Bill Text: IL SR0093 | 2017-2018 | 100th General Assembly | Introduced
Bill Title: Denounces any threats by Russia or any other foreign actors who seek to interfere with the sanctity of our democratic process. Urges that the Illinois State Board of Elections produce a final comprehensive report outlining the nature of breach, an audit of their IT systems, and that they enact preventative measures to ensure that such cyber interference never occurs again.
Spectrum: Partisan Bill (Democrat 1-0)
Status: (Failed) 2019-01-09 - Session Sine Die [SR0093 Detail]
Download: Illinois-2017-SR0093-Introduced.html
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1 | SENATE RESOLUTION
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2 | WHEREAS, Our national and State security should not be | ||||||
3 | undermined
by the concerted efforts of foreign actors with the | ||||||
4 | goal of
compromising our democratic ideals; and
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5 | WHEREAS, In July of 2016, the Illinois Board of Elections | ||||||
6 | was the target of a cyber-attack of unknown foreign origin | ||||||
7 | which targeted the
Illinois Voter Registration System | ||||||
8 | Database; and
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9 | WHEREAS, On July 12, 2016, the IT staff at Illinois Board | ||||||
10 | of Elections was made aware of performance issues with the | ||||||
11 | Illinois Voter
Registration System (IVRS) database server, and | ||||||
12 | processor usage had
spiked to 100% with no explanation; and
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13 | WHEREAS, Analysis of server logs revealed that the spike in | ||||||
14 | usage
was a result of rapidly repeated database queries on the | ||||||
15 | application
status page of the Paperless Online Voter | ||||||
16 | Application (POVA) web site; and
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17 | WHEREAS, Additionally, Illinois State Board of Elections | ||||||
18 | server
logs showed the database queries were a malicious form | ||||||
19 | of cyber-attack
known as SQL Injection, which are unauthorized, | ||||||
20 | malicious database
queries entered in a data field in a web | ||||||
21 | application; and
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1 | WHEREAS, Further analysis of the web server logs showed | ||||||
2 | that
malicious SQL queries began on June 23, 2016, and that | ||||||
3 | malicious
traffic from the IP addresses continued, though it | ||||||
4 | was blocked at the
firewall level; and
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5 | WHEREAS, Firewall monitoring indicated that the attackers | ||||||
6 | were
hitting the Illinois State Board of Elections IP addresses | ||||||
7 | five times per
second, 24 hours per day; and
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8 | WHEREAS, Investigations of the attack concluded Illinois | ||||||
9 | Voter
Registration System passwords were compromised, and | ||||||
10 | passwords included those of election authorities, their | ||||||
11 | staffs, internal Illinois State
Board of Election users, | ||||||
12 | vendors, and web services; and
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13 | WHEREAS, The intelligence community has described these
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14 | individuals or actors as part of foreign entities, namely | ||||||
15 | Russia,
intent on boosting one candidate over the other; and
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16 | WHEREAS, Aggressive actions contrary to American interests | ||||||
17 | that
foster political chaos and institutional mistrust in our | ||||||
18 | democratic
values must be thoroughly repudiated; and
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19 | WHEREAS, The American public also needs assurance that law | ||||||
20 | enforcement is
actively investigating these matters, and if |
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1 | further investigation
finds evidence that foreign actors | ||||||
2 | perpetrated or directed such acts,
appropriate criminal | ||||||
3 | charges and sanctions will be announced and
enforced; | ||||||
4 | therefore, be it
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5 | RESOLVED, BY THE SENATE OF THE ONE HUNDREDTH GENERAL | ||||||
6 | ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, that we denounce any threats | ||||||
7 | by Russia or any other
foreign actors who seek to interfere | ||||||
8 | with the sanctity of our
democratic process; and be it further
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9 | RESOLVED, That such an attack on the United States of | ||||||
10 | America and
the State of Illinois must not go undisclosed, and | ||||||
11 | that we urge that the Illinois State Board of Elections produce | ||||||
12 | a
final comprehensive report outlining the nature of breach, an | ||||||
13 | audit of
their IT systems, and that they enact preventative | ||||||
14 | measures to ensure
that such cyber interference never occurs | ||||||
15 | again; and be it further
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16 | RESOLVED, That a suitable copy of this resolution be | ||||||
17 | delivered to Steve Sandvoss, Executive Director of the Illinois | ||||||
18 | State Board of Elections.
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