with sentencing under subsection (c-5) of Section 11-20.1
of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012,
if committed on or after January 1, 2009 and except as
provided in paragraph (4) or paragraph (6) of this
subsection (d), the term of mandatory supervised release
shall be as follows:
(A) Class X felony, 3 years;
(B) Class 1 or Class 2 felonies, 2 years;
(C) Class 3 or Class 4 felonies, 1 year.
(e) (Blank).
(f) (Blank).
(g) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act and
of Public Act 101-652: (i) the provisions of paragraph (3) of
subsection (d) are effective on July 1, 2022 and shall apply to
all individuals convicted on or after the effective date of
paragraph (3) of subsection (d); and (ii) the provisions of
paragraphs (1.5) and (2) of subsection (d) are effective on
July 1, 2021 and shall apply to all individuals convicted on or
after the effective date of paragraphs (1.5) and (2) of
subsection (d).
(Source: P.A. 101-288, eff. 1-1-20; 101-652, eff. 7-1-21;
102-28, eff. 6-25-21; 102-687, eff. 12-17-21; 102-694, eff.
1-7-22; 102-1104, eff. 12-6-22.)
Section 55. The County Jail Act is amended by changing
Section 13 as follows:
(730 ILCS 125/13) (from Ch. 75, par. 113)
Sec. 13. Whenever the Warden of any jail shall have in his
custody any person charged with a capital offense or other
high crime, and there is no jail in his county, or the jail is
insufficient, he may, with the advice of the judge of the
circuit court of such county, employ a sufficient guard, not
exceeding 3 persons, for the guarding and safe keeping of such
prisoner in his own county. The expense of such guard shall be
audited and paid as other county expenses.
(Source: P.A. 83-1073.)
Section 60. The Code of Civil Procedure is amended by
changing Section 10-103 as follows:
(735 ILCS 5/10-103) (from Ch. 110, par. 10-103)
Sec. 10-103. Application. Application for the relief shall
be made to the Supreme Court or to the circuit court of the
county in which the person in whose behalf the application is
made, is imprisoned or restrained, or to the circuit court of
the county from which such person was sentenced or committed.
Application shall be made by complaint signed by the person
for whose relief it is intended, or by some person in his or
her behalf, and verified by affidavit. Application for relief
under this Article may not be commenced on behalf of a person
who has been sentenced to death without the written consent of
that person, unless the person, because of a mental or
physical condition, is incapable of asserting his or her own
claim.
(Source: P.A. 89-684, eff. 6-1-97.)
INDEX
Statutes amended in order of appearance