Bill Text: NJ A5317 | 2024-2025 | Regular Session | Introduced
Bill Title: Amends felony murder, aggravated manslaughter, and aggravated assault statutes to include death or bodily injury occurring during commission of auto theft.
Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Republican 1-0)
Status: (Introduced) 2025-02-13 - Introduced, Referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee [A5317 Detail]
Download: New_Jersey-2024-A5317-Introduced.html
Sponsored by:
Assemblywoman VICTORIA A. FLYNN
District 13 (Monmouth)
SYNOPSIS
Amends felony murder, aggravated manslaughter, and aggravated assault statutes to include death or bodily injury occurring during commission of auto theft.
CURRENT VERSION OF TEXT
As introduced.
An Act concerning death or bodily injury occurring during commission of auto theft, and amending N.J.S.2C:11-3, N.J.S.2C:11-4, and N.J.S.2C:12-1.
Be It Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:
1. N.J.S.2C:11-3 is amended to read as follows:
2C:11-3. Murder.
a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, theft of a motor vehicle, criminal escape, or terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2), and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
b. (1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of this subsection, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.
(2) If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole.
(3) A person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances:
(a) The victim is less than 18 years old; and
(b) The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or N.J.S.2C:14-3.
(4) Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, or, if the murder occurred during the commission of the crime of terrorism, any person who committed the crime of terrorism, shall be sentenced by the court to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, which sentence shall be served in a maximum security prison, if a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the following aggravating factors exist:
(a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor regardless of whether it is on appeal;
(b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;
(c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim;
(d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value;
(e) The defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another;
(g) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, theft of a motor vehicle, or the crime of contempt in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-9;
(h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant;
(i) The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the murder or (ii) committed the murder at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3;
(j) The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2;
(k) The victim was less than 14 years old; or
(l) The murder was committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2).
(5) A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall be sentenced pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection.
c. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).
d. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).
e. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).
f. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).
g. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).
h. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).
i. For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.
j. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the display of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide shall be permitted.
(cf: P.L.2017, c.150, s.1)
2. N.J.S.2C:11-4 is amended to read as follows:
2C:11-4. Manslaughter. a. Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter when:
(1) The actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life; or
(2) The actor causes the death of another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2, or while operating a motor vehicle under any circumstance in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 or section 1 of P.L.2023, c.101 (C.2C:20-10.1).
Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, the actor shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2, subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10, or section 1 of P.L.2023, c.101 (C.2C:20-10.1), which resulted in the death of another person, regardless of the actual or proximate cause of the death. As used in this paragraph, "actor" shall not include a passenger in a motor vehicle.
b. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
(1) It is committed recklessly; or
(2) A homicide which would otherwise be murder under N.J.S.2C:11-3 is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.
The discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the homicide victim's actual or perceived gender identity or expression, or affectional or sexual orientation, which occurred under any circumstances, including but not limited to circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic or sexual advance toward the actor, or if the victim and actor dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship, shall not be reasonable provocation pursuant to this paragraph. As used herein, the terms "gender identity or expression" and "affectional or sexual orientation" shall have the same meaning as in section 5 of P.L.1945, c.169 (C.10:5-5).
c. Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree and upon conviction thereof a person may, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, be sentenced to an ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years.
Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (2) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree. Manslaughter is a crime of the second degree.
(cf: P.L.2019, c.468, s.1)
3. N.J.S.2C:12-1 is amended to read as follows:
2C:12-1. Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if the person:
(1) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or
(2) Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(3) Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense.
b. Aggravated assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if the person:
(1) Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury; or
(2) Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(3) Recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(4) Knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life points a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded; or
(5) Commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection a. of this section upon:
(a) Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of the officer's duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of authority or because of the officer's status as a law enforcement officer; or
(b) Any paid or volunteer firefighter acting in the performance of the firefighter's duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the duties of a firefighter; or
(c) Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance of the person's duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or
(d) Any school board member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver, or other employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the person's duties or because of the person's status as a member or employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board or any school bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the person's duties or because of the person's status as a school bus driver; or
(e) Any employee of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the employee's duties or because of the status as an employee of the division; or
(f) Any justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or municipal judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of judicial duties or because of the status as a member of the judiciary; or
(g) Any operator of a motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail passenger service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the person's duties or because of the status as an operator of a motorbus or as the operator's supervisor or as an employee of a rail passenger service; or
(h) Any Department of Corrections employee, county correctional police officer, juvenile correctional police officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer or any sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer acting in the performance of the person's duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of the person's authority or because of the status as a Department of Corrections employee, county correctional police officer, juvenile correctional police officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer, sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer; or
(i) Any employee, including any person employed under contract, of a utility company as defined in section 2 of P.L.1971, c.224 (C.2A:42-86) or a cable television company subject to the provisions of the "Cable Television Act," P.L.1972, c.186 (C.48:5A-1 et seq.) while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the employee's duties in regard to connecting, disconnecting, or repairing or attempting to connect, disconnect, or repair any gas, electric, or water utility, or cable television or telecommunication service; or
(j) Any health care worker employed by a licensed health care facility to provide direct patient care, any health care professional licensed or otherwise authorized pursuant to Title 26 or Title 45 of the Revised Statutes to practice a health care profession, except a direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession; or
(k) Any direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession, provided that the actor is not a patient or resident at the facility who is classified by the facility as having a mental illness or developmental disability; or
(6) Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2, or while operating a motor vehicle under any circumstance in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 or in violation of section 1 of P.L.2023, c.101 (C.2C:20-10.1).
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2, or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 or in violation of section 1 of P.L.2023, c.101 (C.2C:20-10.1), which resulted in bodily injury to another person, regardless of the actual or proximate cause of the injury; or
(7) Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or
(8) Causes bodily injury by knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a reported fire or explosion. For purposes of this paragraph, "emergency services personnel" shall include, but not be limited to, any paid or volunteer firefighter, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services and any law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or
(9) Knowingly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, points or displays a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer; or
(10) Knowingly points, displays or uses an imitation firearm, as defined in subsection v. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer with the purpose to intimidate, threaten, or attempt to put the officer in fear of bodily injury or for any unlawful purpose; or
(11) Uses or activates a laser sighting system or device, or a system or device which, in the manner used, would cause a reasonable person to believe that it is a laser sighting system or device, against a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of the officer's duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of the officer's authority. As used in this paragraph, "laser sighting system or device" means any system or device that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and emits a laser light beam that is used to assist in the sight alignment or aiming of the firearm; or
(12) Attempts to cause significant bodily injury or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly causes significant bodily injury to a person who, with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, as defined in subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19); or
(13) Knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly obstructs the breathing or blood circulation of a person who, with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, as defined in subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), by applying pressure on the throat or neck or blocking the nose or mouth of such person, thereby causing or attempting to cause bodily injury.
Aggravated assault under paragraphs (1) and (6) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the second degree; under paragraphs (2), (7), (9), and (10) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree; under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the fourth degree; and under paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury, otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree, except:
any aggravated assault under subparagraph (g) of paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section shall be a crime of the third degree; and
any aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section resulting in serious bodily injury shall be a crime of the second degree. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other law, a conviction for assaulting a law enforcement officer under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section shall not merge with a conviction for any other criminal offense. A mandatory term of incarceration pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1997, c.117 (C.2C:43-7.2) shall not apply to a conviction for aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section unless the assault resulted in serious bodily injury to the officer. A person charged with aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section resulting in serious bodily injury shall be ineligible to apply for admission to a program of supervisory treatment pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.2C:43-12 through 2C:43-22.
Aggravated assault under paragraph (8) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury; if the victim suffers significant bodily injury or serious bodily injury it is a crime of the second degree. Aggravated assault under paragraph (11) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree. Aggravated assault under paragraph (12) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree but the presumption of non-imprisonment set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for a first offense of a crime of the third degree shall not apply. Aggravated assault under paragraph (13) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the second degree.
c. (1) A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to another. Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.
(2) Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and bodily injury results.
(3) Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the second degree if serious bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:
(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;
(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or
(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.
Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel in violation of this paragraph.
A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (3) of this subsection.
It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.
(4) Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and bodily injury results. For purposes of this paragraph, "driving a vehicle in an aggressive manner" shall include, but is not limited to, unexpectedly altering the speed of the vehicle, making improper or erratic traffic lane changes, disregarding traffic control devices, failing to yield the right of way, or following another vehicle too closely.
As used in this subsection, "vessel" means a means of conveyance for travel on water and propelled otherwise than by muscular power.
d. A person who is employed by a facility as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection a. of this section upon an institutionalized elderly person as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
e. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.443).
f. A person who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection a. of this section in the presence of a child under 16 years of age at a school or community sponsored youth sports event is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. The defendant shall be strictly liable upon proof that the offense occurred, in fact, in the presence of a child under 16 years of age. It shall not be a defense that the defendant did not know that the child was present or reasonably believed that the child was 16 years of age or older. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to create any liability on the part of a participant in a youth sports event or to abrogate any immunity or defense available to a participant in a youth sports event. As used in this act, "school or community sponsored youth sports event" means a competition, practice, or instructional event involving one or more interscholastic sports teams or youth sports teams organized pursuant to a nonprofit or similar charter or which are member teams in a youth league organized by or affiliated with a county or municipal recreation department and shall not include collegiate, semi-professional or professional sporting events.
(cf: P.L.2024, c.94, s.1)
4. This act shall take effect immediately.
STATEMENT
This bill amends the felony murder, aggravated manslaughter, and aggravated assault statutes to include death or bodily injury occurring during the commission of an auto theft.
Under current law, paragraph (3) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-3 generally defines what is commonly known as the "felony murder rule" as a homicide occurring when the defendant is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape, or terrorism, and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, the defendant causes the death of another. Under the bill, auto theft is added to the list of crimes to which the felony murder rule would apply. Felony murder is a crime of the first degree, and is subject to sentencing enhancements specific to murder.
Under current law, paragraph (2) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4 defines aggravated manslaughter as a homicide occurring when the defendant causes the death of another while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer. Aggravated manslaughter is a strict liability crime which does not require the prosecutor to prove that the defendant was reckless or intoxicated, and the defendant is liable even if the death was actually caused by a pursuing police officer. Under the bill, aggravated manslaughter is expanded to include death while driving a stolen motor vehicle at any time, whether or not the defendant was attempting to flee the police. Aggravated manslaughter is a crime of the first degree.
Under current law, pursuant to paragraph (6) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1, aggravated assault includes causing bodily injury to another while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 (commonly known as the "joyriding" statute). Aggravated assault is a strict liability crime which does not require the prosecutor to prove that the defendant was reckless or intoxicated, and the defendant is liable even if the injury was actually caused by a pursuing police officer. This section of law was not updated to reflect the recent enactment of section 1 of P.L.2023, c.101 (C.2C:20-10.1), the standalone auto theft statute. Under the bill, aggravated assault is expanded to include injury caused at any time during an auto theft as well as "joyriding." Aggravated assault pursuant to paragraph (6) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:12-1 is a crime of the second degree.
A crime of the second degree is punishable by a term of imprisonment of five to 10 years, a fine of up to $150,000, or both. A crime of the first degree is punishable by a term of imprisonment of 10 to 20 years, a fine of up to $200,000, or both. However, murder is specifically subject to a term of imprisonment of 30 years without parole, or 30 years to life with a mandatory minimum of 30 years.
Clarification of the strict liability nature of aggravated manslaughter and aggravated assault, even when the injury or death was actually caused by a police officer in pursuit of the defendant, conforms the statutes with State v. Lora, 465 N.J. Super. 477, 496 (App. Div. 2020), certif. denied, 246 N.J. 224 (2021), which held that, "A police-related injury in the pursuit of a criminal is a risk created by that criminal, and we should not allow him to escape liability for his behavior."
