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sentenced to death if:
|
(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or |
fireman killed in
the course of performing his official |
duties, to prevent the performance
of his official duties, |
or in retaliation for performing his official
duties, and |
the defendant knew or
should have known that the murdered |
individual was a peace officer or
fireman; or
|
(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an |
institution or
facility of the Department of Corrections, |
or any similar local
correctional agency, killed in the |
course of performing his official
duties, to prevent the |
performance of his official duties, or in
retaliation for |
performing his official duties, or the murdered
individual |
was an inmate at such institution or facility and was |
killed on the
grounds thereof, or the murdered individual |
was otherwise present in such
institution or facility with |
the knowledge and approval of the chief
administrative |
officer thereof; or
|
(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two |
or more
individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or |
under any law of the
United States or of any state which is |
substantially similar to
subsection (a) of this Section |
regardless of whether the deaths
occurred as the result of |
the same act or of several related or
unrelated acts so |
long as the deaths were the result of either an intent
to |
kill more than one person or of separate acts which
the |
|
defendant knew would cause death or create a strong |
probability of
death or great bodily harm to the murdered |
individual or another; or
|
(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of |
the
hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other |
public conveyance; or
|
(5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a |
contract,
agreement or understanding by which he was to |
receive money or anything
of value in return for committing |
the murder or procured another to
commit the murder for |
money or anything of value; or
|
(6) the murdered individual was killed in the course of |
another felony if:
|
(a) the murdered individual:
|
(i) was actually killed by the defendant, or
|
(ii) received physical injuries personally |
inflicted by the defendant
substantially |
contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by |
one or
more persons for whose conduct the defendant |
is legally accountable under
Section 5-2 of this |
Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by |
either
the defendant or the other person or persons |
for whose conduct he is legally
accountable caused |
the death of the murdered individual; and
|
(b) in performing the acts which caused the death |
of the murdered
individual or which resulted in |
|
physical injuries personally inflicted by
the |
defendant on the murdered individual under the |
circumstances of
subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a) |
of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of
this Section, the |
defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered
|
individual or with the knowledge that his acts created |
a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm to |
the murdered individual or another; and
|
(c) the other felony was an inherently violent |
crime
or the attempt to commit an inherently
violent |
crime.
In this subparagraph (c), "inherently violent |
crime" includes, but is not
limited to, armed robbery, |
robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child,
|
aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated |
kidnapping, aggravated vehicular
hijacking,
aggravated |
arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and |
home
invasion; or
|
(7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age |
and the
death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous |
behavior indicative of
wanton cruelty; or
|
(8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to
|
prevent the murdered individual from testifying or |
participating in any
criminal investigation or prosecution
|
or giving material assistance to the State in any |
investigation or
prosecution, either against the defendant |
or another; or the defendant
committed the murder because |
|
the murdered individual was a witness in any
prosecution or |
gave material assistance to the State in any investigation
|
or prosecution, either against the defendant or another;
|
for purposes of this paragraph (8), "participating in any |
criminal
investigation
or prosecution" is intended to |
include those appearing in the proceedings in
any capacity |
such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
|
investigators, witnesses, or jurors; or
|
(9) the defendant, while committing an offense |
punishable under
Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, |
407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of
Section
404 of the |
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a
|
conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, |
intentionally killed an
individual or counseled, |
commanded, induced, procured or caused the
intentional |
killing of the murdered individual; or
|
(10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution |
or facility of
the Department of Corrections at the time of |
the murder, and while
committing an offense punishable as a |
felony under Illinois law, or while
engaged in a conspiracy |
or solicitation to commit such offense,
intentionally |
killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced,
|
procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered |
individual; or
|
(11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and |
premeditated
manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, |
|
scheme or design to take a human
life by unlawful means, |
and the conduct of the defendant created a
reasonable |
expectation that the death of a human being would result
|
therefrom; or
|
(12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical |
technician -
ambulance, emergency medical technician - |
intermediate, emergency medical
technician - paramedic, |
ambulance driver, or
other medical assistance or first aid |
personnel, employed by a municipality
or other |
governmental unit, killed in the course of performing his |
official
duties, to prevent the performance of his official |
duties, or in retaliation
for performing his official |
duties, and the defendant knew or should have
known that |
the murdered individual was an emergency medical |
technician -
ambulance, emergency medical technician - |
intermediate, emergency medical
technician - paramedic, |
ambulance driver, or
other medical assistance or first aid |
personnel; or
|
(13) the defendant was a principal administrator, |
organizer, or leader
of a calculated criminal drug |
conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position
of |
authority superior to that of all other members of the |
conspiracy, and the
defendant counseled, commanded, |
induced, procured, or caused the intentional
killing of the |
murdered person;
or
|
(14) the murder was intentional and involved the |
|
infliction of torture.
For
the purpose of this Section |
torture means the infliction of or subjection to
extreme |
physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or |
prolong the pain,
suffering or agony of the victim; or
|
(15) the murder was committed as a result of the |
intentional discharge
of a firearm by the defendant from a |
motor vehicle and the victim was not
present within the |
motor vehicle; or
|
(16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or |
older and the death
resulted
from exceptionally brutal or |
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
|
(17) the murdered individual was a person with a |
disability and the defendant knew
or
should have known that |
the murdered individual was a person with a disability. For |
purposes of
this paragraph (17), "person with a disability" |
means a person who suffers from a
permanent physical or |
mental impairment resulting from disease, an injury,
a |
functional disorder, or a congenital condition that |
renders the person
incapable of
adequately providing for |
his or her own health or personal care; or
|
(18) the murder was committed by reason of any person's |
activity as a
community policing volunteer or to prevent |
any person from engaging in activity
as a community |
policing volunteer; or
|
(19) the murdered individual was subject to an order of |
protection and the
murder was committed by a person against |
|
whom the same order of protection was
issued under the |
Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or
|
(20) the murdered individual was known by the defendant |
to be a teacher or
other person employed in any school and |
the teacher or other employee is upon
the grounds of a |
school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part |
of a
building used for school purposes; or
|
(21) the murder was committed by the defendant in |
connection with or as
a
result of the offense of terrorism |
as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this
Code.
|
(b-5) Aggravating Factor; Natural Life Imprisonment. A |
defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder and |
who at the time of the commission of the offense had attained |
the age of 18 years or more may be sentenced to natural life |
imprisonment if
(i) the murdered individual was a physician, |
physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice |
nurse, (ii) the defendant knew or should have
known that the |
murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant, |
psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, and (iii) the |
murdered individual was killed in the course of acting in his |
or her capacity as a physician, physician assistant, |
psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, or to prevent |
him or her from acting in that capacity, or in retaliation
for |
his or her acting in that capacity. |
(c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and |
Mitigation.
|
|
The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to |
consider any
aggravating and any mitigating factors which are |
relevant to the
imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating |
factors may include but
need not be limited to those factors |
set forth in subsection (b).
Mitigating factors may include but |
need not be limited to the following:
|
(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior |
criminal
activity;
|
(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was |
under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional |
disturbance, although not such
as to constitute a defense |
to prosecution;
|
(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the
|
defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the |
homicidal act;
|
(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat |
or
menace of the imminent infliction of death or great |
bodily harm;
|
(5) the defendant was not personally present during
|
commission of the act or acts causing death;
|
(6) the defendant's background includes a history of |
extreme emotional
or physical abuse;
|
(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental |
capacity.
|
Provided, however, that an action that does not otherwise |
mitigate first degree murder cannot qualify as a mitigating |
|
factor for first degree murder because of the discovery, |
knowledge, or disclosure of the victim's sexual orientation as |
defined in Section 1-103 of the Illinois Human Rights Act. |
(d) Separate sentencing hearing.
|
Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a |
separate
sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of |
factors set forth in
subsection (b) and to consider any |
aggravating or mitigating factors as
indicated in subsection |
(c). The proceeding shall be conducted:
|
(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's |
guilt; or
|
(2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the |
proceeding if:
|
A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of |
guilty; or
|
B. the defendant was convicted after a trial before |
the court
sitting without a jury; or
|
C. the court for good cause shown discharges the |
jury that
determined the defendant's guilt; or
|
(3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a |
jury
for the separate proceeding.
|
(e) Evidence and Argument.
|
During the proceeding any information relevant to any of |
the factors
set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by |
either the State or the
defendant under the rules governing the |
admission of evidence at
criminal trials. Any information |
|
relevant to any additional aggravating
factors or any |
mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be
presented |
by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility
under |
the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal |
trials.
The State and the defendant shall be given fair |
opportunity to rebut any
information received at the hearing.
|
(f) Proof.
|
The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of |
the
factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and |
shall not be
satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable |
doubt.
|
(g) Procedure - Jury.
|
If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds |
that none of
the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, |
the court shall sentence
the defendant to a term of |
imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified
Code of |
Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that
|
one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exist, |
the jury
shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as |
instructed by the
court and shall determine whether the |
sentence of death shall be
imposed. If the jury determines |
unanimously, after weighing the factors in
aggravation and |
mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court |
shall sentence the defendant to death.
If the court does not |
concur with the jury determination that death is the
|
appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in |
|
writing
including what facts or circumstances the court relied |
upon,
along with any relevant
documents, that compelled the |
court to non-concur with the sentence. This
document and any |
attachments shall be part of the record for appellate
review. |
The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing |
determination.
|
If after weighing the factors in aggravation and |
mitigation, one or more
jurors determines that death is not the |
appropriate sentence,
the
court shall sentence the defendant to |
a term of imprisonment under
Chapter V of the Unified Code of |
Corrections.
|
(h) Procedure - No Jury.
|
In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds |
that none
of the factors found in subsection (b) exists, the |
court shall sentence
the defendant to a term of imprisonment |
under Chapter V of the Unified
Code of Corrections.
|
If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set |
forth in
subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider any |
aggravating and
mitigating factors as indicated in subsection |
(c). If the Court
determines, after weighing the factors in |
aggravation and mitigation, that
death is the appropriate |
sentence, the Court shall sentence the
defendant to death.
|
If
the court finds that death is not the
appropriate |
sentence, the
court shall sentence the defendant to a term of |
imprisonment under
Chapter V of the Unified Code of |
Corrections.
|
|
(h-5) Decertification as a capital case.
|
In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of |
first degree murder
by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for |
resentencing, and the State seeks
the death penalty as an |
appropriate
sentence,
on the court's own motion or the written |
motion of the defendant, the court
may decertify the case as a |
death penalty case if the court finds that the only
evidence |
supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated |
testimony
of an informant witness, as defined in Section 115-21 |
of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, concerning the |
confession or admission of the defendant or
that the sole |
evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or single
|
accomplice without any other corroborating evidence.
If the |
court decertifies the case as a capital case
under either of |
the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a
written |
finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the |
decertification
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If |
the court does not
decertify the case as a capital case, the |
matter shall proceed to the
eligibility phase of the sentencing |
hearing.
|
(i) Appellate Procedure.
|
The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to |
automatic
review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in |
accordance with
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
The |
Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and |
order the
imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the |
|
Unified Code of
Corrections if the court finds that the death |
sentence is fundamentally
unjust as applied to the particular |
case.
If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the
death |
sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular |
case,
independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the |
Illinois Supreme Court
shall issue a written opinion explaining |
this finding.
|
(j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.
|
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to |
be
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States |
or of the
State of Illinois, any person convicted of first |
degree murder shall be
sentenced by the court to a term of |
imprisonment under Chapter V of the
Unified Code of |
Corrections.
|
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the |
sentencing
provisions of this Section is declared |
unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of the United States or |
of the State of Illinois, the court having
jurisdiction over a |
person previously sentenced to death shall cause the
defendant |
to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence
|
the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the
|
Unified Code of Corrections.
|
(k) Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.
|
The Attorney General and
State's Attorneys Association |
shall consult on voluntary guidelines for
procedures governing |
whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines
do not
|
|
have the force of law and are only advisory in nature.
|
(Source: P.A. 99-143, eff. 7-27-15.)
|
(720 ILCS 5/9-2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9-2)
|
Sec. 9-2. Second degree murder. |
(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder |
when he or she commits
the offense of first degree murder as |
defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection (a) of Section |
9-1 of this Code and either of the following
mitigating factors |
are present:
|
(1) at the time of the killing he or she is acting |
under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious |
provocation by the individual killed or
another whom the |
offender endeavors to kill, but he or she negligently or
|
accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or
|
(2) at the time of the killing he or she believes the |
circumstances to be such
that, if they existed, would |
justify or exonerate the killing under the
principles |
stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his or her belief is |
unreasonable.
|
(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an |
intense
passion in a reasonable person provided, however, that |
an action that does not otherwise constitute serious |
provocation cannot qualify as serious provocation because of |
the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure of the victim's sexual |
orientation as defined in Section 1-103 of the Illinois Human |
|
Rights Act.
|
(c) When evidence of
either of the mitigating factors |
defined in subsection (a) of this Section
has been presented, |
the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove either
|
mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence before the |
defendant
can be found guilty of second degree murder. The |
burden of proof, however,
remains on the State to prove beyond |
a reasonable doubt each of the
elements of first degree murder |
and, when appropriately raised, the absence
of circumstances at |
the time of the killing that would justify or exonerate
the |
killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code.
|
(d) Sentence. Second degree murder is a Class 1 felony.
|
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)
|
